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Abstract 
 
The People Behind the Presidential Bully Pulpit 
 
by 
 
Kara S. Alaimo 
 
Adviser: Professor Stanley Renshon 
 
“The People Behind the Presidential Bully Pulpit” argues that civil servants best serve the 
interests of both the President of the United States and the American people as public affairs 
officers in the Department of the Treasury. Using interviews conducted with political appointees 
who served as Treasury spokespeople during the administrations of Presidents Barack Obama 
and George W. Bush, civil servants who served in public affairs for the Treasury, and Treasury 
reporters who interacted frequently with the government officials, the study finds that civil 
servants better advance the goals of the President in the press than the political appointees 
personally selected by the President. This is the case because civil servants have greater 
knowledge of the policies they advocate and because reporters apply greater skepticism to the 
arguments of political appointees because reporters assume that appointees are always 
attempting to advance political agendas – a phenomenon this study calls the “appointee 
discount.” While scholars have previously argued that presidents accept the lower competence  
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of appointees in order to attain their greater loyalty, this study suggests that no such tradeoff 
exists. It finds that political appointees and civil servants leak information to the press that does 
not serve the interests of the President with roughly the same frequency. The study also finds that 
civil servants better serve the interests of the American people in such roles. The study finds that 
neither political appointees nor civil servants in the Treasury’s public affairs department are 
conducting the “permanent campaign” to build support for the President that White House aides 
have been accused of practicing, by governing based upon public opinion polls and appealing to 
the emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people. However, political appointees 
are significantly more likely to withhold information requested by reporters than civil servants.  
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Introduction 
The Politicization of the American Presidency 
  Though the U.S. Constitution is silent on the subject of the bureaucracy, which did not 
grow until the 19
th
 century, in The Federalist #72 Alexander Hamilton laid out a dilemma for 
staffing the government that presidents have grappled with ever since. 
  On the one hand, Hamilton argued,  
 
  the actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the  
  application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general  
  appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of  
  the operations of war – these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to  
  be most properly understood by the administration of government. The persons,  
  therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are committed, ought  
  to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate, and on this account,  
  they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and  
  ought to be subject to his superintendence.  
 
  By this line of argument, presidents of the United States should rely heavily on political 
appointees – staffers who the chief executive personally appoints and is free to dismiss at any 
time. 
  On the other hand, Hamilton warned that the propensity of the president to reverse the 
policies of his predecessor, combined with “the influence of personal confidences and 
attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill 
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the subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and 
ruinous mutability in the administration of the government.” (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1987, 
412-413). By this argument, presidents should rely more heavily on civil servants – staffers who 
enjoy protection from dismissal for political reasons and serve across administrations, bringing 
needed continuity and stability to the government. 
  The balance that American presidents have struck between appointees and civil servants 
has varied. President Andrew Jackson famously claimed that “the duties of all public officers are, 
or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify 
themselves for their performance” – and went on to create a vast spoils system to reward party 
supporters with government posts (Rourke 1984, 17). Calls for reform of the patronage system 
reached a crescendo following the 1881 assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed job 
seeker. In 1883, the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act created a civil service system to select 
employees for federal posts based upon the results of competitive exams and protect employees 
from being fired for political reasons.  
  However, modern-day presidents have shifted the pendulum back in the direction of 
Hamilton’s first hand. The number of federal political appointees increased steadily during the 
1950s-1980s, while overall government employment decreased relative to the U.S. population 
(Richardson and Pfiffner 1999, 179). While the number of appointees has remained relatively 
stable since the 1980s, today, an incoming president fills almost 4,000 jobs – double the number 
of positions as during the middle of the 20
th
 century (Lewis 2012, 587; Lewis 2011, 48-49). 
Scholars refer to the phenomenon of the increased number of political appointees serving in the 
federal government today as the “politicization” of the American presidency (Lewis 2008, 3).  
  While political appointments remain a tiny fraction of the federal workforce, the 
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American system nevertheless stands in marked contrast to that of nearly every other mature 
democracy. For example, an incoming British prime minister, German chancellor, or French 
president would make about 100-200 appointments (ibid., 2). 
  The increased use of appointment power is one part of a larger strategy pursued by 
American presidents since Nixon to exert increased control over the executive branch – an effort 
that Richard Nathan famously dubbed the “administrative presidency.” (Nathan 1983). Terry 
Moe has argued that the strategy is a rational response by presidents, who are faced with limited 
constitutional powers yet held responsible by the electorate for solving so many of their 
problems (1999, 147-148).  
  Presidents began to implement the strategy at a time when it became simultaneously 
harder yet more critical for them to utilize the government to achieve their aims. Since the New 
Deal era, presidents have increasingly assumed responsibility for managing the economy, 
national security, and broader domestic policy. The New Deal expansion of the federal 
government made it more difficult to manage the ballooning bureaucracy, leading President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Brownlow Committee to conclude that “the president needs help.” 
(1937, 5).  
  At the same time, the rise of divided government (in which the president and the majority 
of at least one house of Congress are members of opposite parties) has made it harder for 
presidents to achieve their goals legislatively (Rourke 1991, 114; Waterman 1989, 5). The 2013 
government shutdown, in which the Republican House of Representatives battled the Democratic 
White House in an effort to delay or repeal the Affordable Care Act, is just one example of this 
conundrum. 
  The increased difficulty presidents have faced in harnessing the government to achieve 
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their goals came at a time when it was more critical than ever for them to do so. The decline of 
political parties and party loyalties and growth of primaries as venues for the selection of 
candidates led presidents to wage more individualized campaigns, replete with promises to the 
various groups forming their electoral coalitions. 
  Pfiffner has argued that, in order to keep fickle constituents happy, presidents must find a 
way to achieve greater control of the government so they can actually deliver on their electoral 
pledges (1999, 3). Moe has posited that the president’s reelection prospects, personal standing, 
and historical legacy all depend upon his ability to govern. With such high stakes, it is no 
surprise that “to the extent he has the freedom to move in this direction, the president will find 
politicization irresistible. The appointment power is simple, readily available, and enormously 
flexible.” (1999, 152). Of course, it is also possible that presidents may have be wary of 
extending their control too heavily, since with greater political power comes increased political 
vulnerability and reduced ability to blame other actors when things go wrong – which could 
explain why politicization leveled off in the 1980s. 
  Two key modern institutional changes speeded the politicization process. In1953, 
President Eisenhower – who feared that the civil servants working when he came to office were 
too loyal to previous New Deal programs – created “Schedule C” positions, which allow the 
president and agency heads to hire appointees for confidential or policy-determining positions 
without congressional approval (Pfiffner 1996, 74). In 1978, under President Carter, the Civil 
Service Reform Act created the Senior Executive Service (SES) for the highest-level civil 
servants, allowing for up to ten percent of such positions to be filled by appointees and giving the 
president greater flexibility to re-assign such top-tier civil servants. 
  In addition to appointments, the administrative presidency also entails tools such as 
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centralizing government decision making in the White House, using the budget as a vehicle for 
policymaking, regulatory review, and the creation of new administrative agencies (Nathan 1983; 
Lewis and Moe 2010, 389; Howell and Lewis 2002). But scholars generally agree that the 
appointment power is the “most potent weapon” in the president’s administrative arsenal 
(Waterman 1989, 49). 
  Robert Maranto has noted that straightforward institutional demands have made it 
necessary for presidents to hire more appointees. The skyrocketing growth of interest groups, 
congressional staff, and media over the past several decades has led to increased demands by 
these groups for contact with the government. Liaising with such groups is a political task, which 
civil servants themselves seek to avoid (1998a, 7). But a principal reason that presidents have 
come to see appointments as so powerful is because appointees are generally assumed to have “a 
single-minded devotion to the president’s interest.” (Rudalevidge 2002, 11). President Clinton’s 
senior adviser George Stephanopoulos described his job this way: “doing the president’s bidding 
was my reason for being; his favor was my fuel.” (2000, 210). 
  On the other hand, much-maligned civil servants are assumed to be less responsive to the 
president. In The American Presidency, Clinton Rossiter suggested that members of the 
bureaucracy may be more of an impediment to the president than Congress itself. “Were the 
Presidents of the last fifty years to be polled on this question,” he claimed, “all but one or two, I 
am sure, would agree that the ‘natural obstinacy’ of the average bureau chief or commissioner or 
colonel was second only to the ‘ingrained suspicions’ of the average Congressman as a check on 
the President’s ability to do either good or evil. Several would doubtless go further to insist that 
the President’s hardest job is, not to persuade Congress to support a policy dear to his political 
heart, but to persuade the pertinent bureau or agency or mission, even when headed by men of 
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his own choosing, to follow his direction faithfully and transform the shadow of the policy into 
substance of a program.” (1987, 45). 
  The literature thus suggests that the increased use of political appointees allows the chief 
executive to harness the bureaucracy to work in support of his goals. By contrast, this study 
questions the conventional wisdom that politicization has benefited modern presidents by 
helping them achieve increased control over the executive branch.  
The Lack of Evidence to Guide Presidential Staffing Decisions 
  President Carter once said, “this stuff is boring.” (Lewis 2008, 219). (President Garfield 
might have begged to differ.) In reality, though, the question of how to staff the government is 
one of the most important choices the American people face. As Hugh Heclo has argued,  
 
  presidents and department heads make few choices that are more important than those  
  concerning the type of people who will serve with them in the administration. In affecting  
  the everyday work of government, these … personnel selections add up to a cumulative  
  act of choice that may be at least as important as the electorate’s single act of choice for  
  president every four years. (1977, 88).  
 
  The people who staff the government, after all, are responsible for policies and decisions 
impacting the safety of America’s food, medicine, and environment; the regulation of the 
economy; and the country’s security and continued existence. Yet even at the founding of the 
nation, long before Americans looked to Washington, D.C. to solve so many of their problems, 
President Jefferson reported that “there is nothing I am so anxious about as good nominations, 
conscious that the merit as well as reputation of an administration depends as much on that as on 
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its measures.” (Labiner and Light 2001, 234). 
  To date, the absence of research available to guide presidents in their staffing decisions is 
truly remarkable – shocking, even. As Heclo has noted, the current system of presidential 
staffing is not a product of any rational process of study or consideration. Rather, it simply 
“emerged as a by-product of … microcalculations of political advantage.” (1988, 39). As a 
result, each incoming presidential administration tends simply to start with the same number of 
appointees as the last administration, instead of analyzing specific positions to determine whether 
appointees or civil servants would best serve the president in such roles (Lewis 2008, 206). Of 
course, the short timeframe from election to Inauguration Day would make it difficult for any 
incoming administration to conduct systematic analysis. Yet the absence of scholarly direction 
would make it impossible even for a president attempting to make more informed decisions to do 
so based upon evidence and experience. This is because scholars have generally failed to provide 
presidents with the kind of research that could serve as guideposts. 
  The need for such scholarship has long been recognized. In 1985, the National Academy 
of Public Administration noted that “more attention must be paid to the development of criteria 
for determining where the country will be best served by a career executive and where by a 
political appointee.” (29). In 1999, Moe likewise found that “presidents and their advisers have a 
serious knowledge problem: even if they had the resources to impose any reforms they liked, 
they would not know how to design an institutional system optimally suited to presidential 
needs.” He noted that the social science of organizations is so underdeveloped that “no 
systematic body of knowledge is available to presidents – or anyone else for confidently linking 
alternative institutional designs to alternative sets of consequences. Presidents may know where 
they want to go, but science cannot tell them how to get there.” (149). In 2011, David E. Lewis 
8 
 
likewise concluded that, when it comes to government staffing decisions, “we know very little 
about the tradeoffs and where the ‘sweet spot’ is for appointee management, either to maximize 
the president’s interest or to optimize some general form of agency performance.” (60). The 
present study represents an effort to begin to correct this deficit.  
  Much previous scholarship, such as that of the Presidential Appointee Initiative, has 
focused on the highest-ranking political appointees. While useful in other respects, such work is 
less helpful in guiding presidential staffing decisions. There is no question that the positions of 
cabinet heads and assistant secretaries should be filled by appointees. The highest-ranking posts 
also tend to be created by Congress. However, over the past fifty years, much of the growth in 
appointees has come in Schedule C positions – those over which the president has the most 
control. It is here that presidents could easily swap civil servants for appointees. It is also here 
that research is most lacking. Such appointees are so little-studied that Lewis and Waterman 
have dubbed Schedule C and SES appointments to be the “invisible presidential appointments.” 
(2013, 35). I will begin to correct this imbalance by making Schedule C appointees a key focus 
of my research. 
  Many previous works – such as Lewis’ 2008 study of aggregate ratings of government 
programs and the surveys of the National Academy of Public Administration and Presidential 
Appointee Initiative – are also useful in providing a macro perspective of appointee competence 
and loyalty. But such works are less helpful in helping differentiate the specific agencies, 
environments and positions in which appointees better serve the president – and/or the people – 
vis a vis their careerist counterparts. The professional backgrounds and organizational goals of, 
for example, staff in technocratic agencies such as the Department of the Treasury, are likely to 
differ significantly from those of officials employed in social service agencies, such as the 
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Department of Health and Human Services, or regulatory agencies, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency. As a result, we must be careful about drawing such sweeping generalizations.  
  I will therefore interview political appointees and civil servants who work in public 
affairs for the Treasury and its subsidiary bureaus, in order to determine which group serves as 
more effective and loyal advocates for the president – and what guideposts the results offer to 
presidential administrations regarding how to fill other positions and the wisdom of 
politicization. 
Gatekeepers to Government Information 
  Government public affairs officials were selected for this study because of their critical 
roles as gatekeepers to the majority of the information released by the executive branch. The 
framers of the Constitution were clear that they intended the American people to hold their 
elected representatives accountable. In order to do so, the American people require information 
about the state of the government and the economy. Jeremy Waldron has argued that the 
principle of accountability places an obligation on government leaders to provide such 
information proactively to the people, and in a form in which they understand (2014, 7). Of 
course, the framers indicated that it is also sometimes legitimate for the government to withhold 
information, and they did not explicitly name a right to information. However, it is also clear that 
citizens could not judge their government if key information about agency activities were 
withheld.  
  For example, the Declaration of Independence makes clear that governments derive “their 
just powers from the consent of the governed.” The intention of the Framers is also evident in 
The Federalist #51, authored by James Madison or Alexander Hamilton, which states that “a 
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government.” (Hamilton, 
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Madison and Jay 1987, 320). Of course, citizens could not consent to government actions 
without knowing about them. The Constitutional mechanisms providing for a unitary executive 
and eligibility for re-election were also designed to foster the accountability of government 
leaders to the American people.  (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1987, 344-345, 413, 405-406).   
  As a result, in arguing for a provision that both houses of the Legislature be required to 
publish their proceedings, on August 11, 1787, James Wilson noted that “the people have a right 
to know what their Agents are doing or have done.” (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, 260). James Madison, 
known as the “father of the Constitution,” elsewhere made his views on this subject more 
explicit. In his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, he wrote that the “right of freely examining 
public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon … has 
ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.” (1800). And in his 
Letter to W.T. Barry, he famously quipped that “popular Government, without popular 
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps 
both.” (1822).  
  Former Senator Thomas C. Heninngs, Jr. also noted that the Preamble to the Constitution 
says that “We the People” establish the Constitution. According to Hennings, “since, under our 
theory of government, sovereignty resides in the people, it logically and necessarily follows that 
the people have a right to know what the Government – which they themselves established – is 
doing, and that government officials properly may interfere with the free exercise of that right 
only to the extent the people themselves consent. Thus, while it is not mentioned, the people’s 
right to know is an implicit part of the Preamble of the Constitution.” (1959, 669).   
  Of course, this right to information is also not absolute. Farrand’s debates make it evident 
that the Framers recognized the need for the suppression of information regarding matters such 
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as military activities. For example, according to Madison’s account of the Constitutional 
Convention, on August 11, 1787, Elbridge Gerry and Roger Sherman proposed a clause in the 
requirement that the houses of the Legislature publish their proceedings which would exempt 
matters related to “treaties and military operations.” (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, 256). Hamilton also 
made clear that he believed “secrecy” is vital to the executive branch when he argued in The 
Federalist #70 that a plural executive would reduce the executive branch’s capacity for it 
(Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1987, 403). The Founders ultimately settled on the clause in the 
Constitution that “each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time 
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy” – clearly 
recognizing the legitimacy of suppression when it was required (art. 1, sec. 5).  
  Obviously, national security concerns will at times preclude government disclosure; 
otherwise, the very existence of the nation would be put at stake. It may also be necessary for the 
government to withhold more information during emergencies – however the Constitution says 
little about this issue.  It will also arguably be legitimate for the Treasury public affairs officials 
who are the subjects of this study to withhold information that would roil global markets. 
Likewise, it may be counterproductive for government officials, like the Framers, to share the 
minutiae of deliberations and negotiations before they have been finalized and are ready for 
public deliberation.  
  Furthermore, some have noted that the Constitutional Convention was itself conducted in 
secret. However, it was of course the initial stages of the Convention’s deliberations that were 
conducted in secrecy (indeed, it would be impossible to enforce a requirement that political 
negotiations be made public). Upon agreeing on a proposal, what did the Framers do? They 
immediately made it available to the people for public review and deliberation.  
12 
 
  To be sure, no constitutional mechanism guarantees that citizens will actually avail 
themselves of the opportunity to observe their government so that they make informed 
judgments at the ballot box. Anthony Downs argued that it is rational for the ordinary citizen to 
be ignorant of many of the activities of his or her government. Obtaining information “requires 
time and is therefore costly,” and so it is rational for a citizen to only seek such information if it 
will yield a return that exceeds the cost of obtaining the information (1957, 146). Morris P. 
Fiorina and Matthew S. Levendusky have described a modern political class disconnected from 
the majority of the American people (2006, 49). Ilya Somin has argued that “political ignorance 
[in the United States] is extensive and poses a very serious challenge to democratic theory.” 
(2013, 3). Furthermore, citizens often do not make informed decisions on issues; John Zaller has 
shown that when asked their opinion in a poll, many Americans simply respond with whatever 
argument they have heard recently, and those that do have more well-formed opinions resist 
information which does not comport with those beliefs (1992, 76, 44). 
 However, the debate regarding whether a democracy requires that citizens inform 
themselves falls outside of the scope of this study. My research simply argues that the Framers 
were clear that the American people should have an opportunity to judge their leaders, and 
therefore the people should generally be able to access information about what is happening 
inside their government, should they choose to do so. Even if only a tiny percentage of 
Americans actually avail themselves of the right to examine most government information, this 
small group can, in the famous formulation of Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz,  pull 
“fire alarms” if they notice wrongdoing or disagree with the government’s actions, to raise 
broader awareness of the problem (1984). Therefore, even if only a small number of Americans 
read any single document the government releases, the system can still work, because they can 
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publicize troubling results. 
 Of course, the fact that not all citizens will lucidly evaluate the information that the 
government releases does not absolve the government from the responsibility to disclose 
information. Regardless of the challenges that an uneducated or apathetic citizenry poses to 
democracy theory, a government that operated under a veil of secrecy by claiming that citizens 
could not understand what their leaders were doing would be dangerous, undemocratic, and 
unconstitutional indeed.   
  Thus, it is clear that the intention of the Framers was for sovereignty to ultimately rest in 
the people and for citizens to assess their representatives based upon their performance. Access 
to information about what representatives are doing is a prerequisite for such accountability and 
assessment, and thus clearly a part of their intention; as Madison noted, other rights would be 
jeopardized without it. Accordingly, as Grossman and Kumar have noted, every president 
promises to run an open government. (1981, 273).  
  However, American citizens face a knowledge problem: it is difficult to know whether 
government officials withhold or distort information requested by the media, and if so, whether 
their reasons for doing so are legitimate. To ascertain this, we must study the actions of the 
public affairs officers, who control the people’s access to this information. Unfortunately, 
government public affairs officials are the subject of little scholarly research. Stephen Hess’ 
(1984) anecdotal study – which reported on the results of his year spent observing public affairs 
officers in government agencies and the White House – is now three decades old. The growth of 
the “permanent campaign” since that time makes it particularly critical to bring our knowledge 
up to date.  
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The Permanent Campaign 
  In contradistinction to the goals of the founders, critics have charged modern White 
House staff with conducting a “permanent campaign.” Under the permanent campaign, 
presidential aides are said to focus on courting public opinion rather than good governance 
(Heclo 2000). Furthermore, former White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan has reported 
that, in conducting the “permanent campaign,” government officials distort the truth and 
withhold information from the American people (2008, 4). Theodore Lowi has warned that this 
pathology of the presidency has become so serious that it threatens the future of our nation itself 
(1984, 20).   
  However, scholars have not yet measured how deeply the campaign penetrates. Is it 
conducted exclusively from the White House? Or are government agencies also involved? If 
agency resources are being utilized in the service of this campaign, its potential scope and scale 
is dramatically expanded. This study begins to answer this question, by querying agency public 
affairs officers about their practices. 
Theories to be Tested  
  To preview my arguments, I posit that modern presidents have been misguided in hiring 
more political appointees in an attempt to strengthen their control over the executive branch. I 
argue that, in fact, career civil servants serve the president more effectively than appointees and 
are no more likely to engage in acts of disloyalty to an administration. I further argue that 
government public affairs officers are not conducting a “permanent campaign” because the 
immense workloads of political appointees leave them lacking the time to engage in such 
proactive tactics – resulting in a previously unstudied and extraordinary, if tenuous, mechanism 
of democratic protection. 
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  My theory questions the political science literature on the administrative presidency, 
which suggests that political appointments are a potent and effective tool of executive control 
(Nathan 1983; Moe 1999). It also fills a void in the communication literature by beginning to 
identify, for the first time, the boundaries of the “permanent campaign” which scholars and 
critics have accused modern White House aides of conducting (Heclo 2000; Blumenthal 1982; 
McClellan 2008). Finally, it begins to provide a clearer picture of the activities of government 
public affairs officers, who serve as critical gatekeepers to the information that the American 
people receive about the activities of their government and state of the economy, but have been 
almost entirely neglected in a White House-focused literature. 
  I will begin by reviewing the extant literature on appointees and civil servants (chapter 1) 
as well as public affairs officers in government agencies and the permanent campaign (chapter 
2). I will then outline my research design (chapter 3) and discuss the results of my research on 
the relative efficacy of appointees vs. civil servants (chapter 4), the relative loyalty of appointees 
vs. civil servants (chapter 5), and whether a permanent campaign is being conducted in the 
Treasury Department (chapter 6). Finally, chapter 7 will discuss my conclusions and the 
implications of my findings. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review: Political Appointees vs. the Bureaucracy 
  This chapter reviews the extant literature on political appointees and civil servants. 
Although the conventional wisdom is that civil servants will be less loyal to the president than 
political appointees, and perhaps incompetent as well, I argue that there is reason to believe that 
this view is mistaken – a proposition which I will go on to test. 
  Modern presidents of both political parties have made no secret of their displeasure with 
bureaucrats. As James Q. Wilson has noted, “no politician ever lost votes by denouncing the 
bureaucracy.” (1989, 235).  
  President Franklin D. Roosevelt exclaimed that “the Treasury is so large and far-flung 
and ingrained in its practices that I find it almost impossible to get the action and results I want, 
even with Henry [Morgenthau] there. But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State 
Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, 
policy, and actions of the career diplomats and then you’d know what a real problem is. But the 
Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy.” 
(Maranto 1993, 28).   
  President Nixon wrote in his memoir that he believed the liberal beliefs of civil servants 
made them unsympathetic to his agenda (Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 96). He also argued: “we 
can’t depend on people who believe in another philosophy of government to give us their 
undivided loyalty or their best work … If we don’t get rid of those people, they will either 
sabotage us from within, or they’ll just sit back on their well-paid asses and wait for the next 
election to bring back their old bosses.” (Maranto 2005, 101). 
  President Carter reported: “Before I became president, I realized and I was warned that 
dealing with the federal bureaucracy would be one of the worst problems I would have to face. It 
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has been even worse than I had anticipated.” (Edwards 1983, 204).  
  President Reagan identified the government as the source of the country’s problems, 
indicating the need to “get the bureaucracy by the neck and shake it loose and say, stop doing 
what you’re doing.” (Golden 2000, 5)  
  Their senior advisers have been no less dramatic in their denunciations. Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that, during the Kennedy years, “the problem of moving forward seemed 
in great part the problem of making the permanent government responsive to the policies of the 
presidential government.” (Cronin 1980, 231). Before becoming Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger noted: “First of all, you have to weaken the bureaucracy! … They all want to do what 
I’m doing! So the problem becomes: how do you get them to push paper around, spin their 
wheels, so that you can get your work done.” (ibid.). 
  While President George H.W. Bush ushered in a softer tone of rhetoric on the civil 
service, the suspicion of modern presidents towards the bureaucracy remains evident in the 
decisions of modern presidents to maintain the record numbers of political appointees reached in 
the 1980s (Lewis 2012, 587). 
   Many scholars concur with these officials. According to George C. Edwards III, “one of 
the safest predictions about a new presidential administration is that the president will often find 
the federal bureaucracy unresponsive to his desires.” (1983, 203). Thomas Cronin noted that “it 
is difficult to overestimate the degree of frustration and resentment that White House aides 
develop about the seeming indifference of the permanent government toward presidential 
policy.” (1980, 224). 
A Typology of Why Civil Servants Are Bad 
  While a scholarly chorus concurs with politicians that civil servants will not serve the 
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president’s interests, they offer a wide range of reasons for why this will be the case. Scholars 
have contended that: 
1. Managers cannot effectively control civil servants.  
  In contrast to the private sector, federal civil service rules make it hard for public sector 
managers to fire staff (Wilson 1989, 120-121). John Brehm and Scott Gates argued that “even if 
these rules do not explicitly ban certain sanctions or rewards, the time and energy required to fill 
out all the forms to justify the special treatment of an employee effectively rules out such 
activities, especially when supervisory resources are otherwise constrained.” (1997, 42-43). 
Robert Maranto has actually called for abolishing the tenure system in the civil service, arguing 
that managers can only fire staff with “extreme difficulty.” (1998, 630). “The games that federal 
managers must play to get work done under current personnel rules sap morale by … forcing 
federal employees to work beside a small number of nonperformers who cannot be separated.” 
(ibid., 631).  
  Another legendary tool that civil servants are said to have in eliding the control of their 
bosses is their informational advantages. In contrast with appointees, who tend to serve for short 
periods, civil servants typically acquire their informational advantages through many years of 
work in their agencies. As far back as the Theaetetus, Plato distinguished between the expert and 
the layman (1987). According to Max Weber, “under normal conditions, the power position of a 
fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The ‘political master’ finds himself in the 
position of the ‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert,’ facing the trained official who 
stands within the management of administration.” (Gerth and Mills 1958, 232). Weber made 
clear that civil servants wield these power positions to their own advantage: “Every bureaucracy 
seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and 
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intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of ‘secret 
sessions’: in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action.” (ibid., 233). Michael Sanera has 
further argued that this is an especially pronounced problem in the federal government, because 
“when the political executive issues instructions to his staff, he is not aided in checking on the 
results of his subordinate’s actions by a profit statement. Knowing this, subordinates realize that 
they automatically have more discretion.” (1984, 532).  
  Since they are not incentivized by variable monetary rewards to pursue the interests of 
their bosses and are able to elide the detection of behavior that would displease their bosses, civil 
servants will, by this line of argument, be free to pursue their own agendas. In his important 
work, Inside Bureaucracy, Anthony Downs argued that civil servants will be significantly, 
though not entirely, motivated by their own personal interests (1967, 87). Whenever they have a 
measure of discretion, they will use some of it to advance their own goals (ibid., 64). According 
to Downs, their complex array of personal goals will include power, income, prestige, 
convenience, security, personal loyalty, pride in their work, desire to serve the public interest, 
and commitment to a specific program (ibid., 84).  
  Others argue that civil servants will seek to maximize their leisure time at work. In their 
study of the firm, for example, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz highlighted the difficulty of 
detecting shirking when employees work in teams; since monitoring behavior has costs, 
employers will stop monitoring at the point at which the cost of monitoring begins to exceed the 
gains they receive from doing so, which will allow employees to indulge in leisure time on the 
job (1972, 779-780). While it is possible that an appointee would seek to maximize his or her 
leisure time as well, attempts to evoke detection would likely be much more difficult, since they 
typically serve in much higher profile positions. 
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2. The organizational cultures of civil servants are perverse and/or preclude accountability.  
  According to scholars, the perverse organizational cultures of bureaucracies will further 
inhibit responsiveness to the executive. In his classic analysis, Weber identified impersonality, 
hierarchy, and rule governance as essential qualities of bureaucracies, indicating that the 
“characteristic principle of bureaucracy [is] the abstract regularity of the execution of authority.” 
(Gerth and Mills 1958, 224). Robert K. Merton likewise argued that “goal displacement” causes 
civil servants to focus more on following rules than on achieving goals, even when the 
conditions which initially made the application of a particular rule appropriate no longer apply 
(1957, 198-199). Similarly, Downs and others have argued that bureaucracies will be 
characterized by inertia, resisting change when possible (1967, 174). 
  In The Bureaucratic Experience, Ralph Hummel posited a norm of “bureaucratic 
detachment” which causes civil servants to treat their clients as cases instead of humans (1977, 
10). “To the Social Security official, a man’s death is just another form filled out; to his wife that 
death is the death of her beloved or hated husband and all he meant and all the things they ever 
did together.” (ibid., 9). For Hummel, bureaucrats who behave in this way are “a new personality 
type, headless and soulless.” (ibid., 3). They lack some of the features of normal human beings 
as described by Freud, with the ego which would normally control a person yielding to the rules 
of their jobs, and the superego which acts based upon social norms yielding as the bureaucrat 
carries out orders, even when they do not seem to be the right thing to do (ibid., 7, 14). A 
“psychology of dependence” instead takes root in bureaucrats, as they become dependent upon 
others to direct their actions (ibid., 80). “Both their emotions and actions, to say nothing of their 
wills, are bound by the structure to which they have surrendered their souls for the sake of a 
salary and institutional identity.” (ibid., 39). They become so inured to not showing affect that 
21 
 
they become incapable of intimacy in their personal lives. “In the end,” according to Hummel, 
“bureaucracy destroys the family.” (ibid., 51). It also stunts the growth of the individual, which 
Freud indicated to be necessary for social progress (ibid., 112). The effect is a government 
focused on process instead of people (ibid., 28).   
  Merton, who shared this assessment of bureaucratic impersonality, voiced little hope that 
the problem could be rectified. “This source of conflict may be minimized in private enterprise 
since the client can register an effective protest by transferring his trade to another organization 
within the competitive system. But with the monopolistic nature of the public organization, no 
such alternative is possible.” (1957, 203).  
  Another factor posited to reduce bureaucratic responsiveness to the executive is 
professionalization. The time has long passed when President Jackson could claim that the 
ordinary citizen was fit for most government posts. (Rourke 1984, 17). In Democracy and the 
Public Service, Frederick Mosher noted that the government has become increasingly staffed by 
professionals with specialized training, such as scientists or economists. “The choice of these 
professionals, the determination of their skills, and the content of their work are now principally 
determined, not by general governmental agencies, but by their own professional elites, 
professional organizations, and the institutions and faculties of higher education.” (1982, 142). 
Lawrence Lynn likewise argued that “agencies in which … career personnel have strong 
professional identities … probably constitute the most difficult challenges to a political 
appointee.” (1985, 362). 
  Finally, civil servants may promote the organizational interests of the bureaucracies with 
which they come to identify. Merton argued that “the esprit de corps and informal social 
organization which typically develops in such situations often leads the personnel to defend their 
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entrenched interests rather than to assist their clientele and elected higher officials.” Furthermore, 
he said, “bureaucratic officials affectively identify themselves with their way of life. They have a 
pride of craft which leads them to resist change in established routines.” (1957, 201). By 
contrast, appointees are typically experienced in working in political environments, which 
require regular adaptation to changing conditions. 
 
3. Civil servants will be driven by their own personal ideologies and program loyalties instead 
of the directives of appointees. 
  Downs’ typology of the five types of bureaucrats includes the “zealot,” who narrowly 
pushes his or her own pet policies and priorities (1967, 88). Scholars worry that civil servants 
will attempt to sabotage or shirk administration efforts with which they personally disagree. 
Sanera, for example, argued that “the simple expectation that the private political beliefs of 
bureaucrats will not interfere with the political executive’s control of the government is naïve.” 
(1984, 517). Clinton Rossiter reported that “public servants are no less anxious than [the 
President] to get on with the business of good and democratic government. But his idea and their 
idea of what is ‘good’ or ‘democratic’ must often be at stiff odds with one another, especially 
when he is pushing some untried and unconventional policy.” (1987, 46). By contrast, appointees 
are ostensibly appointed by the presidents for whom they serve at least in part on the basis of 
their ideological agreement. 
 Downs noted that civil servants may also resist the administration they serve, if they do 
not believe particular directives to be in the best interests of the programs to which they are loyal 
(1967, 84). Weber, Chester Barnard, and numerous other scholars have also warned that 
bureaucrats may be driven by the goal of organizational maintenance, in part due to self-interest, 
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since they depend upon their organizations for their livelihoods (Gerth and Mills 1958, 220; 
Barnard 1968, 230; Niskanen 1971). 
 
4. Civil servants will serve masters other than the president.  
  Scholars argue that the roles of Congress in determining agency mandates and funds and 
of outside interest groups in providing support for agencies may cause civil servants to be more 
loyal to these masters than to the president. (Heclo 1977, 226; Moe 1999, 148; Sanera 1984, 
491).  The traditional view of “agency capture” posited the idea of “iron triangles,” in which 
congressional committees, interest groups, and bureaucrats aligned to protect each others’ 
interests, with the President visibly excluded. While this theory was disproven by the 
deregulation that occurred in the 1970s, some scholars continue to argue that bureaucracies will 
be beholden to these outside actors, whose support for their organizations is often longer-lasting 
than that of the less-permanent executive (Wood and Waterman 1994, 17-20). Terry Moe, for 
example, argued that “a pervasive problem is that all organizations have their … own bases of 
support, and the president cannot expect to control them easily. This is clearly true for the usual 
government agencies, whose interests and worldviews center around their own programs, and 
whose support (which they orchestrate) comes from congressional committees and interest 
groups with political muscle.” (1999, 148). Bureaucratic leadership may also have a vested 
interest in maintaining their own power positions which could cause them to defy presidential 
directives (Michels 1978).  Conversely, as previously noted, appointees are ostensibly appointed 
by presidents at least in part on the basis of their loyalty and/or ideological agreement. 
 As a result of these four factors, scholars argue that civil servants may shirk their 
assignments or sabotage administration efforts, instead of faithfully executing administration 
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orders. Brehm and Gates posited two different types of possible shirking: leisure shirking or 
“dissent-shirking,” the latter of which is due to opposition to a particular policy (1997, 30). At 
worst, bureaucrats will actively attempt to sabotage administration efforts. In the past, French 
weavers would stick sabots (clogs) in their looms during industrial disputes, to sabotage the 
outputs of their employers. Brehm and Gates report that the devices of modern-day bureaucratic 
saboteurs are delay, hindrance, bungling, and obstruction (ibid., 28).  
  For a number of presidents and scholars alike, politicization has been seen as the solution 
to weakening the likelihood and impact of such behavior. In the “most extreme” view, Sanera 
has called for the appointment of political staff who serve as “jigsaw puzzle” managers by 
shielding the entirety of their controversial aims from civil servants in order to guard against 
sabotage (Pfiffner 1987a, 59). Under such a scheme, bureaucrats see only enough of the pieces to 
do their individual jobs. (Sanera 1984, 514-515). 
The Competence of Government Managers 
  Yet this literature is seemingly contradicted by a variety of evidence indicating that civil 
servants perform well on the job – better, in fact, than political appointees.  
  In a survey conducted by the Presidential Appointee Initiative in 1999-2000 of hundreds 
of appointees who served in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations, just 
eleven percent reported that their fellow appointees were the “best and brightest America has to 
offer.” (Light and Thomas 2000, 8). By contrast, when asked to assess the competence of the 
civil servants with whom they worked on a scale of one to five, with five being “high 
competence,” eighty-three percent of the appointees gave the careerists a score of four or five 
(ibid., 32). 
  In an earlier survey of political appointees by the National Academy of Public 
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Administration in 1985, eighty-four percent rated the competence of civil servants as high or 
very high, and eighty –three percent reported the responsiveness of civil servants to be high or 
very high. The Academy reported it “striking” that “presidential appointees stand second to none 
in their admiration of career executives.” (1985, 29). Similarly, Judith Michaels – who conducted 
a survey of 639 Senate-confirmed appointees during the administration of President George 
H.W. Bush, as well as follow- up interviews – found that Senate-confirmed appointees consulted 
members of the career Senior Executive Service (SES) more than they consulted other Senate-
confirmed appointees or non-career members of the SES; the appointees also “found careerists 
generally more helpful than the other two groups in accomplishing their work tasks.” (1995, 
279). 
  By contrast, scholars have been warning for generations that wherever political 
appointees go, government performance tends to deteriorate. In his seminal work, A Government 
of Strangers, Hugh Heclo described government as “a system that depends on political amateurs 
for leadership in an operating environment that is distinctly inimical to amateurism.” (1977, 
155). He reported that appointees lack the substantive expertise of their careerist counterparts, 
who typically learn on the job and stay in government for decades. Heclo found that appointees 
stay in their jobs for such a short time that they depart about the time they have finally figured 
out how to do their work (ibid., 110). He further reported that appointees persistently reported an 
absence of teamwork in government. Their previous lack of acquaintance with one another and 
their rapid turnover meant that they never quite figured out how to work together as a group 
across departments and agencies (ibid., 104). Indeed, their short stints have earned appointees the 
moniker in some quarters of the “Christmas help.” (Maranto 2005, 2). 
  But as far back as 1939, at the dawn of our New Deal-spawned system of larger 
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government, a study of federal administrators by Arthur Macmahon and John Millett warned that 
“tenure [of appointees] has been short, and even when the appointees have happened to possess 
cognate knowledge, they have been unacquainted with all the complicated and distinctive 
settings in which governmental action is conducted.” (1939, 123). The possession of such 
“cognate knowledge” was, however, unusual: They found that Assistant Secretaries were 
appointed “with little regard for qualifications or the needs of the posts.” (ibid., 302). 
“Unacquainted with procedures and limitations, unfamiliar with the background of each activity, 
they have often begun with the belief that all needs changing. Impatience of this sort may 
produce chaos.” (ibid., 128). Furthermore, they found that the “haphazard” system of 
appointment resulted in a government without coherence (ibid., 290). Some of the appointees 
chosen to serve particular cabinet heads found themselves “at odds” with their bosses (ibid., 
123). 
  Fast forward seven decades. Researchers are still saying the same thing. A 2008 study by 
David E. Lewis analyzed how the government rates the performance of its own programs, under 
the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). Using this tool, the federal government rates the 
effectiveness of its own programs by assigning a score of 0-100 to each program in four areas: 
program purpose and design; strategic planning; program management; and program results 
(174). Lewis found that programs run by appointees are rated significantly lower than those run 
by careerists. The average PART score for programs run by members of the career SES was 
69.58 out of 100. Average PART scores dropped to 63.50 for Senate-confirmed appointees and 
to 58.66 for SES appointees. Lewis also found that the higher the number of appointees in an 
agency, the lower its program scores (ibid., 178). Of course, this fails to account for the 
possibility that appointees might be used by presidents to sabotage programs with which the 
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president disagrees. Nevertheless, the aggregate evidence questioning appointee competence is 
striking. 
  Researchers argue that a big part of the problem is that appointees are often hired off of 
political campaigns, yet the skills needed to be successful on a campaign may be quite different 
from those needed for governing (Edwards 2001, 83; Rudalevidge 2002, 35; Pfiffner 1996,18). 
Campaigns focus on simplifying issues for voters – which may be necessary to sell or defeat an 
idea – while in the White House presidents must build coalitions and offer complex solutions to 
policy problems that often defy such simplicity (Pfiffner 1996, 18). Campaign staff also tend to 
lack both policy and management experience. This was certainly the case for many of the 
Treasury appointees who I interviewed. 
  In particular, appointees often do not have experience in the policy areas for which they 
are responsible. Declaring that we have an “amateur government,” David Cohen argued that “no 
one would ever have brain surgery performed by a science policy expert without a medical 
degree who had never set foot inside an operating room … And surely no multimillion dollar 
corporation would ever place at the head of a major operating division a young man a few years 
out of college who had never managed funds or supervised more than a handful of people – even 
if he were the son of the CEO’s boyhood friend. Yet the management qualifications of most 
political appointees in our federal government – and even the technical qualifications of many – 
are no more relevant to their positions than those of these … hypothetical candidates.” (1996, 1). 
While unlike brain surgeons, political staff have civil servants to help them, it nevertheless seems 
peculiar that those with less experience would assume the most important positions in 
organizations which often have a dramatic impact on the lives and livelihoods of American 
citizens.  
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 Cohen also argued that proper management and supervisory skills are necessary to 
government leadership, and can only be gained by years of experience in planning, managing 
resources, negotiating, building coalitions, and fostering healthy workplace environments (ibid., 
16-18). Yet “we entrust the administration of the largest ‘company’ in the country, with the 
biggest budget and staff, the widest range of products and services, and the greatest impact on 
the life of every American, to a cast of well-meaning political loyalists with little or no 
management experience. They may be smart, committed, and frequently high-energy 
workaholics, but most have never run anything, except, perhaps, a political campaign.” (ibid., 1).  
  Unsurprisingly, then, numerous studies affirm that political oversight diminishes agency 
competence. In a review of 170 case studies of 104 federal agencies, Patrick Wolf reported his 
most important finding to be that a key contributor to agency performance is autonomy from 
political control by the president and other political actors (1997, 337).  
  Paul Light has also argued that it is the quality of political oversight that is important; he 
found that the better prepared that appointees were for their jobs, the more likely they were to 
report viewing civil servants as responsive and competent, suggesting that they understood how 
to manage their subordinates effectively (1987, 170-171). Light reported that appointees 
generally do come to realize that their civil servants are responsive and competent, but often by 
then it is too late (ibid., 157). Even when they come to this realization, they tend erroneously to 
conclude that their own civil servants are anomalous – not that bureaucrats as a group possess 
these qualities (ibid., 160). Pfiffner has argued that a “cycle of accommodation” occurs, in which 
appointees initially distrust careerists but eventually come to appreciate their value (60, 1987a). 
  Other scholars find that the overuse of appointees also reduces the overall competence of 
government. Light has argued that increasing numbers of political appointees over the past 
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several decades has led to the “thickening” of government. Presidents are increasingly removed 
from the front lines of policy development and implementation, so they do not benefit from the 
advice of careerists; information is often distorted as it is transmitted through so many people, 
and this makes it harder for innovative ideas to make their way to the top (1995, 8, 70; see also 
National Commission on the Public Service 1989, 26; Dunn 1997, 25). The report that never 
made it to the Oval Office on the war game played by civil servants in 1965 predicting that a 
conflict in Vietnam would end in stalemate comes to mind here (Rourke 1991, 127). Light found 
that the explosion of appointees has also diffused accountability. With so many people now 
involved in every decision, no one person can be held accountable for anything (1995, 166). 
  Cohen reported that the large influx and turnover of appointees causes civil servants to 
spend much of their time training their bosses instead of managing their programs, further 
reducing overall government competence (1996, 40). The short tenure of appointees also leads 
appointees to neglect strategies to build the long-term strength of the government organizations 
they lead. Cohen argued that “political appointees have no real stake in the future of the 
organizations they manage. They do not see themselves as the caretakers of ongoing public 
institutions, as responsible for leaving those institutions stronger than when they arrived.” (ibid., 
46). 
  Meanwhile, numerous scholars have argued that as top jobs go to appointees, the civil 
service becomes less attractive to bureaucrats, because the more prestigious opportunities 
become foreclosed to them. This results in recruiting problems and diminished incentives for 
bureaucrats to upgrade their skill sets in preparation for top posts – further reducing aggregate 
government competence (Lewis 2008, 58; National Commission on the Public Service 1989, 25; 
Light 2007, 409; Suleiman 2003, 204). By the same token, Heclo argued that the government has 
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become “a passing parade of people with mythical mandates.” He argued that by reducing the 
number of appointees, presidents could exert greater control over the executive branch because 
the remaining appointees would hold positions of true power (1988, 54). 
  Finally, numerous studies have found that the increased overall number of appointees is 
at least partly responsible for the increased amount of time it now takes for appointees to be 
recruited and confirmed, resulting in prolonged vacancies in important posts that further erode 
government competence (National Commission on the Public Service 1989, 26; Twentieth 
Century Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process 1996, 8; Light 2007, 409; 
Mackenize 2002, 28; Presidential Appointee Project 1985, 5). Scholars also argue that the sheer 
volume of appointments presidential staff are required to make seriously inhibits their ability to 
recruit the very best talent (Pfiffner 1987b, 141; National Academy of Public Administration 
1985, 4; Panel on Presidentially Appointed Scientists and Engineers 1992, 12; Ingraham, 
Thompson and Eisenberg 1995, 270). 
A Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off? 
  Of course, none of these scholars have proposed a government staffed exclusively by 
bureaucrats. While civil servants are generally seen to bring the neutral policy expertise, 
institutional memory, and continuity that government requires, appointees bring outside 
perspectives and perhaps more innovative thinking that is also needed (Lewis 2008, 212, 219). 
Furthermore, appointees are generally viewed to be legitimate because they represent the 
president, who has received a mandate from the people in the most recent election. As Delmer 
Dunn noted, “accountability in a democracy requires that non-elected officials give an account of 
their actions and activities to elected officials.” (1997, 166). 
  The real question, then, is how to strike the right balance in numbers. Given the evidence 
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of the relative competence of the two groups, numerous scholars have called for a reduction in 
appointees in order to improve government performance (Cohen 1996, 52; Lewis 2012, 592-593; 
Meier 1997, 197; National Academy of Public Administration 1985, 2; National Commission on 
the Public Service 1989, 18; Panel on Presidentially Appointed Scientists and Engineers 1992, 
18; Twentieth Century Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process 1996, 8; United 
States Commission on National Security/21st Century 2001, xv). In doing so, the United States 
Commission on National Security/21st Century characterized the current appointments system as 
“putting in jeopardy the leadership and professionalism necessary” for our country’s national 
security (2001, xv). Paul Volcker, Chairman of the National Commission on the Public Service, 
characterized the call to reduce appointees as the Commission’s most important recommendation 
(1996, 31). 
  However, even if civil servants are more competent, a president might still prefer 
political appointees if appointees indeed prove to be more loyal. This has led George C. Edwards 
III to question whether presidents face a “loyalty-competence trade-off” in staffing the executive 
branch (2001, 81). Lewis has likewise argued that presidents will trade competence in order to 
achieve agency responsiveness (2008, 202). Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge have described 
a similar dilemma facing political leaders from time immemorial. From dynastic monarchs such 
as Frederick the Great of Prussia, to Britain’s Queen Victoria, to twentieth century communist 
regimes, to J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, Hood and Lodge trace a familiar tension between leaders’ 
desire for competency and loyalty in their staff (2007). 
  Downs argued that loyalty is critical to managers in a bureaucracy because they cannot 
avoid actions which they wish to shield from the public. This will be the case because managers 
cannot be aware of all actions their subordinates undertake; managers will sometimes make 
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mistakes; and managers will sometimes take shortcuts in order to achieve rapid results (1967, 71-
72). As a result, leaders will sometimes utilize second-rate subordinates, in order to obtain 
requisite loyalty (ibid., 74). 
  According to Barnard, presidents are right to prize loyalty in selecting their subordinates. 
He argued that “the most important single contribution required of the executive, certainly the 
most universal qualification, is loyalty, domination by the organization personality. This is the 
first necessity because the lines of communication cannot function at all unless the personal 
contributions of executives will be present at the required positions, at the times necessary, 
without default for ordinary personal reasons.” (1968, 220). 
  Thus, despite the evidence regarding the relatively lower competence of appointees, the 
strategy of politicization pursued by modern presidents might still make sense – but only if 1) 
civil servants are found not to be reliably loyal to the president and 2) the greater loyalty of 
appointees is determined to redound to the president’s benefit. There is reason to doubt that 
either is the case. 
The Loyalty of Civil Servants 
  Heclo has argued that civil servants effectively have a veto over policy. If they are intent 
upon thwarting an administration’s efforts, they can leak information to allies in the press, 
Congress, and interest groups, or wrap politicians in red tape. More simply, they can just not 
volunteer valuable information that will be critical to the success of an initiative (1977, 172-174). 
Yet many scholars concur that civil servants generally – though not always – neither shirk their 
work nor sabotage administration efforts (Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 129; Brehm and Gates 
1997, 107; Ferrara and Ross 2005, 46; Golden 2000, 126). 
  In fact, in the Presidential Appointee Initiative’s 1999-2000 survey, more political 
33 
 
appointees said it was “very difficult” to successfully work with the White House than said it 
was “very difficult” to direct civil servants! Just five percent of the appointees found managing 
careerists to be “very difficult” – the same percentage who found the substantive details of their 
programs to be very difficult. The “very difficult” scores of every other responsibility they were 
asked about – including managing large programs, working with Congress, working with 
networks who affect their agency, the federal budget process, and agency decision-making 
procedures – were significantly higher. When asked to rank the responsiveness of the civil 
servants they worked with on a scale of one to five, with five being “very responsive,” eighty-
one percent of these appointees gave careerists scores of four or five (Light and Thomas 2000, 
31). 
  In another study of bureaucrats which reviewed three large surveys of civil servants 
conducted in 1979, 1983, and 1992 and case studies of social workers and police officers, Brehm 
and Gates found no evidence of mass shirking. Rather, they reported “high levels of productivity 
and superior performance.” (1997, 74). In a 1993 survey of officials in fifteen agencies, Maranto 
found that “by an … 81-8% margin the appointees trust the career executives in their 
organizations.” (78). And, even during the height of the anti-government protests of the late 
1960’s, Cary Hershey reported that “no more than 2 percent of the approximately three hundred 
and thirty thousand Washington-based federal workers have ever participated in any of the 
numerous forms of protest.” (1973, xi). 
  Of course, some appointees have claimed otherwise. For example, President Nixon’s 
chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, claimed that bureaucratic shirking or sabotage “happened every 
day.” Yet when pressed in an interview with James Pfiffner for examples of such activity, he 
could come up with exactly one: the IRS had refused to audit the tax returns of rival politicians 
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(Pfiffner 1996, 74). 
  What accounts for all of this evidence of the loyalty of civil servants? Scholars have 
found that it is largely the inverse of the expectations in the typology of civil servants examined 
earlier.  
1. Managers have carrots and sticks to control civil servants, though they are often 
unnecessary. 
  In his seminal work Bureaucracy, Wilson considered why bureaucrats work at all rather 
than shirk at every opportunity.” He argued that “in part the answer is that even in government 
service managers to some extent can control the material rewards of their subordinates. It may be 
hard to fire or demote anybody, but it is not too hard to give people attractive or miserable job 
assignments or to speed up or slow down their prospects for promotion.” (1989, 156). A variety 
of scholars concur that an array of incentives are effective in inducing civil servants to adhere to 
the policies and practices set by their managers. As Pfiffner argued, “career bureaucrats want to 
keep their jobs and their paychecks. They realize that if they are found to be undermining 
administration policies in any important way, they can be fired, demoted, moved geographically, 
or given a job with no function.” (1996, 84). 
 Even Sanera conceded that “while it is part of popular opinion that federal employees 
cannot be rewarded or punished, they can.” (1984, 526). He outlined a range of tools appointees 
have for managing civil servants, including trading access to high-level staff and high-profile 
projects for loyalty; the merit pay provisions for top-level civil servants in the SES; and the 
prerogative to move staff to less-desirable positions and locations (1984, 525-529). Maranto 
concurred that because “Washington is a competitive, status oriented company town” and just 
7,000 of the 1.8 million civil servants will be promoted to the upper-echelon SES, the power of 
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promotion that appointees wield is an efficacious tool (2005, 4). Edward Lazear has further noted 
that a system such as that of the civil service, in which a worker’s wages grow over time, serves 
to incentivize the productivity of the worker, who is motivated to secure future benefits (1981, 
606). Meanwhile, the threat of exiling civil servants to “turkey farms,” where low performers are 
sent, is likewise a potent weapon in the arsenal of appointees; “Research suggests that a single 
such bonus, promotion, or exile to a turkey farm can send a message throughout an entire 
organization.” (Maranto 2005, 105). 
  Marissa Martino Golden’s study of four agencies that President Reagan attempted to alter 
dramatically also confirmed this finding. She found that self-interest compelled obedience on the 
part of civil servants because they sought to avoid the wrath of appointees and feared losing their 
jobs or being transferred to undesirable positions or geographical locations (2000, 159). As a 
result, the motive of self-interest resulted in increased bureaucratic compliance during the 
Reagan administration, despite the fact that many civil servants disagreed personally with the 
policies their agencies pursued (ibid., 23). 
  Stephen Hess’ study of government public affairs officers during the Reagan 
administration echoed this finding: “Press officers perform a services function, and as staff 
officers they wish to develop special relationships with the supervisors on whom they must 
depend for advancement.” (1984, 12). He reported that “most of the conflicts I witnessed were 
between political appointees, usually within an agency” and “most fights turn out to be not us 
against them but us against us, including some internecine quarrels among career personnel.” 
(ibid., 12-13). 
  Similarly, Joseph A. Ferrara and Lynn C. Ross interviewed political appointees and civil 
servants in 2004 and found that the careerists wanted their political bosses to succeed. The 
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researchers concluded that this was the case in part because “an unsuccessful appointee is 
probably an unhappy appointee, and an unhappy appointee is probably an unpleasant manager, 
which erodes the quality of work life. Ultimately careerists, like most people, want to please their 
bosses.” (2005, 50). 
  These studies, then, confirm that superiors can exercise control over their subordinates. 
Yet they leave open the possibility that bosses will be unable to do so if they cannot detect 
insubordination in the first place, as Weber and Downs have warned. However, Francis Rourke 
has argued that legislators often specialize in policy areas and politicians may do so as well, 
offsetting the informational advantage Weber posited bureaucrats to possess (1984, 169). Both 
congressional committees and interest groups affected by agency decisions closely monitor 
agency behavior, and can pull “fire alarms” by notifying the president if they are unhappy, 
providing the president with an additional check on bureaucratic expertise (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989, 599). 
  Furthermore, a variety of other evidence suggests that the goals and preferences of 
bureaucrats often align with those of their bosses in the first place. For example, Rourke has 
argued that “a private vice can, as Adam Smith long ago noted, often be transformed into a 
public virtue. The community may also be as well served if rank-and-file employees are allowed 
to gratify their continuing desire for improvements in remuneration and working conditions. It is 
certainly reasonable to expect that satisfied employees will be more efficient…” (1984, 102). 
  In keeping with this theory, in their study, Brehm and Gates found no evidence to support 
the leisure-maximization hypothesis of Alchian and Demsetz – nor other claims of bureaucratic 
shirking (1997, 198). In fact, in a 1992 survey, when federal workers were asked whether they 
desired paid time off, it was the least popular of seven possible types of rewards (ibid., 79). 
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Similarly, in 1979 and 1983 surveys, more than ninety-two percent of workers agreed with the 
statement “I work hard on my job.” (ibid., 90). In the 1992 survey, more than eighty percent 
agreed with the statement “when I don’t feel well in the morning, I still try to come to work 
because I know my contribution will be missed.”  
  Brehm and Gates found that while supervisors do impact subordinate compliance, their 
influence is small (ibid., 107). Staff were motivated primarily by what they termed “functional” 
benefits, in which “the subordinate acquires utility by performing the very things that he is 
supposed to do.” (ibid., 75). In the 1979 and 1983 surveys, employees reported the most popular 
aspect of their job to be “getting a feeling of accomplishment from your job.” The second most 
popular in 1979 was “the chances you have to accomplish something worthwhile.” After 
functional benefits, the second most-important driver of their behavior was solidarity benefits: 
“rewards one receives from the camaraderie and recognition of ones’ peers” – such as respect 
and friendship (ibid., 74-75, 80). 
  The research of James L. Perry and Lois Recascino Wise concurs on this finding that 
civil servants often possess innate desires to do their jobs, rather than shirk, making monitoring 
and/or coercion by superiors unnecessary. They have found that individuals who possess what 
they term “public service motivation” are more likely to become civil servants (2010, 693). This 
motivation “is associated conceptually with six dimensions: attraction to public policy making, 
commitment to the public interest, civic duty, social justice, self-sacrifice, and compassion.” 
(ibid., 5). Dennis Wittmer’s survey of civil servants likewise found that they “exhibited a higher 
value for doing work that is helpful to others” than individuals in the private sector (1991, 379). 
Individuals so driven would seem unlikely to eschew work in favor of leisure while on the clock. 
  Vice President Al Gore’s report “From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that 
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Works Better and Costs Less” similarly reported that “our interviews with hundreds of federal 
workers support what survey after survey of public service workers have found: People want 
challenging jobs.” (1993, 7). Wilson likewise argued that bureaucrats are motivated by a “desire 
to do the job.” (1989, 156). Pfiffner noted that such a desire should incentivize cooperation on 
the part of civil servants, because “…they cannot fulfill their professional roles if they are not 
part of the action.” Therefore, “this professional and psychological need to be included on the 
part of career executives is not compatible with foot dragging, sabotage of administration 
policies, or merely adequate performance of duties.” (1996, 84). Maranto likewise found that 
“given constrained public sector salaries, career executives get important psychological income 
from playing for a winning team.” (2005, 4). Likewise, Barnard noted that “the accomplishment 
of an organization purpose becomes itself a source of personal satisfaction and a motive for 
many individuals in many organizations.” (1968, 89). Similarly, Ferrara and Ross found that 
“careerists care about adding value to the process. If a careerist’s political boss does not 
accomplish his or her goals, this diminishes the careerist’s perception that he or she is 
contributing.” (2005, 50). 
  These studies thus suggest that the civil service system has not completely hamstrung the 
executive; administrations still have tools at their disposal for punishing and rewarding staff. 
While superiors will only be able to effectively wield their powers to the extent that they can 
accurately detect the behavior of their subordinates, much evidence suggests that this problem of 
incomplete information will not result in leisure-shirking on the part of careerists. This is 
because careerists are predisposed to work hard in the first place, driven by the sense of 
accomplishment they derive from their work.  
  A final indication that civil servants work hard lies in the quality of the results they 
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produce. In a review of the extant literature, Charles Goodsell noted that “numerous individual 
citizen surveys, conducted at all levels of government, in just about every functional area 
conceivable, and over several decades back even to 1929, all yield the same essential result: 
Most citizens are satisfied with their personal experiences with bureaucracy most of the time. 
The proportionate levels of satisfaction generally range from perhaps two-thirds to 70 or 75 
percent, and sometimes much higher.” (1994, 29). In another indication of the quality of the 
work of the U.S. federal bureaucracy, a comparative study of popular confidence conducted by 
the European Value Systems Study Group and reported in 1982 found that the reputation of the 
civil service in the U.S. was better than that of both the U.S. Congress and the civil service in 
any other country (ibid., 70-72). Furthermore, Goodsell noted that studies do not even generally 
find that private-sector firms are more efficient than the bureaucracy (ibid., 63). 
2. Organizational culture may promote loyalty to appointees. 
  A large body of work focuses on how the culture of an organization comes to influence 
the behavior of its members. Wilson described organizational culture as “a distinctive way of 
viewing and reacting to the bureaucratic world – that shapes whatever discretionary authority 
(and it is often a great deal) the operators may have.” (1989, 27). In his seminal work 
Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization, 
Herbert Simon noted that these ways of viewing the world are initially imposed on a person who 
joins the organization, but soon become internalized and a part of the person’s psychology and 
attitudes (1957, 198). This culture influences how the individual comes to make decisions “by 
limiting the range within which an individual’s decisions and activities are to lie.” (ibid., 199). 
Through the process of identifying with the organization, “the individual substitutes 
organizational objectives … for his own aims as the value-indices which determine his 
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organizational decisions.” (ibid., 218).  
  The effects of organizational culture may be powerful.  Wilson noted the famous study of 
the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric Company, which found that workers reduced their 
output to adhere to group norms, essentially placing higher priority on peer rewards than on 
monetary rewards (1989, 48). John DiIulio found that civil servants in the Bureau of Prisons 
prioritized the goals of the organization over their own personal goals (Dunn 1997, 33). A 
similar dynamic is seen in soldiers at war. “By almost any standard, the rationally self-interested 
behavior for a soldier facing the prospect of imminent death or injury is to break and run.” 
(Wilson 1989, 45). Why do they fight? At least in part because of peer expectations and concerns 
for their reputations – two forces which scholars say make organizational culture a particularly 
potent influence on behavior (ibid., 46-47). 
  D.M. Rousseau has argued that “people who share beliefs about the behaviors they are 
committed to demonstrate are in a sense doubly bound to those behaviors, both by their personal 
commitments as well as by social pressure to fit in and be accepted.” (1995, 48). But people 
conform not merely for superficial reasons. Doing so may also have great utility. The desire for 
cognitive and behavioral consistency is a well-documented human need (Brehm and Gates 1997, 
51).  Brehm and Gates argue that the reason people conform to specific behaviors is because at 
some point someone initially derived a better outcome from the behavior, and following standard 
operating procedures is more rational than undergoing a complicated decision-making process 
for each occurrence (ibid., 72, 5). As a result, they found that employees learning by imitation 
could end up working hard for rules which they personally disliked (ibid., 73). Additionally, 
Downs and Moe have both argued that individuals invest in their reputations with the expectation 
of future rewards (Downs 1967, 69; Moe 1989, 272). 
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  A variety of additional evidence suggests organizational culture is a powerful influence 
on the behavior of civil servants. Bernard Mennis, for example, studied foreign service officers 
and military officers. In keeping with the cultures in which they worked, Mennis found foreign 
service officers to be more liberal, and military officers to be more conservative (Wilson 1989, 
68). Kenneth Meier and Lloyd Nigro found that it was agency membership that determined the 
attitudes of the civil servants they studied (1976, 465-467). Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman 
also found that the ideological stances of civil servants were related to the departments in which 
they worked (2000, 48-49). 
  All of this has led Wilson to conclude that “people matter, but organization matters also, 
and tasks matter most of all.” (1989, 173). This means that we must study particular workplaces 
to determine whether compliance is a shared value, behavior and expectation among civil 
servants. 
  While, as noted previously, many scholars have argued that organizational culture 
reduces the responsiveness of civil servants, others argue that it is or may also be an important 
force promoting bureaucratic compliance to the aims of appointees. Wilson, for example, noted 
that an organization may be said to have a mission when its organizational culture is broadly 
shared. When this occurs, managers may be confident that subordinates will do what managers 
desire because they have common understandings, helping to overcome the problem of shirking 
(1989, 95, 109). Similarly, Evan Ringquist has argued that “the most effective restraint on 
bureaucracy is not adversarial power, but the values, mission, and role expectations of agencies 
and their personnel,” and that these elements of organizational culture can be shaped by 
appointees through processes such as re-education, bargaining or replacing staff (1995, 352).
 In particular, scholars have found that two factors that should influence organizational 
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cultures – particular shared group norms regarding the role of civil servants and professional 
training – may promote civil service compliance. 
 
Civil Service Norms 
  In the bureaucracies envisioned by Weber and Woodrow Wilson, there would be a neat 
dichotomy between political appointees who determine policy, and civil servants who execute it 
(Gerth and Mills 1958, 220; Wilson 1886). Today, scholars generally agree that such distinctions 
are not feasible in practice. Yet a variety of evidence suggests that civil servants continue to see 
their proper role as neutral executors of the directives of their political bosses, in recognition of 
their supposed electoral mandates. This is likely due to the fact that, as Rourke has noted, “the 
political executive, whether elected or appointed, is in some sense a symbol of public control of 
the governmental process. In a society highly impregnated with democratic ideology – as is true 
of the United States, for example – this is a formidable source of authority.” (1984, 113). 
  In Golden’s interviews, she found that civil service norms prevented careerists from 
sabotaging Reagan’s initiatives, even though they often disagreed with them personally. The 
bureaucrats explained that the president had a legitimate electoral mandate to effect change, and 
it was their job as professionals to execute policy as directed. They “believed that loyalty to 
presidential leadership was “the right thing.” (2000, 24). Or, as one bureaucrat told her: “Of 
course there will be changes around here – there’s been an election and nobody elected me.” 
(ibid., 22). 
  The interviews conducted by Ferrara and Ross interviews echoed this finding. “Many 
careerists spoke of the administration as having the right to make its mark on the government by 
virtue of its electoral legitimacy. There is a sense among careerists that an important part of 
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doing their job is serving the agenda of the current president because he is the current president 
and regardless of his party. In general, we found that careerists check their personal politics at 
the door because they view their role in the political process as technical, not partisan.” (2005, 
45). 
  Additionally, Maranto and Hult conducted surveys of senior civil servants in 1987-1988 
and 1993-1994 and reported an “absence of relationships between careerist ideology and 
evaluations of the political appointees of both presidents Reagan and Clinton” which they noted 
“arguably point to the general centrism of civil servants and to norms of bureaucratic 
accommodation.” (2004, 211). 
Professional Training 
  Wilson noted that bureaucratic behavior is often attributable to their professional norms. 
(1989, 59). “In a bureaucracy, professionals are those employees who receive some significant 
portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow practitioners located outside the 
agency.” (ibid., 60). Such professionals “will bring to the agency their skills but also their biases: 
Lawyers, economists, and engineers see the world in very different ways.” (ibid., 371). In 
Democracy and the Public Service, Frederick Mosher outlined the reasons why this will be the 
case: people first self-select into their professional fields; next the selection process weeds out 
those who are unlikely to conform to professional expectations; the individuals then undergo 
training, providing another opportunity to remove non-conformists; on the job, the systems of 
supervision, review and promotion reinforce professional norms; and many people stay on the 
job for decades. (1982, 162-164). “The holding of a single perspective for so long a time – up to 
forty years – is almost inevitably a sculptor of viewpoints, values, and methods” (ibid., 164). 
  As previously noted, Lynn has contended that “agencies in which … career personnel 
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have strong professional identities … probably constitute the most difficult challenges to a 
political appointee.” (1985, 362). Mosher likewise argued that, as a result of professionalization, 
bureaucratic behavior is controlled by professional organizations and the values inculcated 
during training, as opposed to by government agencies themselves.  
  Yet Golden found evidence to suggest that professional norms may actually redound to 
an administration’s benefit. She found that the professional norms of attorneys at the Department 
of Justice’s Civil Rights Division led them to follow the directives of their political superiors, 
despite their personal disagreements with the administration. The lawyers who Golden 
interviewed told her that they thought they did a better job of arguing the administration’s cases 
than appointees – even though they generally did not agree with what they were actually arguing 
(2000, 96). Golden reported that the lawyers “were quite explicit that they viewed their job as 
winning the case and serving their client, and that in this case their client was the Reagan 
administration. They were quite explicit that they made the arguments they were told to make, 
even though they believed that many of the arguments were misguided.” (ibid., 99). 
  Golden attributed this to their legal training, which indoctrinates attorneys to make the 
best possible case for their clients (ibid., 103). Furthermore, she found that the impact of 
professional training is a key variable in how civil servants approach situations in which they 
disagree with appointees; the legal backgrounds of the Department of Justice lawyers (who were 
essentially trained to argue) also caused them to be more comfortable with voicing 
disagreements internally. By contrast, the engineers at the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, who were trained to present scientific evidence, were less comfortable voicing 
their disagreements to appointees (ibid., 164-165). This suggests that it is necessary to study the 
professional norms of other occupations in order to determine how they affect civil service 
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compliance. My study will therefore build on this literature by studying government officials 
who work in public affairs. 
Autonomy and Responsiveness 
  What about the claims that the organizational cultures of bureaucrats are perverse? 
Merton and Hummel argued that civil servants would follow processes instead of focusing on 
people and outcomes. Yet a variety of evidence contradicts these claims. Brehm and Gates, for 
example, reported that “most of the federal employees feel a moderate degree of autonomy on 
the job, quite in contrast to popular speculations about bureaucrats in faceless jobs with little 
control over their own circumstances.” (1997, 98-99.) John Foster’s study of the extant literature 
found no evidence of bureaucratic rigidity; Melvin Kohn studied 3,101 male bureaucrats and 
found them to be more open-mined, receptive to change, and flexible than other men. (Goodsell 
1994, 118). 
  Similarly, as previously noted, citizens themselves generally report satisfaction with their 
interactions with bureaucrats – even those at the much-maligned Internal Revenue Service! 
(Wood and Waterman 1994, 2; Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 197). The widely-accepted lack of 
a clear distinction between policy and administration and degree of discretion that civil servants 
enjoy, which were previously discussed, also clearly contradict these claims. 
  And what of the claims of Downs and others that bureaucracies will be characterized by 
inertia? They have been directly contradicted by the evidence presented by Brehm and Gates, 
Gore, and others that civil servants are responsive and desire challenging jobs. As Cohen argued, 
“contrary to popular perceptions, career managers get their kicks from the challenge of 
implementing new initiatives. Administering the same programs or functions year after year 
eventually wears thin, and the greatest professional growth and satisfaction usually come from 
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successfully launching new projects or programs.” (1996, 11). 
 
3. Civil servants are not largely driven by their personal ideologies; their concern for the 
reputation and efficacy of their organizations prevents them from sabotaging administration 
efforts. 
  Contrary to the charges of Sanera and others that civil servants will shirk or sabotage the 
efforts of presidents with whom they personally disagree, psychologists tell us there is not a lot 
of evidence that attitudes drive behavior. For example, in a wide review of the extant literature, 
Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein noted that, while they question the methodology of many past 
studies, “reports of rather low or nonsignificant relations between attitudinal predictors and 
behavioral criteria have been accumulating for more than 40 years.” (1977, 888).  
  James Q. Wilson laid out a rather large body of work that concurs on this finding.  For 
example, a study by Jeffrey Manditch Prottas found that the decisions of government welfare 
officers were driven by the exigencies of particular situations – not their personal attitudes (ibid., 
52).. Similarly, Samuel Stouffer’s study of soldiers in World War II found no correlation 
between a soldier’s morale and his effectiveness (Wilson 1989, 46). Most relevantly, numerous 
scholars have failed to document a relationship between a person’s job satisfaction or morale and 
performance at work, as measured by productivity, absenteeism and tardiness (Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1977, 897). 
  The reason for this, Wilson said, is because “our behavior toward an object will be 
influenced not only by our evaluation of it but by the rewards and penalties associated with 
alternative courses of action.” These are controlled by those in authority – or, in the case of civil 
servants, by appointees. “When we realize that attitudes must compete with incentives for 
47 
 
influence over our behavior, it is not surprising that attitudes often lose out to the rewards we 
seek or the penalties we try to avoid.” (1989, 53). 
  Even if it turned out that civil servants were driven by their personal beliefs, it is unclear 
that this would lead to sabotage. For example, Herbert Kaufman’s famous study of the Forest 
Service found that the bureaucracy’s leadership was successful in deliberately manipulating the 
preferences of rangers, so that they aligned with those of their bosses. They used a variety of 
tools to accomplish this, including training; linking the fortunes of the rangers with those of the 
organization through promotion policies not based merely on tenure; transferring new rangers 
frequently to steep them in organizational culture; and promoting agency identification by 
including them in decision-making processes. (1960, 170, 176, 181-182, 185). Falsification of 
records, for example, was prevented by psychological preference controls: “The observer of the 
organization quickly gets the feeling such behavior would be regarded as not only immoral, but 
cowardly, unmanly, degrading to the individual and to the Service (whose members have a fierce 
pride in it), and that any man who practices it must end with contempt for himself for not having 
the courage to fight for those departures from policy that he believes right or to admit his errors 
when he is wrong.” (ibid., 130). As a result of this successful indoctrination and acculturation, 
rangers unconsciously pursued the preferences of their superiors. “From the Rangers’ point of 
view, they are not obeying orders or responding to cues when they take action on their districts; 
they are exercising their own initiative.” (ibid., 222). 
  Another reason that the personal ideologies of civil servants would not impact their work 
is if they were not particularly ideological people to begin with. Brewer and Maranto’s survey of 
government workers in 1987 found that political appointees were more likely to embrace the 
“zealot” role that Downs described than civil servants, which they ascribed to the appointees’ 
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“background in politics and desire to implement the president’s policies.” (2000, 79, 81). 
Likewise, after interviewing officials in agencies that President Reagan attempted to alter 
dramatically, Golden reported that “most of the careerists I studied did not seem to be motivated 
primarily by partisanship or ideology.” (2000, 166). Furthermore, Golden found that the civil 
servants she studied did not necessarily believe they had all the answers (ibid., 143). In fact, 
many of the civil servants told her that they had changed their personal views over time (ibid., 
166). Aberbach and Rockman separately also reported evidence of ideological openness on the 
part of  civil servants, finding that, between 1970-1987, as political appointees became more 
conservative, so too did civil servants (2000, 107, 109). 
  Stephen Hess, who studied government public affairs officers, likewise reported that 
“politicians assume that civil service employees have the same abiding interest in partisan 
politics that they have, but this is rarely the case. Career personnel often have an abiding interest 
in bureaucratic politics, the internal machinations of their agencies, which may or may not work 
to the advantage of political appointees but not because an administration is Republican or 
Democratic.” (1984, 12).  
  Furthermore, a variety of evidence suggests that civil servants would leave agencies if 
they did not agree with the goals they were pursuing. Glenn L. Starks, for example, has found 
that “when people become ‘citizens’ of the organization and find that they do not fit their work 
environments, they will tend to leave.” (2007, 61). Likewise, James L. Perry and Lois Recascino 
Wise argued that “if individuals are drawn to public organizations because of expectations they 
have about the rewards of public service but those expectations go unfulfilled, they are likely 
either to revise their preferences and objectives or to seek membership in organizations 
compatible with their interest.” (1990, 370). Similarly, when Ferrara and Ross interviewed civil 
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servants in 2004, their subjects reported that if they felt strongly against a policy, they would 
leave – not sabotage the initiative (2005, 46). Hummel concurred that “functionaries who cannot 
accept the restrictions of bureaucratic service leave, or are forced to leave, the bureaucracy.” 
(1977, 23). 
  Another reason why the personal policy beliefs of civil servants do not lead them to 
sabotage agency efforts is because they believe that doing so would harm the reputation and 
efficacy of their organizations. In Judith E. Michaels’ interviews with Senate-confirmed 
appointees in the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the appointees reported 
“that as a group, careerists want to help their bosses, in large part because they identify with their 
programs so much more than they identify with the political party of the incoming or outgoing 
administration.” (2005, 14). The interviews conducted by Ferrara and Ross with both appointees 
and civil servants in 2004 concurred on this finding. They reported that the civil servants cared 
about the reputations of their organizations and believed that these reputations would be 
enhanced if the appointees for whom they worked succeeded (2005, 49). Ferrara and Ross 
speculated that this might be the case because the success of the organization reflects well on 
civil servants themselves (ibid., 50). 
  Golden’s research also confirmed this finding. In interviews with careerists at the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where a few civil servants were whistleblowers, she 
found that civil servants uniformly disdained their colleagues who leaked information to the 
press. They “attributed nothing but the basest motives” to these people, complaining to Golden 
that the individuals were disgruntled and publicity hungry and were undermining the agency’s 
work. (2000, 136).  Golden reported that “the careerists I interviewed were more concerned with 
protecting the EPA’s reputation than with protesting policy change or challenging the Reagan 
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appointees.” (ibid., 136). 
  Robert Durant’s study of the implementation of natural resource policy in the Reagan 
administration likewise found that the concerns of civil servants for the interests of their 
organizations made them loath to sabotage appointees by appealing to outside actors such as 
Congress or the press (1992). Durant found that when civil servants disagree with appointees, 
they are likely only to make “limited appeals” by discussing their concerns with their bosses, 
since they fear that resistance would cause delays that would be harmful to their organizational 
missions (1990, 328). When civil servants offer greater resistance, Durant found that often 
“manipulated agreement” may be reached because the careerists fear that mobilizing outside 
groups would result in negative publicity that would be harmful to their organization (ibid., 323). 
When civil servants view changes that an administration pursues as costly, extensive, and 
illegitimate, they may mobilize outside actors, but they will also be eager to reach settlements 
with appointees because they will fear losing control to these outside players (ibid., 324). 
  Therefore, it is only when appointees pursue changes that civil servants view as 
detrimental to an agency’s core mission that civil servants will be willing to engage in protracted 
battles involving outside actors (ibid.). Of course, sometimes presidents actually are hostile to an 
agency’s core mission. However, as we will soon see, even in such instances bureaucratic 
rebellion tends to be muted. In general, however, as Rourke has argued, bureaucrats cannot work 
to undermine the president without undermining the agencies “with which their personal fortunes 
are linked”; the president “is the best salesman they have for the achievement of the agency’s 
goals and the continued replenishment of its resources.” (1984, 113).  
  In all, civil servants do not appear to be driven by personal or organizational interests – 
other than an interest in seeing their agencies succeed. 
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4. Civil servants are more responsive to the president than to other masters. 
  Finally, contrary to the charge that civil servants will serve other masters, a host of 
studies of agency outputs have concluded that they are responsive to the president’s agenda. 
  Studies have repeatedly found that while agencies do respond to other actors, they are 
most responsive to the president. For example, B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman studied 
eight federal agencies, finding that they were responsive to the president, Congress, and the 
courts – but the most frequent mechanism for changing the behavior of the agencies was the 
appointees chosen by the president to lead them (1994, 74). The authors also studied the outputs 
of the EPA, finding that the agency responded to numerous actors, including the president, 
Congress, the judiciary, media, and interest groups, but “administrative resources and leadership 
are the most important determinants of adaptive movements by the bureaucracy.” (1993, 524). 
Additionally, Wood and James E. Anderson studied antitrust regulation, concluding that “in all 
cases, it is obvious that antitrust enforcement levels depend critically on … a politics … driven 
mainly by executive prerogatives.” (1993, 34). Numerous other studies concur in finding that 
regulatory agencies which are ostensibly independent are in fact responsive to the president 
(Brigman 1981, 244-245). 
  Other studies have confirmed the responsiveness to the president of bureaucracies that 
could have been expected to be the most resistant. For example, Thomas J. Weko studied the 
responsiveness of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to the Nixon and Reagan 
administrations, arguing that careerists in the social service agency could be expected to be 
hostile to the conservative agendas of these administrations. Instead, he found compliance to 
political appointees– arguing that “responsiveness can emerge even in the most challenging 
environments.” (1995, 128, 148). Ronald Randall’s study of President Nixon’s successful 
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changes to welfare policy, which included interviews with bureaucrats, found that his 
administration was able to control the bureaucracy through tactics, such as decentralizing control 
to regional bureaucrats who were more receptive to the policy changes the administration sought 
than Washington-based bureaucrats (1979, 802-803, 806). And, as previously noted, Golden’s 
study of four agencies that President Reagan attempted to alter dramatically found that the 
compliance of civil servants actually increased during his tenure (2000, 23). 
  Scholars have also confirmed the responsiveness to the president of organizations 
designed specifically to resist political influence. Moe studied three independent commissions – 
the National Labor Relations Board, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange 
Commission and found that their regulatory behavior changed in accordance with the positions 
of presidents (1982, 198; 1985, 1109). Joseph Stewart, Jr. and Jane S. Cromartie also studied the 
Federal Trade Commission, concurring that it issued more complaints of deceptive practices 
under Republican presidents, in keeping with presidential preferences (1982, 572). B. Dan Wood 
studied the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which in theory should also be 
insulated from political stimuli, finding instead that agency outputs corresponded with the 
preferences of presidents (1990, 503). John Kingdon’s interviews with civil servants in the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare found that when they disagreed with the Nixon 
administration’s policies, they were not able to pursue their own priorities. They responded, 
rather, by continuing to develop ideas and proposals, which they could offer up when a more 
receptive administration came to power (1984, 32-33).  
  Karen Holt studied civil servants in the Department of Justice, who “almost universally 
supported more rigorous enforcement” than the Reagan administration pursued of the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, which allows the Attorney General to file lawsuits 
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against states for unconstitutional conditions in institutions, such as prisons and hospitals for the 
mentally ill. While she did report a few cases of sabotage, such as leaks to Congress and the 
press and assistance to other agents, who could advance the goal of better enforcement, Holt 
concluded that “despite pervasive policy disagreement among holdover careerists, few resorted 
to sabotage. … Most carryover attorneys initially tried to stay and work within the system after 
the new Administration took office.” (1998, 98). 
  And, in perhaps the hardest test, Irene Rubin conducted case studies of offices whose 
programs the Reagan administration cut or eliminated, and found that “there was little, if any, 
footdragging by career officials in the implementation of policy.” She reported that she found 
“no evidence that new policies, such as turning programs over to the states or deregulation, were 
purposely delayed or ignored. The agencies’ employees did what they were supposed to do, 
including terminating their own programs.” (1985, 196). Rubin concluded that “if the president 
can successfully order agencies to terminate programs or to destroy their own capacity to manage 
or implement programs, then he can certainly control the bureaucracy.” (ibid., 23). 
  Of course, not all studies concur on these findings. Wood also studied the EPA, and 
found that civil servants pursued enforcements in contradiction of the goals of the Reagan 
administration (1988, 227-228). Yet Brian J. Cook’s criticism of Wood’s study is a glaring 
example of the limits of such attempts to measure a phenomenon as nuanced as the loyalty of 
staff exogenously and quantitatively. Cook noted that Wood’s model neglected to account for the 
influence that Congress had on the agency, leading to potentially faulty results (1989, 967).  
  Marc Allen Eisner and Kenneth J. Meier’s study of antitrust cases found that neither the 
President nor Congress were influential; outcomes were rather explained by the norms and 
values of the economists of the Antitrust Division (1990, 281, 283). Jeffrey E. Cohen’s study of 
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votes on the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) found that the appointees of a particular 
president do not vote as a group significantly more frequently than they vote with others, 
suggesting that appointment power was limited – though he noted that presidents have not 
prioritized the vetting of ICC appointees (1985, 61, 69). Kingdon reported that, in his interviews, 
some civil servants admitted leaking information to Congressional staff (1984, 34). Furthermore, 
as Dunn has argued, the claims of appointees that civil servants are not responsive must be taken 
into account (1997, 34). Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence seems to point towards 
responsiveness to the president.  
  Maranto’s studies are typical of a literature which often finds small, isolated accounts of 
civil service disloyalty that earn the offenders opprobrium within their own cohort. For example, 
“about a quarter of political appointees interviewed in 1999-2000 noted specific instances in 
which individual careerists hid information or were in other ways less than cooperative in 
supporting administration initiatives, though most saw such actions as isolated.” (2005, 54). In a 
1993-1994 survey, seven percent of civil servants voiced their dissent to interest groups, two 
percent to media, and seven percent to Congress (ibid., 105). Maranto found that “most career 
executives see such activity as not fully legitimate,” and “organization whistleblowers lead 
lonely lives as nonpersons in their own agencies. Coworkers fear being seen with them.” (ibid., 
106). As Rourke concluded, “cases where career subordinates openly repudiate the decisions of 
their political superiors often receive great publicity, but they are exceptions to the general 
willingness of bureaucrats to go along with policies decided upon at a higher level.” (1984, 112). 
What Does Account for the Bad Reputation of Bureaucrats? 
  Contrary to the expectations of the scholars in the earlier typology, these findings 
generally concur with Edwards’ argument that “the recalcitrance of bureaucracy is such a strong 
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element of the conventional wisdom about how government works that it perseveres even in the 
face of widespread contradictory evidence.” (2001, 96). What accounts for this discrepancy?  
  Part of it may be a tendency to blame bureaucrats for a dysfunctional system created by 
other political actors. Moe, for example, argued that dysfunctional bureaucracies are the 
inevitable outcome of our political process. When bureaucracies are created, interest groups 
attempt to restrict them heavily through tools such as detailed mandates and decision-making 
procedures, even though this sacrifices some of the competence that would accrue from giving 
them more discretion, because the interest groups fear that future politicians will otherwise lead 
the bureaucracies in ways averse to their group’s goals. During the creation of a bureaucracy, 
however, these interest groups must unavoidably compromise with those who wish to derail the 
agency’s goals through mechanisms, such as monitoring and checks and balances. The executive 
will attempt to exert as much control as possible over the bureaucracy, while members of 
Congress will attempt to thwart such efforts. The bureaucracy that results from the push and pull 
of these forces will, unsurprisingly, not be designed for optimal performance (1989, 274-280).  
  Other scholars concur that the dysfunctions of the bureaucracy are due to the perverse 
organizational structures that arise under our constitutional system of separate bodies vying for 
power (Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 187; Meier 1997, 197; Wilson 1989, 376). Wilson traced 
increased attempts to control revenues, productive factors, and agency goals by Congress, the 
courts, politicians, and interest groups since the 1970s, further constraining the bureaucracy and 
hindering performance (1989, 71). Each of these groups demands specific rules for governing the 
bureaucracy, which are not reconciled with one another (ibid., 363). Goodsell likewise concluded 
that the problem is that the bureaucracy is given “inconsistent, contradictory, and hence 
unachievable goals and tasks.” (1994, 77; see also Meier 1997, 196). Wilson identified this 
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American preoccupation with rule-making as unique in comparison with other countries – an 
outcome of the distrust of government power whose roots stretch back to our nation’s founding 
(Bruce 1984, 6; Goodsell 1994, 11; Wilson 1989, 335; Wood and Waterman 1994, 2). 
  Another problem is the sheer size of the government.  As Emmet J. Hughes, an aide to 
President Eisenhower, said: “the vast machinery of national leadership – the tens of thousands of 
levers and switches and gears – simply do not respond to the impatient jab of a finger or the 
angry pounding of a fist.” (Cronin 1980, 241). An additional problem may be insufficient 
bureaucratic resources (Rourke 1984, 161-162; Edwards 1983, 204). Indeed, the very fact that 
bureaucracies have been utilized as scapegoats for so many decades can only diminish their 
ability to fight for the resources they need.   
  What do politicians do when agencies they have so constituted and constrained produce 
perverse outcomes? They blame the bureaucrats themselves – rhetoric which itself further 
contributes to the poor reputations of civil servants (Wood and Waterman 1994, 2).  Other 
scholars trace the public relations problem faced by these officials to the fact that, in contrast to 
Europe, where civil servants were long a respected elite (with traditions ranging from the 
intelligent amateur in Britain to Germany’s well-trained specialists), in America the bureaucracy 
developed after the creation of our democracy (Wood and Waterman 1994, 4). Nevertheless, 
contrary to their reputations, the above findings suggest that civil servants are generally, though 
not always, competent and loyal.  
What About Appointee Loyalty? 
  It is finally important to note it is not in fact clear that appointees themselves will always 
be loyal to the president. Cohen, for example, has argued that the appointee selection process, in 
which presidents hire individuals in part to ingratiate themselves with members of Congress, 
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interest groups, and other actors, necessarily reduces the loyalty of appointees to the president. 
“To strike the necessary compromises, he often ends up selecting or approving individuals who 
are not loyal to him, or who are more loyal to someone else, or who have policy agendas at odds 
with his own.” (1996, 12). Furthermore, Cohen pointed out, if an appointee owes his loyalty to 
the White House, (s)he may not obey immediate superiors within his or her agency, ultimately 
making it more difficult to implement presidential programs (ibid., 13). Lewis also drew an 
important distinction between the type of loyalty that campaign workers have demonstrated to 
the president personally “in a costly way” (such as perhaps in lost sleep!) and ideological fealty, 
which is something different (2011, 57). 
  Furthermore, Heclo has argued that policy experts today are part of “issue networks,” and 
appointees from such networks may be more loyal to their networks than to the president (1978, 
106, 118). If a president removes an appointee who disagrees with him, Heclo said, the president 
is likely to end up with another member of the same network who holds similar beliefs (ibid., 
122). Furthermore, in a study of the loyalty of cabinet secretaries – whose public affiliation with 
the president makes it likely that they are the most loyal of appointees – Anthony Bertelli and 
Christian Grose found that, in their congressional testimony between 1991-2002, secretaries of 
agriculture publicly disagreed with the president six percent of the time; secretaries of labor 
disagreed with the president ten percent of the time, and secretaries of commerce disagreed with 
the president twenty-four percent of the time (2007, 237).  
  Furthermore, David Cohen has argued that appointees use their offices to promote 
themselves (1996, 30-31); unlike civil servants, they do not enjoy tenure and are therefore likely 
more concerned with their future career prospects. 
   It is thus far from clear that appointees will be uniformly loyal to the president.  
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Nevertheless, to the extent that appointees are particularly loyal, how does this differential affect 
the interests of the president? 
The Impact of Appointee Zeal 
  The danger of too much loyalty is that it may turn into an overzealousness, which 
ultimately proves detrimental to the executive. Many modern presidential scandals (such as, for 
example, Iran-Contra and Watergate) have actually resulted from too much staff loyalty 
(Rudalevidge 2002, 21). A more recent example of this phenomenon are the senior aides to New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie who ordered that lanes on the nation’s busiest bridge be closed, 
ensnarling traffic jams for days in the town of Fort Lee, New Jersey, in an alleged effort to 
retaliate against the town’s Democratic mayor for not endorsing the Republican governor – 
causing a massive political scandal which weakened the governor (Zernike 2014). As Aberbach 
and Rockman have argued, “the urge to command and centralize often fails to recognize that 
political impulses should be subjected to tests of sobriety. Though there are a good many reasons 
to argue on behalf of the basic idea of “neutral competence” and against the politicization of all 
executive organizations, the most fundamental one that a president ought to consider is the 
avoidance of error and illegality that have wracked recent presidencies.” (1999, 171). Pfiffner 
likewise argued that it is the overzealousness of appointees – more than the efforts of political 
opponents – that have been “the greatest threats to the reputation and political interests of recent 
presidents.” (1999, 6). 
  Furthermore, legions of scholars have demonstrated that, in America’s constitutional 
system, when the president pushes too far, he is usually checked by the other branches of 
government (Wilson 1989, 259). In the famous formulation of Mathew McCubbins and Thomas 
Schwartz, when the president overreaches, upset citizens and advocacy groups pull “fire alarms” 
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and Congress intervenes (1984). 
  For example, Robert Durant’s study of the Reagan administration’s natural resource 
policy confirmed that the more that the administration pursued policy change administratively, 
the more likely it was for Congress, clients, and “an aroused, litigious public” to pull fire alarms 
(1992, 76). Richard Waterman likewise found that when wielded overzealously, the tools of the 
administrative presidency provoked backlash that ultimately reduced presidential influence 
(1989, 189). Evan Ringquist also found that executive attempts to control the EPA in the end 
reduced political control by mobilizing agency clientele groups (1995, 336).  
  Additionally, Kingdon’s interviews with nearly 250 appointees, civil servants, 
congressional staffers, members of interest groups, and others involved in the policy process 
established rather firmly that presidents cannot unilaterally drive policy change (1984, 4, 23, 
128). To become viable, ideas must first be “softened” – a process of acclimating both policy 
communities and the public at large to new ideas, which typically takes years. If a key event such 
as a crisis or a change in the political environment occurs before an idea has gone through this 
softening process, change will not be viable (ibid., 128). Thus, presidents who use appointees to 
attempt blindly to ram through personal agendas lacking wider support are simply unlikely to be 
successful over the long term. 
  Ultimately, achieving lasting change requires building political consensus, not appointing 
zealots to pursue extra-constitutional measures (Rudalevidge 2002, 161; Pfiffner 1999, 19; 
Rourke 1992, 544). As Rourke argued, 
 
  the hard fact that presidents must also confront is that dutiful responsiveness to  
  administration goals may not actually be the greatest service that appointees in executive  
60 
 
  agencies can render the White House. Although most presidential aides would like to see  
  all agency appointees demonstrate such blind loyalty to their chief executive, the ultimate  
  success of any administration may depend less on the unswerving allegiance of its  
  appointees to the President than it does on their skill and dexterity in being responsive not  
  only to Congress but also to the configuration of groups that their agency serves.” (1992,  
  544). 
 
  It therefore seems to be in the president’s interests to pursue the kinds of moderate 
policies with broad consensus which actually last in our pluralist system. The evidence suggests 
that this is just what civil servants are well placed to help presidents do.  
  Finally, the politicization of the executive branch may weaken the government’s overall 
legitimacy, to which the president is inextricably tied. Ezra Suleiman has noted that “one of the 
crucial elements that contributes to or detracts from responsive, accountable, effective, and 
legitimate government is the instrument through which all governments exercise their authority – 
the state bureaucracy.”  (2003, 7). Thus, if the government is perceived by citizens to be political 
instead of neutral, its legitimacy will be weakened – to the detriment of the credibility of the 
chief executive. 
 
The Lack of Comparative Evidence 
  Thus, while there is evidence to question the wisdom of politicization, what is missing 
from the literature is studies of appointees and civil servants who are working in the same 
positions, in order to draw reliable comparisons of their efficacy and loyalty to the president. My 
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study will begin to address this gap by interviewing both civil servants and appointees who 
worked in public affairs roles for the same agency. 
Conclusion 
  A careful review of the literature thus leaves serious reason to question the wisdom of 
politicization. A variety of evidence suggests that civil servants perform more competently on 
the job than political appointees. It might still make sense for presidents to politicize if 
appointees offer greater loyalty, which redounds to the chief executive’s advantage – but a wide 
body of literature suggests that civil servants are, on the whole, unlikely to shirk or sabotage. 
Meanwhile, it is not at all clear that appointees will all be loyal to the president, and overzealous 
appointees may cause serious harm to an administration. Yet none of these previous scholars 
have studied appointees and civil servants working in the same agency and position in order to 
determine which group serves best under particular circumstances.  
  In light of this evidence, I will interview political appointees and civil servants who work 
in public affairs for the Treasury Department in order to assess their relative competence and 
efficacy and to test my hypothesis that the civil servants will be found to be both more competent 
and no less loyal to the president than the appointees.  As the next chapter will discuss, the 
interviews with agency public affairs officers will also shed light on another important 
phenomenon: the “permanent campaign.” 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: Public Affairs Officers in Government Agencies 
The Permanent Campaign 
  In 1982, Sidney Blumenthal famously argued that our nation’s political leaders now 
conduct a “permanent campaign.” Blumenthal, who would later serve as a senior aide to 
President Clinton, wrote that “under the permanent campaign governing is turned into a 
perpetual campaign. Moreover, it remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an 
elected official’s public popularity. It is the engineering of consent with a vengeance.” (23) 
  Blumenthal described how political consultants are hired to get politicians elected, and 
then “brought into the sanctums of government to use the prerogatives of office” to continue 
using the same campaign techniques  –  such as playing to the fears and emotions of the people, 
attempting to capitalize on tragedies, covering up bad policies by diverting attention towards 
images and ideology, prioritizing issues based upon the political advantages they offer, capturing 
voters by entertaining them, and focusing on style over substance (ibid., 26, 126, 246, 250, 331, 
23, 164, 171). “The citizenry is viewed as a mass of fluid voters who can be appeased by 
appearances, occasional drama, and clever rhetoric.” (ibid., 24).  
  A key feature of the “permanent campaign” is the constant courting of public opinion, 
which Jeffrey Tulis (1987) and Hugh Heclo (2000) note that the Constitution was, in some ways, 
carefully crafted to prevent. One of the key concerns of America’s founders was that political 
leaders be sufficiently insulated from day-to-say shifts in public opinion in order to be able to 
govern responsibly.  In The Federalist #1, for example, Alexander Hamilton warned of the 
possibility illustrated by history that politicians would begin “their career by paying an 
obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.” (Madison, 
Hamilton and Jay 1987, 89).  
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  The Constitution was designed to keep the people at arm’s length from day-to-day 
governing and instead allow them to weigh in during periodic elections, in order to promote what 
Heclo termed “deliberative responsiveness” in our leaders (2000, 31). Heclo noted that 
Americans at the time of our founding believed that previous republics had failed because 
ambitious politicians told the people what they wanted to hear. This led to factional strife and 
chaos, which culminated in dictatorship and tyranny (ibid., 5). Contrary to the intentions of our 
Founders, today, Heclo argued, we are governed by an “Anti-Constitution [which] prescribes 
instant responsiveness to the continuous monitoring of the people’s mass opinion and mood.” 
(ibid., 18). 
  According to Heclo, politicians today focus on instrumental responsiveness to the 
people’s whims, rather than teaching them, Franklin D. Roosevelt-style, about the long-term 
challenges America faces and the sacrifices necessary to overcome them (ibid., 30-34). Of 
course, Heclo’s ideal view of democracy is problematic to the degree that it views citizens 
themselves as generally incapable of advocating responsible policy decisions and therefore 
reliant upon more enlightened leaders to ascertain their true interests. Nevertheless, Heclo argued 
that the performance of politicians has become more important than the content of what they say, 
and he is justified in his concern that, as a result, citizens have been left confused (ibid., 31). 
Theodore Lowi has warned that the president’s focus on the presentation of appearances has 
become so serious that it threatens the future of the nation itself (1984, 20).  
  Furthermore, Heclo has noted that whereas the governing process should be collaborative 
and grounded in rational deliberation with the end of arriving at truth, campaigns are designed to 
mute one’s opponents and defeat enemies through the use of images and emotions (2000, 11-15). 
Accordingly, disagreements are overplayed and politics is infused with an unnecessary hostility.  
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In fact, the word “campaign” itself invokes the imagery of warfare: the French army took to the 
champagne, or fields, for operations (ibid., 30, 33, 7). As a result of this conflict, “less dramatic, 
but more realistic, chances for success” via compromise are neglected (Edwards 2003, 249). 
While an electorate inured to emotional appeals would be equally disturbing, all of this drama 
and oversimplification clearly reduces the prospects for serious policy deliberation and 
compromise. 
 In addition to poor policy and bitter partisanship, the permanent campaign is also said to 
result in official deception. In Scott McClellan’s memoir of his time as Press Secretary to 
President George W. Bush, he admitted that the Bush administration indeed conducted a 
“permanent campaign,” and argued that it had resulted in a new and unprecedented level of 
deception in politics (2008, xxiii). McClellan wrote: “Washington has become the home of the 
permanent campaign, a game of endless politicking based on the manipulation of shades of truth, 
partial truths, twisting of the truth, and spin. Governing has become an appendage of politics 
rather than the other way around, with electoral victory and the control of power as the sole 
measures of success.” (ibid., xiii).  
  McClellan reported that the Bush administration regularly manipulated the truth in order 
to achieve short-term advantage in the polls – a strategy that ultimately proved disastrous for 
both the American people and the President himself (ibid., 66, 77). He said that, for presidential 
advisers, “fear of short-term political embarrassment leads them to reflexively manipulate, hide, 
and distort the truth.” (ibid., 88). For example, McClellan reported that the administration was 
guilty of “shading the truth” regarding the evidence and justification for the war in Iraq, and 
argued that the President’s biggest motive – spreading democracy in the Middle East – was 
carefully disguised from the American people (ibid., 131-132).  
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  This continual deception also resulted in bitter partisan polarization, which precluded the 
administration from governing effectively. McClellan warned that “allowing the permanent 
campaign culture to remain in control may not take us into another unnecessary war, but it will 
continue to limit the opportunity for careful deliberation, bipartisan compromise, and meaningful 
solutions to the major problems all Americans want to see solved.” (ibid., 313). Ironically, 
McClellan noted that the campaign was ultimately a disservice to the president himself, severely 
tarnishing his reputation. “Ultimately, that machine worked not only to spin the media and defeat 
our opponents but to spin and defeat ourselves.” (ibid., 311). 
  Yet Blumenthal, Heclo and McClellan never indicated precisely how deeply this 
campaign penetrates: Is it conducted only from the White House, or are government agencies 
also involved?  
  In Polling to Govern: Public Opinion and Presidential Leadership, Diane Heith studied 
the archives of presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, and found that, 
within their White Houses, the results of public opinion polls were shared with, on average, 
about thirty top staffers, and not with cabinet heads (2004, 39). She therefore concluded that 
“polling did not penetrate the bureaucracy.” (ibid., 98). Yet this research needs to be brought up 
to date with evidence from more modern presidencies; McClellan, for example, reported that the 
administration of George W. Bush took the permanent campaign “to a higher level” than the 
Clinton administration (2008, 311). Furthermore, Heith’s work cannot account for the possibility 
that cabinet agencies themselves might be conducting or utilizing public opinion polls, which 
would not have been captured in her examination of presidential records.  
  Like Heith, Mordecai Lee – an expert in government agency communications – has 
claimed that government agencies engage in little survey research, but he does not cite evidence 
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of this claim. For Lee, however, this is “a shame. Private corporations spend gobs of money on 
survey research to be sure that they understand the views of the public.” (2012, 17). 
  More recently, McClellan clearly indicated that the permanent campaign has spread 
beyond the White House. While he was vague regarding its boundaries, he left open the 
possibility that it has permeated the bureaucracy. For example, he indicated that deception, 
which he characterizes as a key tenet of the campaign, “was not isolated to one event or even to 
the Bush White House. It permeates our national discourse. And … it has become an accepted 
way of winning the partisan wars for public opinion and an increasingly destructive part of 
Washington’s culture.” (2008, 4). McClellan acknowledged that “of course, deception in politics 
is nothing new. What’s new is the degree to which it now permeates our national discourse.” 
(ibid., xiii). 
  It is clear that the American people also perceive this change. The Pew Research Center 
for People & the Press reported that public trust in government reached a record low in the 
Obama administration. While in November 1958, seventy-three percent of Americans indicated 
that they generally trusted their government in Washington, in October 2013 the number had 
fallen to nineteen percent (2013).    
  The permanent campaign is also an emerging trend among communications professionals 
in the corporate sector. In its most recent survey of top corporate communicators, Corporate 
Communications International reported as one of its key findings that “political, financial, [and] 
technological uncertainty … has led to running corporate communication like a never-ending 
political campaign.” (Goodman et al. 2013).    
  However, if government agencies are using such polls, there is reason to believe that such 
efforts might not be readily visible, given the opprobrium attached to any hint of the use of polls 
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in the governance process. As Heith observed, “as much a third rail as altering Social Security, 
no staffer, president, or pollster wants to admit to using polls to shape or influence leadership 
while in the White House.” (2004, 13-14). “Moreover, no organizational chart of any White 
House highlights formal structures or guidelines that detail the use of public opinion in 
presidential activities.” (ibid., 14). It therefore seems probable that staffers in government 
agencies – which are supposed to be less political than the White House – would take similar or 
greater steps to conceal their use of polls if they indeed availed themselves of them. 
  Furthermore, Heith’s study found that “information on issues, rather than performance, 
represented the bulk of exchanges” between White House staff on poll data (ibid., 49). This 
would suggest that government agencies – whose work is issue-based to an even greater degree 
than the White House – might use the same approach to utilizing polls to gauge public opinion 
on their issue areas. 
  Heith found that the presidents she studied used polls not to change their stances based 
upon public opinion, but rather to attempt to move the public in the directions they preferred, 
leading her to conclude that the use of polling “has not trumped or triumphed over traditional 
relationships and approaches to governing.” (2004, 136). Her finding echoed Lawrence Jacobs 
and Robert Shapiro’s 2000 study of healthcare debates since the 1970s, which found that 
politicians use polls as a resource for building support among Americans for the policies the 
politicians already favor (xv). However, in 2008, McClellan suggested that this may have 
changed.  He reported that “opinion polling is used not only to read the mood of the electorate 
and guide political leaders in the ways they communicate their messages, but also, at times, to 
determine the policies they will advocate.” (64). 
  In my interviews, the descriptions by government agency officials of the techniques they 
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engage in will provide important answers to this question of whether they are today on a 
permanent campaign – and, if so, precisely what it entails. 
A History of Suspicion of Agency Public Affairs Officers 
  As previously discussed, it is particularly important to understand the work of 
government agency public affairs officers, given their critical role as gatekeepers in America’s 
democratic system. 
  The jobs of agency public affairs officials are held in such suspicion that the work they 
do is, technically, illegal. Under a U.S. law passed in 1913, in government agencies, “no money 
appropriated by … any … Act shall be used for the compensation of any publicity expert unless 
specifically appropriated for that purpose.” (Kosar 2005, 786.) The law is the lingering result of 
the outrage of Rep. Frederick Gillette upon reading an announcement of a civil service exam for 
the position of “publicity expert, for men only.” The person in this advertised post in the 
Agriculture Office of Public Roads would be responsible for preparing material for the media 
and “secure the publication of such items in various periodicals and newspapers” – activities 
which Gillette viewed as an improper attempt at propagandizing (Herold 1981, 15). Government 
agencies have, of course, hired increased numbers of “publicity experts” ever since this time – 
simply skirting the law by calling their jobs by other names. 
  Since the passage of this law, Congress has continued to attempt to curb the practice of 
public relations in federal agencies (Lee 2011). Especially memorably, during the 1950s, the 
House Committee on Government Operations created the Subcommittee on Government 
Information, popularly known as the “Moss Subcommittee,” which expressed outrage over 
publicity operations occurring in federal agencies (Nimmo 1964, 173). Two decades later, 
Senator J. William Fulbright personally wrote an entire book criticizing the Pentagon’s public 
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relations activities (1970). More recently, bills introduced in both the Senate and House in early 
2005 proposed imposing penalties for government officials who propagandize (Kosar 2008, 298, 
304). Congress continues regularly to include language in laws indicating that “no part of any 
appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not 
authorized by the Congress.” (Kosar 2012b, 184). 
  As David Morgan has noted, Congress has continually worked to build up its own public 
relations staff and capabilities, at the same time as it has tried to curb the very same practices by 
government agencies (1986, 25). But, as Kevin Kosar of the Congressional Information Service 
has described, despite more recent congressional efforts to limit government “propaganda,” 
barriers to congressional action include the difficulty of quantifying public relations expenditures 
within agencies, the difficulty of defining the line between public relations and propaganda, and 
the fact that the Department of Justice, within the executive branch itself, would have to initiate 
charges against the executive branch for transgressions (2005, 792-796). 
  If, as discussed in the Introduction, the American people have a right to information 
about their government, which is necessary to the functioning of democracy, why would 
lawmakers attempt to limit the work of the officials responsible for providing the people with 
such information? J.A.R. Pimlott argued that “opposition to government publicity … often 
springs from opposition to the particular purpose for which it is being used” – and from 
congressional fears that the publicity will give the executive increased power relative to the 
legislature (Pimlott 1951, 83, 88; see also Rourke 1961, 186; Lee 2011). But is this suspicion 
justified? Just how powerful are agency public affairs officers? And how do they wield the 
powers they possess? 
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How Powerful are Public Affairs Officials? 
  The potential power of public affairs officials is suggested by President Lincoln’s famous 
claim that “public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail, without it 
nothing can succeed. He who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or 
decisions possible or impossible to execute.” (Cohen 1981, 16). But how much power do public 
affairs officers in government agencies actually have to shape public opinion? 
 
Influencing Media Coverage  
 One way public affairs officers shape opinion is by shaping media reports. First, 
government public affairs officers serve as predominant sources in media coverage. For example, 
Stephen Hess found that reporters who cover the national government reach out to government 
public affairs officials regarding about half of their stories (1984, 5). In 1982, Morgan sampled 
nine leading daily newspapers and found that while Congress provided about a quarter of their 
stories, the Presidency and executive branch were responsible for seventy percent, with two-
thirds of executive branch news coming from agencies and departments (1986, 27-29, 33.) 
Similarly, Judy VanSlyke Turk conducted a study of six state government agencies in Louisiana, 
and found that newspaper reporters utilized half of the information that public information 
officers provided to them (1986, 17). Finally, a study by Leon Sigal of foreign and national news 
stories that ran on the front page of the New York Times and Washington Post between 1949-
1969 found that more than fifty-eight percent of the information reported came from official 
sources, such as press releases, press conferences, and speeches, and an additional 15.7 percent 
from informal sources, such as briefings and leaks. Only 25.8 percent of the information came 
from enterprise reporting, such as a reporter’s interviews and spontaneous events (1973, 120-
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121). Sigal did not address which stories were higher profile or attracted more attention. 
However, he concluded that “at present, news space is still more readily available to high 
administration officials than it is to spokesmen of any other organization or institution in the 
society.” (ibid., 190). Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese have likewise found that 
“news content consists largely of statements from official sources.” (1996, 129).  
  This is the case because, as John Zaller noted, “one of the clearest findings to emerge 
from the scholarly literature on the press is that reporters will regard as newsworthy that which 
their ‘legitimate’ sources say is newsworthy.” (1992, 315). Furthermore, as Francis Rourke 
noted, “their statements come from an official source and thus may have a credibility they would 
not otherwise possess.” (1961, 206).  Of course, this status of newsworthiness and credibility 
helps government public affairs officers to not only shape what is reported but also to construct 
“the context within which all other information is evaluated.” (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 178).
 Furthermore, by serving as predominant sources and influencers of media reporting, 
government public affairs officers crowd out the ability of other actors to do so. As Dan Nimmo 
has noted, “public explanation of policy with or without propagandistic intent competes with 
other explanations publicizing conflicting policies.” (1964, 20). This is the case because, as 
Norton E. Long has observed, facts are rarely presented neutrally; “indeed, if they are to do any 
useful office in clarifying the real alternatives of public policy, they must foreclose some 
alternatives, and in doing so give umbrage to their proponents.” (1954, 22). As a result, Dave 
Gelders and Oyvind Ihlen have noted that “there is a risk that the government becomes too 
powerful and that its voice is privileged in comparison with that of the opponents of a particular 
policy.” (2010, 61).  There is also a risk that media access is used to promote partisan policies 
ibid., 59). Some have argued that the use of such resources also confers a significant advantage 
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to incumbent administrations in electoral races (McCamy 1939, 15).  
  For example, Kosar has argued that the use of government funds to promote the president 
or his policies is problematic because the money could otherwise be used to focus on public 
policy; because “such promotional activities may reduce the ability of the public to assess the 
wisdom of particular policies and, by implication, the competency of public officials and the 
president, which may have electoral ramifications;” and because it gives the president an 
advantage that threatens to disrupt the balance of power between the three branches of 
government (2005, 786). 
  Beyond the advantages of the perceived greater newsworthiness and legitimacy of the 
information they convey, public affairs officers also derive advantages from the fact that 
“reporters’ hunger for news – a commodity essential to the performance of their professional task 
– makes them very vulnerable to being used by an agency to disseminate information that will 
reflect favorably upon it.” (Rourke 1984, 172). In particular, reporters may be unwilling to 
aggressively challenge the statements of an agency public affairs officer or to refuse to cover 
news the agency is actively pitching because they depend upon maintaining relationships with 
their government public affairs contacts in order to secure the information they need to do their 
jobs. Government public affairs officers also control access to information, which, if given 
exclusively to a reporter, gives the correspondent’s media outlet an edge over rivals in a highly 
competitive media market – yet another reason for reporters to stay in the good graces of their 
official sources. 
  Another advantage that Shoemaker and Resse have described public affairs officers as 
wielding to their advantage is their ability to “[monopolize] the journalists’ time so that they 
don’t have an opportunity to seek out sources with alternative views.” (1996, 178). A related 
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form of power that government public affairs officials wield is their ability to provide “usable 
information that is easier and cheaper to use than that from other sources.” (Shoemaker and 
Reese 1996, 178). Oscar Gandy has used the concept of “information subsidies” to describe this 
form of influence (1982, 30). By providing journalists with information in a form that is readily 
useable, government public affairs officers reduce the “costs” (in time and money) to reporters of 
newsgathering. “Faced with time constraints, and the need to produce stories that will win 
publication, journalists will attend to, and make use of, subsidized information that is of a type 
and form that will achieve that goal. By reducing the costs faced by journalists in satisfying 
organizational requirements, the subsidy giver increases the probability that the subsidized 
information will be used.” (ibid., 627). Mark Fishman has therefore argued that the source of 
government’s publicity power is this ability to “lure” reporters with “free, safe, easily available, 
predictable amounts of raw materials for news.” (1980, 153). 
  Thus, public affairs officials in government agencies are uniquely positioned to influence 
news reporting because of the perceived newsworthiness and legitimacy attached to their official 
positions, the dependence of reporters upon continued relationships with such officials in order 
to do their jobs, their ability to keep reporters occupied so that they do not seek other sources, 
and their ability to offer news to reporters at a cheaper “cost” than other sources. Accordingly, in 
1961, V.O. Key claimed that “the picture of the press collectively as the wielder of great power 
on its own initiative does not fit the facts” (394). By this argument, media managers  
 
  should no more be held accountable for the materials that flow through their channels  
  than should managers of transportation concerns be blamed for the quality of the printed  
  matter they transport from place to place. The tone and quality of the content of the  
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  media tend to be mightily influenced, if not fixed, by those who manufacture news and  
  by those who fix the nature of other politically relevant content available for the media.  
  (ibid., 395). 
    
  The ability to influence media reporting is a profound source of power for two reasons. 
First, agencies which are able to bolster their popularity in the press gain immense political 
power. As Rourke has argued, agencies that enjoy widespread support in public opinion become 
practically untouchable: it is difficult for Congress or the President to oppose them (1984, 44). 
  Second, as Walter Lippmann recognized in Public Opinion, in today’s world, it is 
impossible for each of us to obtain most information by firsthand experience. “Each of us lives 
and works on a small part of the earth’s surface, moves in a small circle, and of these 
acquaintances knows only a few intimately. Of any public event that has wide effects we see at 
best only a phase and an aspect.” (1966, 53). We have thus come to depend upon the press for 
much of what we know about the world (ibid., 203). Thus, the ability to influence news reporting 
is in a great sense the ability to define reality for the American people. Studies on agenda setting, 
priming and framing effects illustrate exactly how the media content shaped by public affairs 
officers comes to influence the beliefs and behavior of U.S. citizens.  
Agenda Setting, Priming and Framing Effects 
  The reason that the influence of public affairs officers on the media is such a profound 
source of power is because myriad studies confirm that media reports have agenda-setting affects 
(influencing what issues Americans believe are important), priming effects (influencing the 
weight Americans place on issues), and framing effects (influencing how Americans perceive 
issues). (Iyengar 1991, 132-133). While, in the case of my study, many of those who follow the 
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Treasury closely may be financial industry experts who have sophisticated views less susceptible 
to these mechanisms, the Treasury’s comments on the overall state of the economy may 
influence the views of the public at large through these mechanisms.  
  First, studies confirm that media coverage is a significant shaper of American public 
opinion. For example, John Zaller’s study of the ways in which public opinion is formed found 
that Americans do not possess fixed opinions, which they simply share with pollsters. Rather, he 
found, “most people really aren’t sure what their opinions are on most political matters … 
because there are few occasions … in which they are called upon to formulate and express 
political opinions. So, when confronted by rapid-fire questions in a public opinion survey, they 
make up attitude reports as best they can as they go along. But because they are hurrying, they 
are heavily influenced by whatever ideas happen to be at the top of their minds.”  (1992, 76). 
Media coverage is, of course, a key determinant of what is top of mind. One of the reasons that 
Americans are particularly susceptible to arguments they read or hear in the media is because 
“most Americans do not rate very highly on political awareness,” and therefore “citizens will be 
unlikely to exhibit high levels of resistance to arguments that are inconsistent with their values, 
interests, or other predispositions.” (ibid., 59). 
  A small sample of studies suffice to illustrate the point: One study by Michael MacKuen 
found that the political priorities of individuals change as a result of the information they 
acquire; thus personal agendas “depend more on content of the information environment than on 
internalized standards.” (1984, 386). G. Ray Funkhouser found that the volume of coverage in 
major newsmagazines correlated strongly with the importance that Americans attributed to 
particular issues (1973, 71). Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey found that 
television coverage was responsible for a large percentage of changes in the policy preferences 
76 
 
of Americans (1987, 23). A study by Shanto Iyengar, Donald Kinder, Mark Peters, and Jon 
Krosnick found that “by drawing attention to certain national problems while ignoring others, 
television news programs help define the standards by which presidents are evaluated.” (1984, 
778). Americans exposed to media coverage of energy, defense, and inflation were more likely 
to rate the President overall in the same way they rated him on these issues (ibid., 783). 
Similarly, Iyengar studied media reports on a range of issues, including crime, terrorism and 
poverty, and found that the ways in which media reports framed issues influenced how 
Americans attributed responsibility (1991, 3).  
  Finally, David P. Fan created statistical models of the formation of public opinion on a 
range of issues, such as whether the United States should spend more money on national defense 
between 1977-1986 and whether unemployment or inflation was a more important issue in 1981-
1984. He found that the media is the principal source of influence on public opinion (1988, 4). 
While any individual story tends to have minimal effects on public opinion, Fan found that it is 
the cumulative effect of all of the stories that is powerful (ibid., 3). He concluded that public 
opinion is not a check on elite behavior; rather, elites use the media to convey their messages and 
public opinion tends to reflect the messages conveyed in the press (ibid., 140). 
How do they Wield their Power? 
  It is thus clear that public affairs officers in government agencies wield enormous power 
to influence media reporting, which in turn may bolster the political power of their organizations 
and shape American public opinion. Of course, such power might be used towards laudable or 
questionable ends. As far back as 380 B.C., Plato drew a distinction in the Gorgias between the 
rhetoric of politicians designed for the good of the people and rhetoric used simply to flatter and 
achieve personal gain (Plato 2009).  How do modern government public affairs officers utilize 
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the power they possess: to responsibly provide the information citizens have the right and need 
to possess in order for our democracy to function, or to deceive the people – whether 
malevolently or, as Machiavelli would argue, for the people’s own good? Is their chief role to 
inform the public or to “spin” for the administration’s policies? 
To Strengthen the Administration’s Power Position? 
  In his history of public relations in the United States, Stuart Ewen traced the ways in 
which public relations techniques have often been practiced by government officials to “justify 
and package their interests in terms of the common good,” thereby supporting their own power 
positions (1996, 34). Edward Bernays, the double nephew of Freud credited as one of the fathers 
of the practice of public relations in the United States, for example, “described public relations as 
a response to a transhistoric concern: the requirement, for those people in power, to shape the 
attitudes of the general population. For Bernays, public relations reflected the refinement of 
techniques developed to serve ancient purposes.” (ibid., 11). 
  The field of public relations developed in the early years of the twentieth century, 
initially utilizing factual arguments to reply to the concerns of labor and media “muckrackers” 
about big business. But practitioners soon realized that, as American philosopher William James 
outlined in his 1907 book, Pragmatism: A New Name for Old Ways of Thinking, truth is unstable; 
things could be made to be true, for example, in the way events are structured (ibid., 39-40). One 
of the first practitioners of public relations, Ivy Lee, applied this approach to his craft. “If 
suitable facts could be assembled and then projected into the vast “amphitheatre” of public 
consciousness, he reasoned, they could become truth.  Harnessed to the idea that the truth is 
something that can be merchandised to the public was an approach to the standards of factual 
evidence that represented a prophetic break from their Enlightenment roots.” (ibid., 80). 
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  At a time of fear that the working class revolts happening elsewhere on the globe might 
spread to the United States and trepidation about the behavior of publics in mass democracies, 
early practitioners of public relations in government discovered that “truths” could be presented 
in the service of their aims. During World War I, the U.S. Committee on Public Information, 
established by President Wilson and headed by George Creel, undertook a massive effort to 
mobilize public support for the war effort – the likes of which the world had never before seen. 
The country’s filmmakers, artists, journalists, advertising industry and other groups were 
mobilized to create pro-war works. Opinion leaders in local communities, known as “Four-
Minute Men,” were trained to give speeches to their neighbors. Often, the committee appealed to 
the emotions, rather than the intellects, of the American people. The enemy was presented as 
lurking everywhere; one map of the United States showed the German names that conquerors 
would give to American cities if the nation lost the war (ibid., 124). 
  By the 1920s, public relations practitioners became skilled at appealing to the 
unconscious. Practitioners studied psychological manipulation to find the unconscious triggers 
they could exploit to steer public passions (ibid., 127, 132). The power of pictures was harnessed 
to elicit emotional responses, while pre-empting critical thinking (ibid., 210). Such manipulation 
was justified with claims that most citizens were irrational. The rational few who worked in 
public relations would therefore structure the thinking of the masses, in order to save the people 
from themselves (ibid., 144-145). The introduction of polling offered another public relations 
technique: polls could be structured to elicit virtually any desired response. The poll could then 
be used as justification that its sponsor was acting in the public interest – resulting in what Ewen 
characterizes as “reverse democracy” (ibid., 189). 
  Ewen allowed that government officials have not always approached citizens as irrational 
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creatures to be subconsciously manipulated to serve their own power interests. He credited 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, with attempting to educate citizens and appeal to 
them as rational thinkers in his Fireside Chats (ibid., 254-255). Likewise, the photographs 
commissioned by the Farm Security Administration during the New Deal era, widely covered in 
the nation’s media, helped to humanize and dignify the country’s poor – engaging the nation on 
critical issues and helping to overcome previous representations of the poor as others to be feared 
(ibid., 264, 277-278, 282). Ewen similarly characterized the 1970s as a time when public 
relations professionals responded to African Americans, women, and other groups who were 
newly asserting their rights by targeting them with specific messages.   
  But each time the pendulum has swung in this direction, Ewen said, it has always swung 
back to practices, which attempt to preserve privileges through manipulation, demagoguery, and 
tricks (ibid., 399-400). Furthermore, public relations professionals responded to the movements 
of the 1970’s by narrowly targeting different groups, resulting in an increased fragmentation of 
American society that made it even harder for the public to assert its collective interests (ibid., 
406, 411). 
  Critics of modern-day government public affairs officials charge them with similarly 
sinister practices. Former New York Times columnist Frank Rich’s account of President George 
W. Bush’s handling of the Iraq war suggested that not much has changed since Vietnam. Rich 
accused the administration of using “inflated claims about Saddam’s WMDs and Iraq-Qaeda ties 
[which] were outright lies or the subconscious misreading of intelligence by officials with an 
idee fixe” in order to sell the war (2006, 218). He argued that the President himself exaggerated 
other facts, such as the number of U.S. partners and Iraqi troops (ibid., 178). Rich documented 
numerous other instances in which the administration conveyed false information, such as details 
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of the rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch who was missing in Iraq; facts surrounding the 
death of professional football player Pat Tillman, who the administration claimed was killed by 
enemy fire but later admitted died from “friendly fire;” and the fighting in Falluja, where “a city 
of 250,000 had essentially been destroyed to ‘save’ it from the enemy. The information the 
administration put out about this quixotic victory was brazenly at odds with the known facts.” 
(ibid., 80-81, 123-124, 129, 161).  
  Rich also accused the administration of the “flogging of fear for political advantage,” 
arguing that “in election years, they really pulled out the stops. For the midterm of 2002, that 
meant hyping Saddam’s potential for unleashing a ‘mushroom cloud.’ For 2004, it was time for 
the terrorists who attacked America on 9/11 to make a comeback.” (ibid., 145). For example, he 
reported that when Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the names of seven wanted 
terrorists just before Memorial Day and asked for help finding them, it turned out the wanted 
men were not believed to be in the U.S. and six of them were “recycled from previous warnings” 
(ibid., 145-146). 
  Rich further accused the Bush administration of releasing fear-provoking information in 
order to distract the media from news that would be damaging. For example, he noted that on the 
day that damaging information about the administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina was 
released, the President attempted to capture the headlines by announcing that a plan to drive a 
plane into the U.S. Bank Tower in Los Angeles had been disrupted. This disrupted plot had 
actually been mentioned by federal officials two years previously and the administration did not 
share details with the mayor of Los Angeles prior to the President’s speech (ibid, 204). Rich 
concluded that “certainly this was a White House that was very comfortable with lying.” (ibid., 
218). Reporters were intimated by being branded as “unpatriotic” for questioning the war (ibid., 
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161, 163). 
  Rich further documented how the Pentagon created the Office of Strategic Influence to 
“plant helpful ‘news,’ some of it phony, with foreign media.” (ibid., 32). He reported that 
similarly questionable tactics were used to influence domestic media coverage.  For example, 
more than 50 news stations around the country ran news segments about the new Medicare 
prescription drug benefit that it turned out had been produced by the administration’s 
Department of Health and Human Services (ibid., 166). Likewise, the Department of Education 
paid Armstrong Williams to promote its No Child Left Behind initiative, and he subsequently 
both served as a media commentator and interviewed the Vice President in a segment passed off 
as a genuine news story (ibid.,167-168). Two newspaper columnists were paid by the 
Department of Health and Human Services for promoting marriage initiatives (ibid, 169). The 
Transportation Security Administration used a public affairs staffer with a fake name to act as a 
reporter in a segment about airport security (ibid., 169). “The New York Times found that, all 
told, at least twenty federal agencies had made and distributed hundreds of fake news segments 
over the past four years, landing them even in big markets, such as New York, Los Angeles, and 
Chicago.” (ibid., 169). Additionally, Bush political appointees at NASA and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration were found to be rewriting and censoring documents 
and speeches in which scientific findings conflicted with the administration’s policies (ibid., 
170). 
  One reporter inside the White House press corps was actually exposed to be using the 
false name of “Jeff Gannon.” “A close reading of the transcripts of televised White House press 
briefings over the preceding two years revealed that at uncannily crucial moments, ‘Jeff’ was 
called on by McClellan to field softballs and stanch tough questioning on such topics as Abu 
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Ghraib and [White House Senior Adviser Karl] Rove’s possible involvement in the outing of the 
CIA officer Valarie Plame Wilson.” (ibid., 171-172) Similarly, the audience at a press 
conference held by a deputy FEMA administrator in October 2007 was later exposed as FEMA’s 
own employees (Kosar 2012, 191). 
  More recently, President Obama has been accused of lying about his signature health care 
initiative, the Affordable Care Act, by falsely claiming that Americans who liked their health 
insurance policies would be able to keep them under the new law (Madhani 2013). Obama and 
his top aides have also been accused of lying regarding the details of the September 2012 attack 
on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which left the U.S. Ambassador dead (Mears 2012). 
  Of course, charges of government distortion are not new. In The Politics of Lying, David 
Wise also accused the government of regularly lying during the Vietnam era. For example, he 
argued, the government lied about the circumstances surrounding the torpedo attack which 
caused President Johnson to order the first bombing of North Vietnam, and continued to lie 
throughout the war; the Secretary of Defense publicly and falsely denied an air attack on Hanoi 
and U.S. operations in My Lai, Vietnam – the site of a grotesque massacre – were presented to 
visitors as one of the military’s successful operations (ibid., 6, 10, 27-28, 181).  
  David L. Altheide and John M. Johnson have argued that distortions are in fact 
commonplace, even in seemingly more mundane and innocuous government information. They 
studied how data reported in official government reports was collected across a variety of 
government offices, finding that “many of these workers were oriented to such practical concerns 
as maintaining friendships, promoting individual careers, ‘covering their asses,’ getting back at 
real and potential enemies, and above all, maintaining appearances of competence and legitimacy 
for their superiors.” (1980, 36). As a result, they reported that they “have not discovered one case 
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in which knowledge of the broader context of information processing and awareness of the 
procedures used in collecting, categorizing, interpreting, and presenting data in reports has not 
significantly altered the meaning and confidence in those reports.” (ibid., 239). 
  A key tool that the government is accused of wielding to its advantage is the 
classification system. Wise argued that the government has sometimes released classified 
information to serve its aims or destroy political enemies and at other times classified data to 
protect incriminating evidence (1973, 28, 108-109, 118, 133). In fact, David Pozen has argued 
that the reason government leakers are almost never prosecuted is because doing so could end up 
“compromising the government’s instrumental use of the press.” (Coll 2013, 55). “With its 
control over information supported by an official system of secrecy and classification, the 
government has almost unlimited power to misinform the public,” according to Wise. “It does so 
for various reasons. The government lies to manipulate public opinion, to generate public 
support for its policies, and to silence its critics. Ultimately, it lies to stay in power.” (1973, 28) 
An additional institution which Wise has argued wrongly promotes government secrecy and 
possible manipulation is the use of executive privilege to prevent White House aides from 
testifying before Congress (ibid., 64). 
  In the eyes of critics, it is unequal resources such as these which make what they call 
government “propaganda” so fearsome. For example, former Senator Fulbright noted in his 
attack on the Defense Department’s public affairs apparatus, The Pentagon Propaganda 
Machine, that the Department of Defense has billions of dollars at its disposal, which it utilizes 
to indoctrinate and impress audiences with skydiving paratroopers, bands, and trips around the 
country to build support for its programs (1970, 6, 44). Fulbright argued that the Department also 
capitalizes on the vested interests of workers and businesses tied to the military-industrial 
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complex who support their aims (ibid., 12-13). While Fulbright acknowledged that it is 
imperative for the government to release information, he charged that the government is also 
guilty of propaganda, which promulgates ideas – the namesake of the seventeenth-century 
Congregatio de propaganda which trained missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church (ibid., 
18, 24-25). In particular, Fulbright said, the military stimulates patriotism, makes claims to be 
protecting the American way of life, glorifies militarism, and overplays its humanitarian work 
instead of the death and destruction it wreaks, through distorted, oversimplified, and one-
dimensional communications designed to build support for staggering defense budgets (ibid., 45, 
70, 71, 74 84). The disturbing result of this propaganda, Fulbright said, is that while war used to 
be abhorrent to the American people, they have come to view the military as comforting (ibid., 
148-149). Yet, according to Fulbright, war presents a danger to the nation itself (Fulbright 1970, 
155). Particularly rankling to these critics is that such propaganda is conducted with taxpayer 
money, such that “the citizenry pays to be propagandized” (Chomsky and Herman 1988, 22). 
  Critics also charge the government with using its power to strong-arm reporters into 
positive coverage. “There are … small but effective ways for the White House to retaliate against 
reporters who do not ‘go along,’ according to Wise (1973, 242.)  For example, as previously 
discussed, according to Leon Sigal, “senior officials employ a variety of tactics against reporters 
on the beat in order to confine newsgathering to routine channels. One is simply to keep them 
busy with a steady stream of information through these channels on the premise that the best way 
to keep the press from peering into dark corners is to shine a light elsewhere.” (1973, 54). 
Likewise, there “lies the implicit threat to restrict access. Reporters can be left off a press plane, 
denied a military accreditation card that would allow them on board military transport in a war 
zone, barred from a briefing, subjected to harassment and investigation, or simply never granted 
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an interview or a leak.” (ibid., 55).  
  Ultimately, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have argued, the media feel that they 
must report doubtful information provided by government officials, “even if they tell whoppers,” 
and be cautious with their criticism, because they rely so heavily on government sources to do 
their work (1988, 22). As a result, they argued, the media end up serving the very privileged 
interests that Bernays sought to bolster a century ago, and failing to convey the information 
citizens need to exercise control over the political process (ibid., 298). While the rancor of 
reporters on cable news channels today may suggest that the media was far from timid, the facts 
remains that the U.S. only recently went to war on the basis of false claims of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq which it appears in retrospect the media had sufficient evidence to debunk 
beforehand. Wise argued that “the consent of the governed is basic to American democracy. If 
the governed are misled … the system may go on – but not as a democracy.” (1973, 18). 
To Promote Democracy? 
  Public relations professionals and their defenders take a wholly different view of the 
profession. At their most generous, press offices are described as “an entitlement that flows from 
the nature of a free society and the relationship of the state to the citizen. What more natural 
function of government is there in a democracy than for it to make available information about 
how it is governing?” (Hess 1984, 115). 
  James McCamy argued that, without the information that government public affairs 
officers provide, “the sheer physical inability of the press to cover Washington’s many news 
sources would prevent reporters from fulfilling their role of vigilant protector of the public 
interest.” (1939, 249). Ernest A. Lotito, who served as Commerce Department Public Affairs 
Director, concurred, arguing that  
86 
 
 
  if, we believe an informed citizenry is the foundation of democracy, then public affairs  
  is one of the most critical functions of government. Without it, the job of ferreting out the  
  massive amounts of information it makes available would be an impossible task for the  
  media and the millions of business people and ordinary citizens that require it in their  
  daily lives. Public affairs in government is to help tell the people the facts so they can  
  make the enlightened decisions that ensure the survival and success of our democratic 
  system. (1981, 288). 
   
  Practitioners describe a range of reasons why the information they provide is critical to 
the nation. First, information the government possesses – such as facts about harmful products 
and drugs – may be vital to public health and safety (Settel 1968, 43). It is also critical for the 
government to convey information about its own programs. Roy Swift, who served as 
Information Officer for the Social Security Administration (SSA), drew a distinction between a 
right to know and a need to know. “If the citizen needs to know something in order to secure his 
rights or to meet his obligations under the law, the SSA cannot wait for him to ask. The 
administration must actively seek him out and inform him.” (1968, 273). Former Secretary of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Wilbur J. Cohen, likewise noted that information 
about available programs has not always reached the poor, but “…explaining the government’s 
programs to the people who must pay for them is as essential in a democracy as developing the 
programs and carrying them out.” (1968, 19-20). 
  The government also depends upon the release of such information in order to function 
effectively. A. James Golato, who served as National Director of the Public Affairs Division of 
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the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, noted that since the U.S. tax system depends 
upon voluntary compliance, it is critical for the agency to reach citizens both to educate them 
about tax laws and to convince them that the law is being applied properly, since “voluntary 
compliance depends to a large extent on the public’s perception and confidence that the tax law 
is being administered uniformly and fairly.” (1981, 82). Public support for specific policies is 
also often critical to their success. Andrew Berding, who served as Assistant Secretary of State 
for Public Affairs, noted that “virtually every major foreign policy needs the physical and 
financial as well as the moral backing of the American people.” If the government does not 
convey its policies well, “other countries and our own citizens give only partial acceptance to an 
idea that should have been warmly welcomed.” (1968, 111, 122). In instances such as these, 
Rourke noted that “the public interest can easily suffer more from the weakness than it does from 
the strength of government publicity.” (1961, 15). 
  Additionally, the government must often spur citizens to action in order to solve 
problems cheaper or more effectively. Lee has noted, for example, that government public 
relations campaigns about the importance of seat belt use have saved lives and are cheaper than 
hiring increased law enforcement to issue violations; campaigns about the importance of hand 
washing are cheaper than the cost of medical personnel to handle flu outbreaks; and Post Office 
campaigns to alert consumers to increased rates are less expensive than returning mail containing 
insufficient postage. “Government agencies can encourage citizens to serve as their eyes and 
ears, thus reducing the need for staffing. For example, when a person chooses to call 911 in an 
emergency, he or she has been co-opted effectively by the police and fire departments to serve as 
a member of its informal organization.” (2012, 21-22). 
  Likewise, William Ruder, who served as Commerce Department Assistant Secretary for 
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Public Affairs, argued that “the problems of environmental pollution, of urban decay, of mass 
transit, of unequal employment opportunity … are not susceptible to solution by the spending of 
money alone. There must be a public commitment to their solution. … The government … must 
learn to engage itself into the dynamics of the community so that the community will have the 
will to solve these problems and make the necessary commitments.” (1968, 81). Finally, the 
government may need to communicate in order to recruit staff (Posner 1968, 289). 
  Public affairs professionals are needed not just to release information, but to be sure that 
the government does so responsibly. Michael Amrine, who served as Public Information Officer 
for the American Psychological Association, noted the importance of understanding people’s 
fears and how they will be unleashed by information – a responsibility that clearly carries over to 
government public affairs as well. Amrine noted that policies were carefully crafted for the 
release of information about progress on cancer cures, to take account of the reactions of 
individuals with terminal cancer and their families (Amrine 1968, 213-214). It is likewise critical 
for the Treasury public information officers in this study to account for possible global market 
reactions to their announcements.   
  Public affairs officers are also responsible for ensuring that information is presented 
clearly; as Pimlott argued, “to publish information which the members of the general public 
cannot understand is certainly to “diffuse” information, but it is not to inform those who receive 
it.” (1951, 80). Furthermore, as Bernard Posner, who served as Deputy Executive Secretary of 
the President’s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, has argued, public affairs 
professionals should be “alert for all sorts of clues to current attitude patterns” so that they can 
channel feedback from the public back into the government (1968, 290). 
  Thus, as Lee has concluded, “public relations can help an agency implement its goals 
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better, faster, cheaper.” (2012, 18).  
 
  The tools and techniques of public relations help reach potential customers and clients,  
  notify the public of new laws and programs, promote the goals of the agency through  
  public service campaigns that encourage (or discourage) certain behaviors, or increase  
  public cooperation with the agency, such as through tip lines and websites. In all these  
  examples, public relations is an inexpensive substitute for hiring more staff, increasing  
  agency enforcement and regulation activities, or expanding field offices. (ibid., 19). 
   
  Some public affairs officials have noted the irony of the fact that, when they do their jobs 
particularly well, their outputs are viewed as sinister. “As long as the government produces 
publications which end up by the thousands in basement warehouses, read by no one, not even 
officials of the sponsoring agency, then no one seems to mind,” Cohen noted. “But as soon as the 
government publishes or produces an information product that is good enough to command 
attention, someone yells competition!” (1968, 21). “If the government information officer wants 
to catch the busy American’s attention, he must turn out a professional product that is as 
attractive, exciting, and compelling as all the other communication products on the market.” 
(ibid., 21). 
  The perspective of practitioners also provides a more nuanced view into situations in 
which others have accused the government of dissembling. Former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Public Affairs William Goulding explained such situations this way: “I misled and 
misinformed the American people a good many times in a good many ways – through my own 
lack of foresight, carelessness, through relaying incomplete information which the originators 
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considered complete, through transmitting reports which had been falsified deliberately at lower 
levels,” he said. “But I never intentionally deceived the people.” (1970, 15). Goulding outlined a 
number of less diabolical reasons why the government sometimes misinforms the people. 
  First, Goulding said, first reports from the field on complicated events are very often 
wrong, yet there is pressure from reporters to release information rapidly (ibid., 19). Matters are 
made more complicated by the challenges of information-gathering within large agencies – the 
staff of the Department of Defense (DoD) was larger than the population of some countries 
(ibid., 118). Additionally, Goulding sometimes misinformed the people when lower-level 
Defense officials misrepresented their own misconduct (ibid., 147, 151). “Every nine-year-old 
televiewer knows that the ten conscientious persons in the bank at the time of the holdup will 
give ten sworn statements which are dramatically different as to the ‘facts’ of the robbery,” 
Goulding argued. “Sergeants, lieutenant commanders, brigadier generals and vice admirals are 
no more perfect.” (ibid., 117). As a result, “too often, in any administration, DoD is charged 
unfairly with deceit or cover-up when it is guilty only of great size and of the human error and 
human delay that are part of great size.” (ibid., 119). At other times, Goulding said, he was 
accused of withholding information when foreign nations whom the United States was dependent 
upon for cooperation would not allow him to share information on activities happening within 
their countries (ibid., 51, 125). 
  In fact, Goulding and other practitioners have insisted that public affairs officials are the 
first to demand the release of damaging information about the government. “Top-level admirals 
in the Navy, concerned that a mistake will be misinterpreted, are reluctant to acknowledge that a 
search-and-rescue ship misunderstood a message and steamed in the wrong direction for four 
hours, but the information officer knows the story will surface eventually and wants to get it out, 
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on the record, before the people, on the Navy’s terms instead of as an acknowledgement beaten 
out of the government by the press,” he said. “The experienced information officer knows the 
press. He knows that extreme statements or phony ones will not hold up; that, for example, the 
effort to hide a foolish attempt by a foolish Army commander to solicit free whiskey from 
merchants for a base party will fail. A good information officer always will attempt to tell his 
commander to face up to the errors publicly and get them behind him.” (ibid., 46).  Grossman 
and Kumar concurred that “since presidents and leading advisers often believe that it is best to 
tell the public less than everything, a press secretary often has to convince them that they would 
be best served by ‘going the hangout route’ (a Watergate expression meaning that it is better to 
give out bad news yourself because it will look worse if it appears to have been concealed).” 
(1981, 150). Similarly, in his interviews of reporters and public affairs officers, Nimmo found 
that “both sets of political communicators agreed that withholding of information from the public 
view is an evil.” (1964, 180). 
  Other public affairs officials overwhelmingly at least claim that they release negative 
information in the belief that it is counterproductive to attempt to withhold or dissemble because 
the press will eventually find out – and such efforts will have therefore only served to exacerbate 
their problems (Brown 1976, 34; Cutlip 1976, 6; Goulding 1970, 46; Krohn 2004, 36; McClellan 
2008, 51). Roy Hoopes, who served as Consultant to the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare’s Office of Public Information advised, “above all, no information officer should try to 
persuade a writer that everything is perfect. If mistakes have been made, the agency should admit 
them. If the author is a good reporter, he is going to find them sooner or later anyway.” (1968, 
333-334). In a 1979 study of members of the National Association of Government 
Communicators, ninety-two percent said they would provide information to the public even if it 
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were “embarrassing,” though of course it is easier to make such claims in the abstract. (Rabin 
1981, 109). Likewise, in their study of White House communications, Grossman and Kumar 
concluded that “there are few people who work as White House aides in the area of political 
communications who do not understand that … reporters should get answers to their questions, 
and that honesty is the best policy – or at least that outright lying is usually disastrous.” (1981, 
306). 
  A further check on the government is the presence of individuals and organizations with 
competing agendas who have incentives to correct the record if the government dissembles. In 
one of the first studies of government public affairs officers in 1939, McCamy noted that “the 
publicists of other interests and opposition parties can be on the job to keep government 
publicists from dominating the field.”(19). Similarly, Pimlott’s 1951 study of government public 
relations found that “releases are prepared in the knowledge that they will be exposed to the 
expert scrutiny of other newspapermen and of watchful Congressmen.” (148). As a result, he 
found, “the very suspicion that the truth may not be told sets a premium upon scrupulous 
accuracy about verifiable facts, and on many matters the public receives fuller and more reliable 
information than would otherwise have been the case.” (ibid., 213). Rourke also noted that the 
media industry has strong incentives to ensure that the government is not able to conceal 
information, because “the press itself makes a living off the news.” (1961, 217). He argued: “The 
brashness of American newspapermen in ferreting out information is legendary, and this, 
coupled with the hound-dog inquisitiveness of Congress, makes it impossible to keep very many 
things secret in American government today merely because they are embarrassing.” (ibid., 188).  
  The media’s suspicion of government is a deeply imbued value. Rourke has noted that  
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  in accordance with the ‘muckracking’ tradition of American politics, the reporter in this  
  country ordinarily conceives of his or her appropriate role as that of exposing the  
  misdeeds of public officials … representatives of the media as a group commonly  
  cultivate an attitude of cynical disbelief toward statements and activities at ‘city hall’ – a  
  term embracing executive agencies at all levels of government. This attitude creates a  
  built-in ‘credibility gap’ of substantial dimensions between media personnel and  
  government officials, and strongly reinforces the independence of reporters. (1984, 172).  
 
  Lee concurred that “the negative view of government in American journalism is as old as 
America itself. The American revolutionary war was justified as a reaction to tyranny.”  He 
noted that “therefore, the ethos of American journalism was that its raison d’etre was to cover 
government critically.” (2008, 88). As Morgan has also reminded us, the media in the United 
States enjoy more freedom than the press in virtually any other nation (1986, 147). Rourke also 
noted that government agencies are required by law to release much information; “failure to do 
so might bring them under legal or political attack for concealing information from the public.” 
(1961, 191). 
  Lee has argued that media coverage of government agencies focuses so heavily on 
covering stories with familiar archetypes, such as the “money-wasting bureaucrat” and “the 
victim of bureaucracy,” that government public affairs officers have had no choice but to strike 
back with sophisticated counter-strategies. (1999, 459). Joseph P. Viteritti has likewise argued 
that the press “has a serious point of view that often borders on bias, and it frequently loses its 
balance on the precarious wire-thin line between reporting and editorializing. … If managing the 
press is a form of manipulation, it is also a survival skill that assists the public administrator in 
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transmitting information without distortion.” (2008, 328).  
  Furthermore, the skepticism of the American people themselves may be seen as a further 
democratic check on the ability of government public relations efforts to dupe them. As Altheide 
and Johnson have argued, “in the United States, as well as other modern societies, the search for 
the self-serving and self-interested character of official records is always part of the scrutiny and 
doubt with which these populations greet governmental and corporate organizations … the 
American public is hardly a ‘pushover’ for official rhetoric or records.” (1980, xiii). 
  Additionally, the checking of official statements from other parts of the government 
springs from America’s Constitutional system of divided, competing branches. As Rourke 
memorably noted, “in the pluralist environment that is the essence of democracy, government 
never monopolizes all the instruments of persuasion, and under the American system of 
separation of powers, it is even possible to find the opposition entrenched within the structure of 
government itself.” (1961, 203). “The existence of competing centers of power within society 
serves to guarantee that official pronouncements will not go uncontested, if there is any question 
of their accuracy on matters of fact or interpretation, and it insures that efforts to conceal 
information will be subject to frequent challenge.” (ibid., 216). He noted that a further check is 
“the vigorous competition within the cadres of bureaucracy - … which spills over and manifests 
itself in the form of public exposure by one agency of suppression or distortion of information in 
which another agency is alleged to be engaged.” (ibid., 221).  
  Leon Sigal likewise argued that it is America’s constitutional structure that results in the 
release of more information in the United States than in Britain (1973, 131). As Carlton Spitzer, 
who served as Director of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s Office of 
Public Information, put it:  
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  government public information officers can be as guilty of propagandizing narrow causes  
  and clouding issues as any huckster on New York’s Seventh Avenue, and usually with far  
  more serious consequences. But only the foolish or misguided would participate in such  
  schemes because they are doomed to failure. The whole system of government in 
  America is open and fragmented. Employees in various agencies are not necessarily on 
  the same side of all issues, although they may occupy the same offices. Leaking 
  information is common practice. Public information workers cannot act merely as  
  creatures of the Congress or spokesmen for the current administration. Their moves and  
  statements are scrutinized and challenged by a skeptical press and critical private-interest  
   associations of every kind.” (1968, 53-54). 
  
 Another reason for this strategy of preemptive release is that if information were 
withheld, when the truth eventually did surface, the government would lose all credibility – with 
the American people and with the press. Goulding, for example, wrote that he regretted that the 
government did not preemptively explain to the American people the inevitable death and 
destruction the war in Vietnam would wreak on local peoples. When the New York Times 
covered the deaths of civilians and destruction of homes, Americans were shocked – contributing 
to distrust of the U.S. government and lessening support for the war (1970, 89). Spitzer noted 
that “Americans respond with strength and determination to discouraging news if the news is 
honestly presented and a course of action is outlined. But the American people, like good editors, 
rarely if ever forgive a lie” – although eventually their memories may fade (1968, 63). Hiebert 
cited social science research indicating that humans are most susceptible to persuasion when they 
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hear events for the first time as further ammunition for why upfront disclosure makes strategic 
sense. (Hiebert 1981, 10). 
  Numerous public affairs officials also report that misinforming the press for whatever 
reason cripples one’s reputation and ability to do their job (Goulding 1970, 23). President George 
W. Bush’s Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, explained that “the job of the White House press 
secretary isn’t to say everything you know to be true, but everything you say had better be true.” 
(2005, 246). President George W. Bush’s next Press Secretary, Scott McClellan, resigned after 
two top administration officials – Senior Adviser Karl Rove and Chief of Staff to the Vice 
President “Scooter” Libby – both gave him personal assurances they were not involved in the 
leak of the identity of C.I.A. officer Valerie Plame, which later turned out to be false (McClellan 
2008, 219, 260). McClellan reported that “unknowingly passing along a falsehood … would 
ultimately prove fatal to my ability to serve the president effectively.” (ibid., 3). Grossman and 
Kumar likewise found that “when reporters, editors, and others concerned with covering the 
President do not trust them, press secretaries lose their usefulness to news organizations and thus 
to the President as well.” (1981, 131). “Thus public information officers and their peers must 
hold to the truth and remain faithful to the facts of any issue in order to survive.” (Spitzer 1968, 
54). Yet the ability to maintain the trust and confidence of the press is at least partly a personal 
skill; Grossman and Kumar, for example, noted that while President Nixon’s Press Secretary, 
Ronald Ziegler, was unable to maintain the trust of the White House press corps, when his 
deputy, Gerald Warren, began replacing him at briefings, the reporters believed Warren even 
though he conveyed the exact same information (1981, 155).  
  Rourke indicated that one of the reasons why “administrative officials are quite defensive 
about withholding information and are reluctant to persist in practices of secrecy when these 
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practices are exposed to public view or come under congressional criticism” is because “the 
political beliefs of administrators have been framed in the same ideological tradition as those of 
Congressmen and newspaper editors.” (1961, 109-110). The academic training of many 
government public affairs officials in journalism may also impart values that cause them to 
eschew conveying “mistruths.” In a recent survey by the Society of Professional Journalists and 
National Association of Government Communicators of 154 members of the Association – 
eighty-nine percent of whom worked as public affairs officers – fifty-two percent of the officials 
reported that they had previously worked as a journalist and 47.3 percent reported that their 
principal area of study in their education was journalism (Carlson and Jackson 2013, 12-13). 
  Another indication of the limited capability of public affairs officials to manipulate 
information is the argument of former White House Press Secretary, George Reedy, that what 
presidents consider to be problems with media coverage more often reflect problems in the real 
world that the White House is powerless to present as otherwise. “Unfortunately for the mental 
peace of presidents, events cannot be altered significantly by control over the printed word ... 
While the White House does have at its command instrumentalities for manipulating the press, 
they are effective only in regard to adjectives, not to the hard, substantive news that is the 
ultimate shaper of public opinion.” (1970, 107). Reedy reported that “it is only in George 
Orwell’s world that war can be labeled peace.” (ibid., 106). 
  Goulding allowed that the government sometimes conceals information to protect 
national security.  “In determining what information is to be made public, the government must 
and does take into account the effect the release of that information will have on sovereign states 
which are friendly to us, allied with us, neutral about us, potentially hostile or outright enemies.” 
(1970, 20). He also argued that it is sometimes proper for the government to give false 
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information to protect intelligence operations. “It is too bad that we need to engage in illegal 
intelligence activity in this imperfect world, but it is necessary for our liberty that we do so.”  
(ibid., 126). 
   At other times, government officials may be accused of secrecy when it would be 
premature and counterproductive to discuss policies because they are still in development.  For 
example, when New York Times correspondent James Reston met with Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson on the Secretary’s last day in office, Acheson is said to have told Reston that it would 
have been impossible for them to have had a better relationship. “A Secretary of State, Acheson 
said, has to germinate new policies and to nurse them along until they have reached the stage of 
development when they can withstand the battering assaults of the political arena. The reporter’s 
primary purpose, on the other hand, is to get news for his paper no matter what the effect on 
policy.” (Cater 1959, 20). 
  Beyond and sometimes despite these circumstances, however, these authors say that 
public affairs officials advocate within their governments for the release of information. After 
spending a year observing the press offices of the White House, Pentagon, Department of State, 
Department of Transportation, and Federal Drug Administration, Stephen Hess concluded that 
“if they were invited to view press operations from the inside, many reporters would be surprised 
to see the extent to which the press officer is their advocate within the permanent government.” 
(1984, 35).  
  It should also be noted that, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), it is illegal 
for the government to withhold information from the public. The Act contains nine exemptions 
allowing the government to withhold information related to national security; trade practices; 
personnel practices; certain inter- and intra-agency messages; information exempted from 
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disclosure by statute; and certain personnel, medical, law enforcement, and financial regulatory 
records. In one of his first official acts, President Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of 
executive departments and agencies, directing them to “adopt a presumption in favor of 
disclosure” in responding to FOIA queries, quoting the maxim of former Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” (Obama 2009). Of course, 
the administration has been accused of improperly withholding national security information, 
particularly in the wake of the leaks by former CIA staffer Edward Snowden; veteran CBS News 
anchor Bob Schieffer recently described the Obama administration as “the most manipulative 
and secretive administration I’ve covered.” (Downie 2013). 
  However, while a significant amount of government information is withheld and cannot 
be corroborated (particularly regarding national security), the presumption of disclosure and 
substantial amount of information that is disclosed annually can only promote the comportment 
of government claims with reality, since public affairs officers know that reporters can utilize the 
law to obtain documents to corroborate their accounts. Reporters can (and do) even file FOIA 
requests for the correspondence of public affairs officials about their inquiries. 
  For similar reasons, these authors claim that the government is not guilty of engaging in 
propaganda. Goulding reported that  
 
  ‘propaganda’ is another color word which to me suggests sugar-coating information so  
  that the public swallows it, or deliberately repeating a false concept so often that the  
  public accepts it. I have seen no Assistant Secretary of Defense engage in propaganda of  
  this description, either in my four years in government or in fifteen years as a Washington  
  newspaperman, and I know of no evidence supporting any charge of this nature. (1970,  
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  165). 
 
   As for Fulbright’s charges that the Department of Defense promotes militarism, 
Goulding claimed the very reverse to be true; he said he coordinated funding requests and 
regularly forced various parts of the Pentagon to limit them (ibid., 160, 162). 
  Part of the reason that government public affairs officials eschew propagandizing may be 
that if the government tried to “spin” facts too obviously, they would be criticized for so doing 
(Helms 2012, 661). But Goulding claimed that when he worked in the government, there simply 
was no organized apparatus for going beyond the release of information actually to attempt to 
explain policy to the American people (1970, 81). 
  The claim is consistent with Hess’ fieldwork.  Hess reported that “the most frequent and 
serious charge against press offices- that they manage, manipulate, or control the news – I found 
inaccurate for an almost perverse reason: they are simply not skillful enough or large enough to 
manipulate the news.”  (1984, 108). “The view from inside a press office is that most energy 
seems to be devoted to trying to find out what the rest of the agency is doing (often 
unsuccessfully), gathering material that has been requested by reporters rather than promoting 
carefully prepared positions, and distributing information that is neither controversial nor 
especially self-serving.” (ibid., 108). 
  Hess found that public affairs officers engage in four key activities: “informing 
themselves and their colleagues, preparing material for the news media, staging events, and 
responding to reporters’ inquiries.” (ibid., 38). He noted that the amount of time that such 
officials spend being proactive – as opposed to reacting to reporters – is an useful gauge of the 
opportunity for manipulation. This distinction will be useful for me in this study of public affairs 
101 
 
officials. Hess, for example, found “that press offices spend as much time responding to 
reporters’ inquiries as they do on all other activities combined. Given that a substantial number 
of hours are devoted to keeping themselves informed and to pursuing internal agency business, 
not more than a quarter of their time is left for staging events and preparing material for the news 
media.” (ibid., 53). 
  In the end, Hess concluded that “most of their activities behind closed doors as well as in 
briefing rooms are merely variations of shouting good news and whispering bad news.” (ibid., 
111). In other words, government public affairs officers try to convey the best possible 
impressions of their agencies. It is unclear that this is different from normal human behavior. 
Erving Goffman’s seminal work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, for example, 
depicted all people as active managers of the impressions they give to others in social situations 
(1959, 4). In this sense, public affairs officers are singled out and criticized for doing what 
normal people do virtually every waking moment of their lives! 
 Furthermore, in his interviews, Nimmo found that reporters believed that government 
publicity was both necessary and positive, since it is only through the leadership of public 
opinion that federal officials are able to build the support they need in order to govern (1964, 
184-185).  He reported that “given a choice between the danger of being used by political 
officials for partisan purposes and being spared such danger by being shut out of policy matters, 
reporters consistently prefer the hazards of being manipulated.” (ibid., 199). 
  While Hess found that such officials do not blatantly lie or propagandize, they do, 
however, often tell what he calls “half-truths” by defining questions narrowly (1984, 25). “Press 
officers hedge, they insinuate, but I always felt they thought they were playing by rules that 
reporters understood.” (ibid., 112).  Furthermore, he noted, “it is by unraveling the half-truths 
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that reporters display their professional skill; consequently, they too have a vested interest in 
maintaining this system despite whatever personal beliefs they have about government’s 
obligation to tell the truth.” (ibid., 25). 
   Of course, nearly all truths are partial in the first place, given the vast array of possible 
details that could possibly be utilized to describe any particular situation, as well as the influence 
that the describer’s personal values and perspective has on how they interpret events and 
determine what they believe to be most important and relevant. Nevertheless, public information 
officers clearly have an incentive and opportunity to place their facts in the best possible light, 
and it is undeniable that it would generally be better for citizens if they were more eager to share 
their bad news. However, it is not at all obvious that any other system would or could be better – 
especially in light of our basic human nature that Goffman has explored.  
  Stanley Kelley, Jr., for example, has studied the system that existed before government 
public affairs officers. National leaders could not obtain party consensus or authority because 
voters were reached through fragmented local party bosses. “The importance of the boss’s role in 
political maneuverings … encouraged a de-emphasis on issues in American party conflict. … the 
boss’s appeal to the voter was not primarily on issues and particularly not on national ones. His 
entire effort was rather to tie himself, through patronage and favor, a bloc of votes on which he 
could rely regardless of policy debates and regardless of candidates.”  What was neglected was 
building “the ability of men to understand the issues of policy, to discuss, and to govern for 
themselves – these are articles of faith that lie at the center of democratic thought.” (1966, 217). 
Thus, while Kelley allowed that the possibility for distortion and oversimplification by 
government public affairs officers is present, and while allegations regarding the permanent 
campaign make clear that, today, issues are certainly not always debated in the level of detail 
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they perhaps call for, “what one is criticizing cannot be contrasted with a past age in American 
politics when public issues were sincerely presented and soundly argued.” (ibid., 218). 
  Yet the limited and now very dated literature available to us on public affairs officers in 
government agencies makes it particularly important to bring these studies up to date with 
evidence from the modern, new media era. 
 
Conclusion 
  Which side is right? Are government officials on a “permanent campaign” to build 
support for the president, distorting and withholding the information they provide to the media in 
the process? Or are they servants of the people, providing the information citizens need to judge 
and participate fully in our democracy? These accounts make clear that, like other humans and 
comic book action heroes, government public affairs officers have the capacity to use their 
power for good or for sinister purposes. However, as previously discussed, government public 
affairs officers have been mostly neglected in a literature that has focused on the White House, 
and the important account of Stephen Hess is now three decades old. This study will therefore 
shed light on this question and bring the literature up to date by questioning modern government 
public affairs officers about their practices, in order to gain greater clarity on their tactics, 
techniques, and views of their roles.  
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Chapter 3: Theories and Research Design 
  I have already demonstrated the importance of these questions (in the Introduction) and 
reviewed how the extant literature raises more questions than it answers (Chapters 1 and 2).  In 
this chapter, I build upon the previously-reviewed literature to develop my own theories and 
research design regarding the two central issues of this study: (1) whether political appointees or 
civil servants better serve the interests of presidents of the United States in key positions; and (2) 
whether political appointees in government agencies are conducting a permanent campaign.  
  My theories are informed by logical extensions of the academic literature, as well as by 
observations from my own experience serving as Spokesperson for International Affairs in the 
Treasury Department, as a political appointee in President Obama’s administration from 2011-
2012.  
 
Theories To Be Tested 
Civil Servants vs. Political Appointees 
   This study is designed to test two theories. First, I argue that efforts by modern presidents 
to improve their efficacy by hiring more political appointees have been counterproductive. I 
expect that, in positions critical to the president’s agenda and political fortunes, civil servants 
will be found to be more effective and no less loyal to the president than political appointees.  
  I define effectiveness as success in advancing the administration’s goals. In my study, I 
consider an effective public affairs officer to be one who is able to shape the tone, volume, and 
content of media coverage in order to reflect positively on the administration he or she serves 
and advance the administration’s policy arguments. I define loyalty as the pursuit of the 
president’s goals – even when they conflict with an official’s own personal goals. This study 
105 
 
investigates the practice of disloyalty, using the prevalence of leaking unauthorized information 
to the press as a measure.  I define leaks as information given without attribution to reporters 
which does not further the interests of the administration and would not be approved by an 
official’s supervisors – in contrast to plants, which I define as information given to reporters 
without attribution which does further the interests of the administration and would be approved 
by the official’s supervisors.   
  As discussed in chapter 1, a variety of evidence indicates that civil servants perform 
better on the job than political appointees (Heclo 1977; Lewis 2008). Yet, as we have seen, 
American presidents continue to use political appointees in unprecedented numbers globally. 
George C. Edwards III has questioned whether presidents accept the lower competence of 
political appointees because they believe that appointees offer greater loyalty (2001, 81). 
However, this would only make sense if civil servants were less loyal to the president – a 
proposition that I argue is false.    
  In my study of Treasury public affairs officers, I expect to find that the relative 
effectiveness of political appointees with the press is diminished by several factors.  
  First, I expect civil servants to be more effective because political appointees tend to have 
bigger portfolios and operate in more of a pressure-cooker environment, which likely leaves 
them lacking the capacity to engage in the proactive practices of good communications 
professionals – such as crafting strategies in advance, pitching stories (rather than focusing solely 
on responding to inquiries from reporters), and coordinating with counterparts across the 
government. (Of course, civil service rules generally limit the number of hours that careerists can 
work, but even if careerists were assigned bigger portfolios, I suspect that they would still retain 
an advantage over appointees because their greater policy knowledge, which will be discussed 
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below, would allow them to respond to reporters more rapidly.)   
 Second, I expect that political appointees spend a greater percentage of their time focused 
on the images of the officials for whom they work than their career counterparts; while a positive 
image of the president’s Treasury team is ultimately beneficial to an administration, in my 
estimation the president benefits more from positive coverage of his policies and achievements. 
  Third, the shorter tenure of political appointees likely gives them less knowledge of the 
issues they are responsible for communicating in the press and weaker relationships with the 
reporters who cover their agencies. After spending a year observing the public affairs offices of 
the White House and several government agencies, Stephen Hess reported that “government 
public information practitioners … frequently lack the fundamental awareness and understanding 
of a given situation to either provide public affairs counsel to decision-makers or even respond 
adequately to media queries regarding public policy, particularly during crisis.” (1984, 228). Yet 
one of the most critical qualities of a successful spokesperson is being well-informed (Grossman 
and Kumar 1981, 149). In Morgan’s survey, he found that the biggest complaint reporters had 
about public information officers was their lack of technical knowledge (1986, 74). 
  Other scholars have further warned that overreliance on appointees crowds out the 
knowledge and input of civil servants, who typically amass decades of experience in the 
minutiae of their policy portfolios, equipping them to offer critical advice to appointees. As 
Hugh Heclo has argued, “the independence entailed in neutral competence does not exist for its 
own sake; it exists precisely in order to serve the aims of elected partisan leadership.” (1975, 81). 
Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman put it more bluntly: “one of the major functions … of the 
permanent apparatus is to serve presidents by helping them avoid stupid mistakes that threaten 
their political viability.” (1999, 171). Yet when the government becomes too top-heavy with 
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appointees, decisions lack this central input. 
  As a result of this tenure-based expertise, David Cohen has argued that civil servants are 
actually well-placed to advise appointees on political matters, because they are accustomed to 
working in an environment which requires taking account of the objectives of Congress, interest 
groups and other parties. Ironically, Cohen reported, “inexperienced political appointees often 
have far less sound political judgment.” (1996, 10). This claim is seemingly born out by Andrew 
Rudalevidge’s study of legislation proposed by presidents between 1949-1996. He found that 
bills written in departments and agencies (which, by implication, involved greater input from 
civil servants) had a fifteen percent higher likelihood of passing in Congress than legislation 
drafted in the White House (2002, 156). Of course, it is possible that bills drafted in agencies 
were more technical or less polemical, making it easier for them to gain support. However, the 
possibility that civil servants could more effectively advance an administration’s agenda is a 
fascinating proposition worthy of further investigation. 
 Ronald Johnson and Gary Libecap have further discussed the ways in which the civil 
service system serves the interests of the president by promoting government efficacy. They 
have noted that the civil service was extended by presidents McKinley and Cleveland, 
specifically to meet the needs of the executive (1994, 13, 72-73). While the fully patronage-
based system that previously existed generated inefficiency, fraud, and scandals, the civil service 
system allows presidents to meet the demands of their constituents for the more efficient delivery 
of government services by improving the quality of the government workforce (ibid., 14, 20, 24). 
Furthermore, the use of civil servants allows presidents to avoid becoming completely besieged 
by jobseekers, as they were under the solely patronage-based system – resulting in significant 
time savings for the executive (ibid., 56-57). Johnson and Libecap observed that the same 
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incentives remain for presidents today (ibid., 171) – although, ironically, as a result of 
politicization, modern presidents today also have more aides to handle personnel matters. 
  Furthermore, I expect to find that, very often, the president does not necessarily need 
appointees in some of the positions they currently fill because their duties are not very political. 
Since the 1970s, Congress has significantly increased its oversight of federal agencies (Aberbach 
1991). The Treasury and other agencies are therefore obliged by law to operate in certain highly 
specific ways. Therefore, staffers enjoy little discretion on many tasks – such as, for example, the 
release of congressionally-mandated economic indicators. 
  However, I expect the greater overall efficacy of civil servants to be somewhat 
diminished by efficacy advantages which the appointees possess. I expect that, relative to their 
careerist counterparts, appointees have better access to information, work on more high profile 
issues, and their superiors make more time for them because they place greater importance on the 
press. This would give appointees better, faster access to information in order to make their cases 
to reporters and would allow appointees to offer more interviews to reporters with senior 
administration officials in order to shape media coverage. 
  In my study of the loyalty of government officials, I expect to find that appointees are no 
more loyal to the president than civil servants. I suspect that this is partly due to the different 
selection processes for civil servants and political appointees, which influence their propensity to 
leak information to the press. While civil servants only advance in their careers if they follow 
strict protocols, political appointees are rewarded for more independent and riskier behavior. 
Political appointees also operate in a more political and high-profile environment in which there 
are greater advantages to be obtained from the outcomes of leaks – such as weakening rivals or 
doing favors for members of the press who will consider the value of their relationship when 
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judging them in future stories.  Furthermore, unlike civil servants, political appointees do not 
enjoy tenure – incentivizing them to focus more heavily on bolstering their future career 
prospects through strategies such as fostering relationships with reporters. I therefore expect that, 
contrary to claims that civil servants will not be loyal to the president, this study will find that it 
is political appointees who are more likely to leak information to reporters that does not serve 
the president’s agenda. 
  This unconventional expectation is actually supported in the literature. As David Pozen 
has noted, “journalists, researchers, and government insiders have consistently attested that 
leaking is far more common among those in leadership positions.” (2013, 12). For example, 
legendary New York Times correspondent and editor James Reston concluded that “government 
is the only known vessel that leaks from the top.” (1967, 66). James Pfiffner likewise argued that 
“incidents like … leaks to the press will surface in any administration, but as likely as not they 
will be instigated by the president’s own political appointees.” (1996, 85). “Perhaps the greatest 
frustration for presidents,” Hess suggested, “is when they are forced to realize that most 
executive branch leakers are their own people - political appointees - rather than the faceless 
bureaucrats they campaigned against.” (1984, 76). In his memoir, former Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates likewise described President Obama as being infuriated over leaks, explaining that 
while his agency was often accused of being the source of such leaks, “the president would 
acknowledge to me he had problems with leaks in his own shop.” (2014, 358). 
 However, in studies of the loyalty of civil servants, leaks have never before been utilized 
as a measure. Rather, as I will later discuss, myriad previous studies have attempted to measure 
civil service loyalty by testing whether agency outputs conform with presidential goals. 
Furthermore, what we know about leaks is largely anecdotal. My study attempts to address these 
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gaps. 
  I further expect that civil servants will be unlikely to engage in politically-motivated acts 
of disloyalty to an administration because the civil servants will not have particularly partisan 
views in the first place. I suspect that individuals with strong political views would choose a 
different, less constraining, line of work. The explosion of ideological think tanks and interest 
groups over the past several decades has created a plethora of job opportunities for policy 
professionals who are also politically ideological. 
 In addition, I hypothesize that the perceived greater loyalty of appointees to the president 
actually works to the president’s disadvantage. I suspect that because appointees are viewed as 
political, reporters may be more skeptical of their claims. For example, in his study of 
government public affairs officers, David Morgan noted that “there exist a number of media 
relations advisers brought in by political appointees. Such people are themselves typically 
responsible only for selling their bosses, not the agency or department. Reporters certainly see 
such ‘boss flacks’ that way and treat them accordingly.” (1986, xi). Likewise, Judy VanSlyke 
Turk’s study of six state government agencies in Louisiana found that public affairs officers 
“who view their role as providers of persuasive ‘propaganda’ that serves the interests of their 
agencies are less successful in obtaining newspaper acceptance and use of their news releases 
and other ‘handouts’ than are public information representatives who view themselves merely as 
providers of information regardless of whether that information is persuasive.” (1986, 7). (Of 
course, these studies are now significantly dated – evincing the need for more recent research on 
this subject.) 
  Therefore, while I expect that civil servants will be found to be both more competent and 
no less loyal than political appointees, I argue that the perceived greater loyalty of appointees to 
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the president actually works to the disadvantage of the chief executive, by hampering the 
effectiveness of his appointee advocates. 
 
 The Permanent Campaign 
  The workloads of political appointees are well-documented to be massive (Bonafede 
1987).  I therefore suspect that their large volume of responsibilities will be found to preclude 
them from engaging in the more sophisticated techniques of the permanent campaign – providing 
a rather extraordinary mechanism of democratic protection. As a result, I expect to find little 
difference between political appointees and civil servants in the degree to which they are 
engaged in the permanent campaign tactics of utilizing public opinion polls to govern, playing to 
the emotions of the American people, and withholding and distorting information. I suspect that 
the activities of both groups are limited to more traditional tasks, such as releasing factual data 
and information about agency activities to the press and attempting to place such information in 
the best possible light and in congruence with the goals of the administration – not engaging in a 
permanent campaign.  Furthermore, I suspect that the values of the journalism profession, such as 
faithfulness to facts, will cause public affairs officers to be willing to present facts and ideas in 
the most convincing and beneficial manner to the administration possible, but unwilling to distort 
or withhold information. In a 2013 survey by the Society of Professional Journalists and National 
Association of Government Communicators of 154 members of the Association (eighty-nine 
percent of whom worked as public affairs officers), fifty-two percent of the officials reported that 
they had previously worked as a journalist and 47.3 percent reported that their principal area of 
study in their education was journalism (Carlson and Jackson 2013, 12-13). And in one of the 
few previous studies ever to conduct interviews with public affairs officials in government 
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agencies, Dan Nimmo reported that the officials told him that “withholding of information from 
the public view is an evil.” (1964, 180). Of course, the evidence considered in chapter 2 makes 
clear that government spokespeople have certainly withheld and distorted information. However, 
I suspect that those who study journalism may be somewhat less willing to do so, as a result of 
the values imbued during the course of their educations. 
   I expect that the public affairs officers will report that attempts to convey mistruths would 
be counterproductive. As discussed in chapter 2, in America’s system of divided government and 
media scrutiny, attempts to cover up information are unlikely to be successful for very long, 
since someone will have an incentive to leak whatever facts are being withheld or distorted.  (Of 
course, it is difficult to identify information that is withheld and not exposed by other actors – 
another reason why this research is so important, because I will ask public affairs officers how 
often they withhold information). 
  I therefore theorize that, in my interviews, civil servants will be found to be more 
competent and no less loyal than political appointees – and neither group will be found to be 
engaging in the tactics of the permanent campaign. 
 
Research Design 
  In this section, I discuss how these arguments will be tested in my case study. First, I 
discuss the selection of public affairs officers, and Treasury officials specifically, as 
representatives of the “career” and “appointee” categories in my theory. Next, I discuss the 
qualitative data collection process (interviews) utilized in this study and how I will 
operationalize the conceptual variables in my theory. 
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Case Study Selection 
  Public affairs officers were selected for this study because of their outsize importance to 
the president. The most potent weapon in the arsenal of modern presidents is widely believed to 
be their power to communicate – making the jobs of officials who communicate on behalf of the 
president particularly important.    
  Richard Neustadt revolutionized scholarship about the presidency when, borrowing the 
words of President Truman, he claimed that “presidential power is the power to persuade.” 
(1991, 10). Neustadt argued that since America’s leaders share authority but do not have 
influence over whether other officials hold their jobs, the only way for the president to convince 
other politicians to do what he wishes is to persuade them that doing so is in their own interests 
(ibid., 29-30). Presidents may increase their power by burnishing their reputations and public 
support, since other Washingtonians take account of the level of public support the president 
enjoys in assessing the consequences they will face for disagreeing with him. (ibid., 55, 73). 
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. likewise influentially argued that “it has been the relationship between 
President and public that has given this office its power and importance.” (1969, 3). Lacking any 
formal constitutional authority to dictate the law beyond the veto, “the leverage the President has 
acquired in the law-making process has been indirect, based on use of the arts of persuasion, and 
ultimately grounded in the popular support he can claim or mobilize.” (ibid., 4).  
  Of course, Edwards takes issue with this theory because he finds that presidents 
(including the “giants” such as Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Reagan, have largely been 
unsuccessful in their attempts to persuade other actors (2009, 21). Edwards instead argues that 
chief executives act as more modest “facilitators” who “understand the opportunities for change 
in their environments and fashion strategies and tactics to exploit them” (ibid., 12). However, he 
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has argued that presidents “cannot reshape the contours of the political landscape” through the 
art of persuasion (ibid., 189). This raises the possibility that my study could find that neither 
appointees nor civil servants were able to effectively shape media coverage on behalf of the 
administrations they served. 
 One of the tools that modern presidents use in their efforts to persuade is the platform 
which President Theodore Roosevelt famously named the “bully pulpit.” The nation’s twenty-
sixth president did not intend the phrase to contain diabolical implications; in the vernacular of 
his day “bully” meant “first-rate” or “excellent,” reflecting Roosevelt’s estimation that with the 
office came an opportunity to reach a wide audience which was beneficial. The bully pulpit is 
perceived to be particularly powerful because it is a prerogative all the president’s own, 
unencumbered by the other branches of government (Muir 1995, 14). 
  Modern presidents are availing themselves of this power more than ever. Presidential 
communications proliferated dramatically in the twentieth century. Jeffrey Tulis calculated that 
nineteenth-century presidents delivered a grand total of about 1,000 speeches – or an average of 
ten per year (1987, 16). By contrast, George C. Edwards III noted that, on average, President 
Clinton spoke in public 550 times per year (2003, 3). Furthermore, while nineteenth-century 
presidents had significant opportunities to speak to the people, they largely declined to do so, 
instead communicating in written messages addressed to the Congress. In the nineteenth century, 
less than one percent of presidential communications were delivered verbally. Today, presidents 
speak directly to the people: in the twentieth century, forty-two percent of presidential 
communications were delivered orally (Tulis 1987, 139).  
  If the source of the modern presidency’s power indeed lies in communications, then the 
members of the executive branch who develop and execute communications must be particularly 
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important to the president.  Even if Edwards is correct that the power that presidents exercise is 
limited to exploiting opportunities which exist in the environment rather than creating new ones, 
it is especially important to the president that those who “facilitate” on his behalf be effective. As 
Edwards explained, “change is not inevitable, and facilitators make things happen that otherwise 
would not. Effective facilitators are skilled leaders who must recognize the opportunities that 
exist in their environments, choose which opportunities to pursue, when and in what order, and 
exploit them with skill, energy, perseverance, and will.” (2009, 12).  
  Furthermore, the mere fact that they shape media coverage makes public affairs officers 
key staffers for the president, since as discussed in the previous chapter, press reporting 
significantly influences public opinion. It is for this reason that federal public affairs officers 
were selected for this case study. 
  More specifically, public affairs officials who work on economic issues for the 
Department of the Treasury and its bureaus were selected for this study because they are 
especially vital communicators. The Treasury is one of the four original cabinet agencies created 
by President George Washington, which Thomas Cronin has classified as “the inner, or 
counseling, cabinet positions … vested with high-priority responsibilities.” (1980, 276-277).  
Since modern chief executives assumed responsibility for the performance of the economy 
during the New Deal era, there have been few – if any – subjects more important to the president. 
Voters heavily prioritize the economy, given that the jobs, and thus livelihoods, of most citizens 
depend upon the performance of the nation’s economy. Since the 1946 inception of the Gallup 
poll asking Americans to name the most important problem the country faces, the economy has 
typically dominated (Wood 2007, 7-8). Re-election challengers most frequently criticize 
incumbent presidents over their handling of the economy (ibid., 59-60). 
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  As a result, a large literature has consistently confirmed that the president’s public 
approval ratings and re-election prospects are closely correlated with the state of the economy. 
Incumbents reap the benefits of strong economies and suffer electoral punishment for negative 
economic conditions – or, as Edward Tufte memorably declared, “as goes economic 
performance, so goes the election.” (Tufte 1978, 137; Erikson 1989; Lewis-Beck and Tien 2004; 
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Nickelsburg and Norpoth 2000). Robert Erikson, for example, 
found that income change during the previous administration was a better predictor of the 
outcome of the next presidential election than whether voters even liked the candidates (1989, 
568). Michael Nickelsburg and Helmut Norpoth studied University of Michigan Surveys of 
Consumers and New York Times/CBS News polls from 1976-1996 and found that a president’s 
handling of the economy is as important to his public approval ratings as his handling of foreign 
policy (2000, 313). Additionally, in a 1992 study, Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice 
found that, in all but one U.S. presidential election between 1948-1988, when the unemployment 
rate was declining, the incumbent or his party won the presidency – but when unemployment 
was not improving, the incumbent or his party lost (32).  
 However, in the 1992 election, President George H.W. Bush lost his bid for re-election, 
despite the fact that the economy had rebounded. The reason for this, Marc Hetherington found, 
was that negative reporting about the economy in the media altered the perceptions of voters 
(1996, 372). A variety of other studies confirm the importance of media coverage of the 
economy to the president. Richard Nadeau, Richard G. Niemi, David P. Fan and Timothy Amato 
studied the relationship between economic news and presidential popularity between 1977-1995 
and found that news about the economy had significant effects on presidential approval ratings, 
often accounting for shifts of two percentage points or more. Media coverage of the economy 
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actually had a greater impact on presidential approval than objective economic indicators (1999, 
126). Barry Burden and Anthony Mughan found that, during the Clinton administration, the 
media covered America’s trade deficit with Japan more heavily than the U.S. trade deficit with 
Canada, and as a result the deficit with Japan impacted the president’s approval ratings, while the 
deficit with Canada did not (2003, 555). And Dhavan V. Shah, Mark D. Watts, David Domke, 
David P. Fan, and Michael Fibison’s study of presidential elections between 1984-1996 found 
not only that media coverage of the economy significantly predicted the selection of the 
president but also that “across all elections, economic coverage is a much more powerful 
predictor of presidential preference than noneconomic coverage.” (1999, 937).  
  A different body of studies has argued that voters judge the president in whole or in part 
based upon their expectations of future economic performance (Fiorina 1981; MacKuen, Erikson 
and Stimson 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001). However, whether the economic evaluations 
of voters are retrospective or prospective, it is clear that such evaluations heavily influence their 
assessments of the president.  
  Researchers have also found that voters place greater emphasis on the economy as a 
whole, rather than their personal financial circumstances, when they factor the economy into 
their voting decisions – a phenomenon known as “sociotropic voting.” For example, Donald R. 
Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet found that “voting in congressional elections from 1956 to 1976 
was influenced hardly at all by personal economic grievances. Those voters unhappy with 
changes in their financial circumstances, or those who had recently been personally affected by 
unemployment, showed little inclination to punish candidates of the incumbent party for their 
personal misfortunes.” (1979, 495).  
  A similar phenomenon has been observed in presidential elections. Gregory Markus 
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studied data from National Election Studies between 1956-1984 and found that “personal 
financial predicaments … carry weight in individuals’ voting decisions, but changing 
macroeconomic conditions are more important as determinants of election outcomes” in 
presidential elections. (1988, 137). Shah et al. likewise found that voters focus more on national 
economic conditions than on their own personal circumstances (1999). This provides an 
important opportunity for an incumbent president in a re-election campaign. The chief executive 
does not have to (and likely cannot) solve the personal economic problems of individual voters 
in order to win their votes; he simply needs to convince them that the nation’s overall economic 
conditions and/or prospects are good. 
  Therefore, presidents have an enormous incentive to attempt to influence the way the 
media cover – and thus the American people perceive – the economy. As we would accordingly 
expect, unless the country is experiencing a crisis, the President talks more about the economy 
than any other topic (Wood 2007, 60). The extraordinary level of presidential prioritization of 
and sensitivity to this issue is perhaps best evidenced by B. Dan Wood’s finding that presidents 
alter their economic rhetoric in response not to changes in actual economic conditions, but rather 
to changes in the perceptions of the American people about the economy (ibid., 163).  
 Presidential messaging on the economy is also uniquely powerful. This is because our 
modern economy is grounded in psychology; economic outcomes are determined in part by the 
attitudes about the economy that Americans hold. Indeed the term “public opinion” was first 
used by King Louis XVI’s finance minister, Jacques Necker, following the French Revolution, as 
he endeavored to boost confidence in the money market in Paris (Altheide and Johnson 1980, 8). 
Today, in the United States, two-thirds of the country’s economic activity is driven by consumer 
spending – and the remaining third is strongly impacted by consumer spending decisions (Wood 
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2007, 138-139). Thus, if presidents can convincingly project optimism about the economy, they 
can increase consumer confidence, which is one measure of the strength of the economy. B. Dan 
Wood’s study of all public remarks by twelve presidents over sixty-three years confirmed that 
optimistic presidential rhetoric led to improved consumer confidence, which ultimately improved 
both actual economic performance and presidential approval ratings (ibid., 159, 167).  Of course, 
as the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftereffects make clear, presidential rhetoric is certainly not 
a panacea for the country’s economic challenges. Nevertheless, research shows that the president 
can reap the rewards of increased public approval if he and his staff are successfully able to 
shape the way the American people view the economy – even if actual economic conditions are 
less promising than the government officials project. As we have seen, increased public 
approval, in turn, helps presidents get re-elected and, as Neustadt showed, achieve their goals in 
office (1990, 73).  
  Further confirmation of the importance of the Treasury comes from a survey of fifty 
reporters who cover federal agencies and departments. Asked to rank federal agencies by their 
importance, reporters gave the most mentions to the Treasury (Morgan 1986, 55). Given the 
unique importance of media coverage of the economy to the president, there are, then, perhaps 
no public affairs officials more crucial to the president than those who work on economic issues. 
If civil servants are found to be reliable advocates for the president in such roles, the finding 
would likely be applicable in lesser-stakes environments as well. 
  These circumstances are also ripe for encouraging officials to engage in tactics of the 
permanent campaign. The fact that the president’s rhetoric responds to public perceptions about 
the economy – rather than objective economic data – is a clear indication that the White House is 
on a permanent campaign when it comes to this issue. Given the extraordinary importance of the 
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economy to the president, if an administration were to extend the permanent campaign beyond 
the White House to any government agency, the Treasury appears to be the most likely place to 
find it being waged. My interviews with public affairs officers about the tactics they employ 
were designed to determine whether they are on this campaign. 
   This case study further poses a critical test of appointee competence because presidents 
are likely to place their best appointees at the Treasury. Gabriel Horton and David E. Lewis have 
found that presidents place their most competent appointees in agencies that are most prominent 
and critical to their agenda (2009, 6, 8). Thus, if presidents are found to be better served by 
career executives than by Treasury appointees – who should be among the most effective 
appointees – the finding would likely apply to other appointees as well.   
  The Treasury also provides a solid, if not most extreme, test of the loyalty of civil 
servants. In the United States, economic policy is clearly the subject of major ideological 
dispute. The Treasury has in the past not garnered the scholarly and media attention of very 
extreme cases – such as the virtual cottage industry of studies on the Environmental Protection 
Agency, where civil servants were said to be activists, especially under President Reagan 
(Golden 2000; Maranto 2005; Ringquist 1995; Waterman and Rouse 1998; Waterman 1989; 
Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1993; Wood and Waterman 1994). Nevertheless, the agency 
is the site of decision making on areas of significant partisan disagreement, including the 
controversial responses to the 2008 financial crisis undertaken under both the administrations 
studied. 
  Finally, I believe that using the Treasury for this case study significantly improved the 
quality of my results. Because I previously served as a Treasury spokesperson in the Obama 
administration and had a friend who served in the Treasury during the Bush administration, I was 
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able to use my access and contacts to earn the trust and participation of research subjects, who 
rarely grant interviews to discuss their work. Furthermore, because my research subjects knew 
that I already had an intimate familiarity with the Department’s public affairs operations, I 
believe they were at least somewhat more likely to be honest in the interviews –knowing that if 
they conveyed inaccurate information, I would sometimes be able to identify it as such. My deep 
familiarity with the programs, people, and myriad acronyms to which my research subjects 
referred allowed for particularly rich conversations. I typically did not need to ask my research 
subjects to explain references they made to particular initiatives, individuals, events or acronyms, 
unless such information was actually relevant to my research.  
  On a practical basis, it also would not have been possible to conduct this research in a 
more important government agency. The Secretary of State is considered the most important 
member of the Cabinet, and is followed by the Secretary of the Treasury and then Secretary of 
Defense in order of precedence. These three agencies are practically universally recognized as 
the most important, and are the only three agencies which have dedicated in-house press corps 
that could provide the detailed independent corroborations utilized in this study. However, unlike 
the Treasury Department, the State Department relies heavily upon civil servants in public affairs 
positions, which would make the comparisons of appointees and civil servants utilized in this 
study unworkable. Likewise, so much of the Defense Department’s information is classified that 
their spokespeople would not be able to share facts and examples highly relevant to their work in 
such an interview, making it practically impossible to arrive at informed judgments.  
  Interestingly, the portfolios of Treasury spokespeople include International Affairs (a 
portfolio that handles U.S. economic diplomacy) and Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (a 
portfolio responsible for the tracking of the financial assets of terrorists). My interview subjects 
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therefore included spokespeople handling the diplomatic, economic, and defense issues most 
critical to the president. 
 
Data and Measures 
  Most previous studies attempted to assess the loyalty of civil servants quantitatively and 
exogenously, by examining whether indicators such as agency outputs or votes comport with the 
president’s wishes (Cohen 1985; Eisner and Meier 1990; Moe 1982; Moe 1985; Stewart and 
Cromartie 1982; Wood 1988; Wood 1990; Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman 
1993; Wood and Waterman 1994). Yet there are strong limitations to measuring a subject as 
complex and nuanced as human loyalty without ever interacting with the individuals being 
studied. By contrast, my study replicates Golden’s (2000) approach to qualitative analysis by 
conducting detailed interviews with government officials in an effort to obtain similarly rich, 
explanatory, and nuanced results. 
 
I. Interviews with Government Officials 
  To test my hypotheses, I conducted detailed interviews with ten political appointees and 
seven civil servants who previously worked or currently work in public affairs for the 
Department of the Treasury and its subsidiary agencies. The political appointees all worked as 
spokespeople for the Treasury. Examples of possible spokesperson portfolios include Domestic 
Finance, International Affairs, Tax Policy, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), through which the U.S. government purchased financial 
assets in order to help stabilize the economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. While I will 
likewise not list the exact bureaus for which my interview subjects who were civil servants 
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worked, in order to protect their identities, examples of such bureaus are the Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Internal Revenue Service, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and U.S. Mint. The inclusion of different bureaus 
provided a desired diversity in my sample.  
  To account for any differences between the approaches of Democratic and Republican 
administrations, I conducted half the interviews of political appointees with individuals who 
have served or are serving under President Obama, and half with appointees who served under 
President George W. Bush. All the civil servants whom I interviewed had previous experience 
working in public affairs for a government agency during at least one Republican administration 
(predominantly during the administration of President George W. Bush), though not necessarily 
within the Treasury.  
  The Obama appointees whom I interviewed were all colleagues, who I met while 
working at the Treasury, or individuals to whom I was introduced through my former Treasury 
colleagues. I was introduced to one Bush appointee through a former Bush administration 
official, whom I worked with at a national foundation several years previously. This Bush 
appointee in turn connected me to several other Bush appointees who I interviewed. I reached 
two other Bush appointees by contacting them directly to introduce myself via email. All of the 
appointees whom I interviewed started at the Treasury in Schedule C positions. However, as I 
will later discuss, the aggregate job functions of the Bush appointees who I interviewed were at a 
slightly higher level than those of the Obama appointees.  
  One of the civil servants was introduced to me by a former appointee. I reached the other 
six civil servants by researching their contact information online and calling or emailing them. In 
order to make the basis of comparison between the political appointees (who typically serve in 
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higher-level posts) and civil servants as comparable as possible, I interviewed civil servants who 
were working at a senior level in their public affairs offices whenever possible. Four of the civil 
servants served in positions in which they led public affairs for their bureau, while three served 
as spokespeople or public affairs liaisons.  
  While every Obama appointee and nearly every Bush appointee with whom I requested 
an interview agreed to participate in this research project, several of the civil servants who I 
approached did not. This is likely the case in part because I did not have pre-existing 
relationships with these individuals. As I will discuss in chapters 5 and 7, the willingness of these 
civil servants to grant my requests for interview may be an indicator that my sample is overall 
somewhat more likely than the average civil servant to be open in their interactions with 
reporters, a fact that could have resulted in a sample which over-represented civil servants who 
leak information to the press. 
  I felt that I had a comfortable, strong rapport with every appointee and civil servant 
whom I interviewed, with the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who will be discussed in greater 
detail below. It nevertheless remains the case that, because I was appointed by a Democratic 
president and because I had previously worked closely with all or most of the Obama appointees, 
the Bush appointees may have viewed me with less trust than the Obama appointees, and may 
therefore have been less forthcoming. However, I was struck by the professionalism, candor, and 
respect granted to me by all the Bush appointees, with the exception of Bush Appointee 5.   
  Of course, despite our strong rapport, it certainly seems reasonable to project that if the 
officials whom I interviewed had engaged in truly egregious behavior in their positions, they 
might have sought to protect themselves by not sharing such details with me. However, the 
readiness with which both groups discussed situations that reflected poorly on their offices, 
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which is evident in the chapters that follow, led me to conclude that my interview subjects were 
overall very forthcoming (again, with the caveat of a single research subject, Bush Appointee 5).  
The accuracy, validity, and representativeness of my results are considered in detail in the 
Conclusion.  
  Prior to conducting the interviews, I tested and refined my questions by asking them to a 
former public affairs official who worked in the administration of New York City Mayor 
Michael R. Bloomberg. 
  All of the interviews lasted at least one hour; most lasted closer to an hour and a half. The 
interviews were all conducted in person in Washington, D.C. or in New York City, with the 
exception of one interview conducted by telephone because the personal circumstances of my 
interview subject precluded an in-person meeting. This subject was particularly loquacious and 
detailed in our discussion, so I did not feel that the loss of face-to-face contact diminished the 
quality of his responses in a significant way.  
  Some of the interviews were conducted in the offices of the American Political Science 
Association in Washington, which generously granted me office space in their Centennial Center 
for Political Science and Public Affairs, for the purpose of conducting this research. 
  Following the interviews, I followed up with my research subjects by email and 
telephone in order to ask additional questions and/or clarify their responses. 
 
Measuring the Competence and Effectiveness of the Government Officials 
  In my interviews with the government officials, I used seven measures in order to assess 
the relative competence and effectiveness of the appointees and civil servants. As will later be 
discussed, in order to obtain further information about the relative competence and effectiveness 
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of the two groups of government officials, I supplemented the information that the government 
officials provided to me with additional questions which I asked to the reporters I interviewed. 
  First, I asked the officials how much access they had to the principals for whom they 
worked. Greater access to senior officials would be one indicator of a public affairs officer’s 
greater efficacy, since it would allow the public affairs officer to obtain important information 
about the agency’s current activities and priorities, to inform their media strategies and responses 
to reporters.  
  Second, I queried the officials on their knowledge of their subject matter portfolios, by 
asking questions such as “I know that you arrange media interviews for your principal(s). If you 
were to do the interviews yourself, how well do you think you’d do?” and “many of the reporters 
who cover economic issues have been doing so for a long time. Do you think that gives them an 
advantage over you? How do you handle it?” It is critical for public affairs officers to understand 
the substance of the policy portfolio(s) for which they are responsible; otherwise, they cannot 
meaningfully respond to reporters’ queries; craft substantive arguments to advance the 
administration’s goals; identify inaccuracies in news reports; or develop meaningful strategies in 
order to attain media coverage that accurately and persuasively conveys the administration’s 
policy positions.  
  Third, I asked the officials to estimate their response times to media inquiries. Because 
reporters work on tight deadlines, if an administration is to have an opportunity to shape and 
share their point of view in news stories, they must respond to press inquiries rapidly. The ability 
to do so is thus an essential qualification of an effective public affairs officer.   
  Fourth, I asked the officials about the quality of their relationships with the press. A 
competent public affairs officer would be expected to stay in regular contact with the reporters 
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who cover his or her agency, not only to respond to queries but also to proactively pitch stories 
and obtain intelligence about stories on which reporters are working. It is to be expected that 
officials will sometimes have disagreements with the press; indeed, the ability and willingness to 
forcefully argue the administration’s point of view is a sign of an effective public affairs officer. 
At the same time, a competent public affairs professional must be able to handle such exchanges 
respectfully and professionally, in order to maintain productive working relationships with the 
members of the press who they will seek to influence on many future stories. 
  Fifth, I asked the appointees and civil servants how much success they felt they had in 
influencing the topics covered by reporters and the tone and content of media reports. Obviously, 
their own assessments would be subjective and I sought corroboration of their claims in my 
interviews with reporters. However, these queries were designed to help me obtain insight into 
the standards by which the officials judged the outcomes of their work and how they defined 
success and failure. 
 I also asked the government officials whether they thought that appointees or civil 
servants are more effective at conveying the administration’s messages in the press, in order to 
obtain insight into the observations they had made regarding the relative competence and  
effectiveness of their colleagues. 
  Additionally, I considered whether the officials appeared to employ savvy tactics in order 
to advance the administration’s goals. 
 
Possible Causal Factors   
  My assessments of the efficacy of the officials took into account the varying levels of 
importance and salience of the issues for which they were or are responsible, as officials working 
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on less high-profile issues cannot be expected to exert as much influence over the media agenda 
as officials working on the most newsworthy topics. 
  I also queried the officials on several variables in order to determine whether they 
impacted their relative efficacy. 
  First, I queried the officials about their previous work experience, in order to determine 
whether one group had more relevant and/or extensive prior professional experience that might 
have increased their efficacy. 
  Second, I asked the officials about their educational backgrounds, as another way of 
comparing the training that they brought to their jobs which might have impacted their efficacy. 
  Third, I asked how long the officials served in their positions. With greater tenure, 
officials might become more skilled in their positions; it is also possible that they would develop 
routine ways of doing their work and that individuals who came in with fresh energy and ways of 
thinking could be more effective. My other measures were therefore designed in part to 
determine how tenure impacted the effectiveness of my interview subjects.  
  Finally, I queried the officials on the manageability of their workloads and how they 
spent their time, in order to determine whether the legendarily long hours that other researchers 
have found appointees to work influenced their effectiveness. 
  
Measuring the Loyalty of the Government Officials 
   In my interviews with the government officials, I used six measures in order to assess the 
relative loyalty of the appointees and civil servants. 
  First, I asked the officials what someone in their position should do if asked to advocate a 
policy with which he or she personally disagreed, in order to determine whether the officials 
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believed that it would be appropriate to attempt to undermine an administration’s goals. 
  Second, I asked both groups of government officials how often they personally disagreed 
with an administration policy they were required to advocate and how they reacted in such 
circumstances, in order to determine whether they had ever engaged in acts of disloyalty to an 
administration they served. 
  Third, I asked the officials whether leaks to the press occurred in their offices, and, if so, 
if they were aware of whether the officials responsible for the leaks were appointees or civil 
servants. This question was designed to serve as one measure of whether appointees or civil 
servants were responsible for the majority of leaks during the tenure of my interview subjects. 
  Fourth, I asked the officials whether they personally had ever been tempted to leak 
information to the press. This question was designed to determine whether they had in fact ever 
leaked to the press, without directly asking the question and thereby potentially making my 
research subjects defensive. 
 
Possible Causal Factors 
  I also explored two possible causal factors for differences in the loyalty of the two 
groups. 
  First, I asked both groups of officials whether their personal political views impacted 
their work. This was designed to determine whether the officials attempted to pursue their own 
personal goals in their work, and, if so, if such attempts ever conflicted with the goals of the 
administration(s) they served.  
  Second, I asked the appointees whether they would consider working as a Treasury 
spokesperson under an administration of a different political party, in order to determine whether 
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and how loyalty to the president they served was a factor in their motivation for serving in their 
positions. 
 
Measuring Whether the Government Officials Are on a Permanent Campaign 
  In my interviews with the government officials, I used nine measures in order to assess 
whether they were conducting such a campaign.  
  First, I asked the officials how much time they spent focusing on the profiles and images 
of the officials for whom they worked, and whether it was a good use of their time. This question 
was designed to determine whether the officials focused on the administration’s image at the 
expense of policy priorities. 
  Second, I asked the officials to describe the most sophisticated techniques they used to 
shape what reporters covered, in order to determine whether they would report availing 
themselves of permanent campaign tactics.  
 Third, I asked the government officials whether they ever attempted to appeal to the 
emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted. As 
discussed in chapter 2, Blumenthal has argued that, as part of the permanent campaign, 
politicians play to the emotions of the people instead of fostering rational policy debate (1982, 
21). 
  Fourth, I asked the government officials whether they ever utilized public opinion polls in 
their work, and if so, how. As discussed in chapter 2, as part of the permanent campaign, Heclo 
has charged presidential aides with using public opinion polls to make policy decisions, in cases 
when the country would be better served by making unpopular choices that would serve the 
nation’s long-term health (2000, 30-34).    
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  As also discussed in chapter 2, McClellan has reported that, as part of the permanent 
campaign, presidential aides distort and withhold information requested by the media in order to 
bolster short-term support for the president (2008). I therefore next asked a series of questions 
designed to determine whether my interview subjects engaged in such tactics. Fifth, I asked the 
government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for someone in their position to 
withhold information requested by the press, what the circumstances would be, and whether this 
happened often or rarely in their work.  Sixth, I asked the government officials whether they 
believed it is ever appropriate for someone in their position to shade the truth, what the 
circumstances would be, and whether this happened often or rarely in their work. Seventh, I 
asked the government officials whether they believed that it would be possible for someone in 
their position to tell untruths to make the president look good, and whether they or their 
colleagues had ever attempted to do so. Eighth, I asked the government officials what percentage 
of the messages they sought to promulgate they would describe as ideas and narratives, as well 
as how they developed and sculpted narratives to make their points, in an effort to determine 
whether they distorted facts in the process. Ninth, and fnally, I asked the government officials 
how their offices determined how to handle information that was potentially damaging or 
embarrassing. 
 
Possible Causal Factors 
  To measure possible factors that could account for whether or not a permanent campaign 
was being practiced, I first queried the government officials about their workloads, in an effort to 
determine how much time they had to engage in proactive tactics and therefore whether the 
potential for conducting a permanent campaign existed. 
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  Second, I asked the officials how much of their time they spent proactively attempting to 
influence the media, and how much time they spent reactively responding to requests from 
reporters. This question was designed to serve as another measure of whether the potential for a 
permanent campaign was present, by identifying how much time the officials enjoyed to engage 
in proactive tactics. 
  Third, I asked the officials to describe the end goals of their work. Fourth, I asked them to 
what degree their end goal was to build public support for the president. Both of these questions 
were designed to determine whether the officials were motivated by the goal of the permanent 
campaign, which is to build support for the president. 
  Finally, I observed whether those government officials who held journalism degrees 
reported themselves to be less willing than the other officials to withhold or distort information 
from the press – and, if so, whether this suggested that the values imbued during their journalism 
training acted as a mediating variable.  
 
II. Interviews with Reporters 
  For an independent assessment of the civil servants and political appointees, I also 
interviewed seven reporters who interacted frequently with these officials. All of the members of 
the press interviewed were individuals who reported on the Treasury while I served as a 
spokesperson for the Department from 2011-2012. In order to protect their identities, I will not 
disclose the specific outlets for which my research subjects work or worked. However, they all 
currently cover or previously covered the economy for national, daily U.S. newspapers or wire 
services, which I consider to be the most influential media outlets in the country. 
  Nearly every reporter whom I approached granted me an interview. I had an excellent 
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rapport with all of the reporters I interviewed, which likely stemmed in part from the fact that I 
had interacted frequently and/or traveled extensively with most of them on Secretary Timothy 
Geithner’s international trips, when I worked at the Treasury.  
  Prior to conducting the interviews, I tested and refined my questions by asking them of a 
former reporter and editor for outlets including the New York Times and Washington Post, who 
currently teaches journalism.  
  To ensure that the reporters were able to provide a basis of comparison between a 
Democratic and Republican administration, I only interviewed members of the press who 
covered Treasury issues under both President Obama and President George W. Bush. However, 
two of the reporters whom I interviewed covered Treasury issues under the Bush administration 
significantly less extensively than during the Obama administration, and a third indicated that his 
memory of the Bush administration had somewhat faded, so it seems likely that the responses of 
reporters were more heavily informed by their interactions with the Obama administration.  
  The length of the interviews was on average just over one hour. All were conducted in 
person in Washington, D.C.  Afterwards, I contacted several of the reporters by telephone or 
email to ask them to clarify and/or expand upon their responses. 
 
Measuring the Competence and Effectiveness of the Government Officials  
  To measure the relative competence and effectiveness of the appointees and civil 
servants, I first asked the reporters how well they thought that both groups of government 
officials knew the subject matter for which they were responsible. As previously discussed, it is 
critical for a public affairs officer to understand their policy portfolio in order to effectively craft 
and rebut arguments and advance an administration’s policy positions. 
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  Second, I asked the reporters which group of government officials responded to them 
more quickly. As previously discussed, the ability to rapidly respond to media queries is essential 
to a public affairs officer’s ability to shape media coverage that is often produced under extreme 
deadline pressure. 
  Third, I asked what both groups of officials did when they were upset with the reporter’s 
coverage. While, as previously discussed, it is critical for a public affairs officer to forcefully 
advance an administration’s messages and rebut alternate arguments and critiques, it is essential 
for them to do so while maintaining positive working relationships with reporters, in order to 
preserve their ability to shape future media coverage. 
  Fourth, I asked the reporters to describe the degree to which both groups of officials 
influenced the topics on which they ultimately reported, as well as the tone and content of their 
coverage, in an effort to determine which group of officials was more successful at shaping press 
reports. 
  Fifth, I asked the reporters whether they found themselves more skeptical of the claims 
made by either appointees or civil servants. This was designed to test my hypothesis that 
reporters might apply greater skepticism to the claims of appointees because reporters believe 
that the raison d’etre of such officials is to make the president look good – a factor that would 
diminish their efficacy. 
  Finally, I asked the reporters which group of government officials was better at getting 
them the information they needed for their stories. While it will sometimes be in an 
administration’s interests to withhold information, effective public affairs officials must 
generally be able to provide reporters with the answers they seek; otherwise, they will both 
damage their relationships with reporters and cede control of the narrative to other actors who do 
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respond to the press. 
  
Measuring the Loyalty of the Government Officials 
  I asked the reporters whether government officials have ever leaked information to them 
or otherwise conveyed their disagreement with official administration policy, and whether 
political appointees or civil servants have done so more frequently. This question was designed 
to measure the relative frequency with which both groups of government officials have engaged 
in acts of disloyalty to the administrations they served. 
 
Measuring Whether the Government Officials Are on a Permanent Campaign 
  To measure whether the government officials were engaging in a permanent campaign, I 
asked the reporters to describe the savvier things that federal economic agencies did to shape the 
coverage they received in the press, in an effort to ascertain whether they would describe 
permanent campaign tactics. 
  In an effort to determine whether the officials ever distorted and/or withheld information 
from the reporters, I asked whether the reporters ever became aware of practices conducted by 
either group of government officials which they considered to be inappropriate. If reporters did 
not respond by indicating that the officials had ever withheld information, I asked the reporters 
directly whether they thought that the officials had done so. Likewise, if reporters did not 
respond by indicating that the officials had ever lied to them, I asked the reporters directly 
whether they thought that the officials had done so. 
 My complete interview questions are listed in appendix A. 
Promoting Honesty and Candor in Interview Subjects 
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  To promote honesty and candor in my interview subjects, I pledged to keep their 
identities confidential. This was necessary because I asked sensitive questions, such as whether 
the government officials had ever leaked information to the press – an offense for which they 
could potentially be fired. Furthermore, if the identities and responses of the officials were to 
become public knowledge, their future employment prospects could have been adversely 
affected. Likewise, if the identities and certain responses of the reporters were to become public 
knowledge – such as, for example, their assessments of the competence of the public affairs 
officers with whom they work – their relationships with officials on whom they depend to do 
their jobs might have been compromised. I therefore do not disclose the identities of the 
individuals who I interviewed in this study. As a further measure to protect the identities of my 
research subjects, I refer to every interviewee in this publication as “he,” regardless of his or her 
gender. I selected masculine language because the majority of my research subjects (seventeen of 
my twenty-four interviewees) were male. 
    I asked my research subjects to determine the time and place of the interviews, in order to 
ensure that they would be comfortable. As a safeguard to protect the identities of my 
interviewees and to promote candor in the interviews, I did not record the conversations. I 
instead typed notes during the interviews and stored them on a password-protected computer and 
password-protected website designed for data storage. My notes were coded with letters and 
numbers, instead of names, of interview subjects. The master coding sheet was stored in a locked 
box in a separate location. I also requested the oral, instead of written, consent of my interview 
subjects so that there would not be other written records of the identities of the interviewees.  
  I have omitted specific facts and details which could be used to identify research subjects 
in this report. If I had questions about whether a specific detail I wished to include could be used 
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to identify a research subject, I reached out to the interviewee to ask whether it was acceptable 
for me to include the information. 
  My use of human subjects in this study was approved by the Institutional Review Board 
at the City University of New York. 
Bush Appointee 5 
  I have a very low level of confidence in the veracity of the responses of Bush 
Appointee 5, who is described in greater detail in Appendix B. While I describe his responses 
throughout chapters four, five, and six, I nevertheless viewed them with greater skepticism 
than the responses of my other interview subjects when conducting my analysis of the results. 
Fortunately, however, I felt that I established strong trust and rapport with the other twenty-
three of my interview subjects (ninety-six percent of my interview subjects), leaving me 
confident regarding the overall results of my research – a matter which will be discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 7.  
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Chapter 4: Results: Efficacy of Appointees vs. Civil Servants 
Introduction 
  This chapter reviews the results of my interviews on the relative efficacy of political 
appointees and civil servants in Treasury public affairs positions. As discussed in chapter 3, I 
define effectiveness as success in advancing the administration’s goals. I hypothesized that civil 
servants would be more effective administration advocates because their longer tenure would 
give them greater knowledge of their policy portfolios and stronger relationships with the 
reporters who covered their agencies; reporters would be more skeptical of the claims of 
appointees because they would believe that the raison d’etre of appointees is to make the 
president look good; the massive workloads of appointees would diminish their efficacy; and 
appointees would spend more time attempting to boost the images of their principals, which is 
less helpful to the president than advancing his policies. However, I also anticipated that 
appointees might have efficacy advantages in that their bosses might make more time for them 
because they place greater importance on the press. I used nine measures in order to investigate 
which group is more effective in such roles.  
  First, I asked the officials how much access they had to the principals for whom they 
worked. Greater access would improve a public affairs officer’s efficacy by giving him or her 
greater information about agency activities and priorities, allowing the official to respond rapidly 
and substantively to reporters’ questions and to craft and implement more detailed and accurate 
media strategies.  
  Second, I queried the officials on their knowledge of their subject matter portfolios. Of 
course, it would be critical for an effective public affairs officer to possess a deeply sophisticated 
understanding of his or her policy portfolio in order to communicate it effectively. Third, I asked 
139 
 
about their response times to media inquiries. An effective public affairs officer would need to be 
able to respond rapidly to media queries in order to effectively influence media coverage prior to 
reporters’ deadlines. Fourth, I asked the officials about the quality of their relationships with the 
press. While it is to be expected that effective officials would sometimes disagree with reporters 
and would push back against reporters’ representations of their administration when it was not 
favorable, at the same time it would be critical for them to maintain ongoing dialogue with 
reporters and professional working relationships in order to inform future stories. Fifth, I asked 
the officials how much success they believed they had in influencing the topics covered by 
reporters and the tone and content of media reports. Of course, such self assessments would be 
subjective and potentially biased, however the question was designed to provide an indication of 
how the officials themselves assessed their own work.  
   For independent assessments of the officials, I also asked the Treasury reporters whom I 
interviewed to assess the appointees and civil servants with whom they worked on stories on 
measures two through five: their relative knowledge of their subject matter portfolios, response 
times to media inquiries, relationships with themselves, and success in influencing the topics 
covered by reporters and the tone and content of media reports. 
  Sixth, I asked the reporters which group they judged to be more credible sources, since 
reporters would be expected to give greater weight in their stories and more favorable coverage 
to sources who they deemed to be credible. Seventh, I analyzed the responses of reporters 
regarding whether the officials provided them with the information they sought. While it might 
be in the interests of a public affairs officer not to answer every question a reporter asked, an 
effective public affairs officer would be expected to generally provide reporters with information 
in response to their queries; otherwise, the administration would cede control of the narrative to 
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other sources and leave reporters feeling frustrated, a factor which would likely influence their 
media coverage. 
  Eighth, I asked the government officials whether they thought that appointees or civil 
servants are more effective at conveying the administration’s messages in the press. 
  Finally, I considered whether the government officials used savvy tactics in order to 
advance the administration’s goals. 
 
Measuring Causal Factors 
 I also investigated four possible factors that could account for the greater relative efficacy 
of either group. First, I queried the officials about their previous work experience, in order to 
determine whether either group brought greater professional experience to their Treasury roles 
that boosted their efficacy. Second, I asked the officials about the educational qualifications they 
brought to their jobs, in order to determine whether either group had better training that 
influenced their efficacy. Third, I asked the officials how long they served in their Treasury 
positions, in an effort to determine how tenure impacts efficacy. On the one hand, longer tenure 
could improve an official’s skill at his or her job; on the other hand, serving for long periods of 
time could cause them to become ingrained in their thinking or even exhausted, leaving the 
Treasury lacking fresh ideas, perspective, and energy. Finally, I queried the officials on how they 
spent their time and the manageability of their workloads, in order to determine whether the 
legendarily long hours that other researchers have found appointees to work influenced their 
effectiveness.  
I. Access to Principals 
  Access to principals is an indicator of a public affairs official’s efficacy because such 
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officials require information about their leadership team’s priorities and activities in order to 
implement timely and accurate media strategies that advance the administration’s goals. I 
hypothesized that one area in which appointees might have an effectiveness advantage is in their 
access to the principals for whom they work, because the more senior administration officials for 
whom appointees work might place greater value on the press. In keeping with this hypothesis, 
most appointees were adamant that they enjoyed, in the words of Obama Appointee 2, a “really 
high” level of access to their principals. Bush Appointee 2 described having “tremendous access 
to principals;” Bush Appointee 1 was “very, very satisfied.” The only caveat among appointees 
was a single appointee who indicated that it would have been helpful to attend meetings typically 
attended by his boss. Additionally, one Bush appointee and one Obama appointee indicated that 
it took time for them to initially gain the trust of their principals. However, many indicated that 
they could walk into the offices of their principals when they needed them; “I could pull him out 
of a meeting if I absolutely had to.” (Obama Appointee 3). The appointees uniformly indicated 
that this access was critical to their ability to do their jobs, because they needed to be able to both 
get answers for reporters and understand what was happening in the building. 
  There were not significant differences in the responses of civil servants, who generally 
indicated they had the access they needed to their principals. The exception was Civil Servant 6, 
who had enjoyed daily access to previous principals but now might sometimes not be in touch 
with his principal for several days. He indicated that this “affects my level of comfort, but as far 
as affecting my work, I don’t really think it has.” Otherwise, civil servants generally indicated 
that they were “reasonably comfortable” with their level of access (Civil Servant 4), “very 
pleased” (Civil Servant 5), “it’s not an issue” (Civil Servant 7), or they could walk into their 
principal’s office anytime (Civil Servants 1 and 2, who both attributed their access to the small 
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size of their offices). Civil Servant 3 was closest to the appointees in describing his access as 
“100 percent, never any problem;” Civil Servant 7 likewise described his access as “key to 
success.”  
  Thus, both groups generally reported that they had the access to the principals which they 
needed to do their jobs. However, appointees placed greater emphasis on their very high levels of 
access, and were more adamant that this was critical to their work. To be sure, these differences 
in nuance might be explained by the fact that in politics, one’s importance is often measured by 
one’s level of access, and therefore political appointees might be more eager to brag about or 
even overstate the access they enjoyed. However, I suspect that the appointees did in fact have 
particularly high levels of access to their principals. The accounts of appointees were certainly 
consonant with what I witnessed and experienced firsthand, when I served as a Treasury 
spokesperson in the Obama administration from 2011-2012.  
  Adding to the efficacy advantage this particularly high level of access gives to appointees 
is, of course, the fact that the principals for whom appointees work are responsible for 
particularly important and high-profile issues. Based upon their responses, appointees therefore 
seem to enjoy particularly significant access to information that is particularly in demand by 
reporters.  
  This finding is corroborated by the fact that, when asked about the strengths of public 
affairs appointees, several reporters volunteered that appointees are able to obtain information 
from key principals. The strength of appointees was described by Reporter 5 as “their more 
direct access to the people who are making the decisions in the agency.” As Reporter 7 
explained, “civil servants aren’t always keyed in to what’s going on in the same way politicals 
are;” Reporter 2 concurred that among civil servants, there is an “occasional lack of awareness 
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around political realities.” Reporter 3 likewise believed that appointees “often can be well 
connected and close to the axis of power so … they can be well informed on decision making.”  
  I therefore concluded that this somewhat higher level of access to principals gives 
appointees a slight effectiveness advantage. However, as will later be discussed, the overall 
effectiveness of appointees is diminished by other factors. 
 
II. Knowledge of their Subject Matter Portfolios 
 I next measured the officials’ knowledge of their subject matter portfolios. Without a 
nuanced understanding of their issues, they could not effectively answer reporters’ queries, 
identify inaccurate reporting, rebut arguments, or plan media strategies to achieve the 
administration’s policy goals. Almost all of the political appointees reported learning the 
substance of their subject matter portfolios on the job, such as by attending meetings, reading 
internal memos, and otherwise learning from the Treasury policy staff. Bush Appointee 1 
described the experience as “trial by fire” and “very challenging.” Bush Appointee 3 explained 
that the way he learned was that he “asked a lot of questions of very smart people and read 
newspapers and then asked more questions.” 
  As will later be discussed, only one Bush appointee and one Obama appointee reported 
having previous economic and/or financial knowledge that was useful to them in their Treasury 
posts. However, even the appointee with the strongest background in economics described a 
“very steep learning curve.” Obama Appointee 5 recalled that he discussed his lack of 
knowledge of his policy matter portfolio with a senior Treasury official when he interviewed for 
his job, and the official told him that “we need someone to ask questions, to help us put this in 
English, we need some people here that don’t know [the substance].”  
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  By contrast, five of the seven civil servants reported already having knowledge of their 
subject matter portfolios when they assumed their Treasury public affairs posts; two of these 
civil servants had previously worked in policy on their issues at the Treasury and one had 
previously reported as a journalist on his subject matter portfolio. One of the civil servants with 
previous experience relevant to his portfolio indicated that when he interacted with Treasury 
officials who were more accustomed to working with spokespeople who were appointees, they 
were surprised by his command of his portfolio. “I had a lot of feedback …. that was unusual 
when it comes to communications professionals,” he said.  
  The appointees generally indicated that it took them about six months to start to feel 
comfortable with the content of their subject matter portfolios (or in the words of Bush 
Appointee 3, to find it “less daunting”), and they achieved strong mastery after about a year. 
While two of the civil servants indicated that it took them six months to feel comfortable with 
their policy portfolios, three others indicated feeling comfortable “right away,” “within a matter 
of weeks,” or “at most [within] a couple of months.” One civil servant who lacked relevant 
previous policy experience indicated that it took him a year. An outlier response was that of a 
civil servant who reported that it took him four to five years. This civil servant had served in his 
bureau since the inception of some of its programs and previously worked on policy and 
indicated that it therefore “wasn’t hard” to learn the substance, however he indicated that the 
mechanics of major financial transactions were complicated – perhaps evincing a particularly 
high standard for feeling fully comfortable in such a position. This suggests that the prior 
experience and knowledge of civil servants may have allowed some of them to “hit the ground 
running” a bit faster than the average appointee.   
 Asked how well they ultimately mastered their subject matter portfolios, seven of the 
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appointees indicated “very well,” two appointees indicated “pretty well,” and one indicated that 
he never mastered the subject, though this appointee’s subject matter was a new portfolio for the 
Treasury, and an undertaking which the government had never previously attempted, making it 
particularly challenging for everyone involved. There were not significant differences between 
the responses of the Bush and Obama appointees in this regard. By contrast, just two civil 
servants indicated that they knew the substance of their subject matter portfolios “very well,” 
while five civil servants indicated that they understood the content “pretty well.”  
  This discrepancy is contradictory, given that, as I will later discuss, the civil servants both 
brought significantly more policy knowledge to their posts and had significantly longer tenure in 
their jobs. It is certainly possible that the results indicate that appointees work harder, are more 
competent, and/or perceive the stakes to be higher, and therefore better master the content of 
their policy portfolios. However, given that civil servants with the most policy experience 
typically reported knowing their subject matters only “pretty well,” I suspect that these responses 
may actually reflect higher standards among civil servants for policy mastery. Additionally and 
interestingly, the two civil servants who were most confident and reported themselves to know 
their subject matter “very well” ranked among the most politically experienced. Although 
outside the scope of this study, the discrepancy could also point to differences in the confidence 
and/or modesty of the two groups. 
  The responses to my next two questions further confirm my proposed explanation for this 
discrepancy. When I raised the stakes, appointees became significantly less confident in their 
policy mastery. Treasury spokespeople typically book and prepare senior officials for media 
interviews. I asked the public affairs officials how well they think they would do if they were to 
conduct the interviews themselves, in place of their principals. Here, only two appointees 
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indicated that they would do “very well.” These were the two appointees, who worked at the 
Treasury the longest and the only two appointees who were promoted to other public affairs roles 
within the Treasury after first serving as spokespeople.  
  A third appointee indicated he believed he could have handled 80-85 percent of the 
interviews; two appointees indicated they would do “pretty well;” one appointee indicated “okay 
but not well;” and two indicated that they could do well on the overall message but not on 
technical matters of policy expertise. In the words of one appointee, “I think people like us know 
what we want to achieve through an interview and can tell [principals] overall what we want to 
communicate, but when we have the Assistant Secretary talking to The Economist, that 
conversation gets to a level I’m not familiar with.”  
  Two appointees were clear that they could not handle such interviews. One responded 
“oh my God, not well. It depends on the interview, but if it’s an off-the-record background 
briefing I don’t have a lot of confidence in my ability to do that, I could do the talking points, but 
not the way [the senior administration officials] did it.” A final appointee indicated “probably not 
very well because [the issues are] really complicated. Politics is easy because everyone has an 
opinion. Trying to bullshit your way through financial stuff is impossible.” Overall then, even 
though most political appointees indicated that they mastered their subjects “very well,” they 
seemed to mean by this that they could handle the talking points. They generally (though not 
always) did not master their subject matter at a level that would allow them to engage deeply and 
substantively on the nuance of technical and policy issues with major reporters.  
  Interestingly, here the confidence of civil servants seemed slightly higher. Three civil 
servants indicated that they did in fact conduct media interviews; two indicated that they would 
do “pretty well” with one adding “I’m pretty comfortable with that;” one said he conducted a lot 
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of interviews on background and thought he would do well on the record but might get nervous 
and make a mistake; and one indicated that he would not do the interviews “nearly as well” 
because he was “blessed” with a talented principal. However, the final civil servant’s response 
seemed to be more reflective of his principal’s skill than his own. Indeed, we should both hope 
and expect that the heads of Treasury bureaus will be more knowledgeable than their public 
affairs staff. Overall, then, civil servants appeared somewhat more comfortable than appointees 
with granting interviews to reporters – a concrete indication of their mastery of their policy 
portfolios. 
  As a final way of discussing their policy knowledge and how it affects their work, I asked 
the appointees and civil servants whether the fact that the reporters who cover economic issues 
have been doing so for a long time gave the reporters an advantage. One appointee indicated that 
the question was not applicable to him because the subject matter for which he was responsible 
was new, and the Treasury had never previously conducted such an initiative. Three Obama 
appointees and three Bush appointees indicated that it did give reporters an advantage, at least 
initially or at times. In the words of Bush Appointee 2, “obviously it did because they have that 
wealth of history and knowledge.”  Bush Appointee 4 likewise indicated “it did at the beginning 
and that’s what scared me.”  
  Two Obama appointees indicated that they did not feel reporters had a knowledge 
advantage. For Obama Appointee 4, “the great thing about Treasury and its principals is they’re 
excellent resources, so in arranging these interviews I always knew what the top line, big picture 
stuff was and the principals knew the stuff just as well if not better than the reporters, so the 
system worked, I think.” Here again, however, it was clear that reporters had greater knowledge 
than this appointee; he simply found this to be unproblematic.  
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  Bush Appointee 3 likewise indicated that this advantage was not necessarily a problem 
because reporters “were more than happy to answer questions and brag about their knowledge. I 
wasn’t talking about what I didn’t know and they get that, they respect that. What they want is 
your help with access, quotes, … that type of thing.” Bush Appointee 4 likewise indicated that he 
“learned a lot from reporters. They were really helpful. They had a vested interest; they wanted 
me to be helpful to them so they were very helpful in educating me about how the job is 
supposed to go.” And, in the words of Obama Appointee 2, “where we had the advantage was we 
had all the information they were trying to get at, so you could outmaneuver a reporter.” 
  The only appointee who did not believe that reporters generally at least sometimes 
possessed a knowledge advantage was Obama Appointee 5. “One of the things most surprising 
to me is I expected reporters covering this would be sophisticated on the issues, and of course 
there were a handful that were – usually the columnists or extremely well-respected magazines,” 
he explained. “But the day-to-day beat reporters I think we made mistakes sometimes in 
overestimating, when we should have explained things more. I was under the impression they 
knew more than they did and sometimes it surprised me that some knew absolutely nothing and 
it was like talking to a wall, which surprised me given the gravity of the issues we worked on.” 
This appointee indicated that this was the case even for reporters for some elite national outlets. 
Finally, Bush Appointee 5 likewise indicated that “a lot who cover the Treasury … didn’t have 
detailed knowledge,” but he ultimately declined to answer the question because he said he could 
not understand how reporters would have an advantage since “they’re not trying to stump you.”  
  In general however, with minor exceptions, most appointees were willing to acknowledge 
that they were in a position, at least at times, of being the sources of information for people who 
clearly better understood their own policy portfolios. While several appointees downplayed the 
149 
 
disadvantage this situation placed them in, it nevertheless seems reasonable to anticipate that 
spokespeople who could go toe-to-toe with reporters on the substance of their issues would be 
better positioned to influence media coverage to the advantage of their administration. 
  By contrast, only one civil servant believed that the superior knowledge of reporters gave 
members of the press an advantage. While this civil servant had decades of experience as a 
government spokesperson, he did not have prior previous knowledge of his subject matter 
portfolio when he assumed his Treasury position and indicated that many of the trade reporters 
with whom he worked had decades of experience on the substance of his issues. A second civil 
servant indicated that while there are still a few reporters with superior knowledge, “there’s been 
a lot of turnover within the press corps … [and] increasingly reporters covering us don’t have 
broad nor deep knowledge.” While this likely does point to changes in the media landscape, I 
suspected it also pointed to the benefits of the length of his tenure. Another civil servant 
indicated that there was not a problem because if he did not know how to answer a question he 
would do research and then get back to the reporter, but because he had decades of experience as 
a policy specialist in his subject matter portfolio, I doubted that lack of knowledge was an issue. 
  However, a majority of civil servants were clear that there was no knowledge differential 
whatsoever. Two civil servants were explicit that they simply knew as much or more than the 
reporters with whom they worked. In the words of Civil Servant 6, “I’ve been around for a while 
too … especially, I think we all lived through [the financial crisis of] 2008 together and that’s an 
advantage; we all have a similar vocabulary. … I’ve read a lot of books and talked to people who 
wrote them on the financial crisis, and think I’m keeping up okay. I’m old.” Another civil 
servant indicated that when it came to his portfolio, “this is one area where reporters do know 
their stuff;” however, he indicated that this still was not a problem: “the programs were so 
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complicated that I don’t know they had an advantage.” A different civil servant indicated that 
reporters likewise seemed to know too little, indicating that they have “blinders on” and he had 
to educate them about how his programs were different from the issues they typically covered.  
  Of course, it is possible that there is less of a knowledge differential between civil 
servants and reporters than between appointees and civil servants because the policy portfolios of 
civil servants are less important than those of appointees, and therefore mainstream reporters 
spend less time learning about and covering them. However, there are serious trade publications 
which closely monitor the Treasury bureaus, and civil servants would therefore be likely to bump 
up against this problem with such reporters. I therefore concluded that, overall, civil servants had 
greater knowledge of the policy portfolios for which they were responsible. This conclusion was 
corroborated by my interviews with reporters.  
Reporters on the Knowledge of Appointees vs. Civil Servants 
  Reporters overwhelmingly indicated that, with few exceptions, appointees typically came 
to their jobs with inadequate knowledge of their policy portfolios. In the words of Reporter 2, 
“they generally do not come into their roles with a meaningful amount of background knowledge 
about either their topic or the beat reporters who cover them.” Or, as Reporter 7 put it: “those 
first few months at Treasury when Obama came in, it was patently obvious that the folks 
working there, while some were very nice, had limited experience in the area.” However, 
reporters consistently indicated that the better appointees could come up to speed rather quickly 
(Reporter 2 estimated that this could happen in as little as six months).  
  Most devastatingly, Reporter 4 complained that “you get at Treasury people whose 
careers have been working on political campaigns, and as best I can tell lack an ability to balance 
their own checkbooks and misunderstand the most basic aspects of the workings of financial 
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markets, and loudly insist things are true that aren’t and make fools of themselves.” He 
complained that “not infrequently it’s the case that you find yourself in a position asking a 
question and needing to explain the question and why it’s a question and what the possible 
answers to the question are and where they might obtain possible answers. It’s more the case 
with appointees than with civil servants, although it happens with both, because they’re 
intermediating between you and the experts, so questions that might make perfect sense to the 
end recipient need to be packaged and translated because you’re playing a game of telephone and 
you need to work through an intermediary.” However, he noted this problem may be more 
extreme at the Treasury than in other government agencies, because of the sheer complexity of 
the issues and the divorce of these issues from the knowledge of the average person; as Reporter 
7 put it, “as is frequently the case, campaign workers … haven’t been reading up on the latest 
currency report or Fed regulations.” Since most government agencies handle complex, technical 
issues, this may be an issue faced by other appointees, as well. 
  The sole exception to these complaints about the initial lack of knowledge of most 
appointees was Reporter 6, who unlike the other reporters interacted with Treasury public affairs 
officers only sporadically on stories for a major national publication, and reported that he had 
never found inadequate knowledge to be a problem because if public affairs officials were 
unfamiliar with a topic they were unafraid to say so and would indicate that they would get back 
to him.  
  Another common complaint of reporters about the knowledge of appointees was that they 
typically focused nearly exclusively on the politics of a situation. Reporter 1 explained that with 
appointees, it is “sometimes … hard to get them to speak about things other than the politics of a 
situation, whereas I was usually trying to gather a broader picture.” Reporter 3 explained that 
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appointees “usually see things through a prism of politics that isn’t always helpful to us as 
reporters or in some cases isn’t even pertinent to the subject matter.” Reporter 2 indicated that 
this is the case because “they tend to see … economic and financial reporters through a similar 
prism through which they saw political reporters on a campaign trail and often do not realize that 
economic and financial reporters are completely different from political reporters and how they 
operate. … You end up having people who talk past each other way too often.” 
  By contrast, only one reporter described a similar period of learning on the job by civil 
servants; in the words of Reporter 1, a veteran Treasury reporter, “I don’t think I ever 
encountered one who I didn’t think was up to the task right off the bat.” Reporters 
overwhelmingly described civil servants as having greater knowledge of their subject matter 
portfolios than appointees, stemming from their longevity in their jobs; according to Reporter 7 
“the civil servants’ strength is typically that they understand the issues a lot better; they have a 
lot more context and knowledge.” Reporter 2 characterized civil servants as offering “incredible 
historical perspective, grounded dispassionate analysis, and … incredible depth in their job.”  
Reporter 3 noted that civil servants are “more likely to be in it because they have an interest in 
the topic as opposed to being moved there after completing a political job, so I consider them for 
the most part better informed and also I would say probably because of that probably more 
effective.” The Federal Reserve Bank was often cited as an office with civil servants who served 
as particularly competent spokespeople. (While former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan was famous for his opaque language, New York Times columnist Douglas R. Holmes 
recently reported that “those days are long gone.”) (2014).  
III. Response Times to Media Inquiries 
 One of the most important qualities of a public affairs official is the ability to respond 
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quickly to reporters working on deadline. In recent years, as print reporters have begun to file 
their stories in real time online as opposed to meeting evening deadlines for the next day’s paper, 
and cable news channels broadcast all day as opposed to facing set deadlines for the morning, 
noon and evening news, the importance of this quality has heightened. I therefore attempted to 
determine whether political appointees or civil servants are better at responding to reporters 
under deadline pressure.    
  I first asked both sets of officials how long it typically took them to respond to media 
inquiries. Appointees stressed that their response times depended upon the question, but two 
Obama appointees indicated that they could often respond within an hour, with more time 
required for some responses; one Obama appointee said he responded immediately to say he was 
working on the reporter’s query, and afterwards the time required varied; and two Obama 
appointees said responses could take several hours, with one estimating five hours and another 
saying he got back to reporters within the day. Two Bush appointees likewise indicated they 
would respond within a half hour or right away to say they were working on the answer; Bush 
Appointee 5 responded “usually by their deadline;” and one Bush appointee said he responded 
immediately if he could and usually within 24 hours.  
  The response of one of the only two appointees who started as a spokesperson but later 
served in a higher-level Treasury public affairs post – and thus had a significantly longer tenure 
than average – illustrated clearly how policy knowledge is related to response times. This 
appointee indicated that when he started his job he would ask his colleagues what they 
recommended he say in response to media inquiries, but he thought this process, which he called 
“standard operating procedure,” took too long. As he grew to intimately understand the policy 
substance of his portfolio, he was able to shift his approach. “So what I started doing very 
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quickly is, instead of saying ‘what are we saying?’ I would say, ‘here’s what I’m planning’ and I 
would write the talking points so I could have responses [to reporters] in an hour, I cut the time 
in half, and after a while [Treasury officials] trusted me to be able to just talk to reporters without 
having to go through the process of developing talking points.” Obviously the ability to do this 
requires a major level of policy sophistication. 
  Of course, it is not possible to draw firm comparisons from such an open-ended question, 
especially given the varying portfolios of the officials which by their nature somewhat dictate 
response times. For example, it is possible that civil servants receive more technocratic questions 
from reporters which by definition simply require more time in order to retrieve data. 
Nevertheless, civil servants seemed somewhat less likely than appointees to report that they 
could respond immediately to reporters. The exception was Civil Servant 5, who indicated that 
he could respond “off the cuff” and believed he got back to reporters faster than political 
appointees. Civil Servant 2 likewise said he could sometimes respond within 20 minutes if the 
question was easy, but more complicated questions could take “a day or two.”  Civil Servant 4 
tried to respond “within a few hours or a half day depending on complexity,” Civil Servant 1 said 
it could take several hours, Civil Servant 6 tried to respond in less than half a day, and Civil 
Servants 3 and 7 tried to get back to reporters the same day, but it could take until the next day. 
  In comparing the response times of the public affairs officials, it seems most accurate to 
rely on the assessments of reporters who interact with both appointees and civil servants. It 
seems reasonable to believe that the highly seasoned reporters who were the subjects of my 
interviews take the difficulty of obtaining information into account when judging the 
reasonableness of response times to their inquiries and apply the same set of standards when 
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judging the response times of appointees and civil servants. I therefore place particular value on 
their responses to the question of which group of officials responded to them more quickly.     
Reporters on Response Times 
  Civil servants were also somewhat – though certainly not vehemently or universally – 
perceived by reporters to be slower to respond to their inquiries. Reporter 7 was the sole reporter 
who found civil servants to be faster. He found this to be the case because appointees were 
defensive. Reporter 3 could not discern a difference in the speed of the two groups, while 
Reporter 4 found that while neither appointees nor civil servants were overall faster to respond as 
a group, “the one distinction is to the extent appointees see a political advantage in a particular 
story, they are the most helpful PR people.” Reporters 1, 2, 5, and 6 found appointees to be faster 
to respond to them, however Reporters 1 and 5 indicated that civil servants were also generally 
good at responding. Reporter 5, for example, indicated that the internal approval process delayed 
the responses of both groups, while the responses of appointees could be delayed “because they 
don’t know the issues.”  
  Reporter 2 was most critical of civil servants in this regard, arguing that civil servants 
“move at a snail’s pace compared to the realities of the media and political environment” and in 
some agencies “like the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census and IRS, … you wonder what 
kind of planet they’re on” and “you have to push the people who do this work a lot harder than 
you think you should have to,” while other civil servants, such as those at the Federal Reserve, 
were much faster. 
  However, reporters did not necessarily find the more rapid responses of appointees to be 
helpful. Like Reporter 4, Reporters 2 and 6 attributed the faster pace of appointees to their 
political motivations. Reporter 2 indicated that while appointees are “attuned to the fact that you 
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need things quickly and they don’t want a story to get ahead of them,” the information they 
actually provided was “not always that valuable.” Similarly, Reporter 6 indicated that “for my 
purposes the politicals are more quotable, they’re more accessible on a deadline basis to give a 
quote, they want to make sure their person or agency is represented in the story so in terms of the 
logistics of producing a piece of newspaper content on deadline, they’re better by far.” On the 
other hand, he said, in these faster responses, “it’s hard to reach that level of trust where they 
really tell you what’s happening as opposed to what they want you to think is happening or how 
they want you to interpret it.” 
  Thus, while appointees overall appear to be somewhat faster to respond to the press, the 
differences in their response times was far from extreme. Furthermore, reporters indicated that 
they were often left unsatisfied with or skeptical of the actual responses of appointees even if 
they were faster, which indicates that their arguments were not influential with reporters, a factor 
which would have diminished the effectiveness of appointees.  
IV. Skill at Managing Negative Interactions with the Press 
 I next measured the quality of the relationships that the public affairs officers enjoyed 
with the press. While disagreements would be expected in such positions, it would be critical for 
an effective public affairs officer to maintain collegial relationships and close contact with 
reporters in order to effectively influence media coverage on behalf of their administration. With 
the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who both refused to answer the question or to provide a 
reason for not answering it, political appointees generally described themselves as enjoying very 
good personal relationships with reporters and placing high value on the importance of such 
relationships. The appointees almost universally acknowledged that their exchanges with 
reporters rarely but nevertheless occasionally became heated, but they worked quickly to repair 
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relationships after such events. Bush Appointee 4 indicated that he was “embarrassed” after a 
screaming exchange with a reporter in front of other members of the Treasury press corps, and 
thought it was important that shortly afterwards the other members of the press saw him 
communicating civilly with this reporter. However, it was unmistakable that the appointees were 
willing to be forceful when they disagreed with a reporter. Obama Appointee 3 explained that his 
strategy when he was upset with a reporter was to “push back and push back and push back. If 
that story is never going to be corrected, with the next story you have leverage.” His definition of 
pushing back entailed “getting the Assistant Secretary on the phone and lawyers to explain why 
they’re fucking wrong and every question, replying with a voluminous response, making it a pain 
for him to write the story.” 
  The Obama appointees indicated that more aggressive measures were often taken at the 
behest of their bosses. For example, Obama Appointee 4 explained that “I think sometimes, 
particularly at Treasury, we were overzealous in wanting stories to be written a certain way, and 
I think 60 percent of the time it was reasonable asks and 40 percent of the time it was people 
above us trying to [do] a lot of posturing and a lot of making sure the boss is happy as opposed 
to, like, reasonable expectations.” When the Treasury was truly upset with a reporter, Obama 
Appointee 5 indicated, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Public Affairs “would sometimes 
blacklist, which is something I personally disagree with. They would stop inviting them to 
briefings. I think everyone ended up on the blacklist at some point, there were three spaces on 
the list and when one came off they’d find a way to get another on; it was kind of bizarre.” 
  Bush Appointee 1 indicated that relations with reporters became “increasingly 
combative” at the end of the Bush administration, because among the press there was a “[former 
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Newsweek investigative correspondent] Mike Ikikoff ‘I have a right to know’ attitude you had to 
deal with, ‘what are you not telling us,’ ‘why aren’t you doing more.’” He acknowledged that he: 
had some serious screaming matches with reporters in some cases and cut reporters off 
sometimes. It wasn’t as blatant as I won’t take the call, I never did anything like that, I 
always returned calls, but you had reporters writing incorrect stories and not taking the 
time to learn their stuff [and] they became very dangerous to us because they were 
misreporting. They lost a lot of privileges they could have otherwise had: access to senior 
officials, my time. If you’re going to be irresponsible in your writing, which we’ve seen, 
I’m not going to waste my time with you, because you’re going to write bad stories 
anyways. I will help reporters who write responsibly. [That’s how I’ll] spend my time. 
Like the appointees, the civil servants reported having good relationships with members 
of the press. One civil servant indicated that things had never gotten heated; reporters sometimes 
were frustrated if he did not immediately have information at his fingertips, but reporters tended 
to understand. Another indicated that things had only gotten heated once, when a reporter was 
requesting an unreasonable amount of information under FOIA, but he was able to sit down, 
discuss, and resolve the matter with the reporter.   
  Two civil servants indicated that on the rare occasions when things became heated, they 
were simply unhelpful with reporters. Civil Servant 2 explained that “the occasional reporter … 
is not being transparent and usually I have a pretty good gut instinct and their frustration will rise 
because if I think they’re angling at something and not being transparent, I’ll be very factual, 
like, ‘Do you know what time it is?’ ‘Yes, I know what time it is.’ But I’m always very polite 
and professional.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6 reported simply being unhelpful with difficult 
reporters: “Someone wanted to interview a staffer and because she had not been particularly 
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friendly in the past, I referred her to a report on the web and said ‘that’s all you need, it’s all 
we’re offering.’ In our little world, that feels like a big deal, but that’s about as aggressive as it 
got, and I said to have her editor contact me if you disagree.” 
  However, Civil Servant 3, who had no previous press experience before his Treasury 
public affairs role, evinced a strikingly passive relationship to the press. He explained a 
damaging story written by a reporter for a major national newspaper who he considered to be 
“determined to make the facts fit his storyline. I got the subject matter expert on the conference 
call with him to explain it, and he still didn’t report it correctly.  We ended up with a front page 
story … we weren’t happy, but what could we do? We gave him a call to correct the information 
and he was determined he was going to have it his way, so what could we do? That’s all we 
could do, we just accepted it and moved on.” By contrast, it would be difficult to imagine a 
political appointee simply “accepting” a factually incorrect, high-profile story without elevating 
the situation to an editor or taking other punitive measures. 
  Of course, civil servants covered less high-profile and less political – and therefore by 
definition less contentious – issues to begin with, likely making for less contentious interactions 
with the press. And, as Civil Servants 2 and 5 noted, they could also get help from the Treasury 
public affairs appointees when they had issues with reporters. Nevertheless, it seemed clear from 
their divergent responses that political appointees worked significantly more actively and 
strategically on a day-to-day basis to attempt to influence media coverage while striking a 
balance that maintained their relationships with press. Civil servants, on the other hand, appeared 
from their responses to this question to engage significantly less in working to actively 
manipulate the stories and reporters with which they worked. This finding was clearly 
corroborated when I asked reporters what both groups of officials did when they were upset with 
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their coverage of a particular story. 
  
Reporters on What Officials Do When Upset With Their Coverage  
  When asked what happens when government officials are upset with their reporting, 
Reporters 1, 2, and 6 indicated that appointees are quick to complain, while civil servants will 
rarely do so. In the words of Reporter 1, appointees “tend to come quickly, by phone or in 
person, while the civil servants are a little less likely to come to you but will probably send the 
political person after you.” Reporter 2 likewise indicated that “appointees will respond 
aggressively and immediately” while “civil servants rarely do anything. Sometimes you’ll hear 
about it days or weeks later, in passing.” Reporter 6 concurred that “civil servants just tend to 
smolder and don’t say anything unless their bosses tell them to. Two weeks later, you find out 
they’re still pissed off at you for something you wrote that they never called you about.”
 Reporters 3, 4, 5, and 7 said civil servants do sometimes complain, but in the words of 
Reporter 3, appointees do so “more frequently, more vociferously, [and] more aggressively.” 
Reporters 4 and 5 indicated that calls from civil servants tended to be about true factual errors, 
though Reporter 4 indicated that civil servants may also object to the tone and perspective of 
stories. Reporter 7 was most dramatic in his description of the complaints of civil servants, 
reporting that “both politicals and civil servants will try to shape your coverage, as is their job, 
by cajoling, wheedling, and complaining. That’s what you get paid to do.” 
 Reporter 5 drew a distinction between the Obama and Bush administrations, arguing that 
the Obama administration “was incredibly touchy, they would call and argue about adjectives. 
The Bush folks didn’t do that.” 
  A truly new phenomenon reporters described – which should perhaps be considered an 
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additional facet of the permanent campaign – is attempts by government spokespeople to 
actually edit articles written by reporters. While just a few years ago such attempts would have 
been impossible, articles are now often posted on the websites of news organizations before they 
appear in print in the next day’s paper. Public affairs officials monitor these websites closely, 
and when they are upset with a story they now attempt to convince reporters and editors to 
change them before the next day’s paper goes to print. Reporter 6 explained that there is now “a 
clear recognition that the story isn’t the story in immutable form. As soon as something is up on 
the web, if someone doesn’t like it or wants to shape it, they will fight for real-time change in the 
content or headline. It suggests to me a really high level of sensitivity and sophistication about 
how information works these days.” 
  Reporter 4 explained, “my wife still talks about this regular 11 pm call with the White 
House, where she could hear a voice angry with me, seeking changes and objecting to 
characterizations.” He argued that this strategy may actually be effective because “there is an 
opportunity that didn’t exist before for aggressive PR people to modify stories in that initial 
period before they’re final” and he indicated that as a result of such conversations he had made 
“significant” changes to his stories, especially but not only during the financial crisis. 
 Reporter 6 explained that his media organization tried to resist making such changes, in 
recognition of “the very slippery slope you’re on as soon as you start making changes, so unless 
there is a very clear, factual screw-up that would generate a correction in the next day’s paper, 
you really have to hold your guns or otherwise you’re on a merry-go-round that will never stop.”
 However, reporters seemed unfazed by these complaints. They consistently indicated that 
they were open to having such conversations, even when they viewed complaints as 
unreasonable, and they did not report that such confrontations negatively impacted their 
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reporting on their sources in the future. Reporter 2 noted that sometimes the government 
spokespeople would punish reporters (“you get shut out of something later or certain people 
don’t talk to you again or you have icy relations for a while, and in every case it passes.”). 
Reporter 4 likewise noted that government spokespeople would “play games with access. If 
they’re mad, you’re less likely to get the next interview or leak. There’s a clear reason appointees 
in particular will allow themselves to get angry and yell: It does have an effect. No one likes 
getting yelled at, we need access, and we don’t want to get caught out in errors – so I think in 
some ways it’s effective, though it’s not optimal. … It breeds resentment and hostility in the 
relationship and so it … may … curtail that tendency to write the negative, but it also curtails the 
upside, to embrace your side of the story.” 
 But aside from Reporter 4’s description of how such interactions iced relations with 
government spokespeople and made him less likely to write positive coverage, none of the 
reporters indicated that they themselves held grudges against spokespeople who complained 
and/or tried to edit their stories before final publication, even when they did so aggressively. The 
reporters indicated a willingness to correct their stories, if they were wrong. Reporter 3, who was 
one of the reporters generally most critical of government spokespeople, explained that “even if 
you’ve called me five straight days to complain about something I thought was stupid, I think it’s 
my responsibility on the sixth day to keep an open mind; maybe you’re right.”    
  Likewise, when I asked Reporter 5 if hostile reactions from spokespeople would impact 
his next story, he responded, “oh, no, it’s just part of the game.” Reporter 6 described a 
willingness “to forgive and forget on both sides. It’s not a war, it’s a battle. You fight it, you get 
over it, you move on.” Reporter 7 explained that such confrontations were inevitable because 
“there is no be all, end all truth when you’re dealing with policy.” Reporter 4 even seemed to like 
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it, explaining that when spokespeople were truly incensed they would “call bosses, email bosses, 
… in extreme cases issue public statements explaining why the story was wrong – which I think 
is a healthy, good way to respond. … My general response is it makes me feel like it must have 
been a pretty good story.” 
  In sum, then, although both civil servants and appointees were reported to sometimes 
complain and joust with reporters, it is clear that appointees took significantly more aggressive 
measures to attempt to alter the course of reporting that appeared to be headed in a direction 
which they perceived as disadvantageous – and even to “edit” stories once they were published. 
Of course, some of this difference clearly stems from the fact that they are responsible for more 
contentious policy issues to begin with. Nevertheless, as the recent allegations into IRS 
misconduct (which shall later be discussed) indicate, civil servants are certainly not immune 
from handling negative stories. The fact that most reporters were adamant that the complaints 
and other aggressive tactics of appointees were par for the course and did not have a lasting 
impact on their relationships or coverage indicates that, to the degree that appointees are 
successful in altering coverage through the tactics they pursue, the changes clearly redound to 
the benefit of the administration – indicating that political appointees are simply more effective 
in this regard. 
V. Skill at Influencing Media Coverage 
  I next attempted to measure the overall influence that both groups exerted over both the 
topics that reporters cover and the tone and content of media reports which they attempted to 
influence.  
  Asked how much influence they had over the topics reporters covered, four out of five 
Obama appointees believed they had little influence because reporters covered the “news of the 
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day.” As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, the Obama appointees generally 
indicated that their massive workloads precluded them from proactively pitching stories. Obama 
Appointee 4 explained that his portfolio “was so broad that … there were all kinds of things that 
you could focus on, that oftentimes it was overwhelming plus we rarely even got to do any of the 
proactive stuff on this because so much of what I dealt with was incoming questions from 
reporters.” Obama Appointee 5 concurred that “this is probably a shortfall of the department – 
there was very little time spent thinking about proactive stories,” because the amount of 
incoming inquiries he received was sometimes so great  that there were “times where it felt like I 
couldn’t breathe because I couldn’t figure out what to do next.” Obama Appointee 1 also 
indicated that “we didn’t do enough pitching,” in part because “you’re trying to keep your head 
above water in that job.” Obama Appointee 2 explained, “a lot of it was so reactive … there’s 
just so much incoming.” Obama Appointee 3 explained, “I played a lot of defense” and reported 
that “I literally had no time.”     
  Obama Appointee 1 indicated that “we were more reactive than proactive in terms of 
topics, or [reporters] were driven by the calendar” and reported on scheduled events, such as 
mandated releases of reports or international meetings. However, he argued that this was also in 
some ways a function of being a government agency responsible for the “wheels of 
government;” it was the job of the White House to drive the “message of the day.” Obama 
Appointee 5 indicated that “whatever was happening that day was the topic we were all talking 
about.” Of course, often the news of the day was what the Treasury was doing, so in this sense 
the Obama appointees may be considered to have had more influence than that for which they 
gave themselves credit. Obama Appointee 3 was the sole Obama official to report having “a lot” 
of influence “because I held the keys; [reporters] had to talk to me.”  
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 By contrast, the Bush appointees were significantly more likely to report exerting 
influence over the topics reporters covered. Bush Appointee 1 described his influence as 
“moderate to strong;” Bush Appointee 3 indicated that much of what reporters wrote was 
influenced by the Secretary’s agenda; Bush Appointee 4 indicated that “we were able to drive a 
lot of stories …not that it was easy to do.” All four of these Bush appointees reported that their 
influence over topics stemmed at least in part from pitching stories or creating events that would 
drive coverage, with Bush Appointee 1 describing aggressive efforts to pitch stories and Bush 
Appointee 4 indicating that he was willing to engage in “banging a spoon on a highchair” if that 
is what it took to get attention. Bush Appointee 5 could not remember how much influence he 
had over reporters’ topics. 
 Thus, it appears that, overall, the Bush appointees were more likely to engage in 
proactive pitching, while the Obama appointees did so in a more limited fashion. A possible 
explanation for the differential between the Bush and Obama appointees is that many of the Bush 
appointees served at least in part prior to the 2008 financial crisis, which was likely a more 
pacific time at the Treasury than not only the crisis period but also the present, as the U.S. 
economy remains fragile. This could have given them greater time to engage in such proactive 
tactics. The fact that the Obama appointees realized and explained that they did not engage in as 
much pitching as they would have liked indicates that they likely would have done so under 
calmer circumstances – suggesting that appointees may overall have a greater propensity to 
attempt to proactively influence the topics of media reports, but also that their massive 
workloads may result in an effectiveness disadvantage in this regard.   
  Civil Servants overall reported exercising a moderate degree of influence over reporters’ 
topics. Civil Servant 3 indicated that he exerted no influence over reporters’ topics; Civil 
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Servants 4 and 6 indicated that reporters tended to cover their announcements; Civil Servants 1 
and 2 said they were able to make suggestions which influenced reporters’ topics when reporters 
called regarding stories; Civil Servant 5 said he was able to pitch smaller outlets but had limited 
influence over national reporters; and Civil Servant 7 likewise indicated success at pitching 
stories to the press. Nevertheless, it was striking that only two of the seven civil servants reported 
pitching stories.  
   If they considered themselves to have little influence over topics, the Obama appointees 
nevertheless reported significantly shaping the tone and content of stories they attempted to 
influence. Obama Appointee 1 reported a “pretty fair amount” of influence; Obama Appointee 2 
reported “a lot;” Obama Appointee 4 reported “a significant amount;” and Obama Appointee 5 
reported that he “was able to do that pretty effectively.” Obama Appointees 1, 4, and 5 indicated 
that they achieved this influence through making their cases persuasively to reporters. The 
exception was Obama Appointee 3, who indicated that “content you can mess with, but tone is 
basically your relationship with that reporter [and] how they normally write anyway. Tone is 
hard because unless it’s inaccurate, if you complain, they don’t give a fuck.” 
  The Bush appointees reported a perhaps somewhat smaller degree of influence, which in 
part seemed to stem from their belief that the press was sometimes against them. Bush Appointee 
2 said the administration had moderate influence over more controversial topics because “we 
were just always playing against a narrative that was against us” and fairly strong influence over 
other topics. Bush Appointee 1 echoed this belief, indicating that he had a “moderate” degree of 
influence but “a lot of times it depends on the attitude the reporter came in with.” Bush 
Appointee 3 reported that some of their influence stemmed from the fact that reporters traveled 
with and grew to like his principal; “we were kind of close.” Bush Appointee 4 reported having 
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influence stemming from relationships with reporters in which he tried to educate them on topics 
he wanted them to cover, as well as influence stemming “less [from] messaging than having 
really strong facts you can show and present in a quick way, but that’s really hard to do.” Bush 
Appointee 5 could not remember. 
  Civil Servant 5 covered a topic so controversial that he reported having little influence 
over tone and content, despite the fact that I judged from his other responses that he conducted 
his work with sophistication. The other civil servants all reported exerting some influence, 
although they often explained that they exercised this influence once a reporter had already 
decided to pursue a story and reached out to them. They exercised this influence through 
relationships (Civil Servants 2 and 4), offering access and information (Civil Servants 2 and 7), 
very occasionally convincing a reporter to shift the focus of his or her story to something more 
“interesting” (Civil Servant 3), or occasionally recommending third party validators (Civil 
Servant 6). However, Civil Servant 6 indicated that “often I don’t think it’s really necessary 
because of the line of business we’re in; most of this stuff is straightforward and factual and 
matters of tone aren’t all that important.”  
  Interestingly, Civil Servant 1 indicated that providing such factual information was 
actually a source of influence, indicating “reporters appreciate … when they call you up and 
you’re very straightforward and get a subject matter expert on the phone within a couple of 
hours; I think that has a positive influence on tone and content.” He indicated that when 
appointees got involved in their stories, it tended to be to the detriment of the story, because 
“they typically don’t want to say anything and I think that influences tone and content.” This 
issue shall be further discussed in section 8. 
  While the responses of civil servants certainly indicated that they engaged in good 
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practices, it seemed clear that appointees were in the business of actively attempting to 
promulgate their arguments to a much greater degree than civil servants – even if, in the case of 
the Obama appointees, they largely promulgated their messages in responses to topics reporters 
were already covering or, in the case of the Bush appointees, they believed that the impact of 
their arguments was somewhat hampered by a liberal media bias. Of course, this is somewhat to 
be expected given the more polemical nature of their portfolios. This finding was corroborated 
by the responses of reporters.   
Reporters on Who Influences Their Topics and the Tone and Content of their Coverage 
   Interestingly, Reporters 3, 4, and 6 explained that they were rarely pitched stories from 
either group of government officials. Reporter 4 explained, “I don’t think public affairs people 
do a very good job of being proactive … they’re almost wholly reactive and it’s very unusual for 
them to try to influence the selection of topics from the outside.” This is especially significant 
given the perception of appointees as aggressively attempting to shape media coverage on behalf 
of the president. 
  However, most reporters indicated that appointees attempted to exert greater influence 
over their stories overall. For example, Reporter 5 indicated that “I probably would be surprised 
if I got a pitch from a civil servant, just because they don’t do too much of that. In my 
experience, it’s been initiated by the appointees.” Appointee 3 concurred that “appointees are far 
more likely to push harder to try to influence a story than non-politicals,” while Reporter 2 
indicated that “appointees more frequently influence the topics [he covers] because they’re trying 
to push a particular line or push back against a particular line of thinking” while civil servants 
“tend not to have a lot of tone in what they do.” Reporter 4 likewise indicated that civil servants 
are “not trying to manage you to the same extent or get at a particular goal and when they do 
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they’re not as good, so they have less influence over tone and content.” In this sense, appointees 
also had an advantage because of their political access; Reporter 1 indicated that when an 
appointee pitched a story he “knew that’s what the Secretary wanted discussed.”  
 Reporter 1 indicated that appointees were “undoubtedly better at making arguments,” 
while Reporter 4 concurred that “appointees tend to be better at pursuing a particular objective in 
shaping a story, arguing for their own understanding of the facts,” but he also noted that they 
sometimes do so in such an aggressive manner that their efforts become counterproductive, 
because, as will be discussed in the next section, it makes him apply greater skepticism to their 
claims.    
 Appointees were also said to have a keener sense of what was most newsworthy. 
According to Reporter 2, “if you rely on civil servants for your topics, you’ll end up with a lot of 
boring topics.” Meanwhile, according to him, appointees “tend to be more attuned to what 
people are actually discussing as the hot issue of the day, because they’re not drowning in 
decades of background.” 
  However, most reporters (Reporters 1, 3, 4, and 6) were clear that appointees were often 
not successful in shaping the tone and content of their stories because their attempts to do so 
were so aggressive and overtly political that, in the words of Reporter 3, their efforts “can 
backfire” and cause reporters to become skeptical. The next section will explore this issue in 
greater detail.  
  Thus, it seems clear that, unsurprisingly, appointees work harder to influence media 
coverage and promulgate their preferred narratives. However, their efforts are often ineffective 
because they lack credibility with reporters, as the next section will explore. Civil servants, on 
the other hand, made less of an effort to pitch stories altogether, indicating that they are relatively 
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ineffective in shaping the topics of coverage. The argument of Reporter 4 that civil servants are 
not good at influencing stories when they try to manage them suggests that they may also not be 
effective in shaping the tone of stories. However, the next section makes clear that civil servants 
enjoy a credibility advantage which likely translates into an efficacy advantage in influencing the 
content of the stories they work on with reporters, because the information they provide is 
viewed by the press as less biased than that of their appointee counterparts.  
 
VI. Credibility with Reporters 
  To determine how the efforts of appointees and civil servants ultimately impact the 
coverage of reporters, I asked the reporters whether they find themselves more skeptical 
regarding the claims made by public affairs officers who are political appointees or civil 
servants. In one of the clearest and most consistent findings to emerge from my interviews, 
reporters indicated, without exception, that they discount the claims of political appointees, 
because they believe that the raison d’etre of political staff is to make the president look good. 
They indicated this to be the case not just in response to this specific question, but also 
repeatedly throughout the course of our conversations.  
  Reporters were unequivocal that they judge appointees to have less credibility than their 
careerist counterparts, simply by virtue of the positions they hold. Accordingly, appointees begin 
every conversation and interaction with reporters at a disadvantage, because they are assumed 
from the start to have political motives – making it more difficult for them to promulgate the 
information and messages they seek to convey. Here are reporters in their own words:   
“As you can imagine, for reporters, when we recognize that we’re being kind of sold a story by 
the political appointees, we tend to take the opposite side because we’re thinking, what are they 
171 
 
up to, what’s going on here? If it was a good, logical argument why some particular tax issue or 
something was about to become a highlight of political discussion, yeah, that was fine, you 
would have that discussion, but you were always a little suspicious. Maybe suspicious is 
overstating it, but you always tried to determine whether there was some other side to the story 
when a political offered it to you. With civil servants, no.” 
- Reporter 1 
 
“The arguments of civil servants almost always carry greater credibility than the arguments of 
appointees, because we tend to view civil servants as people who have worked across 
administrations and who will probably work in other administrations, and they want to maintain 
some semblance of consistency on how they approach these issues… I’m more skeptical of 
appointees for sure because they have more pressure on them and they are more concerned 
about the political implications, and as a result they’re more likely to be selective in what kind of 
information they provide and may not always give you the full picture of what you’re pursuing.” 
-Reporter 2 
 
“If I get a call from someone at Treasury pushing a narrative that the Secretary was very 
influential in doing X, Y or Z, I don’t know how effective that is, because I’m instantly wary 
they’re spinning. That doesn’t mean it’s not true. It could be both and worth writing, but I’m 
instantly wary because I know it’s almost inconceivable an appointee would pitch a story or try 
to get me to incorporate some angle that didn’t clearly have a benefit to the boss. They wouldn’t 
suggest a story because they thought it was interesting or good journalism; they’re not thinking 
that way.” 
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-Reporter 3 
 
“I’m definitely more skeptical of information put out by appointees. They’re political appointees, 
they have it basically as their job to have a commitment to the president or to the administration 
who appointed them, whereas the civil servant probably sees himself or herself as having more 
of a commitment to the U.S. taxpayer, or the government as a whole, or to the country…” 
-Reporter 3  
“I think it’s true that appointees view themselves as in the service of a political party or of the 
individual who appointed them or the administration they serve … they see stories through the 
framework of political advantage, so that informs the things they are and aren’t willing to tell 
you … It’s my view that the role and responsibility of public affairs officers is to make 
information available to the public, and it’s my strong sense that they don’t share that 
perspective about their job.” 
-Reporter 4 
“Appointees tend to be better at pursuing particular objectives in shaping a story, … but … they 
don’t necessarily serve their own interests by doing so as aggressively as they do because the 
aggressive effort to sell the story can and does lead you to doubt the merits of your story or make 
sure you’re telling the other side or push back on what you’re told, and, one, that frustration can 
influence the tone and content, and, two, it undermines their credibility. The facts presented you 
view through a little more of a jaundiced eye and wonder whether they’re true and it leads you to 
do a little more due diligence on whether you’re getting the full and complete version of the 
answer to the question you asked.” 
-Reporter 4 
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“It’s the government, these guys are spending three trillion dollars a year and it’s a democracy, 
so they’re answerable to the public and public opinion, so therefore they will always try to tailor 
their message. It’s like a car company trying to sell cars, they’re selling a service which is 
government service, so they’re going to tailor it to whatever the view of politics is just because 
this town is run by people who get elected, so therefore that’s a driving force in what they think 
and their worldview. No one elects the Treasury Secretary,  but they elect the President, and the 
Secretary works for the President, and the President has to face re-election…” 
-Reporter 5 
“Appointees make arguments and they are heavily discounted because they’re advocates, they’re 
coming from a point of view and their prime objective is to defend the perspective of the person 
who appointed them at the expense of all other perspectives and other facts and what’s a fair 
rendering of a set of circumstances.” 
-Reporter 6 
“I try to take the posture that I’m not giving more or less weight to what any person says, but 
there’s just a natural hesitancy to give much weight to what appointees say just because you 
know they’re coming from that advocacy perspective and there’s an ulterior motive in everything 
they do.” 
-Reporter 6 
“The U.S. may have had more influence there [in Europe, during the sovereign debt crisis] than 
we reflected in stories, because we thought it was a load of heap.” 
-Reporter 6 
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“You’re probably a little more skeptical of something coming out of Treasury’s Office of Public 
Affairs [which is staffed by appointees] than something like the OCC Public Affairs office [the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s public affairs office is staffed by civil servants] 
because they don’t have the political pressures or don’t see the same political pressures that an 
Undersecretary of Public Affairs sees or imagines.”  
-Reporter 7 (For the record: the title of the Treasury’s top appointee for public affairs is Assistant 
Secretary, not Undersecretary.)  
 
  However, one reporter indicated that this suspicion decreased over time, while another 
reporter indicated that it increased, indicating that appointees are at least able to influence the 
degree of reporters’ skepticism through their individual actions. Additionally, Reporter 4 noted 
that sometimes the narratives the appointees sought to promulgate were helpful, because “I am in 
the business of telling stories and it can be useful to deal with people in the storytelling business, 
because they have an awareness of what is or isn’t useful, or an adversarial relationship can force 
you to think more clearly about the conclusions you’re reaching.”   
  Furthermore, multiple reporters noted that civil servants themselves may be concerned 
with protecting their offices; in the words of Reporter 5, “even though they can’t be fired, 
everyone wants to please the boss and do well in these organizations.” On the other hand, 
Reporter 4 noted that “some [civil servants] appear genuinely committed to increasing public 
understanding,” using as an example a Securities and Exchange Commission press officer whose 
main goal appeared to be expanding knowledge of the office’s function and activities as opposed 
to putting his office in a position of advantage in every story – which Reporter 4 argued was an 
effective long-term strategy for building media influence.    
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  To be sure, it is clear that the arguments of civil servants do not escape the scrutiny of 
reporters. However, the responses above indicate that most reporters assume that appointees have 
particular political motives in everything they do and are almost always trying to spin for their 
bosses. As a result, in the words of Reporter 6, the arguments of appointees are “heavily 
discounted” and met with a level of suspicion that significantly exceeds that which reporters 
apply to the information they receive from civil servants. This low level of credibility that 
appointees hold in the eyes of the press can only serve to handicap their ability to serve as 
effective advocates for the president – giving them a significant effectiveness disadvantage.  
 
VII. Skill At Providing Requested Information to Reporters 
  Next, I consider how reporters described their ability to access the information they 
sought for their stories from both appointees and civil servants. While it would certainly be in an 
administration’s interests to sometimes withhold information from the press, effective public 
relations officers would be expected to generally provide reporters with helpful information for 
their stories. Otherwise, they would damage their relationships with the press and cede control of 
the message to the other sources to whom reporters would turn. 
Appointees 
 Although appointees were perceived as knowing more about what was happening in the 
upper echelons of the Treasury, every reporter with whom I spoke vociferously argued that 
political appointees fail to give them the requisite background and context to shape their 
reporting. This complaint was emphatically made by every reporter with whom I spoke, despite 
the fact that I did not ask a direct question on the subject. The reporters indicated that they 
needed more conversations that were either on background (meaning that sources are not named 
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directly but rather referred to by agreed descriptions such as “Treasury official” or 
“administration official”) or off-the-record in order to explain issues, what might be happening in 
the future, and perhaps even discuss areas of disagreement. This situation was contrasted sharply 
by the majority of reporters with the Bush administration, in which Treasury officials were 
described as significantly more willing to engage in such discussions than the Obama appointees.  
  Reporter 2 reported that “in this administration versus others, there is … less fruitful 
conversation on the front end to shape stories and thinking than there is in other administrations 
where you’re just kind of talking back and forth. In this administration, not just at Treasury but at 
numerous economic agencies, it may be the case that there is an administration-wide cultural 
approach to not risking information getting out, not volunteering information.” Reporter 3 
concurred that: 
 
  the current administration is way too closed, way too afraid to walk, way too reluctant to  
  even sort of give basic information. … One of the problems with having a lot of  
  appointees is that it’s harder for them to see and really get their head around, like, if I call  
  and say can I talk to someone in the TARP [Troubled Asset Relief Program] office about  
  TARP, they’re just afraid to do that. They’re afraid the guy or woman isn’t political, they  
  don’t know if they’ll say something they don’t want to say, and I’m not going into the  
  political, I’m just trying to get information, I just want a briefing from someone who can  
  explain how it works. They’re just afraid, they figure, ‘what do we have to gain, the  
  person talking could fuck it up.’  
   
  Similarly, Reporter 5, a veteran Treasury reporter, explained that “we cover very 
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complicated issues, so so many of our questions are just, ‘can you help me understand this, how 
does this particular thing work,’ and the politicals often feel constrained to be so on message 
with whatever the political point is that they’re either unwilling to go off the talking points just to 
help us understand an issue or they don’t know, just because they don’t know the issue 
themselves.” Reporter 7 indicated that, in contrast to other federal economic agencies who will 
“acknowledge the other side of an issue or the other arguments and explain them,” the Treasury 
responds to critical questions “in like a combative way.”   
   Two reporters speculated that this caution stemmed from the trauma of Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner’s widely-perceived-as-poor performance and lack of clarity 
announcing a plan to stem the country’s financial crisis on February 10, 2009, which caused the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average to immediately tank, dropping by about 300 points. “They got a 
little gun shy after that,” Reporter 3 said. Reporter 5 also attributed the diminished access 
afforded to reporters by appointees in the Obama administration to differences in the styles of 
their principals. “Paulson and Geithner were different; Geithner because he had been staff [civil 
service] at Treasury saw things in a different way than Paulson, who hadn’t served in 
government. Paulson was used to running Goldman, so if you wanted to talk, he talked – and he 
was rather forceful.”  
  By contrast, Reporter 5 indicated that, to get information from this administration, he 
needed to engage in “hostage taking.” “It’s often how this administration seems to run,” he said. 
“If you get a fact they may be willing to talk to you, but you’ve got to get it from a lobbyist or an 
opposing political party on the Hill and then present it to them as your hostage.”  The reporter 
used an example of a story I was involved in, when Geithner made a short trip to Europe in 
September 2011 without press, in order to discuss the region’s sovereign debt crisis with 
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European finance ministers. When the Austrian Finance Minister made remarks critical of 
Geithner at the meeting, the reporter said, “she was our hostage” because it forced the Treasury 
to reach out to him to provide the U.S. version of events.  
 Reporters indicated that this approach left them “constantly puzzled” (Reporter 4). “It’s 
just a very, very, very cautious way of going about the exercise of public affairs, and it’s just 
hard to see how it’s effective.” (Reporter 3). This is because, for reporters, one of the best ways 
for a source to influence their reporting is by providing them with access. When asked about the 
savvier things that federal economic agencies do in order to shape the coverage they receive in 
the press, the majority of reporters indicated that providing access was the smartest thing they 
could do (an argument which, as shall later be discussed, is also, of course, self-serving). The 
reporters consistently argued that the lack of access provided by Obama appointees made the 
appointees less effective advocates for the administration, because they voluntarily forfeited 
opportunities to include their facts and point of view in stories and to shape the thinking of 
reporters. For example, Reporter 5 explained that one story he wrote which the Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs had complained about resulted from the fact that he was not being 
provided with sufficient information from the Treasury on an overseas trip and therefore had to 
look elsewhere to come up with something to satisfy his editors’ demand for stories.  
  Reporter 7 likewise explained that “if there’s an issue … you know is going to come up, 
giving reporters early access to not only lay out the issue but lay out the agency’s or 
department’s approach to it is invaluable, because reporters innately when tackling a topic will 
defer to that approach, so if you explain an issue to a reporter from your point of view before 
anyone else, they will default in a time crunch, and from then on approach the issue with that in 
mind … It’s amazing how easy it is to shape reporters’ perceptions.”  
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  Reporter 3 argued that the lack of information and access he receives from the Obama 
appointees makes it harder for him to write positive stories about the administration. 
Additionally, he explained, “one advantage to giving journalists interviews and access is that it’s 
harder to write scathing pieces about people you’ve gotten to know. It’s easier to be more critical 
of someone a group you’ve never sat down with. It’s just human nature.” 
  Two reporters emphasized that the current appointees have foregone opportunities to 
build strong relationships with members of the press which foster trust and influence. One 
reporter contrasted this approach with that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which 
held a “reporter day” to allow the press to engage with officials, made its principals available for 
lunches and background conversations regularly, and worked to educate reporters about their 
work. “They built these relationships under less stressful circumstances, and then when they 
needed those relationships [during the financial crisis] they were able to draw on them,” he said. 
“There’s this fear of being burned by talking to a reporter and I understand it, but the benefits get 
overlooked.”  
  Reporters 3 and 5 were perhaps most critical of the performance of Treasury appointees 
in this regard, because the argued that this lack of access reflects a fundamental incompetence on 
the part of public affairs staff.  For example, Reporter 3 used the example of the Treasury’s 
December 9, 2013 announcement that it had sold its final shares in General Motors, which were 
purchased during the financial crisis in order to stabilize the country’s automobile industry, as an 
example of a “lack of savvy and lack of experience” among its public affairs staff: 
   
   They announce an hour beforehand a conference call with [Treasury Secretary] Lew and  
  senior officials on background late in the day. Here’s, this is where they undoubtedly  
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  have a good story to tell and almost nobody is on the other side of this now saying it was  
  a huge failure, people say the people lost $10 million, but for the most part opposition to  
  the auto bailout has dissipated or been beaten into submission, it’s a good story to have to  
  tell and they know it and want to tell it, but they don’t know how to tell it, so they do a  
  call with Lew, make a big announcement, and there’s no visual, there’s no photos, it’s a  
  call, there’s no ‘there,’ there’s no physical place, there’s no press conference, there’s just  
  a call. Someone has to explain to me how that’s effective, even if your motivations are  
  purely political. They’re not doing a good job of even representing themselves, often.  
  They aren’t good at explaining when they have a good story to tell. 
 
  Of course, such event creation has long been understood by sophisticated public relations 
professionals; Daniel Boorstin defined the “pseudo-event” as a human creation which, in contrast 
to a “train wreck or an earthquake … is planned primarily … for the immediate purpose of being 
reported or reproduced. Therefore, its occurrence is arranged for the convenience of the reporting 
or reproducing media.” (1992, 11).  
  Reporter 5 likewise indicated that the story in which he used the Austrian finance 
minister as a hostage was an example of a time when appointees were “kind of being inept.” 
“Someone should have told the Secretary that others will talk and you’ll be interpreted through 
others’ voices,” he said. 
 Both Reporter 3 and Reporter 5 blamed the fact that appointees often failed to provide 
access in a strategic way on their lack of journalism experience. “You can’t have an entire office 
of people dealing with the media who have never worked in the media,” Reporter 3 said. “It’s 
illogical. The lack of experience shows. You can see it in their inability to pitch stories or even 
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time them appropriately.” 
  Reporter 7 attributed the lack of access to several things: “Some of it’s arrogance. Some 
of it is the unfair treatment they’ve received. And some stems from the knowledge gap [of 
appointees on the issues they cover.]” 
  For Reporter 5, this lack of access isn’t just aggravating to reporters and 
counterproductive for appointees. It also poses a problem for democracy. “Oftentimes what we 
see as the public’s right to know bumps up against the view of appointees of what is good for 
their bosses,” he said. “Therefore, they’re … trying to either manage the message or limit 
whatever information they’ll let out. That’s a constant conflict.” 
Civil Servants  
 Just as appointees were perceived by reporters to not be forthcoming with the political 
information to which they had greater access, reporters indicated that civil servants likewise did 
not wield their greater policy knowledge to effectively influence reporting. “They’re … very 
reluctant on the record but I was always struck by how much, even off-the-record, civil servants 
are reluctant to shoot the shit,” Reporter 2 said. For Reporter 1, civil servants are often “unclear 
or suspicious, I think, of what reporters’ intents are, so I would have to spend quite some time 
trying to explain that ‘I’m not trying to get you to say something that will get you in trouble.’” 
  Reporters 3, 5, and 6 argued that this is the case because civil servant spokespeople are 
often not authorized or empowered to speak to press a great deal. “It’s the political people who 
have been authorized to talk more, so you’re probably having a longer conversation with them,” 
Reporter 5 said. Civil servants “know the issues, but often – this whole town has gotten so much 
over the years about message control that they often feel that there’s just no benefit in talking to 
reporters because the only thing that will happen to them is they’ll get in trouble, so they can feel 
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constrained.” Reporter 5 did, however, indicate that “the ones who’ve been around a while and 
know how things work are usually more forthcoming.” 
  Meanwhile, Reporter 2 complained that civil servants sometimes fail to grasp how their 
subject matter connects to the stories reporters are writing. According to Reporter 4, civil 
servants “tend to just be less invested in the political consequences of a story, which sometimes 
means they lack the incentive to talk to you, but sometimes means they lack the disincentive.” 
Reporter 4 found civil servants to be generally less savvy than appointees in dealing with the 
media, reporting that “to the extent civil servants felt the need to defend their agency, they’re 
generally not very good at it.” 
  Reporter 6 concurred that civil servants seem less interested in attempting to influence 
reporting altogether. “I think they view themselves as facilitators only … I don’t think they care 
about the outcome always, they view the request as an intrusion on their day as opposed to being 
their job. But they tend to be in much more of a neutral posture with questions, where they 
realize they’re dealing with facts and data and one of their jobs is to get it out to you, so if you’re 
calling about stuff like that, they tend to be a bit more useful. At the Bureau of Labor Statistics or 
Census, they’re good with data. If you ask them if you’re drawing the right conclusions, or 
crunching data and you call them up and say you’re having trouble extracting this, they’ll put it 
together, and a day later, it’s in your inbox. That’s what they’re trained to do and they’re really 
good.” Reporter 2 likewise found civil servants to provide better informational content. 
  Thus, reporters indicated that civil servants might sometimes be helpful at providing raw 
data, with the exception of Reporter 4 (who indicated that civil servants might sometimes not be 
politically motivated enough to have disincentives to providing information). However, reporters 
generally indicated that civil servants were, like their appointee counterparts, cautious and 
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unhelpful about providing the context, backgrounds, and explanations that they sought for their 
reporting. Of course, this could partly be the case because appointees prevented the civil servants 
from sharing such information; as will be discussed in the next section, Civil Servant 5 was 
adamant that if a civil servant was speaking on the record and sharing information of which the 
administration did not approve, the administration would stop the civil servant from speaking. 
  Of course, these complaints of reporters must likewise be discounted, at least to a degree, 
given the natural tension inherent in their jobs. As Reporter 5 explained, “we’re paid to find out 
things and tell our readers about them.” Obviously, reporters will always advocate for greater 
access to information.  
  The fact that reporters consistently argued that the Bush administration provided better 
access, however, does call for consideration of the possibility that the Obama appointees are less 
skilled or are withholding more information than the Bush administration. Of course, this 
narrative is particularly self-serving for reporters because it suggests that the current 
administration’s practices are abnormal and improper, and should thus be changed. However, the 
consistency with which this allegation was volunteered to me by reporters made it evident that 
the matter merited consideration. It will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
  Overall, however, while it would certainly not be in the interests of the administration to 
grant the completely free and open level of access that reporters desire, at the same time, it seems 
reasonably clear that both appointees and civil servants are missing opportunities to exert 
influence by providing explanations – even off-the-record – that might inculcate their worldview 
and strengthen their relationship with reporters. In this regard, neither group holds an 
effectiveness advantage. This finding is particularly striking in the case of the appointees, who, 
as we have seen, overall exerted significantly greater efforts to attempt to shape media coverage. 
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Nevertheless, reporters universally and consistently indicated that they were unable to access 
information from the appointees which, they argued, would have allowed them to better convey 
the administration’s perspective on key issues.   
VIII. Who Appointees and Civil Servants Perceive to be More Effective Administration 
Advocates  
  For additional insight into the question of whether appointees or civil servants are more 
effective advocates for the president in Treasury public affairs positions, I asked both the 
appointees and civil servants which group they thought was more effective at conveying the 
administration’s messages in the press. Perhaps unsurprisingly, appointees overwhelmingly (but 
not universally) believed they were more effective, while civil servants overwhelmingly (but not 
universally) believed they were most effective.   
  Appointees indicated they were more successful because civil servants do not 
“understand the broader political architecture” (Obama Appointee 1), while “a big part of 
succeeding in government is political instinct. With reporters, we’re good at reading situations 
very quickly, and that’s something careers don’t have any of, zero, and it’s not just careers, there 
are some Assistant Secretaries at Treasury who aren’t political and lack that quick instinct that 
will help you to be effective” – a skill that appointees offer their principals (Obama Appointee 
5). Additionally, appointees “may be more invested and more concerned with how the 
administration is portrayed (Obama Appointee 2) because they “truly believe in the president, 
administration and people they’re working for” (Bush Appointee 1), and “you can be more of an 
effective advocate because you’re on the same side” (Bush Appointee 2), while the priorities of 
civil servants “are not the same as the appointees’ priorities.” (Obama Appointee 4). However, 
Bush Appointee 3 noted that appointees enjoy better access, while civil servants are “kind of 
185 
 
behind the scenes … just by design.” 
  Bush Appointee 4 likewise explained that it is necessary for appointees to serve as 
spokespeople because policies change under different administrations: 
 
  You can’t forget that the administration, the executive branch is a political body. The  
  departments and agencies are not independent. They serve at the pleasure of the  
  president. It matters who the president is. You’re part of an administration and the policy.  
  I don’t believe a spokesperson can be credible who on a dime on January 20 at noon can  
  go from being the voice of one policy and then at 12:01 go to being the voice of the  
  opposite policy. That’s just not credible, and to me the most important characteristic of a  
  really effective spokesperson is credibility. 
 
  Obama Appointee 5 also noted that “it’s nothing against civil servants, but there’s limits 
on what a civil servant can do. They can’t work the same hours as we do … whereas a political 
person has come up through the political ranks, so you’re just used to working round the clock, 
dealing with high level principals, talking to them succinctly … You’re battle tested coming 
through the political machine.” Bush Appointee 1 likewise argued that appointees “know we’re 
here a short time, we’re hungry, so many came off the campaign so you’re used to working 
round the clock, so … you go.” 
 The exception among appointees was Obama Appointee 3, who thought that “people 
underestimate career folks” who enjoy “subject matter expertise; they’ve seen stories before on 
particular subjects. They may not be as savvy media wise, but in a lot of cases that’s not true. 
People really underestimate them.” Bush Appointee 5 said he did not know who was more 
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effective. 
  By contrast, civil servants generally argued that they conveyed the administration’s 
messages in the press more effectively than appointees. Civil Servant 5 disagreed with Bush 
Appointee 4’s claim that civil servants cannot credibly speak to political matters. He argued that 
“to the average mom or dad, they identify more with the agency and federal government than 
with the administration … Within the beltway and among reporters, they assume if you’re 
speaking for the agency and have clearance to do so, you are speaking for the administration … 
if you’re in a political agency, you’re doing and saying what the political want or they will stop 
you from speaking.” 
  Civil Servant 6 likewise pushed back on the conventional wisdom that civil servants are 
politically tone-deaf. He argued that “civil servants are almost always at least partially 
supervised by a political communicator … and as a civil servant, I’m sensitive to what the 
political spokespeople are concerned about and certainly make an effort not to screw things up 
and get people pissed at me.” 
  Civil servants also argued that their greater efficacy stemmed from their greater 
experience. While Civil Servant 3 did not feel comfortable pronouncing which group was 
ultimately more effective because the two groups worked well together, he indicated that he 
thought “appointees are at a disadvantage if [their subject matter portfolio] wasn’t a particular 
focus in college, grad school, or somewhere they worked.” Civil Servant 1 likewise explained 
that “civil servants often have twenty years plus working in an organization, which doesn’t 
necessarily make them wonderful, but a lot of times you’re looking at people that have incredible 
background.”  By contrast, he explained, 
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  There is a bumper sticker that says ‘hire a teen while they still know everything.’ In many  
  ways, I see politicals like that. A lot of them are very young with very little experience  
  and they think they know everything. They’re coming from a campaign mode, so they  
  think in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ but you have to be one or the other, and that’s why if  
  you express doubts of something … you’re probably perceived as being ‘them,’ and they  
  wouldn’t trust you, which would mean they would do everything they could to take you  
  out of the loop completely, ‘cause that’s the way they work. And I’m just not sure how  
  you get to a political and say, ‘no, that’s not how it works, 80 percent of people in the  
  world are not interested in politics at all. They’re here trying to do a good job. They’re  
  not trying to make the administration look bad; if they do their job well, then your   
  administration will look well.’ Most people I work with want the current administration  
  to look good because it reflects on them. So if people are saying the government is doing  
  a good job, we’re happy because it means we’re doing a good job. 
   
  Civil Servant 1 also argued that the proclivity of appointees to cover up information was 
actually damaging to the administrations they served: 
 Appointees have a separate motivation, let’s put it that way, and there really isn’t any  
  difference in the Obama administration than in the Bush administration. Politicals hate,  
  absolutely hate, to take responsibility for anything. ‘Oh my god, you mean something  
  went wrong and it was our fault?’ My thought is always, hey, when you start out you’re  
  not trying to do the wrong thing, you had a set of reasons for making a decision, it didn’t  
  go the way you wanted, to me the appropriate response is why you made the decision and  
  what you’ll do now, and if you approach it that way it’s a reasonable approach and both  
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  the media and the public would look at it and say it’s reasonable. Instead, politicals say  
  we can’t tell them that everything didn’t go perfectly, so don’t say anything to anybody,  
  and that’s to me … I mean, they’re in charge so I do what they say but I really, really  
  don’t think it’s the right answer a lot of times because if you don’t say anything the  
  assumption is going to be the worst possible scenario, which probably isn’t the case and I  
  think you’d get off a lot lighter if you explain. 
  Civil Servant 7 made a similar argument that civil servants are more likely than political 
appointees to be “objective about a situation.” For him, this not only better served the American 
people’s right to know, but also translated into greater efficacy with reporters because “there’s 
no spin. I think reporters perceive appointees as, there’s always sort of a shadow of a doubt, are 
they coming totally clean, are they conveying everything, what are they not telling me, is there 
something that is missing?’” 
  Civil Servants 2, 4, and 6 both argued that appointees are better at communicating the 
administration’s priorities or talking points, while civil servants are better at “communicating the 
substance that supports the policies.” (Civil Servant 4). Interestingly, Civil Servant 2 reported 
that he was “definitely more effective in explaining how an inclusive economy in which low 
wealth individuals have an opportunity to get credit and capital is critical to the economy as a 
whole in moving forward. I can probably articulate that better, with more nuance and examples 
than a political, just because it’s something I live and breathe, where they’ll often boil it down to 
talking points that will work for them, that they understand and at times may also be colored by 
the overarching administration message.”  
  The policy substance Civil Servant 2 was attempting to convey, of course, was a 
powerful argument on behalf of Democratic policies. Given what we know about the “appointee 
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discount,” I would argue, in fact, that the Obama administration might be better served by a 
spokesperson making such an argument which would be perceived by reporters as more neutral 
given its source, yet would actually make a more nuanced and compelling argument for the 
administration’s priorities than Civil Servant 2 seems to suggest political appointees are even 
capable of crafting. Of course, this would not necessarily be the case if the current administration 
was Republican. However, the example is a striking indication of a situation in which a civil 
servant might actually better advance an administration’s priorities.  
  While the appointees generally believed that they made more effective administration 
advocates, at other points during in our conversations, two Obama appointees shed light on 
additional factors that may diminish the effectiveness of the particular individuals who serve as 
appointees. Obama Appointee 3 argued that the administration was “incredibly insular” and 
divided its own staff into “true believers and non-true believers.” He argued that the 
administration favored hiring individuals who had worked on the campaign, and placed them in 
senior positions even when they might have found others who were more qualified. Meanwhile, 
he said, “cabinet [secretaries] hire people from the campaign for White House access.” President 
Obama has elsewhere been accused of being insular in his staff picks (Nicholas 2010), while 
others have also questioned the power afforded to his White House aides. For example, in his 
memoir, former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates expressed dismay at the prerogatives 
asserted by White House staff, arguing that “for an [National Security Staff] staff member to call 
a four-star combatant commander or field commander would have been unthinkable when I 
worked at the White House – and probably cause for dismissal. It became routine under Obama.” 
(2014, 566).   
  However, Obama Appointee 5 shed light on part of the reason why the administration 
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may have relied so heavily on campaign aides in top posts, arguing that “there were a lot of 
extraordinarily smart people they were looking at to be Assistant Secretary [of Public Affairs at 
the Treasury] but the process of vetting and ridiculous information they needed to turn over, 
about spouses and kids and taxes, just became such a huge pain, that they missed out on some 
really, really good appointees. The process becomes so nasty … [that] really smart, successful 
professionals don’t want to go through that … the process was just such a turn-off, it’s hard to 
get people.” The impact on government efficacy of a vetting process widely perceived to be out 
of control has, of course, been well documented by other scholars (Mackenzie 2001). 
  Of course, the findings of this chapter on the political experience of civil servants cast 
doubt on the assertion of appointees that careerists lack political savvy. The next chapter will 
further call into question the appointee claims that civil servants are less loyal. On the other 
hand, the responses of reporters on the knowledge of civil servants and the “appointee discount” 
appear to affirm the claims of civil servants to serve as stronger advocates in the press. 
VIX. Relative Savvy 
  Finally, I considered whether the officials appeared to utilize savvy tactics in order to 
advance the administration’s goals. 
  During the course of my interviews, I likewise detected a lack of sophistication on the 
part of two of the civil servants whom I interviewed. Civil Servant 3 came to his position without 
any previous media relations experience, as was evident in his anomalous, yet nevertheless 
surprising, assertion that nothing could be done when a reporter for a major, mainstream 
publication wrote an inaccurate story. I found another Civil Servant whom I interviewed to be 
tediously verbose, at times continuing to drone on after I indicated to him several times that “I 
got it” in response to his lengthy answers. At one point, when after exhausting my subtler cues I 
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finally politely suggested we should perhaps not spend too much more time on a particular point 
he was making, he raised his pointer finger in the air and indicated he needed to finish reading 
me a passage from a book he had produced in his office before we moved on. However, both 
civil servants worked in lower-level posts – not the heads of public affairs positions that were 
most common among my interview subjects – and the latter civil servant worked in a position in 
which the law required that only very limited and technical information be released, perhaps 
justifying his more stereotypically bureaucratic behavior. Furthermore, I found their 
insufficiently sophisticated approaches to be significantly less of a threat to the administration 
than the truly inappropriate behavior of Bush Appointee 5, which is discussed in Appendix B. 
On the other hand, I found the formidable skill and qualifications of Civil Servants 1 and 5 to be 
especially remarkable. One civil servant who brought particularly strong policy background to 
his job described Treasury as his ideal post and had waited for years for a position to open up 
within the Department. Of course, the variability of the skill of my interview subjects is to be 
expected, as in any organization there are likely be particularly weak and particularly strong 
individuals. 
  However, while, as previously discussed, the reporters indicated that civil servants rarely 
pitched stories and were ineffective at making arguments, in other ways they appeared to employ 
savvy tactics to advance the administration’s goals. For example, I asked the government 
officials whether they utilized public opinion polls in their work – a tool which requires 
sophisticated planning and savvy analysis in order to utilize the results to inform a public affairs 
officer’s work. While none of the appointees indicated that they had utilized public opinion polls 
in their work, four of the seven appointees indicated that they had used or were planning to 
utilize public opinion polls.  
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  I also asked the government officials whether they ever tried to appeal to the emotions, as 
opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted – a tactic which 
evidences a sophisticated approach to attempting to shape how people will receive messages. 
Civil servants were also more likely to utilize this technique. While four of ten appointees 
indicated that they attempted to appeal to emotions, five of the seven civil servants reported 
doing so. The responses to these questions are described in greater detail in chapter 6, as they are 
also germane to the question of the permanent campaign. 
  This evidence suggests that civil servants may conduct their work with more savvy than 
that for which they are given credit by reporters – perhaps because reporters believe bureaucrats 
to be stereotypically unsophisticated and/or erroneously assume that the civil servants’ lack of 
overt partisan goals causes them to make less sophisticated efforts to advance the messages of 
the administrations they serve. 
Possible Causal Factors 
  I next considered possible factors that could influence the relative efficacy of the two 
groups. 
Previous Professional Experience  
 Despite the fact that political appointees tend to serve as spokespeople for the issues 
generally considered to be most high-profile and critical to the administrations for which they 
serve, as expected, civil servants brought significantly more professional experience to their jobs. 
While the average appointee whom I interviewed had just over five years of experience before 
his appointment as a Treasury spokesperson, the average civil servant had more than twenty-four 
years of previous experience before he started working in his Treasury public affairs position 
(including previous positions within the Treasury in offices other than public affairs). This means 
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that the average civil servant had more experience than more than four appointees combined. 
Half of the appointees had four or less years of work experience prior to becoming a Treasury 
spokesperson; two had just two years of experience. The Bush appointees overall had slightly 
more professional experience than the Obama appointees. 
   Without exception, every political appointee had previously worked in public affairs on a 
partisan basis – for elected officials, political campaigns, and/or a political party committee. 
Although a few of the appointees had limited private sector experience as well, overall the 
appointees had little previous professional experience beyond these political communications 
posts. Only two appointees reported having previous knowledge of the policy portfolio for which 
they were responsible. 
  Contrary to the conventional understanding of civil servants as technocratic and 
apolitical, the vast majority of the civil servants, like the appointees, had previous political 
experience. Surprisingly, the great majority of the civil servants had also previously worked in 
political roles – such as holding elected office or working as a lobbyist or for a political party 
committee, member of Congress or political campaign.  
 While the civil servants all brought a great deal of varied professional experience to their 
posts, unlike the appointees, the direct relevance of the previous experience of civil servants to 
their Treasury public affairs posts was more mixed. While four of the seven civil servants had 
previous experience working for the federal government in public affairs, three had no previous 
media relations experience at any organization before beginning their Treasury public affairs 
roles (although the latter civil servants all had significant policy experience). Still, because civil 
servants had so much more aggregate experience than the political appointees, the civil servants 
had on average more years of prior experience working in media relations positions than the 
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political appointees. Additionally, five of the seven civil servants reported having previous 
experience working on the policy issues for which they were responsible. 
  At the same time, three of the seven civil servants lacked any previous media relations 
experience – an art and science which does require prior training. Of the four remaining civil 
servants, one had very impressive media relations experience but no previous exposure to his 
subject matter portfolio. The evidence regarding how their previous professional experience 
impacted their efficacy is therefore mixed. The majority of the civil servants had previous 
experience in the policy areas for which they were responsible, which likely bolstered the 
efficacy advantage they enjoyed in their greater knowledge of their subject matter portfolios. On 
the other hand, the lower previous media relations experience of nearly half of the civil servants 
was likely a factor in their lower propensity to attempt to shape media coverage. 
 
Education 
  Whereas the Bush appointees tended to have slightly more previous professional 
experience, the Obama appointees possessed more elite educational qualifications. The majority 
of Obama appointees attended national universities, with an average ranking by U.S. News and 
World Report as the thirty-eighth best college in the country, and the Obama appointees held two 
graduate degrees. By contrast, the average ranking of the national universities attended by the 
Bush appointees was ninety-second in the country, and the Bush appointees held no graduate 
degrees. About half of the civil servants attended national universities, and these institutions had 
an average ranking of eighty-sixth best in the country. The other civil servants all attended 
regional universities. Among the regional universities attended by civil servants for which U.S. 
News and World Report rankings are available, the average ranking was thirty-third best 
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university in the region.  
  Overall, then, the appointees attended more elite undergraduate institutions than the civil 
servants. The subjects that the appointees studied were also more germane to their work. The 
great majority of appointees studied subjects I consider to be highly relevant to the work of a 
Treasury public affairs official, such as communications, public relations, journalism, 
economics, political science or government, with no significant differences between the Bush 
and Obama appointees. By contrast, some civil servants majored in areas with no relevance to 
their line of work. Less than half of civil servants studied subjects relevant to their work as 
undergraduates.  
  However, the civil servants were significantly more likely than appointees to hold 
graduate degrees. While the ten appointees brought just two graduate degrees to their jobs, more 
than half of the civil servants held graduate degrees. This is likely attributable in part to the fact 
that civil servants tended to be significantly older than the appointees. Half of the four graduate 
degrees held by the civil servants were relevant to their work; by contrast, both of the appointee 
graduate degrees were relevant and were earned at significantly more elite universities than the 
graduate schools attended by the civil servants. 
  Nevertheless, I concluded that, because the differences in the educational qualifications 
of the groups were relatively minor, they did not likely play a significant role in differences in 
the relative efficacy of the two groups. 
Tenure 
  As expected, the tenure of civil servants was significantly longer. The average civil 
servant had served in his Treasury public affairs post for six years at the time of interview 
(excluding time served in other Treasury and/or government positions), and the vast majority 
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were still serving in their posts. By contrast, the average political appointee worked at the 
Treasury for 2.55 years, and the vast majority of appointees were not still serving at the 
Treasury. The majority of appointees worked for the Treasury for two years or less; the average 
is skewed upwards by a couple of appointees who worked in Treasury public affairs for an 
unusually long period of time, and did not necessarily remain in Schedule C positions or in the 
role of spokesperson for their entire tenure. The Bush appointees whom I interviewed had a 
slightly longer average tenure than the Obama appointees. 
  It appeared that the dramatically longer tenure of the civil servants gave them a decided 
efficacy advantage in their greater knowledge of the policy portfolios for which they were 
responsible. 
Workloads 
  Finally, I attempted to ascertain whether the heavier workloads and longer hours of 
appointees influenced their efficacy by querying the officials about how they spent their time. As 
Table 1 (which is also considered in chapter 6) indicates, the heavier workloads of appointees did 
not appear to preclude them from engaging in the tactics of proactive, effective communications 
professionals, including pitching stories to reporters and crafting and implementing strategies to 
attain desired media coverage. Appointees reported spending an average of 18 percent of their 
time pitching stories – double the percentage of time spent by civil servants. Furthermore, while 
civil servants estimated spending 30 percent of their time crafting and implementing strategies to 
attain desired coverage – 2 percent more than appointees – this likely represented less overall 
time, because (as will be described in chapter 6) appointees reported spending more hours on the 
job. While Obama appointees in particular reported not having as much time as they would have 
liked to pitch stories, and therefore their heavy workloads likely diminished their overall 
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efficacy, the results indicate that their workloads did not preclude them from advancing the 
administration’s arguments in comparison with than civil servants.  
Table 1: Distribution of Work Time for Public Affairs Officials at Treasury 
 
 
Percent of time spent 
pitching stories 
Percent of time spent 
responding to 
inquiries from 
reporters 
Percent of time spent 
crafting and 
implementing 
strategies to attain 
desired coverage 
Average for Obama 
appointees 
17% 53% 31% 
Average for 
responding Bush 
appointees 
24% 38% 25% 
Combined average for 
responding appointees 
18% 46% 28% 
Average for civil 
servants 
9% 28% 30% 
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  I also asked the government officials whether their workloads were manageable, in 
another effort to ascertain whether workloads may have accounted for differences in their 
relative efficacy. As will be described in greater detail in chapter 6, it was clear that appointees 
were often overwhelmed, and that this lack of time to think was likely a factor in diminishing 
their efficacy. For example, Obama Appointee 3 explained that he was “totally frayed by the end 
… It’s hard to drink from a fire hose and learn at the same time. That I found the most difficult 
part.” Obama Appointee 5 explained that there were “times where it felt like I couldn’t breathe 
because I couldn’t figure out what to do next.”  He explained that “there were definitely some 
boneheaded things they asked me to do at Treasury, but I think I was probably so tired, I said 
‘fine, I’ll do it your way.’” Bush Appointee 2 compared his “normal workload” of twelve to 
thirteen hour days before the financial crisis favorably with his work during the crisis, because 
beforehand “it was nothing where I was going too out of my mind.” 
  While the civil servants likewise generally described their jobs as demanding, it was 
evident that they were not working around the clock or finding their jobs to be “insane” or 
causing “scary” personal problems. Civil Servant 1 explained that he generally stopped checking 
his Blackberry at 7:00 pm on weeknights; Civil Servant 3 explained that he “probably put in nine 
or ten hours a day, but I know there are public affairs people who work twelve hours a day; I’m 
just not willing to do that anymore.” Civil Servant 4 described his workload as “reasonable; it’s 
manageable;” Civil Servant 6 explained that his workload was reasonable because his policy 
portfolio was “pretty narrow” and therefore “I rarely work weekends or need to respond then … 
and I’m usually home by 6:30 or seven and rarely respond in the evening,” with no early 
mornings, either. Civil Servant 7 explained that “it’s a lot less intense of an environment here” 
than in his previous public affairs positions.  
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  This lack of time that appointees had to think likely accounts for part of their lower 
overall efficacy.  
Conclusions and Analysis: The Most Effective Administration Advocates 
  I attempted to ascertain whether appointees or civil servants serve as better administration 
advocates, by testing the relative efficacy of my interview subjects. The results confirmed my 
hypothesis that civil servants in Treasury public affairs positions better advance the interests of 
the president than appointees, because civil servants were indeed found to be more effective than 
their appointee counterparts.  
  I had hypothesized that civil servants would be more effective, in part, because their 
longer tenure would give them greater knowledge of their policy portfolios, allowing them to 
make more convincing arguments to reporters. My interview subjects who were civil servants 
indeed reported having greater knowledge of their portfolios when they started in their positions. 
This appeared to give them an efficacy advantage, both because appointees spent more time on 
the job learning the substance of their portfolios and because reporters were, at least initially, 
skeptical of the knowledge of appointees in their interactions. Furthermore, civil servants had 
longer tenure in their posts, contributing to their knowledge advantages. The responses of both 
groups to the questions of whether they could conduct interviews in place of their principals and 
whether reporters had a knowledge advantage suggested that civil servants enjoyed greater 
overall knowledge of their portfolios, as well. While I had hypothesized that this greater policy 
knowledge would allow civil servants to make more convincing arguments to reporters, it 
actually appeared that civil servants engaged in less of an effort to make polemical arguments to 
reporters than appointees. However, paradoxically, this made the information they conveyed 
more convincing to reporters. 
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  This is because, as I had also hypothesized, reporters were skeptical of the claims of 
appointees. Reporters believed that the raison d’etre of appointees was to bolster the partisan 
goals and political fortunes of the president, even if it came at the expense of other values, such 
as transparency and accountability. The apolitical nature of civil servants, combined with the 
lesser efforts they made to “spin,” therefore, allowed them to build significantly greater 
credibility with members of the press, dramatically enhancing their efficacy. 
  I had further hypothesized, however, that appointees might have a slight efficacy 
advantage in one regard: they might have better access to information, work on more high-
profile issues, and their superiors might make more time for them because they place greater 
importance on the press. The appointees certainly worked on more high-profile issues, and, 
therefore, had better access to the information generally most in demand by reporters. While civil 
servants reported that they had the access to their principals which they needed to do their jobs, 
appointees were slightly more emphatic that they enjoyed particularly high levels of access, 
perhaps giving them an additional efficacy edge – but not one which overcome the overall 
significantly greater effectiveness of civil servants. 
  Several of my other hypotheses, however, were not confirmed. I had hypothesized that 
the shorter tenure of appointees would give them weaker relationships with the reporters who 
covered their agencies. While I judged appointees to have weaker relationships with reporters, 
this was bred by the reporters’ perceptions that appointees were driven by purely partisan 
motivations and were providing insufficient information and access – not by their shorter 
tenures. Indeed, because the reporters appeared to have more interactions with the appointees 
than with the civil servants, any advantages civil servants had in knowing reporters for a longer 
period of time did not appear to be the cause of the weaker relationships the appointees enjoyed 
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with the press. (It is, however, reasonable to presume that the knowledge civil servants had of 
reporters’ previous stories gave them an efficacy advantage in anticipating the directions and 
content of their future stories). 
  I had further hypothesized that the massive workloads of appointees would explain the 
greater efficacy of civil servants, because appointees would be left lacking time to engage in 
proactive or manipulative strategies. While the workloads of appointees were found to diminish 
their overall efficacy, giving them less time to pitch stories than they would have liked, in one 
regard, it did not give them an advantage in comparison with civil servants. This was the case 
because, despite the large volume of incoming press queries they received, appointees still 
managed to pitch significantly more stories to reporters than their civil service counterparts. 
Furthermore, civil servants indicated that they spent only two percent more of their time than 
appointees crafting and implementing strategies to attain desired coverage – which, as previously 
discussed, reflects rough estimates and may have represented less overall time, since appointees 
worked longer hours. Nevertheless, the workloads of appointees helped explain the greater 
efficacy of civil servants in another regard: appointees reported that their massive workloads 
often left them with little time to think; Obama Appointee 5 described executing strategies 
against his better judgment, simply because he did not have the energy to argue with his bosses. 
This did not appear to be the case for appointees’ civil service counterparts. 
  My results indicate that civil servants were generally more effective in advancing the 
goals of the administrations for which they worked. Perhaps most critically, civil servants 
appeared from both their own descriptions and from the accounts of reporters to have better 
knowledge of the policies for which they advocated. While this differential could perhaps have 
been overcome if appointees, after learning on the job, stayed in their positions for a long period 
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of time, of course the opposite was true. It is difficult to see how a public affairs official can 
influence media coverage in a sophisticated manner without deep knowledge of the subject 
matter for which he or she is responsible. Without understanding a policy in significant detail, it 
is difficult to explain it convincingly to others, or to rebut the arguments of critics.  
  While the previous finding was expected, on certain measures, civil servants displayed a 
level of sophistication in their work which contravened traditional stereotypes. In one of the most 
remarkable findings of this project, civil servants were more likely to attempt to appeal to the 
emotions of the American people and to utilize public opinion polls in their work – evidencing a 
level of sophistication that exceeded that of their appointee counterparts on these measures. 
  Of course, the effectiveness of civil servants is often contended to be undercut by their 
lack of political savvy, as Obama Appointees 1 and 5 alleged. However, the results of this study 
cast doubt on this conventional wisdom. Surprisingly, the vast majority of civil servants had 
previously served in hyper-partisan positions, which appeared from my interviews to have given 
them such political skills. (To be sure, if their partisan backgrounds and skills caused them to 
attempt to sabotage administration efforts, this would have made them particularly dangerous 
actors from the perspective of the president; however, chapter 5 will not find this to be the case). 
Throughout my interviews, numerous civil servants made comments which indicated that, while 
they are legally prohibited from engaging in political activity, they nevertheless apply their 
appreciation of political nuance in ways that would be helpful to the president. Civil Servant 6 
explained that if he did not conduct himself in a politically astute manner, his bosses would be 
upset with him. Civil Servant 2 explained that when he developed talking points, he worked to 
ensure that they would be consonant with the political perspectives of his bosses. Civil Servant 5 
explained that he was aware that, if he had contradicted the political messages of appointees in 
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any way, the appointees would have stopped him from speaking. 
  To be sure, however, all political appointees had prior political experience, in comparison 
with most of the civil servants. And, reporter 2 was explicit that he sometimes found civil 
servants to be incognizant of political factors. Furthermore, presidents cannot count on future 
civil servants to necessarily have political experience, nor can they control for this outcome, 
since civil service rules are designed explicitly to prohibit such factors from influencing hiring 
processes. 
  Additionally, other evidence pointed to a somewhat lower level of sophistication among 
civil servants in dealing with the media. Civil servants seemed downright passive in comparison 
with appointees in attempting to counter negative media coverage, and they appeared to exert 
lesser overall efforts to make arguments. Civil servants also made significantly less efforts to 
pitch stories to reporters than appointees – a discrepancy that is especially remarkable given that 
the workloads of civil servants were so much lighter than those of their appointee counterparts. 
Some reporters complained that, in addition to lacking political savvy, civil servants also lacked 
a sense of what was newsworthy and interesting, or were incapable of making convincing 
arguments when they tried (ironically, as will later be discussed, this lack of sophistication may 
have some ways redounded to the administration’s advantage). 
  As a group, however, the appointees possessed other effectiveness advantages. They had 
somewhat more access to key principals, and it also seems reasonable to presume that they may 
have been afforded more trust by senior administration officials, given their partisan credentials. 
As previously indicated, they pitched many more stories in an effort to proactively influence 
media coverage, and they made greater attempts to make arguments to reporters. 
  Accordingly, the evidence indicates that the appointees were in fact better advocates for 
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the administration than civil servants in one key area. When a reporter pursued a story that the 
administration did not like, appointees worked much more aggressively to change it. They even 
attempted to “edit” stories once they had been published – even if, as Reporter 5 explained, a 
story was not technically inaccurate and appointees simply took issue with the “adjectives.” This 
behavior appeared to serve the interests of the administration, since the reporters indicated that 
they sometimes did edit their work when they found merit in the complaints of appointees. 
Furthermore, the appointees were generally able to engage in this behavior without alienating 
reporters to the detriment of future coverage. Reporters clearly indicated that the appointees 
worked harder in an effort to influence their coverage on less contentious stories, as well, and 
seemed to sometimes have a greater sense of what was newsworthy. Appointees also appeared to 
be somewhat faster to respond to reporters.  
  Nevertheless, when the actual outcomes of their work were investigated in greater detail, 
it was clear that all of the efforts and advantages of appointees did not result in greater 
effectiveness in influencing media coverage to the benefit of the administration, for two critically 
important reasons.   
  First, this project discovered the existence of a previously unreported “appointee 
discount.” Reporters were adamant that they judged appointees to be deeply lacking in 
credibility, because they viewed their motivations as too overtly political. As a result, even when 
appointees had a good story to tell, the reporters indicated that they were simply reluctant to 
believe it. Reporters considered anything and everything that appointees attempted to convey as 
an attempt at partisan advantage. They generally indicated that they found it inconceivable that a 
pitch or argument made by an appointee would be motivated by a desire to serve interests 
beyond those of the president, such as making information available to the American people. 
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Reporter 6 even indicated that, although he tried to keep an open mind when speaking to sources, 
he simply found this to be impossible with appointees! Reporters were clear that they saw civil 
servants as more credible and trustworthy sources. By contrast, appointees entered into 
conversations with reporters at a disadvantage compared to other sources. This obviously 
significantly handicapped their ability to do the core function of their jobs, which is to advance 
the administration’s positions in the press. 
  It is ironic that, in this sense, the lower sophistication that reporters perceived on the part 
of civil servants may actually have benefited the president. This case was made directly by Civil 
Servant 1, who noted that he thought his bureau received better media coverage when appointees 
did not attempt to overtly shape stories that reporters were working on, because in such cases the 
bureau made less attempts to spin, and reporters appreciated this. Civil Servant 1 also explained 
that he felt that, when his bureau had negative news to report, coverage was more favorable if he 
was forthcoming with the rationale for what had happened and how it would be fixed, but 
appointees often rejected such strategies. Civil Servant 7 was likewise clear that his lack of 
“spin” allowed him to achieve greater influence with reporters.  
  Civil Servant 2’s explanation for why he could explain economic fundamentals that 
actually justify the administration’s programs better than appointees was a particularly striking 
example of how the knowledge of civil servants can also be a powerful weapon in advancing 
administration priorities. The fact that we now know that reporters would have viewed his 
arguments with greater credibility than those of appointees makes him a doubly powerful 
advocate for the president.  
  The respect and credibility that reporters afford civil servants was also evidenced by the 
responses of reporters. Reporter 1, for example, was explicit that he is suspicious only of 
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appointees, and not of civil servants. Reporter 3 was likewise clear that he considered civil 
servants to be motivated by the aims of serving their country, as opposed to the president. This 
positions civil servants to be particularly powerful agents on behalf of an administration, because 
they are viewed as credible in the eyes of the media. 
 Second, appointees appeared to be unskilled at providing information to reporters. While 
the complaints of reporters must be interpreted in light of their own interests in obtaining access 
to maximum information, reporters were also clear that they often could have better conveyed 
the administration’s perspective, if only they had understood it. They repeatedly emphasized that 
appointees had continually forgone opportunities to shape the thinking of reporters by simply 
explaining the rationale for their policies and positions. Reporter 3 argued that getting to know 
senior administration officials better would have, by virtue of human nature, hampered his 
inclination to be overly critical of them. Reporter 5 explained that if the administration had fed 
him information, at times he would not have had to go looking elsewhere for stories the 
administration ultimately disliked. And, when appointees did provide information, reporters 
often found it to be unhelpful, because it was political rather than substantive.  
 I suspect that the decision of appointees to be cautious in granting access to information 
was, at least in part, calculated. Appointees can only have been keenly aware that they were 
operating in a hyper-partisan climate in which anything they said might be used against them, 
and may simply have judged that they had more to lose than to gain in providing greater 
information to reporters. Their emphasis on caution in releasing information to the press can only 
have been heightened by the fragile state of the U.S. recovery and the global economy. As 
appointees explained, when the Treasury spoke, markets could move – and they were therefore 
justifiably concerned to avoid roiling them. At the same time, the examples that reporters 
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provided made it clear that there were instances in which the administration could have done a 
better job of providing access in savvy ways which would likely have advanced the president’s 
interests without appreciable risk of partisan or economic harm.  
  It seems clear that, for appointees, part of the problem may have been that they simply 
did not have much time to think. However, I also suspect that if they had understood the 
substance of their issues in greater detail, they might have better been able to identify 
opportunities and confidently calibrate the (sometimes low) levels of risk involved in the more 
innocuous requests of reporters. They also would have been able to themselves provide 
explanations of Treasury policies, programs, and thinking to reporters on the myriad technocratic 
matters that did not pose risks to the country’s economic stability or the president’s political 
fortunes.    
  In sum, it appears clear that civil servants are generally better positioned to advance an 
administration’s positions. By contrast, appointees are viewed by reporters as having truly 
suspect motivations, and therefore lacking credibility. A spokesperson with such a handicap can 
most certainly not effectively do his or her job. (As Bush Appointee 1 explained, “to me the most 
important characteristic of a really effective spokesperson is credibility.”) Thus, despite the 
perhaps less sophisticated approach of civil servants in some areas, it was clear that the civil 
servants served as more effective advocates for the president than the appointees studied in 
Treasury public affairs posts. 
  This study also investigated possible causal factors for this greater efficacy. Civil 
servants brought significantly more extensive previous professional experience to their jobs. For 
example, at their time of hiring, civil servants were more than four times more likely than 
appointees to have at least five years of experience, including relevant media and policy 
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experience. The average civil servant had significantly more previous professional experience 
than four appointees combined (which is especially striking when considered in light of the fact 
that there are only seven appointees currently serving as Treasury spokespeople). While some of 
the prior professional experience of civil servants was less relevant to their jobs than the more 
limited and targeted experience of appointees, the civil servants still had many more years of 
relevant professional experience than their appointee counterparts, and their aggregate years of 
experience can only have contributed to their maturity and judgment.  
  Furthermore, the average civil servant had already served in his position much longer 
than the tenure of two appointees combined and was still serving, which appears to have 
enhanced their mastery of their positions. As Obama Appointee 3 explained, civil servants have 
“seen stories before on particular subjects,” allowing them to predict the types of questions 
reporters would ask and arguments reporters would make, when covering those subjects in the 
future. These two factors likewise contributed to their greater efficacy. 
  One of the causal mechanisms which I investigated did not appear to influence the 
efficacy of the officials. While the appointees had just slightly stronger and more relevant 
educational backgrounds, this did not appear to give them an efficacy advantage, as civil servants 
possessed greater mastery over the subject matter for which they were responsible.  
  Likewise, the greater workloads of appointees may not necessarily have rendered them 
less effective in one regard. The appointees’ greater workloads did not reduce their ability to act 
proactively in comparison with civil servants. Having more free time to implement proactive 
strategies would have possibly actually diminished the efficacy of reporters, since reporters 
viewed their claims with such suspicion. (Of course, on the other hand, if appointees had reduced 
workloads and used the extra time to learn the substance of their policy issues better, this would 
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have improved their efficacy). However, appointees indicated that they were so overwhelmed 
that they sometimes did not have time to think, or moved forward on strategies despite their 
better judgment – likely also explaining the greater efficacy of civil servants. 
  The results, then, suggest that civil servants may be more effective than their appointee 
counterparts. As chapter 7 discusses in greater detail, this questions the wisdom of the policy of 
politicization pursued by modern presidents. 
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Chapter 5: Results: Loyalty of Appointees vs. Civil Servants 
Introduction 
  This chapter reviews the results of my interview questions designed to assess the relative 
loyalty of political appointees and civil servants in Treasury public affairs positions. I have 
defined loyalty as the pursuit of the president’s goals – even when they conflict with an official’s 
own personal goals. A key concept in this chapter is “leaks,” which I have defined as information 
given without attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the administration 
and would not be approved by an official’s supervisors. I hypothesized in chapter 3 that political 
appointees would be no more loyal to the president than civil servants, because appointees would 
have greater incentives to leak information in order to build relationships with reporters and 
bolster their future career prospects.  
  I used six instruments to measure which group is more loyal to the presidents they serve.  
  First, I asked the appointees and civil servants what someone in their position should do 
if asked to advocate a policy with which he or she personally disagreed. Second, I asked both 
groups of government officials how often they personally disagreed with an administration 
policy they were required to advocate and how they reacted in such circumstances.  
  Third, I asked the officials whether leaks to the press occurred in their offices, and if they 
were aware of whether the officials responsible for the leaks were appointees or civil servants. 
Fourth, I asked the officials whether they personally had ever been tempted to leak information 
to the press. Fifth, to corroborate the accounts of the appointees and civil servants, I asked the 
reporters how often both groups of officials leaked information to them. 
  I also examined two possible causal factors for differences in the relative loyalty of the 
two groups. First, I asked both groups of officials whether their personal political views impacted 
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their work. Second, to gauge the degree to which support for the president is critical to their 
work, I asked only the appointees whether they would consider serving as a Treasury 
spokesperson under an administration of a different political party. I hypothesized in chapter 3 
that many of the duties of appointees are not very political, and therefore civil servants could 
easily replace such officials. 
I. What Public Affairs Officials Should Do If Asked to Advocate a Policy With Which They 
Personally Disagree 
  I first asked both groups of officials what they thought someone in their position should 
do if asked to advocate a position with which he or she personally disagreed, as a way of 
measuring whether they believed acts of disloyalty would ever be appropriate.  
  Appointees universally indicated that if someone serving in their position disagreed with 
a policy they were responsible for advocating, he or she should nevertheless communicate the 
administration’s position faithfully. Two Obama appointees and two Bush appointees indicated 
that, in such a position, an appointee should first voice their disagreements internally, but if they 
were overruled, they had a responsibility to advocate the administration’s policy. Two Bush 
appointees indicated that the exception to this rule would be if the disagreement were “so severe” 
(Bush Appointee 3) or “crosses an ethical or moral line, in which case you refuse to do it, but 
that’s a really tough standard.” (Bush Appointee 4). Obama Appointee 5 was the sole appointee 
who said that “often the teams are big enough that you can say you’re not comfortable handling 
that one and ask a colleague to take it.” But the response of Bush Appointee 1 was typical: “you 
can’t cherry pick what you want to talk about. If you aren’t comfortable with it, that’s fine; 
maybe this isn’t the correct job for you.” 
  The responses of six of the seven civil servants were strikingly similar to those of the 
212 
 
appointees. These civil servants were quite adamant that, in the words of Civil Servant 3, “if it’s 
not gonna kill you, if they’re not asking you to lie, then you do it, because you are here, you 
work for who you work for.” Civil Servants 3, 6, and 7, like several of their appointee 
counterparts, indicated that a civil servant in this position should first voice his or her 
disagreement to their boss, but then fall in line if overruled. Civil Servant 2, however, suggested 
that, if he were in this position, the reason for sharing his concern with his supervisor would be 
that “in that instance it might be appropriate to have my boss … speak to the [reporter] because 
[my disagreement] could potentially come through.” Sadly, Civil Servant 1 advised the opposite, 
explaining that “in government you probably don’t want to have a conversation with the political 
[appointee] telling them you think it’s a bad idea, because it’s not well taken, it’s not taken as 
constructive criticism, but a lot of it is because they’re very young people that don’t have a lot of 
experience. In the political realm, if you express misgivings, it’s taken more as, ‘you’re not on 
board and I can’t trust you.’” 
 The striking exception to these responses that the official in question should advocate the 
administration’s policy was that of Civil Servant 7, who indicated that the official could “talk to 
reporters off the record to explain [why the administration’s policy was wrong] … let them find 
other sources to quote; point them in the direction of other reports.” He used an example of an 
instance in which he personally had done so, because he and other career staff in his bureau felt 
that the administration was bowing to special interests instead of implementing a policy which 
could save taxpayer money. I found his argument as to why the administration was wrong in this 
instance to be compelling. However, Civil Servant 7 noted that, in conveying messages that 
question administration policy off-the-record, he was not sharing his personal opinion with the 
press, but rather that of the head of his bureau. Additionally, the example he used was not an 
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issue on which there was partisan disagreement, further suggesting that he was motivated by a 
desire to improve his bureau’s policy rather than political aims.  I also happened to know that, 
when I worked at the Treasury, the policy to which he referred had caused significant 
disagreement and argument among appointees – something I had overall rarely witnessed, 
suggesting the anomalous nature of the situation.  
  These findings indicate that most civil servants are similar to appointees in believing that, 
even when they disagree with an administration policy, their position requires them to loyally 
convey the administration’s beliefs. Nevertheless, not all civil servants will do so. In this study, 
one out of seven civil servants expressed a willingness to speak out when he felt the 
administration was wrong – but only to express the beliefs of the bureau for which he worked.  
  Of course, this number comes from a small sample. However, I suspect that it likely 
overstates the propensity of civil servants to convey their disagreement with an administration to 
the press, due to selection bias. As discussed in chapter 3, although I reached out to nearly every 
Treasury bureau to request interviews with career public affairs staff, not all civil servants agreed 
to my request for interview. It is reasonable to project that the civil servants most cautious about 
sharing information would have declined my request for interview, while those most willing to 
be open about their views (and thus also most likely to share their concerns or disagreements 
with the press) would have been more likely to agree to participate in this project, resulting in a 
sample which over-represents individuals who might convey their disagreements to the press. 
Nevertheless, the results demonstrate empirically that not all civil servants will be completely 
loyal to the president – a factor which must be given serious consideration in determining which 
group more effectively advances the president’s interests. This finding is also logical, since it is 
reasonable to presume that individuals personally appointed by the president due at least in part 
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to their ideological agreement would behave more loyally towards the administration than 
individuals who go through no such selection process and are protected from being fired for 
political reasons.  
  Likewise, one out of seven civil servants volunteered the fact that he could not share his 
concerns with appointees – an indication of poor leadership amongst appointees which is clearly 
bad for the American people. However, based upon the examples he used in our conversation, 
Civil Servant 1’s particularly scathing opinion of appointees – which were anomalous in their 
intensity – appeared to have been influenced significantly by his prior experience in a different 
government agency. 
II. How Often Government Officials Disagreed with the Policies They Advocated 
  To measure the potential for acts of disloyalty, I next asked the officials how often they 
disagreed with policies they were responsible for advocating. Both the Bush and Obama 
administrations appeared to have succeeded in hiring true believers for their political posts. The 
appointees who worked under both administrations were clear that, in the words of Obama 
Appointee 2, “actually, I really agree with the policies we were pursuing at the time. I still do.” 
Bush Appointee 1 concurred: “I drank the Kool Aid.” Accordingly, the appointees reported 
rarely, if ever, disagreeing with a policy they were responsible for advocating. Asked to provide 
examples, only two Obama appointees and one Bush appointee could think of examples of 
administration policies to which they would have made adjustments. The only Bush appointee 
who was able to come up with an example served in his post the longest of any appointee. (Later 
in our conversation, a second Bush appointee also acknowledged that “with TARP, however, I 
think all of us, being more free market inclined, didn’t enjoy what we did, but we knew for the 
greater good of the country and for the financial system that we had to do what we had to do. But 
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I don’t think any Republican at Treasury was happy bailing out the banks, but we were in a 
situation where that was the only thing we could do.”)   
  Civil servants reported that it was more common to have been placed in a position in 
which they were responsible for advocating a position with which they disagreed. However, even 
among this group, such situations were very infrequent. Five of the seven civil servants reported 
previously advocating a position with which they disagreed. However, one of the civil servants 
had done so in a previous federal government position and said such a situation had never 
occurred in his Treasury post. Of these five civil servants, four indicated that they had faithfully 
communicated the administration’s views to the media, despite their personal disagreement. As 
discussed in the previous section, the exception to this rule was Civil Servant 7, who indicated 
that he had communicated his boss’ disagreement confidentially to reporters. Of course, among 
these civil servants, such situations were exceedingly rare. As previously discussed, Civil 
Servant 1 said it had occurred in a previous post but never at the Treasury; Civil Servant 3 said it 
had happened “once or twice” in his post; Civil Servant 5 said it happened “occasionally;” Civil 
Servant 6 said it happened “a few times a year;” and for Civil Servant 7, it was “not that often.” 
  Civil Servant 1 recounted an incident in which a different government agency paid a 
large private contractor tens of millions of dollars to produce a product that never worked, was 
“bending over backwards not to make [the contractor] look bad,” and, following the debacle, 
went on to award the very same contractor an even larger contract to produce a different product. 
Later in our discussion, he also shared another example from the other government agency, in 
which the Obama administration was attempting to prove that they had done a better job on a 
particular initiative than the Bush administration. “Virtually every civil servant in [the agency] 
would have said they weren’t, but the administration was like, ‘we want you to produce numbers 
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that say we’re doing [better], so even though every civil servant I know would have said 
privately [that] this is crap, they didn’t go to press, what they did is they did everything they 
could to support the request and find numbers, even though everybody was like, ‘yeah, right.’” 
  The other examples all came from the Treasury. Civil Servant 2 used the example of a 
Treasury policy which saved taxpayers money but made it harder for Americans to access a 
service. Civil Servant 5 explained that he sometimes rolled out programs when he believed that it 
was obvious from the outset that they could not work. Civil Servant 6 used the example of an 
operational decision not to release information which he considered to be important. And, as 
previously discussed, Civil Servant 7 used an example in which he felt the Treasury was wasting 
money in the service of special interests.  
   To be sure, it is possible that the American people would have been better served in 
these situations if the civil servants had leaked so that there could have been a national debate 
about these issues. In such cases, the civil servants’ views of the public interest conflicted with 
that of the present administration. However, arguments could also be made for the positions of 
the administrations they served. For example, the Obama administration has laid out reasonable 
arguments for the position they have taken on the issue on which Civil Servant 7 disagreed and 
subsequently leaked to the press. Furthermore, the civil servants in some sense enjoyed a 
privileged position in that their ability to make judgments that did not need to account for the 
political factors which often hamper the executive. As discussed in chapter 2, the president 
requires political support in order to govern; other actors take account of the level of support the 
executive enjoys when assessing the consequences they will face for disagreeing with him 
(Neustadt 1991). Therefore, even if a president believes a certain policy to be correct, he may 
nevertheless be unable to advance it if it will cost him support which will make it impossible to 
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achieve other goals which he judges to be more important.  Presidents also have a tendency to 
conflate their own self interest in remaining in power with the national interest. 
  Of course, appointees are generally responsible for advocating the more controversial 
policies, but personal disagreement among this group of officials appears to have been headed 
off by their ideological agreement with the administrations they served. Civil servants are not 
selected by the executives for whom they work and serve in their positions for much longer 
periods of time, which we should expect to increase their instances of disagreement with the 
administrations they serve. On the other hand, the policies for which they are responsible are less 
controversial to begin with.  
  However, I wondered whether factors explored elsewhere in this project also contributed 
to the greater propensity of civil servants to have personal disagreements with the administration 
they served. For example, when I asked Bush Appointee 4 whether he had ever disagreed with a 
policy he advocated, he could not recall such an occasion, but then responded, “maybe I didn’t 
even understand the policy. Just kidding.” I suspected that his joke might actually have been 
revealing. I established in chapter 4 that civil servants appear to have significantly greater 
expertise in their subject matter portfolios, due to both the greater policy experience they bring to 
their posts and their longer tenure. As a result, civil servants might disagree more with 
administration policy simply because they understand it to a significantly more technical and 
nuanced degree than their appointee counterparts.  
  An additional reason why civil servants might have greater disagreements with an 
administration would be if they had more time to think about the policies they are advocating. As 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, the heavier workloads of political appointees 
likely leave them lacking time for reflection. For example, as will be again considered in the 
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following chapter, when I asked Obama Appointee 3 whether he ever disagreed with 
administration policy, he replied, “when you’re drinking from a fire hose, you don’t have the 
ability to think about it for too long. I was drinking from a fire hose, I was always at my fucking 
desk, I literally had no time.” Likewise, while Obama Appointee 5 indicated that he had never 
disagreed with administration policy, he said that he sometimes disagreed with the media 
strategies his bosses wanted to pursue, but “I’d say in this job you’re so exhausted and there’s so 
much to do, that you just want to move on … there were definitely some boneheaded things they 
asked me to do at Treasury, but I think I was probably so tired, I said ‘fine, I’ll do it your way, 
and when this blows up it’s not my frickin’ fault.’” 
  Thus, the fact that appointees are more loyal to the administration’s policies seems at first 
blush to benefit the president, since we have seen that, although cases of civil service 
disagreement appear to be quite rare at the Treasury, and instances in which civil servants 
communicate their disagreement to the press are even rarer, it nevertheless does happen. 
However, to the extent that part of the greater loyalty of appointees stems from the fact that they 
do not fully understand the policies they are responsible for advocating and do not have the 
bandwidth to actually think about the actions they are taking, this ostensibly greater loyalty 
appears significantly less attractive to a chief executive. In this sense, the president might be 
better served by tolerating the small number of civil servants who on rare occasions will share 
their disagreements with the press, if careerists bring other significant benefits to the table – such 
as the ability to better explain the policies they are responsible for advocating because they 
understand them better, and the greater sense of clarity and strategy that comes from time to 
think. 
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III. Knowledge of the Identities of Leakers 
 To determine whether civil servants or political appointees leak information to the press 
more frequently, I asked both groups of government officials whether leaks to the media 
occurred while they were serving in their Treasury posts, and if so, whether they knew if the 
leakers were appointees or civil servants. I defined “leaks” for my interview subjects as 
“information given without attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the 
administration – as opposed to plants, which further the interests of the administration.”  
  Of the political appointees I interviewed, only one had actually determined the identity of 
a leaker, and the leaker was an appointee. This Obama appointee, who handled two major leaks, 
learned that one of the leakers was an appointee but indicated that, although he and his public 
affairs colleagues were surprised by the leaks, he “can’t guarantee they weren’t signed off on by 
someone else” in the administration, perhaps to give reporters information that the Treasury 
would not officially release because it was too sensitive and market-moving.  
  Additionally, one Obama appointee handled leaks that he suspected came from the White 
House or another government agency, but he was unsure whether appointees or civil servants 
were responsible. A Bush appointee who handled the same portfolio as the previously-discussed 
Obama appointee suspected that leaks came from a different government agency than the agency 
suspected by the Obama appointee, but was likewise unclear of the identity of the leaker(s).  
  One Bush appointee discussed a particularly egregious leak of a counterterrorism 
initiative which the Treasury did not wish to announce, but was unaware of the identity of the 
leaker (who could have been an outside party). This event will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. Another Bush appointee recounted an incident which first appeared to be a 
leak but which he later discovered to be the result of poor coordination, because the White House 
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released information without his knowledge, while his principal was overseas communicating a 
different message.  
  Of the civil servants, four were aware of the identities of individuals responsible for 
events which I considered to meet my definition of leaking, and all of the leakers were political 
appointees. However, the fourth civil servant described a period of numerous leaks which could 
have only been conducted by appointees, suggesting perhaps a greater number of appointees who 
leaked. 
  One civil servant reported that a leak occurred when an appointee had access to 
information about an upcoming announcement and sent it to someone in Congress. 
   Two other civil servants described two separate instances in which appointees had 
shared information with outside audiences that they had not been approved to discuss. The first 
of these two civil servants indicated that an appointee discussed a program in a speech before the 
administration had officially launched the initiative. The civil servant indicated that the 
appointee did so in order to gain personal credit for the initiative. (In a particularly brash move, 
the appointee did not provide the information to the press anonymously, per the terms of the 
definition of leaking I gave to the government officials. I nevertheless consider this event to be a 
leak because the appointee provided information to the press which did not serve the 
administration’s interests, which gets to the heart of the issue. Such information is typically 
provided anonymously simply in an effort to protect the leaker). The civil servant indicated that 
this leaker received a “slap on the hand” from the administration. The other civil servant 
described a similar situation in which an appointee provided information the administration was 
not yet ready to announce to an outside group, and assumed that the appointee did so to make his 
office look good. 
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  A fourth civil servant described a period of intense leaking as the administration 
attempted to decide the future of particular policies in response to the financial crisis. He said 
that “everybody was looking for a magic bullet; different politicals were looking for different 
ideas, which they’d try to float up the food chain, and one or two tried to float ideas with the 
media as trial balloons to see if they would work.” He indicated that the leaks could only have 
come from appointees because there were only a small group of appointees in the room when the 
discussions which leaked occurred. This indicates that while at least one appointee was 
responsible, it is possible that other appointees were leaking, as well.  
  A final civil servant discussed some initiatives his bureau undertook in which “it’s come 
to a point where it’s unusual for these actions not to leak,” however he was unaware of the 
identity of leaker(s) and indicated that the leaker(s) could have been third parties with whom his 
bureau was in negotiations. 
 A single civil servant described a situation in which he and his civil service boss had 
“leaked” information. However I did not consider his description to meet my definition of 
leaking. This civil servant described a situation in which someone in his bureau had made a 
mistake which caused a problem, and public affairs appointees wanted him to simply tell 
reporters that there had been a technical problem. To allay concerns reporters raised about the 
possibility of future technological errors, he and his boss both indicated that the problem was 
“rare” or “unusual.” This angered the appointees, who had not wanted them to share further 
information beyond the fact that a technical error had occurred, but the civil servant said he 
genuinely did not realize that this would upset them. He said that “leaks” like this happen a few 
times per year, “frequently because there’s a lack of understanding of where the administration is 
coming from, why that would be bad to be out there. Politicals might see it more as ‘they’re 
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undermining our position,’ whereas civil servants are like, ‘why do you care? It’s not that big a 
deal.’” He indicated that, in such instances, “usually you find out afterwards” from appointees 
that they did not want particular information to be shared, indicating that when he receives 
instructions from appointees, “even if I disagree with it, if that’s what they want to say, we’ll say 
it.” He was also clear that “I haven’t run into anything where the civil service is literally trying to 
undermine the administration in any way, shape, or form.” I judge the fact that this civil servant 
truly was unaware beforehand that appointees did not want him to share particular pieces of 
information and that he did not believe such information to be damaging to the administration to 
disqualify these examples from my definition of leaks. 
  Finally, Bush Appointee 3 revealed later in our conversation that he “knew lower-level 
White House people who leaked. It’s known within our circles. The motivation was to curry 
favor with reporters and burnish their own coolness.” Bush Appointee 3 found this to be odious, 
describing it as “a sign of weakness, not strength.” 
  Thus, I encountered five specific situations in which officials were able to identify 
leakers of Treasury information as appointees, although in reality this number is possibly greater 
because the civil servant who described the leaks of information that was discussed in small 
meetings attended only by appointees indicated that such leaks occurred quite frequently, for a 
period of time, suggesting that more than one appointee may have been involved. A Bush 
appointee also claimed to be aware of Bush White House appointees who leaked. By contrast, 
the government officials did not report a single event that met my definition of leaking by a civil 
servant (although, as previously discussed, Civil Servant 7 previously admitted to personally 
leaking information). Of course, such leaks by appointees never appeared to be attempts to 
undermine the administration for whom they worked, but rather to be efforts to make themselves 
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look good and/or to advance their preferred policies. I next asked the government officials 
whether they themselves had ever been tempted to leak information to the press.  
IV. Whether the Officials Were Personally Tempted to Leak 
  I next asked the officials whether they personally had ever been tempted to leak 
information, as a way of determining whether they had in fact ever leaked information to the 
press. Every political appointee said no, with the exception of Obama Appointee 3, who 
indicated that he had been tempted to leak but could not tell me more than this. I took this as an 
indication that he might have leaked information to the press. Obama Appointee 3 had told me 
previously in the interview that “I didn’t really ever leak anything because, with leaks, the whole 
point is to move something you can’t move through normal [channels],” suggesting that he 
already enjoyed power within the administration which made leaking unnecessary. However, in a 
previous conversation when I first requested an interview with a different Obama appointee who 
participated in this project, this other Obama appointee volunteered to me that he suspected 
Obama Appointee 3 of leaking information to reporters.  
  Additionally, during the course of our interview, Bush Appointee 3 volunteered to me, 
without provocation, that he suspected that Bush Appointee 5 had leaked information to 
reporters. As previously discussed, I did not believe that Bush Appointee 5 trusted me, nor did I 
trust his answers, so I do not believe that he would have told me if he had in fact been tempted to 
leak or leaked information to reporters.  
  As previously discussed, Civil Servant 7 previously admitted to leaking to the press. Five 
of the other six civil servants indicated that they had never been tempted to leak in their Treasury 
posts, although one civil servant indicated that he had leaked in a previous federal government 
job. In this instance, he was attempting to keep pressure on another government agency but was 
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told to issue his announcement on the Friday of a holiday weekend. He chose to instead give 
reporters the information in time to publish it on that Friday. Accordingly, he was yelled at by 
two senior officials. Asked whether he was glad he did so, he replied that “in retrospect, I don’t 
think I achieved anything. I don’t think the world is a safer place because of it. I wouldn’t do it 
again. I’m also ten years older; I have a bigger mortgage. Perspectives change.”   
  A final civil servant indicated that he had been tempted to leak information during the 
Bush administration, but had not done so. The example he used was of Treasury data which 
pointed toward the impending subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. “It just seemed the Treasury 
leadership was really slow to catch on to the mortgage crisis and some of the facts and data we 
had here were kind of alarming and I thought more attention should be paid … the administration 
line was this is simply a market correction, but you could just see it building up.”  However, he 
indicated that he ultimately did not leak the information because “they’re my boss; right or 
wrong, I work for the administration and I’m loyal to my employers, and I think I probably took 
an oath or something along the way and said I wouldn’t do it.” The position in which he served 
made me judge his claim to have identified early warning signs of the crisis as credible. 
Ironically, however, such a leak would have not only served the American people but arguably, 
ultimately, the Bush administration as well. 
  Nevertheless, the findings here document a single admission of a civil servant who leaked 
information to the press and no such admissions by appointees. Most of the claims of leaking by 
appointees came from civil servants. While I would have judged the results unreliable if I had 
simply asked the civil servants in the abstract which group is more likely to leak, the fact that 
they described very specific examples and circumstances made me judge their responses as very 
225 
 
credible. To corroborate this finding, however, I also asked reporters who interacted frequently 
with these officials whether civil servants or appointees leaked to them more frequently. 
V. Reporters on How Often Appointees and Civil Servants Leak 
  When asked how often both groups leak, several reporters described a strikingly similar 
pattern among civil servants of being willing to acknowledge viewpoints beyond those of the 
administration.  
   Reporter 6, who reported least on the Treasury, indicated that no appointee or civil 
servant had ever leaked to him, but he believed this to be the case because he had not been 
pursuing stories that would lend themselves to leaking. Reporter 5, a veteran Treasury reporter, 
indicated that while neither group had ever leaked to him, when talking to civil servants, 
“sometimes you get a sense, not directly but perhaps in talking to them, … they’re not too keen 
on whatever policy’s being pursued, but that’s rare ... Normally they’re pretty much on board.”  
  Like Reporter 5, Reporter 1 indicated: 
 
 I do not recall a really hard and fast single example of a civil servant leaking to me, but I  
  have had them say to me, you should take a look at this or that area that would balance  
  out what you were being told elsewhere. They weren’t leaks. They were steers. I don’t  
  think it was intended to steer you towards something negative, but towards a balanced or  
  more nuanced look. … I don’t think people were doing it out of any sense of  
  vindictiveness. I think they were doing it because they could tell you were trying to  
  understand or explain something; they were trying to give you a fuller picture of a whole  
  situation so that you wrote about it more knowledgably and understood better what was  
  going on. Nobody ever came to me and said, ‘I want to bring this person down or tear  
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  down some institution.’ It was always in the context of … ‘that’s the position we’re  
  taking, but you could make an alternative case too,’ which would lead me to broaden out  
  my own look at a particular situation. 
 
  Reporter 1 estimated that this might only happen once every three to four years. Reporter 
7 described a very similar scenario, in which civil servants are “willing to acknowledge that they 
aren’t as team cheerleady about [the issue] or as defensive; they state the case but they can also 
acknowledge there’s another side to things.” 
   Like Reporters 1 and 5, Reporter 3 estimated that civil servants leak slightly more than 
appointees. Reporter 3’s description of instances in which civil servants convey their 
disagreement was similar. He indicated that civil servants “will sometimes leak because [he or 
she] feels there isn’t sufficient publicity to an issue or the agency isn’t being sufficiently 
transparent – not so much in my experience to embarrass anybody. There’s a feeling there’s not 
being enough attention paid to this and they want to get it out. It doesn’t happen often; it happens 
occasionally.”  
  However, unlike Reporters 1 and 5, Reporter 3 indicated that appointees will sometimes 
(though rarely and less frequently) leak as well. He indicated that this has happened only a 
handful of times, and only under two specific types of circumstances. The first was to undermine 
other administration officials. “I don’t know of an appointee leaking something to me that 
undermined the Treasury Secretary or the President,” he said. “They may have leaked me 
something that undermined another agency – maybe the Chairman of the FDIC … but not their 
boss.” The second set of circumstances in which he indicated appointees would leak would be to 
explain that they disagreed with the administration’s strategy. “I would say what I’ve gotten for 
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the most part is indications they don’t agree with the strategy, not so much a broad policy. 
Especially in public affairs, it wouldn’t be that uncommon for someone … to say, ‘I really think 
we should have done a press conference, but I was overruled.’ But … I don’t get stuff like, ‘I 
don’t think we should be doing outreach to Iran,’ and don’t think I will.”  
  While Reporter 3 speculated that appointees engage in the latter kind of leaking because 
they are frustrated (and, as previously indicated, reported that such incidents were uncommon), 
Reporter 4 indicated that such “leaks” were actually “pretty frequent” in his interactions with 
appointees, and he believed that they could actually serve the interests of the administration.   
   
  It’s a personal style for some people: ‘Between you and me, I have great concern about  
  X. But the official position is Y.’ … Though it may be because my perspective was  
  obvious, so it’s an open question to the extent to which they believed that or were trying  
  to manage me. … It creates an intimacy, I guess; it’s a method of sort of distancing the  
  subject and bringing the two of you closer. … When done well, it can be very effective. It  
  creates a sense of common ground. It’s a natural way of disarming a critical question, that  
  insertion of personal perspective. One of the most frustrating things is when there’s   
  obviously a problem and the agency simply denies it exists. It’s infuriating and, really,  
  it’s true in life, they teach you in psychology. Saying ‘yes, but’ is much more effective  
  than saying no. When a PR person says ‘yes, but now that we’re on the same side, let’s  
  think about this more carefully,’ I think it’s much more effective than negating the  
  premise. 
 
  Accordingly, when Reporter 7 described civil servants as sometimes willing to 
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acknowledge the other side of things, I asked him if he thought this might actually improve the 
coverage they received. He agreed with Reporter 4 that “showing honesty is not always a 
weakness. It is appreciated. As opposed to a political who insists this is the way things are and 
you’re being ridiculous by not accepting our take on things.” To the extent this is true, such 
incidents should be categorized not as leaks but rather as sophisticated (and seemingly 
efficacious) public relations tactics. 
  Also like Reporter 3, Reporter 4 suspected that civil servants leak more frequently than 
appointees; however, he reported a significantly higher incidence of leaks among both groups. 
Reporter 4 indicated that leaking intensifies during periods of major change, describing the 2008 
financial crisis and its aftermath as a period of “intense leaking” during both the Bush and 
Obama administrations. “The stakes were high and the futures of agencies hung in the balance,” 
he explained. “In particular, civil servants were fire hoses because they perceived real risk to 
their agency mission and were not convinced the administration had the best interests of their 
agency in mind and saw real advantage in advancing their cases. When an agency comes to feel 
at odds with the administration, a civil servant will almost always identify with the agency … 
[During the financial crisis] agencies perceived significant advantage in trying to shape the 
narrative and many sought to do so quite aggressively.”  
  This account is strikingly consonant with Durant’s theory, discussed in chapter 1, that 
civil servants will only involve outside actors such as the press in agency battles when they 
perceive a serious threat to their agency’s core mission. During the financial crisis, Reporter 4 
indicated that appointees leaked “a little less” about these internal battles because “their bosses 
had the upper hand … so they could argue internally and prevail, so they saw less advantage in 
talking to media.” However, he said, “appointees wanted to respond to leaks by independent 
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agencies … so both did it a lot, but if I had to pick, maybe during that period, civil servants 
[leaked] more.” 
  While he described leaks as infrequent among both groups during more pacific times, 
Reporter 4 said he did not “know if [leaking] happens more often [among civil servants] but it 
feels like a higher rate because many of those agencies have interests discreet from those of the 
administration and see opportunities to advance particular agendas at the expense of or with 
indifference to the goals of the administration.” However, he was careful to indicate that the only 
time civil servants leak is to advance the beliefs of their agencies—not themselves personally (a 
stipulation also described by Civil Servant 7, the sole official who admitted to leaking in my 
interviews). “In instances where the agency felt the administration was wrong about a policy,… 
they would say the agency disagrees, but they wouldn’t disagree with an agency position. That’s 
very rare. I can’t even think of an example. It’s a sharp contrast.”Among appointees, Reporter 4 
described the infrequent leaks occurring during calmer times as occurring when “interests of two 
parts of the administration are in conflict and one part sees advantage in leaking.” 
  Unlike the four other reporters who reported receiving leaks, all of whom perceived civil 
servants to leak somewhat more than appointees, Reporters 2 and 7 indicated that appointees and 
civil servants had about the same propensity to leak information. Reporter 7 indicated that both 
groups leaked a “handful of times a year:” appointees would leak when they disagreed about 
policy outcomes, at times to criticize other approaches or to influence their bosses by floating 
trial balloons in the press. Civil servants leaked when agencies disagreed amongst themselves. 
Interestingly, Reporter 7 used an example in which, like Reporter 4, he indicated that civil 
servants were representing “their agency’s perspective” – as opposed to their own personal 
points of view. 
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  Reporter 2 was careful to note that he would “almost never get a call that is a true leak, 
where somebody says, ‘you should do a story on X because so and so is a jerk.’” However, he 
indicated that he “regularly” – on average a couple of times per month – would receive leaks in 
the course of other conversations. While he reported no difference in the frequency of leaking 
among the two groups, he contrasted their differences in intent. While appointees leak “with a 
specific goal of advancing their interest, or of who they’re representing, and pushing a particular 
angle, often to undermine someone else or to accomplish a political goal,” civil servants, 
according to this reporter, will leak “to point out how so and so is a bozo, look what they’re 
talking about, they’re wrong, here’s why I’m right and the other side isn’t going to get 
anywhere.”  
  This was the most dramatic description of leaking by civil servants that I encountered, 
since every other reporter tended to describe civil service leaks as being designed to show the 
other side of a debate or to advance agency interests. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that this reporter was clear that such leaks happened only in the course of other conversations; 
civil servants did not actively approach him with such claims. Interestingly, the description was 
made by Reporter 2, who worked for a media outlet popularly perceived as more conservative. 
Reporter 4, who provided the other rather dramatic account of leaking during the financial crisis, 
reported for a media outlet popularly perceived as more liberal. It therefore makes sense that 
these two reporters would provide the more “extreme” accounts of leaking, since leakers are 
likely to share information with reporters who they perceive to be sympathetic.  
  The results nevertheless point to more leaks by civil servants. Two reporters indicated 
that only civil servants “leak,” while four indicated that both groups of officials leak, but two 
indicated that civil servants leak more, while two indicated that the frequency of leaks was about 
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the same. However, with the exception of the epic upheaval of the financial crisis, leaks by civil 
servants were always described as rare. Furthermore, reporters’ descriptions of these “leaks” 
were not very dramatic.  
  Civil servants did not appear to be dialing reporters to lodge complaints about the 
administration for partisan purposes. Rather, reporters almost always described situations in 
which they were already talking to civil servants and the careerists seemed more willing to 
acknowledge the possibility of alternate points of view than their more partisan appointee 
counterparts. The information shared by civil servants in these situations typically represented 
the viewpoints of their bureaus, not than the civil servants’ personal views. Furthermore, the 
degree to which some of these instances meet the definition of leaking is therefore somewhat 
questionable, since, in cases where the civil servants were willing to acknowledge alternate 
points of view while communicating the administration’s position and accordingly reporters 
found their claims to be more credible and persuasive, they would have served the 
administration’s interests by advancing their goals in the press. Nevertheless, their actions in 
such cases would likely not have been approved by their political superiors, or by the president.  
  While it would certainly be naïve to believe that this was always the case, nevertheless, 
reporters did indicate that, in some cases, the willingness of civil servants to acknowledge other 
points of view may actually have helped the administration’s cause, because, as Reporter 4 
explained, “it’s infuriating” when spokespeople try to deny the existence of an obvious problem. 
In fact, the greater willingness of civil servants to acknowledge alternate arguments could be part 
of the explanation for the low credibility that appointees hold in the eyes of reporters – which 
appears to significantly hamper their ability to do their jobs, as described in the previous chapter. 
Ironically, then, this behavior of civil servants might actually redound to the long term benefit of 
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an administration, if it causes reporters to perceive government officials as more transparent and 
trustworthy.  
 Of course, leaks by appointees appeared to be even rarer. As expected, they were driven 
by attempts to undermine other administration officials or to try to advance their policy interests 
during internal disputes. 
 
Possible Causal Factors 
  I next asked questions designed to determine whether the officials’ political views impact 
their willingness to engage in acts of disloyalty to an administration. 
  
VI. Whether Political Views Impact their Work 
   First, I asked the government officials whether the political views of the people who 
work in their public affairs office have an impact on the work they do, and whether their personal 
political views impact their own work. Unsurprisingly, of course, appointees indicated that their 
partisan beliefs positively impact their work because they act as a driving motivation. More 
significantly for this test of loyalty, however, civil servants were adamant that their personal 
political beliefs played no role in their work. 
   With the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who said he declined to comment, the majority 
of appointees said that their political views impacted their work and the work of their colleagues 
in a positive manner. The response of Obama Appointee 1 was typical: “Unsurprisingly, the vast 
majority of people I worked with were liberal Democrats …  I can’t think of an instance in which 
we acted against the public interest to advance the administration, but that’s partly because we’re 
appointees and view the public interest through the prism of what we believe in … I think our 
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political views enhanced [our] work in some cases, because we believed in what we were doing, 
the righteousness of it, so in those circumstances, we might work even harder.” Bush Appointee 
1 likewise reported that the appointees in her office “all believed in the charge, in the work we 
were doing.” This appears to have driven the appointees to work harder, perhaps making it easier 
for them to cope with their massive workloads, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
  The majority of civil servants, by contrast, were unwavering that their political views did 
not affect their work. In the words of Civil Servant 1, “all I care about is policy, and it’s all I ever 
cared about.” Civil Servants 3, 4, 6, and 7 explained that politics simply did not come into play 
in the areas in which they worked. In the words of Civil Servant 6, “a lot of what we do is very 
fact-based and there’s really not a lot of room for political interpretation.” Likewise, Civil 
Servant 7 explained that he focused on simply telling the story of the relatively apolitical work of 
his agency. Civil Servant 5 added that while his job “wasn’t so much about politics,” in fact 
politics did impact his work because he wanted to see the administration be successful. Finally, 
Civil Servant 2 acknowledged that politics did affect his work but said that “we’re pretty 
collaborative, so if a person above me espouses a belief I don’t agree with, I can say ‘here’s why 
I don’t agree,’ so it hasn’t impacted working with reporters or getting a good story out.”   
  Of course, it is much easier for civil servants to make such claims in the abstract – and 
perhaps difficult for any individual to truly disentangle the nuanced ways in which their beliefs 
might affect their behavior. Nevertheless, the civil servants were certainly clear in reporting that 
their political beliefs did not impact their work, and their claims are consonant with all of the 
other findings of this research which point to the conclusion that, while civil servants will not 
always be loyal, their acts of insubordination against an administration tend to be motivated by 
the goals and beliefs of their bureaus, as opposed to personal partisan views.  
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VII. Whether Appointees Would Do Their Work for a President of the Opposite Party 
  I next asked only the political appointees whether they would consider doing their 
Treasury public affairs job under the administration of a different political party (this question 
would obviously be irrelevant to civil servants, who serve across administrations). 
  Six of the ten appointees indicated that they would not consider doing their job under the 
administration of a different political party or that it would be “highly, highly unlikely” (Obama 
Appointee 1), because “there was a real sense of camaraderie, a team atmosphere: this was our 
team, our guy” (Bush Appointee 3) and “I was really proud to serve for an administration I 
agreed with.” (Bush Appointee 5). Obama Appointee 4, whose portfolio was the site of epic 
partisan battles, explained that “my political views did impact my work and I do this work to try 
to help advance those views.” A seventh appointee, Bush Appointee 2, was basically also in this 
camp, indicating that he would only serve a different administration if the executive’s views 
more closely matched his personal policy positions than the Republican party.   
  Revealingly, however, two of these appointees indicated that their own policy portfolios 
would likely not differ significantly under the administration of a different party. The problem 
for these two appointees was rather that “probably 90 percent of other issues I’d have a different 
view on, so it would be tough to hold myself up as a spokesperson for the administration” (Bush 
Appointee 1) and “taken as a whole I don’t like what the Bush administration was doing, so I 
don’t feel like I would be as motivated. You want to feel like you’re having a positive impact.” 
(Obama Appointee 3).  
  Two Obama appointees indicated that they would consider serving in an administration 
of a different party because their portfolios were “pretty apolitical” (Obama Appointee 3) or “a 
little less political” (Obama Appointee 2). Bush Appointee 4 likewise indicated it would depend 
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on the policies of the administration, but he respected the policies of certain past Democratic 
Treasury Secretaries. Interestingly, then, while all of the previous evidence we have examined 
indicates that appointees were particularly loyal to the administrations they served, a full half of 
these otherwise very partisan appointees were clear that they would not necessarily expect the 
policies they advocated to change under administrations of a different party – indicating that the 
specific portfolios they covered were not very political.  
  While it would certainly not make sense for a president to actually hire appointees of an 
opposing party given the evidence we have previously examined about how the affiliations of 
appointees affects their motivations, the relatively apolitical nature of these portfolios suggests 
that civil servants might be slotted into them without detriment to the president. While some 
Treasury portfolios, such as Tax Policy, are hyper-political, others – such as TARP, Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence and International Affairs – are simply not the locus of major partisan 
disagreement. These results speak to our ultimate question of how presidents should staff 
agencies for maximum performance, which will be addressed in chapter 7.  
Conclusions and Analysis 
  This study confirmed my hypothesis that civil servants would be no less loyal to the 
president than appointees. I hypothesized that this would be the case in part because appointees 
would have greater incentives to leak damaging information to the press, in order to bolster their 
less-certain future career prospects. Therefore, I expected to find that appointees would leak 
more information to reporters. In fact, however, appointees and civil servants appeared to leak 
with roughly the same frequency. 
  I further hypothesized that the president does not necessarily need appointees in some of 
the positions they currently fill, because their duties are not very political. This expectation was 
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also confirmed. As previously discussed, half of the appointees whom I interviewed indicated 
that they would not expect the policies they advocated to change significantly under an 
administration of a different political party. 
  Finally, I hypothesized that civil servants would be unlikely to engage in politically-
motivated acts of disloyalty to an administration, because the civil servants would not have 
particularly partisan views in the first place. One civil servant was clear that he only cared about 
policy. However, the fact that the great majority of civil servants had previously worked in 
partisan political roles disproved this hypothesis. 
  As discussed in chapter 1, civil servants would emphatically not have served as effective 
administration advocates if their personal views caused them to attempt to secretly undermine 
the work of presidents with whom they disagreed – a charge leveled at them by legions of 
scholars and political operatives. However, my findings on the loyalty of appointees and civil 
servants indicate that, contrary to the assumptions of Moe and other scholars, civil servants are 
not significantly more likely than appointees to engage in acts of disloyalty to the administrations 
they serve.   
  One civil servant admitted to leaking information to the press that did not serve the 
administration’s interests during our interview. While no appointees admitted to leaking, I had 
reason to question the veracity of the responses of two of the appointees. Coincidentally, two 
other appointees independently volunteered to me, without provocation, that they suspected these 
very same officials of leaking.  
  However, with the exception of Civil Servant 7, appointees and civil servants alike were 
adamant that their jobs required them to advance the views of their superiors, regardless of their 
personal beliefs. Additionally, both groups reported that it was unusual for them to disagree with 
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an administration in the first place, suggesting that, at least within the Treasury, presidents rarely 
face even the possibility of acts of disloyalty (although, of course, such instances of 
disagreement occurred more frequently in the case of civil servants, which would be expected 
given their longer tenure and apolitical selection processes.).    
  When I asked the government officials whether they were aware of the identities of 
leakers in their offices, no public affairs official had identified a single civil servant who had 
leaked information to the press. However, they provided evidence of leaking by a minimum of 
five appointees.  
  On the other hand, the responses of reporters (who should know the identities of leakers 
with greater accuracy) indicated that civil servants were more likely to leak. However, upon 
closer examination, many instances of purported “leaks” by civil servants appeared to reflect a 
simple willingness on the part of civil servants to acknowledge alternate points of view – which 
perhaps strikes reporters as remarkable simply because appointees are so unwilling to sometimes 
acknowledge the obvious. As we have seen, such dialogue may actually serve the 
administration’s interests, because reporters view such sources with greater credibility. It is also 
reasonable to believe that acknowledging other arguments may give government spokespeople 
valuable opportunities to rebut them. Nevertheless, appointees appeared more loyal in this regard 
as they did not proactively share alternate views with reporters, and it clear that such actions on 
the part of civil servants would not have been acceptable to their political superiors or the 
president. 
  In other cases, it was clear that civil servants did engage in the more literal definition of 
leaking. However, reporters emphasized that such events happened rarely. Such leaks were 
described by Reporter 4 as happening most dramatically when the very existence of agencies was 
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at stake, as the government crafted its response to the 2008 financial crisis – which is hardly a 
normal set of circumstances (although presidents do from time to time shutter or radically overall 
agencies). While the greater weight that should be accorded the views of reporters (who 
unquestionably know the identities of leakers) suggests that civil servants might in fact leak more 
than appointees, the results reported by the reporters were so close (of the reporters who received 
leaks, four believed that civil servants leaked more, including one reporter who was not entirely 
sure whether there was a difference between the two groups, and two reporters believed that 
appointees and civil servants leaked with roughly the same frequency) that it is not possible to 
definitively arrive at this conclusion. 
  Perhaps the most remarkable finding of all, however, is the willingness of civil servants 
to stay quiet. They described doing so even when they witnessed administrations wasting 
millions of dollars, attempting to make false claims for partisan advantage, and ignoring data 
warning of a grave, impending recession. The civil servants were also universally clear that their 
personal political views did not impact their work.  
  Of course, these mixed results are approximate; it would be impossible to quantify with 
precision actions which government officials have an enormous stake in concealing. 
The results are nevertheless clear: civil servants and appointees both leak to the press. And both 
groups appear to leak with roughly the same frequency. 
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Chapter 6: Results: The Permanent Campaign 
Introduction 
  The previous two chapters measured whether appointees or civil servants are more 
effective and loyal advocates for the president. I now turn to the question of how well appointees 
and civil servants serve the interests of the American people. In chapter 3, I hypothesized that I 
would find little difference between political appointees and civil servants in the degree to which 
they are engaged in the permanent campaign, and that this would largely be a result of the fact 
that heavy workloads prevent appointees from being as proactive as they might otherwise want 
to be. This chapter reviews the results of my interview questions designed to determine the 
degree to which Treasury public affairs officials are conducting a “permanent campaign.” I have 
defined the permanent campaign as using “government as an instrument designed to sustain an 
elected official’s public popularity” (Blumenthal 1982, 23). I have identified tactics of the 
permanent campaign as utilizing public opinion polls to govern, playing to the emotions of the 
American people, and withholding and distorting information. 
  Of course, as discussed in chapter 2, there is nothing inherently nefarious in the 
president’s attempts to build support; indeed, doing so is necessary in order for the chief 
executive to achieve his goals, since other actors consider the level of support the president 
enjoys when assessing the consequences they will face for contradicting his wishes (Neustadt 
1991). However, the use of the tactics of the permanent campaign in order to build this support is 
potentially problematic. If an administration attempts to play too heavily to the emotions, as 
opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they craft, it might fail to convey 
facts which are essential for citizens to understand the state of the economy and hold their 
leaders accountable. Likewise, if an administration bases its governing decisions solely on public 
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opinion polls, they might fail to sometimes make the difficult decisions that serve the long-term 
interests of the nation. (Of course, such decisions themselves are themselves subject to active 
partisan debate, such as, for example, paying down the nation’s debt). Furthermore, if an 
administration withholds or distorts information requested by the media, it might prevent the 
American people from obtaining the information they need in order to hold their government 
accountable and participate in key governance decisions.  
  I therefore used nine measures in order to investigate whether the officials were 
conducting such a campaign.  
 First, I asked the officials how much time they spent focusing on the profiles and images 
of the officials for whom they work, and whether it was a good use of their time. Of course, 
Blumenthal charged presidential aides with conducting a permanent campaign in order to boost 
the popularity of the president. Even though the Treasury Secretary and other senior officials are 
not elected, if the permanent campaign tactics were to have been extended into government 
agencies, it is to be expected that public affairs officials would focus on the images of their most 
senior principals.  
  Second, I asked the officials about the most sophisticated techniques they used to shape 
what reporters covered. To independently corroborate their claims, I also asked reporters about 
the savvier things that federal economic agencies did to shape the coverage they received in the 
press. 
  Third, I asked the government officials whether they ever attempted to appeal to the 
emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted. 
  Fourth, I asked the government officials whether they ever utilized public opinion polls in 
their work and, if so, how.  
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  Fifth, I asked the government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for 
someone in their position to withhold information requested by the press, what the circumstances 
would be, and whether this happened often or rarely in their work. To independently corroborate 
their responses, I also asked reporters whether they became aware of practices public affairs 
appointees engaged in which they felt were inappropriate. If reporters did not respond by 
indicating that the officials had withheld information, I asked them directly whether they thought 
that the officials had done so. 
  Sixth, I asked the government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for 
someone in their position to shade the truth, what the circumstances would be, and whether this 
happened often or rarely in their work. To independently corroborate their responses, I used the 
responses of reporters to my question of whether they became aware of practices that public 
affairs appointees engaged in which they felt were inappropriate. If reporters did not respond by 
indicating that the officials had lied to them, I asked them directly whether they thought that the 
officials had done so. 
  Seventh, I asked the government officials whether they believed that it would be possible 
for someone in their position to tell untruths to make the president look good, and whether they 
or their colleagues had ever attempted to do so. 
  Eighth, I asked the government officials what percentage of the messages they sought to 
promulgate they would describe as ideas and narratives, as well as how they developed and 
sculpted narratives to make their points, in an effort to determine how they attempted to shape 
information to their advantage. 
  Ninth, and finally, I asked the government officials how their offices determined how to 
handle information that was potentially damaging or embarrassing. 
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Measuring Causal Factors 
I next investigated possible factors that could explain why the government officials were 
or were not conducting a permanent campaign. To determine the extent to which the potential for 
a permanent campaign existed, I first queried the government officials about their workloads, in 
an effort to determine how much time they had to engage in proactive tactics. Second, I 
attempted to determine how much of their time was spent proactively attempting to influence the 
media, and how much of it was spent reactively responding to requests from reporters.  
  To determine whether the officials were motivated by the goals of a permanent campaign, 
third, I queried the appointees and civil servants about the end goals of their work and, fourth, I 
asked them to what degree their end goal was to build public support for the president. 
  Finally, I considered whether those officials who studied journalism were less likely to 
engage in the tactics of the permanent campaign. 
 
Possible Differences Between the Obama and Bush Administrations 
  Finally, because reporters overwhelmingly indicated in chapter 4 that the Obama 
appointees were significantly less forthcoming with information than the Bush appointees, I 
attempted to ascertain whether there are differences in the practice of the permanent campaign 
among the two administrations I studied by asking many of my interview subjects what they 
thought accounted for this difference. 
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I. Time Spent Burnishing the Profiles of Government Officials 
  As previously discussed, Blumenthal described one of the key tenets of the permanent 
campaign as attempts to bolster the images of elected officials. To measure whether a permanent 
campaign was being conducted in the Treasury, I first asked the officials how much time they 
spent attempting to burnish the personal profiles of their principals. Such efforts would be a 
logical extension of the permanent campaign within government agencies. While Treasury 
officials are not elected, the images of the president’s most senior appointees bear directly on the 
reputation of the president. 
  Appointees generally indicated that they spent “some time,” “not a ton,” or, at most, 15-
20 percent of their time focused on the images of the individuals for whom they worked. I found 
their arguments for doing so to be compelling. 
  Obama Appointee 1 explained that it “is a good and appropriate use of time because it is 
the nature of things that principals are identified and intertwined with the institution.” Obama 
Appointee 2 explained that “your principal has to be seen as knowledgeable and accountable, 
[that] they know what they’re doing, so I think building up a public profile is part of that. It also 
helps with their interactions with foreign officials, … members of Congress, … [and] members 
of the private sector.” For Obama Appointee 3, “it reminded people that there was a human 
element” to his work. Likewise, Obama Appointee 5 indicated that “my thinking is that a public 
servant is paid by taxpayers, and any chance for them to get to know whose working on their 
behalf is probably something we should participate in, so when the chances came in, I worked 
hard for us to participate.” Obama Appointee 4 explained that “it was a great use of my time 
because … having principals who are so well-respected and so good in their issue area is 
definitely hugely beneficial and they were people who could talk to reporters and reporters didn’t 
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feel like they were being spun around.”  
  Bush Appointee 1 likewise explained that people trust officials more when they see “the 
human interest side of things” and that if reporters like a principal, they are more likely to get 
positive media coverage – a belief also echoed by Bush Appointees 2 and 4. Bush Appointee 5 
claimed that he could not understand the question.  
  The question was not relevant for one civil servant, because the job responsibility for 
managing the reputations of principals fell to others on his team. Civil Servant 7 explained that 
he spends “zero” percent of his time focused on the image of his principal and it would not be a 
good use of time because it would be “serving [the principal]; it’s not serving the organization.” 
He explained, “I think that’s where appointees become too focused on themselves and worried 
about their next life.” Another appointee who spent “not very much” time on the image of his 
principal said he thought having a more low-key image allowed his principal to better advance 
his agency’s work, which I considered to be a reasonable assessment given the nature of his 
bureau’s work which required projecting a degree of independence.  
 Every other civil servant saw value in such work. For example, Civil Servant 2 explained 
that “the more [his principal] is out there and looked at favorably, it raises the organization and 
the visibility we have in our programs.” Another civil servant explained that if a principal was 
seen as unfriendly to a particular group, it would negatively impact views of the agency’s 
programs. The amount of time they spent on the images of the officials for whom they worked 
varied, from one percent to five percent, to at “certain points quite a lot” and at others less so. 
Another civil servant explained, “I don’t know if I don’t spend any time on it or if I spend all my 
time on it. It’s just part of everything we do and I don’t make a distinction between making my 
agency look good and making a principal look good. I think it’s all connected.” 
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  Thus, while I had hypothesized that appointees might spend an inordinate amount of time 
focusing on the images of the officials for whom they worked – which would both be an 
indication of the permanent campaign and an indicator that they were less effective, because the 
president would ultimately be better served if they spent their time promoting his policies – I did 
not find this to be the case. The amount of time both groups spent focusing on images appeared 
to be reasonable and, in doing so, appointees were clear that their end goal was to build 
credibility for their organizations, which would allow them to advance the administration’s work. 
Furthermore, the sophistication with which the civil servants likewise approached such work also 
served as an indicator of their overall level of competence. Thus, this measure did not provide 
evidence of a permanent campaign. 
 
II. Most Sophisticated Techniques 
 In an effort to identify any permanent campaign techniques in which they might be 
engaging, I asked the appointees and civil servants to tell me about the more sophisticated 
techniques they used to shape what reporters cover. The most striking thing about their responses 
was that they could all be found in most Public Relations 101 textbooks. Of course, this 
observation is not meant to diminish the difficulty of their work. The appointees, in particular, 
explained and defended some of the government’s most difficult decisions and high-profile 
policies – including extremely complex economic and financial matters – and attempted to calm 
global markets amidst the panic of the Great Recession and a particularly partisan national 
climate. The skill required to carry out such responsibilities should not be underestimated. 
However, the actual tactics they described employing in their work in no way struck me as 
particularly diabolical nor as different in kind from the strategies with which most public 
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relations professionals are familiar. 
     For example, Obama Appointee 1 explained that his more sophisticated strategies were 
giving information to reporters as a “source familiar.” “This is more subtle or sophisticated to 
move or shape stories – the sausage-making that may not seem obvious to the public at large.”  
Obama Appointee 2 explained that “managing a principal’s time” was the most sophisticated 
thing he did, explaining that he could generate coverage by making his principal available to the 
press. Obama Appointee 3 said the two keys to his job were being responsive to reporters on 
deadline and being nice. He also described being targeted and thinking “about who the best 
person is to write a story, creating a favor bank … [and] giving them information and they give 
you information. Make it a two-way process.” Obama Appointee 4 described doing sophisticated 
economic analysis to prove why his policy was right and providing it to a top reporter. Obama 
Appointee 5 explained that “it starts with the relationship. You need to understand what a 
reporter is thinking, what other sources are telling them, and then figure out what to do: do you 
need to bring someone in to talk, [do you need a] third party validator, [do you need to] do 
research for them because we thought they didn’t understand it. So, it’s almost like we were 
doing their work for them. We would do anything we could to make it easier to get our point of 
view in their story.”  
  Bush appointees focused heavily on building relationships with and educating reporters 
about their worldview. “A lot of it was personal relationships, trying to build relationships with 
reporters so they knew the issues,” Bush Appointee 1 explained. “You got them interested in 
issues [so] they wanted to cover you, or it was as simple as, ‘I see you writing on this issue, you 
haven’t called us, come in and meet our Assistant Secretary’ or ‘we have a new person in our 
office you should get to know’ [and] have coffee, start a dialogue.” Bush Appointee 2 explained 
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the importance of “just making them understand the whole process” by explaining how and why 
things were being done. He used an example of a “roadshow” that Vice President Dick Cheney, 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, and other administration officials took to every site in the 
country that was printing stimulus checks in 2008 in order to highlight for reporters how the 
process would work. Bush Appointee 3 explained briefing the press before trips by Treasury 
officials and following up afterwards to stimulate stories.  
  Bush Appointee 4 likewise focused on educating reporters. “It’s that Dale Carnegie stuff 
on how to win friends. Educate them. Don’t always call reporters when you need them, call 
when you don’t need them and help them do their jobs. Help them cultivate sources. None of that 
is sophisticated; it just means you have to do it every day.” He explained that “sophisticated is, 
like, doing some original research and presenting it … [you] could give that exclusively, that 
kind of stuff” but he indicated that this would not be enough to generate “those hits” of larger 
press coverage. He also said “finding third parties to help influence a story also helps a lot.” 
Bush Appointee 5 said he could not remember, but said “I don’t think a lot of what we did was 
so sophisticated. A lot of what we did was trying to simplify things, because this stuff was so 
complicated.” 
  Civil Servant 1 explained that he would “try to understand what a reporter is after and 
counter-offer what we can do for them.” When reporters made an argument, he would also make 
counterarguments to defend his bureau’s position. Civil Servant 2 explained trying to find 
specific examples of people who have been helped by his bureau’s programs and giving those 
stories to reporters, and also pitching stories to reporters on why a new program of his bureau 
represented a particularly sophisticated approach. Civil Servant 3 likewise explained that when 
his bureau wanted reporters to cover a particular story, he would launch national campaigns and 
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“we’d bend over backwards to get them information and if they hadn’t done a story on this or 
that, we would call them and we always had a good relationship [and] … we had people trained 
to work with reporters across the country to get the story out.”  
  Civil Servant 4 reported being particularly responsive by responding via email to 
questions from reporters as an event was happening. He also tracked the comments of reporters 
on Twitter and blogs during the event and let them know when they wrote things that were 
incorrect. Civil Servant 5 explained using messaging to make clear that the administration 
understood the needs and challenges of ordinary Americans and also using data to tell stories. 
Civil Servant 6 explained building relationships of trust with reporters which allowed him to 
share information on background or under embargo (meaning the reporter could not publish it 
until a specified future time), steering reporters to other sources, and providing exclusives to 
larger publications. Civil Servant 7 likewise described building relationships with reporters, 
pitching them stories, and giving them liberal access to his staff to help them write their stories. 
  Thus, the responses of the appointees and civil servants did not evince particular 
differences in their level of sophistication – evidence which is also germane to the question 
considered earlier of the relative efficacy of both groups. Neither group of officials described 
engaging in tactics of the permanent campaign, such as tailoring their messages in response to 
public opinion polls, or withholding or distorting information. To corroborate these findings, I 
also asked reporters about the most sophisticated strategies they witnessed both groups employ. 
 
Reporters on the Savviest Strategies Government Spokespeople Use  
  When asked about the savviest things federal economic agencies do to shape their 
coverage, the most striking thing about the responses of reporters is that the strategies they 
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described were likewise not particularly sophisticated or Machiavellian. All were variants on 
simply providing information to reporters. In the words of Reporter 5, the savviest strategy 
government officials employed was when they were “as open and forthcoming as possible about 
whatever issue [they were] confronting and … [getting] the most competent people to talk to 
reporters, whether they’re appointees or civil servants, whoever knows the issue.” 
  Reporter 1 described the “savviest thing of all” as talking to reporters on background and 
off-the-record “so they [could] write more clearly” because they handle such complex issues. 
Reporter 6 likewise described such informal meetings as “most influential in shaping coverage” 
because it gave reporters a sense of how policy was being made and how the U.S. was 
prosecuting its interests around the world. Reporter 4 contrasted the Treasury negatively with the 
Federal Reserve in this regard, reporting that because the Federal Reserve sees itself as less 
political, officials there were much more willing to explain their thinking and decision-making 
processes on background, whereas “Treasury takes seriously the idea that they want you to look 
at the cupcake and not come into the kitchen.” He argued that while this approach does not 
always serve the Federal Reserve well on every story, in aggregate, the Federal Reserve benefits 
because their staff are able to shape the thinking of reporters.  
  For Reporters 2 and 3, the savviest strategy was to give exclusives to reporters. In the 
words of Reporter 2, the savviest strategy was to “generate buzz and force others to follow up 
when they think they will get a certain outcome from a certain outlet, because you’ve already 
shaped the narrative early on” or to “plant a story in a less prominent outlet to create the crumb 
that needs to be followed by someone else.”  
  Reporters 3 and 4 also described the savviest thing government officials did as simply 
providing access to the press. In the words of Reporter 4, “the agencies best at managing the 
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media tend to recognize we need to eat something, and if they serve us filling meals, then we’re 
less likely to be hungry and wandering around looking for other things to eat.” He described the 
public affairs office of the Federal Reserve as an example of spokespeople who “do a good job 
[of] providing information proactively and encouraging interactions with their officials, so you 
don’t feel like you’re on the outside trying to get in. You’re getting a story, it’s the one they’ve 
packaged for you, and they’re occupying your attention.”  
  Finally, as discussed in chapter 4, Reporter 7 emphasized the value of explaining issues 
to reporters early on in order to shaping their thinking, because, according to him, reporters will 
defer to the first version of events they hear, especially when they face deadline pressure.  
  Of course, as discussed in chapter 4, reporters were clear that Treasury officials did not 
generally provide them with the access they desired in ways that could have allowed the officials 
to better shape coverage. Rather, they described access as the most sophisticated technique they 
saw public affairs officers in economic agencies ever employ. 
  Thus, it seemed evident from the responses of both the appointees and civil servants that, 
while government officials might execute their work with sophistication, the particular strategies 
they used to influence media coverage were not extraordinary – and certainly did not include the 
permanent campaign tactics described by Blumenthal, Heclo, and McClellan. 
 
III. Appealing to the Emotions of the American People 
   One of the tactics of the permanent campaign described by Blumenthal is playing on the 
emotions of the American people, as opposed to appealing to their reason. I therefore asked the 
appointees and civil servants I interviewed whether they ever attempted to appeal to the 
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emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted. The 
results of this question, as well as the following question on the use of public opinion polls, were 
also utilized as measures in my investigation of the relative efficacy of appointees and civil 
servants in chapter 4.  
  Although, as was discussed in the introduction, most citizens do not carefully follow the 
information released by the government, at the same time, it is important for the audiences which 
do follow the Treasury carefully to be able to accurately assess the state of the economy and 
work of the Department. These publics include investors who make decisions in part based upon 
information released by the Treasury and thought leaders, such as members of the media who 
heavily influence consumer perceptions of the economy. Of course, the Treasury might release 
sophisticated information for such audiences while targeting less-knowledgeable citizens with 
emotional appeals that could have positive effects (for example, by convincing American 
citizens to save more for their children’s college educations or for retirement). On the other hand, 
it would be problematic if the Treasury appealed to unsophisticated consumers with self-serving 
messages. For example, if the Treasury attempted to bolster support for the president with 
emotional appeals projecting confidence in the economy but actual economic conditions were 
less rosy than the Department conveyed, this could cause consumers to make irresponsible 
decisions about their personal credit and spending. 
  Obama Appointees 2 and 4 indicated that they did not appeal to emotions; according to 
Obama Appointee 2, “I don’t think I was, like, sophisticated enough to have thought of that.” 
Obama Appointee 1 said he never “appealed in a demagogic way” but he was “aware of the 
emotional overlay of the way people consume news.” Obama Appointee 3, by contrast, argued 
that “it’s all emotion. In politics, reason doesn’t get you anywhere. If there was reason, Social 
252 
 
Security would be different; all of my hopes and dreams would actually come true.” Likewise, 
Obama Appointee 5 indicated using emotion because “I think sometimes reason would be lost on 
them. If you can say, like, ‘remember what it was like to lose your house or watch your 401K 
disappear overnight or lose your job,’ those are things people can relate to. I don’t think it was 
trying to make them feel like crap, but to say, ‘these are the things we’re trying to prevent, we 
understand how hard it was and we don’t ever want it to happen again.’” 
  Bush Appointees 2, 3, and 4 likewise indicated that they did not appeal to emotions. Bush 
Appointee 2 explained that “we placed a premium on trying to be factual and accurate, especially 
considering we were dealing with a lot of numbers. Numbers don’t lie.” Bush Appointee 4 
explained, “I think analytically.” However, two other Bush appointees indicated that they used 
emotional appeals for foreign audiences on issues such as terrorism and financial intelligence. In 
a response resonant of Obama Appointee 5, Bush Appointee 5 explained that, in communicating 
with the American people, he sometimes appealed to emotions as he was “trying to explain 
things in ways that people relate to. You have different ways of communicating to financial 
market professionals than ways of communicating to your mom and dad.”    
  Surprisingly, civil servants were much more likely than appointees to indicate that they 
attempted to appeal to the emotions of the American people. While Civil Servants 1 and 4 
indicated that they did not do so (for Civil Servant 1, this was because “I tend to be a financial 
person who thinks of people in terms of logical reasons”), five of the seven civil servants 
indicated that they did in fact play to emotions. Civil servants indicated that at times they 
appealed to emotions because they were trying to convey how people could be impacted by very 
real financial threats to consumers, or why taking particular financial steps was important to the 
futures of Americans and their children. At other times, they did so because they felt that they 
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would be more successful at encouraging citizens to take action if they showed that they 
understood how Americans had been impacted by the financial crisis. One civil servant 
explained, “I always thought that was great; you felt like you were really helping the public.” At 
other times, they did so by using “success stories to pull the emotional string of the person 
reading the story but have it be enriched with real data so you can quantify how the [program] is 
making a difference.” 
   Surprisingly, then, civil servants were much more likely than appointees to practice this 
technique of Blumenthal’s “permanent campaign.” This interesting and counterintuitive finding 
might be attributable in part to the fact that civil servants were more likely to be responsible for 
communicating information targeted to consumers than appointees, who focused on portfolios 
such as tax policy and domestic finance and may have tended to work with more elite economic 
and financial reporters. Nevertheless, the fact that the majority of civil servants attempted to tap 
into emotions while conveying their messages suggests a level of sophistication and savvy 
among this group which also speaks to their efficacy. Of course, the reasons why both the 
appointees and civil servants explained that they sometimes used such appeals – to communicate 
in terms that the ordinary American could understand – also hardly feels like a threat to 
democracy. Although ultimately such efforts by appointees would likely have helped to build 
support for the president’s policies – and, by extension, the president – both groups appeared to 
do so in an effort to connect with the American people and explain policy rather than to overtly 
advance partisan agendas. I therefore did not judge such efforts to be evidence of a permanent 
campaign. 
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IV. Use of Public Opinion Polls 
  Of course, a key tactic of the permanent campaign as alleged by Heclo is using public 
opinion polls to craft messages designed to maximize public support for the president, even if 
this requires advocating policies which are damaging to the nation over the long term. I therefore 
asked the government officials whether and how they used public opinion polls in their work.   
  While McClellan acknowledged that the Bush administration sometimes governed based 
upon public opinion polls, the Treasury appointees indicated that the practice had not penetrated 
their department (2008). Obama and Bush appointees universally reported that they had never 
once commissioned a poll to guide their messaging. One Bush appointee did indicate, however, 
that the Treasury Chief of Staff Christopher Smith brought Republican pollster David Winston to 
the Treasury on more than one occasion to brief very senior Treasury officials on polling he had 
conducted on economic issues. Additionally, almost every appointee indicated that he was aware 
of polling reported in the media.  
  Obama Appointee 2 and Bush Appointee 3 both indicated that the thought never even 
crossed their minds to commission a poll. Bush Appointee 3 explained that “we’re not going to 
change our policy because of polls,” while Bush Appointee 2 explained that “whether explicit or 
implicit, we all knew from a Public Affairs standpoint where things were [in terms of public 
opinion] but I don’t think, at the end of the day, it influenced things much. TARP was hugely 
unpopular, but we continued to just do our job on that.” 
  Obama Appointees 1, 3, and 4 said that polling would happen more at the White House, 
while the Treasury’s “focus is on thought leaders” (Obama Appointee 4) and “in an agency you 
are less overtly political.” (Obama Appointee 1). Obama Appointee 3 indicated that it would not 
make sense to commission polls at Treasury about how to communicate with the American 
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people because “the things Treasury deals with are too complex; you’ve lost everybody.” (Of 
course this would not preclude possible benefits of conducting public opinion polls of key 
constituencies which follow Treasury issues, such as business leaders and investors, but the 
appointees indicated that they did not do so). Obama Appointee 5 indicated that he “sometimes 
would reference them in conversations with reporters … more of like, ‘the American people 
want this done. Why won’t Congress do it?’” 
  Obama Appointee 5 and Bush Appointees 3 and 5 explained that the government simply 
did not have the resources to commission polls; Bush Appointee 3 indicated that it would not be 
a good use of resources even if the money were available. One appointee described a scenario in 
which banking trade associations would be “putting hundreds of thousands if not millions behind 
their campaigns [against Treasury efforts to regulate the industry, presumably by utilizing 
sophisticated polling] and we had people making fifty to 115 K that had to go up against that …. 
A team of four people at Treasury … had to respond to that on top of everything else we were 
doing.” 
 Particularly surprisingly, while no appointee had ever commissioned a poll, the majority 
of civil servants had or were planning to conduct public opinion polling. One civil servant 
indicated that polls would not be relevant to the work of his bureau, and two other civil servants 
had never commissioned them. However, four of the seven civil servants had or were planning to 
commission such studies. One civil servant indicated that he had done so “often,” for many 
years. All of these polls focused or would focus on Treasury products, in order to determine 
whether consumers understood and liked them. One civil servant who held focus groups with 
consumers to test messages reported that he “was asked not to talk about that because the 
administration didn’t want it to look like we were polling or testing efficacy. I didn’t agree with 
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that, because it’s pretty typical to test [marketing campaigns] and shows we were being 
responsible with our money.”  
 Nevertheless, in a particularly fascinating and counterintuitive finding, while none of the 
appointees had ever used this central tool of the permanent campaign, a majority of civil servants 
were found to have done so. Of course, they did not do so to build support for the president or 
even for his policies, and therefore cannot be alleged to have actually conducted a “permanent 
campaign.” Their use of such polls is, however, likely evidence of their efficacy and further 
indication that they approached their work with some degree of sophistication. Nevertheless, this 
second unexpected finding that civil servants are more likely to engage in the tactics which 
Blumenthal and Heclo charged political campaign operatives with importing into government is 
striking. 
 
V. Withholding Information Requested by Reporters 
 Of course, perhaps the most disturbing depiction of the permanent campaign was 
McClellan’s claim that government officials withhold and distort information requested by the 
press. I therefore first asked the government officials whether they believe it is ever appropriate 
for someone in their position to withhold information requested by the press. I then asked under 
what circumstances these actions would be appropriate, and whether this happened often or 
rarely in their work.  
  Obama Appointee 1 indicated that it was acceptable to withhold information for several 
reasons. He explained, “we were in a unique place at Treasury in that what we did was market 
sensitive, so there were certain instances in which providing certain information can influence 
markets in unpredictable ways.” (Of course, other agencies, such as the Departments of Defense 
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and Agriculture also make announcements with market implications.) Like Bush Appointee 1, 
who, as previously discussed, had reported giving less time to reporters who he found to be 
irresponsible, Obama Appointee 1 likewise argued that it is “more justified to withhold or be less 
helpful to purely ideological outlets rather than people who are true journalists.” Obama 
Appointee 1 also indicated that it was acceptable to withhold information about Treasury actions 
that impact financial institutions.  
  Obama Appointee 1 was clear that “you might omit a data point … you don’t want to 
make someone else’s case for them. Political communications is different from detached 
academic analysis in which you would have the responsibility to not omit relevant data points or 
factual assertions. You have a job to do, in terms of advancing a particular viewpoint. You 
shouldn’t view the job as a platonic ideal of searching for truth.” Later, when asked how he 
handled potentially damaging information, he explained that “you can sometimes be aggressively 
unhelpful to a reporter. If they are specifically writing something you think is unfair and don’t 
accurately present the truth, don’t think or feel an obligation to always be helpful.” 
 Obama Appointee 2 likewise argued that “you don’t have to tell the whole truth.” He 
indicated that “if there’s information I’m aware of that would result in a negative story, there’s 
no way I would make that available to a reporter,” and described withholding as “an unavoidable 
part of the job” that was a “regular occurrence, even in the sense that if a reporter doesn’t ask a 
question that I know the answer to, I’m not going to steer them in the direction of answering.” If 
a reporter did ask a question that Obama Appointee 2 did not wish to answer, he indicated, “I 
think the whole point is to do your best to tell the truth, but not the whole truth. You can stop at 
the point at which it will become damaging.” 
 Obama Appointee 3 concurred that “withholding is easy, you just don’t give it to them, 
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you point them somewhere else. They can’t yell at you for omitting things.” He explained, “I’m 
under no obligation to give out information unless it’s, like, obviously in the public domain. If 
it’s in a press release, you have to share. If it’s not, you’re under no obligation to do so.” He 
indicated that he withheld information “regularly,” explaining that “you’re playing a game, at the 
end of the day. That’s too simplistic, but you’re always evaluating your options and constantly 
recalibrating.” He also stipulated that “withholding when someone asked doesn’t mean I didn’t 
give it to someone else,” indicating a willingness to selectively provide information based upon 
how he believed reporters would use it.  
  Obama Appointee 4 explained that withholding was acceptable “in a situation where it 
could potentially be a very damaging story, where there are numerous Congressional 
investigations and we’re timing out the release of information, knowing that it will probably get 
out eventually, but holding while we figure out all the facts and a strategy.” He indicated that this 
happened “occasionally – like, sometimes, not daily, but it’s not rare, either.” 
  Obama Appointee 5 explained that “that’s kind of what the job is. I tried to be as upfront 
and transparent as I could, but I think there are legitimate times when it doesn’t make sense to 
offer up everything you’re thinking at that time prior to when a decision is made, things that 
could be market-moving events; there’s times when you’re not ready to talk about everything. I 
think good PR people are good at walking that fine line of never lying but just leaving out details 
to reporters’ questions, answering truthfully and honestly but just making decisions about what’s 
included in an answer and what will not be.” He indicated that this happened “somewhat 
frequently, especially around really tense, difficult topics.” 
  Bush Appointee 1 explained that withholding was “fine” because “you’re trying to 
implement a strategy and showing all your cards at any given time is not the way to go about it.” 
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He explained that “when reporters call and ask, ‘will you do X, Y or Z,’ I would say I would 
never speculate. Some would get mad later if [we] did, but … yes, you are serving the people, 
but at some level you have to implement work, have a strategy, and get through it, and you can’t 
necessarily do that by having everything that goes on in the public domain.”  
  Bush Appointee 2 initially said it was appropriate to withhold information when “lives 
are at stake, it’s a sensitive or classified issue, that kind of genre,” but, when pressed, he 
indicated it was acceptable to withhold if “something was not primed for market, if it will be 
released but the reporter got a leak or inside track, I would not give that, confirm those numbers 
or give out accurate numbers until the situation was solidified that we were in a position to do 
so.” He indicated that such situations generally happened “rarely.” 
  Bush Appointee 3 likewise withheld, but “not too often.” He explained, “it’s a public 
affairs spokesperson’s job to guide a reporter in the right direction. Don’t lie, but it’s not their 
job to be open kimono and tell them everything. It’s a reporter’s job to get that information and 
there’s got to be a certain level of transparency, because you do have a relationship with this 
reporter, and that’s part of the trust with a reporter and, by larger extension, the public, but you 
don’t have to tell them everything. It’s on a need-to-know basis, but don’t send them in the 
wrong direction.” 
  Bush Appointee 4 indicated that “there are lots of times when it might be appropriate” to 
withhold information. He explained, “let’s say you know a person will be nominated for a job 
tomorrow. Just because you ask a question doesn’t mean it’s right for me to give the 
announcement today.” Obama Appointee 4 explained, “the term of art was, ‘I have nothing for 
you on that,’ but I would frequently say ‘I’ll let you know when we have something.’”   
  Bush Appointee 5 initially indicated “I don’t want to answer that,” but later explained 
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that, “no, of course you don’t have to tell a reporter everything they ask you.” 
  On the other hand, while most civil servants indicated that they would sometimes 
withhold information, it was clear that they were more likely to provide information requested by 
reporters when they could. In chapter 3, I explained that I was not previously acquainted with the 
civil servants who I interviewed and reached out to six of my seven civil service interview 
subjects without an introduction from a friend or colleague. Several other civil servants declined 
my request for interview. Thus, as described in the previous chapter, I consider it probable that 
my sample of civil servants is somewhat more likely than the average civil servant to be open 
and forthcoming with information, by virtue of the fact that they agreed to be interviewed for this 
project. Just as I believe that this could have over-represented civil servants who leak 
information in my sample, I likewise believe that this selection bias may have over-represented 
civil servants who eschew the withholding of information. Nevertheless, the views of civil 
servants were so similar, and so starkly different from those of appointees, that I consider it 
likely that they represent a true point of difference between the two groups, even if the responses 
of the civil servants who I interviewed may slightly overstate the degree of the difference. 
 Civil Servant 1 explained that “in terms of withholding, there’s often times when a 
reporter calls and asks, and I would say, ‘I have nothing to tell ‘ya right now.” He indicated that 
this happens “rarely” at Treasury; asked under what circumstances it was appropriate, he 
indicated “rank has its privileges; if [a] Treasury [appointee] tells me not to say anything, I 
won’t.” However, it was clear that he was uncomfortable with this because, when asked if he 
shades the truth, he responded that “anytime I stick to just one statement … in that sense, yeah, I 
guess I do. There’s too many times when I don’t tell the entire story to say I don’t shade the 
truth.”  
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   Civil Servant 2 indicated that he would “rarely” simply not return a phone call in order to 
not provide information a reporter was requesting.  Civil 3 likewise characterized such situations 
as rare, explaining that “97 or 98 percent of the time we’ll give reporters what they’re asking for 
if we have it or can get it for them correctly.” While he was clear that it is sometimes appropriate 
to withhold information “if you’re protecting the organization and you think it’s the right 
perspective to give on the situation,” his definition of when such circumstances are warranted 
seemed to be significantly narrower than that of appointees.   
  For example, Civil Servant 3 recounted the same story told by a different civil servant in 
chapter 5, in which Treasury appointees wanted to refer to a “technical error” and not share 
further information about an event with reporters, explaining that the appointees “wanted to 
shade the truth and we thought it would be better just to tell the whole truth and be done with it; 
it wasn’t that shocking. So they definitely shaded the truth.” In general, he explained, “if I have it 
and I know it, we will give it,” explaining that “there’s nothing that makes us look bad, I don’t 
think. It’s the way people could manipulate information that makes us look bad.”   
  Civil Servant 4 was more constrained by law than most other officials in what he could 
provide to reporters, and indicated that it was generally appropriate to share what was in the 
public record as opposed to the analysis, background and context often requested by reporters. 
He was clear that “I don’t always tell everything I know, but I don’t consider that shading the 
truth.” If Civil Servant 4 was most conservative, Civil Servant 5 was most liberal, explaining that 
“the only reason someone wouldn’t have gotten [information they requested] would have been if 
it was determined by FOIA. That decision would have been above my pay grade, determined by 
lawyers. In this day and age, you would probably have a blog written by reporters one second 
later saying you didn’t do it, so it’s probably not worth it.” However, he did indicate that “spin is 
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okay, to give the facts [and] still be truthful, but spin it a particular way.” 
  Civil Servant 6 explained that “usually the rules are pretty clear about … what we can 
provide and what we can’t. Because we are less well known, I tend to be as transparent as 
possible, I try to provide as much [information] as I can, because I think it’s generally good for 
the [bureau].” He indicated that he therefore withheld information “rarely,” however he indicated 
that “shading” is acceptable in the sense that “I would like to direct reporters to the most positive 
part of every story and usually there’s a dark side to every story and I try to avoid [it] and try to 
anticipate the bad questions we’re going to get and try to avoid or steer to the more positive.” 
  Civil Servant 7, who I previously determined had leaked information to the press, was the 
sole government official who did not believe withholding information was appropriate. For him, 
“it has an impact on your integrity, and once you’ve compromised your integrity and people here 
have been covering the Treasury … for fifteen, twenty years who know behind-the-scenes 
things, if they know you withheld information, you lose your integrity and you never get it back. 
Never. Or it’s a long road to hope.” Interestingly, Civil Servant 7’s standards in this regard were 
significantly higher than those of reporters themselves. 
 
 Reporters on Withholding 
 To independently corroborate the responses of the government officials, I also asked 
reporters whether they became aware of practices which public affairs officials engaged in which 
they felt were inappropriate. If reporters did not respond by indicating that the officials had 
withheld information, I asked them directly whether they thought that the officials did so. 
  Very surprisingly, reporters seemed to accept the withholding of information from 
reporters by government officials as legitimate. For example, when I asked Reporter 7 whether it 
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was acceptable for government officials to withhold information, he responded, “yes, of course. 
It’s my job to ask the right questions, where you are put in a spot where either you have to 
answer or you have to be, like, ‘I can’t answer that.’ It’s my job to be smart about how I ask 
questions.” He used an example of a time when he had worked hard to understand how the 
Federal Reserve thinks about an issue “so that when they were working on a new issue I can 
work backwards from where I think they want to get, to figure out how they will get there, and in 
that circumstance I can ask their public affairs staff much more incisive questions, where even if 
they can’t answer me, I get the information I need.” 
  Reporter 6 indicated that he understood that sometimes it is not in the government’s 
interests to give reporters details of negotiations underway with other actors, for example. “I 
don’t think it’s their job to give us access to stuff that might hurt what they’re trying to do and I 
don’t resent them over that,” he said. “None of this information is critical to the functioning of 
the democratic process, but in terms of telling the story of how the U.S. responded to Europe’s 
[sovereign debt] crisis … there’s so much more I’m sure they could have told.” The reporter 
indicated that, if he ever wanted a detail that the government was withholding badly enough, he 
could always find a way to get it from other sources who were involved. “If it felt like there was 
a good story there, I would push, push, push,” he said. “It depends how much time you want to 
invest. You can almost always get information if you figure in workarounds.” 
  Reporters even seemed to accept the withholding of information from one reporter when 
it was provided to another as legitimate, describing such a situation as merely frustrating as 
opposed to outrageously inappropriate. For example, Reporter 1 explained that “from time to 
time, I would get frustrated, I would have spoken with a civil servant or an appointee and I’d see 
something appear in another publication, and I’d say, ‘wait a second, you didn’t tell me that’ and 
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sometimes they’d say ‘well, you didn’t ask’ or ‘well, I didn’t have it at that time.’” Reporter 2 
even characterized situations in which he told a public affairs officer about a story he was 
working on and they gave it to another reporter who they thought would write the piece more 
sympathetically as “bad form but not outrageous.” “If I’ve told someone information, they’re 
free to do what they want with it,” he explained. “But the consequence is that public affairs 
people have less time to respond to stories because of that risk and there are longer-term 
consequences. It’s almost always the appointees who do this.”  
  Reporters indicated that government spokespeople withheld information as a matter of 
course; Reporter 3 described withholding as “sort of like the main job” of government public 
affairs officers. “That’s what they do: withholding information,” he said. According to Reporter 
2, “any public affairs official will share information beneficial to the interests of an 
administration and not draw attention to other information” but, again, “you can get some of that 
unfavorable information from other officials.”  
  Reporter 2 indicated that “politicals certainly do it more than civil servants, but both do.” 
Reporter 4 also judged civil servants to be somewhat less likely to withhold, explaining that “at 
times, a particular piece of information not advantageous to the agency is helpful in 
understanding what happened … Civil servants are more likely to provide you with that kind of 
information.” In a statement resonant of the responses of reporters to the question of whether 
government officials leak information, he explained:  
 
 It’s not infrequently the case that, if I go to an agency and say, ‘I want the following  
  information, I know I can obtain it through FOIA [the Freedom of Information Act] but  
  you have it in hand and it’s easy to provide, let’s skip that,’ the odds that a civil servant  
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  will give that are pretty decent. It works a fair amount of the time. The odds an appointee  
  will are vanishingly small, even when the benefits to them would exceed the costs.  
  Appointees are really afraid to transact on the basis of damaging an agency in small  
  ways, even if it might benefit the agency in the long term. They don’t want to give out  
  bad information, even if it might strengthen the relationship with me … [and they could]  
  capitalize on that down the road. That’s not a trade most of them are willing to consider  
  … whereas there really are civil servants that will give you information; they’ll just do it.  
  They don’t seem to do the calculus in the same way. 
 
  However, Reporter 5 indicated that he believed civil servants to ultimately be subjected 
to the same pressures as appointees, who are, after all, their bosses. “A lot of the forces that are 
driving the appointees are often driving the civil servants because the civil servants work for the 
appointees,” he argued. “They don’t want their agency to look bad even if they’re civil servants, 
so they’re often limiting the information they’ll allow us to get about whatever subject we’re 
interested in or trying to cover.”  
 Thus, it is clear that both appointees and civil servants sometimes withhold information 
requested by the media. However, it is evident from the responses of both the government 
officials and reporters that civil servants seem to do so much more infrequently, while at least 
some appointees have no problem with withholding information simply for the reason that it will 
not make the administration look good. To be sure, as the government officials indicated, there 
will certainly be times when it is truly not appropriate to release information. While President 
Wilson, who disliked secret negotiations, called in his Fourteen Points statement for agreements 
that were “openly arrived at,” the Constitutional Convention clearly set a precedent for the 
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government to engage in debates behind closed doors before making proposals open for public 
debate (1918). However, the descriptions of some of the appointees made clear that they made 
their decisions much more capriciously, at least sometimes withholding information purely in an 
effort to achieve partisan advantage. 
   Of course, as discussed in the Introduction, there are many legitimate reasons for the 
government to withhold information. Much of the Treasury’s work gathering terrorism and 
financial intelligence, for example, is highly classified. In the case of the Treasury, judgments of 
when it is appropriate to withhold non-classified information are particularly difficult and 
subjective because the department possesses information which could cause short-term panic in 
global markets, but which also might point to risks which it is in the interests of the country to 
understand. This is because, as discussed in chapter 3, the strength of the economy depends in 
large part on confidence, which is heavily affected by statements and signals from the Treasury.  
  For example, Reporter 2 raised the possibility that U.S. Treasury officials and their global 
counterparts, in attempting to project optimism about Europe’s current sovereign debt crisis in 
order to keep markets strong and avert greater spillover effects in the U.S. economy, are 
currently propping up a “house of cards” in Europe. They could be downplaying the current 
warning signals about the weakness of the European economy, setting up the U.S. to suffer much 
more gravely if Europe’s economy ultimately collapses. The incentives for Treasury officials to 
attempt to calm and strengthen markets by withholding information or downplaying risk might 
be particularly strong in election years, since, as discussed in chapter 3, a president’s re-election 
prospects are closely correlated with the economy.  
  A similar dynamic could help to explain why warning signs of the U.S. financial crisis in 
2008 were not appreciated earlier. When I asked Bush Appointee 2 about this, he indicated that 
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the administration “could see things starting to bubble, but we never anticipated the extent to 
which everything would melt down.” However, he argued that the administration had incentives 
not to share warning signals with the public early on, because “from a Treasury-Fed perspective, 
you don’t want to be the cause of any significant … market or economic situation. You don’t 
want to run into a crowded movie theatre and yell ‘fire’ and then you end up being wrong. You 
don’t want to say, ‘we’re concerned about this area,’ because then either you’re wrong, so your 
credibility overseeing the market is diminished, or there could have been problems but you’ve 
just accelerated that process [by panicking markets] and created a bigger issue for yourself than 
if you had kind of let it go its course.” 
  In other words, as a result of the ideational nature of the market, Treasury decisions to 
release any negative information could potentially inflict actual and serious harm on the nation’s 
economy – making it highly understandable, and on one hand good for the country, that Treasury 
officials take the cautious approach to providing reporters with access that was identified in 
chapter 4 and sometimes withhold information. On the other hand, as we have seen, withholding 
information might not serve the long-term interests of the nation in understanding the nature of 
extant economic threats. Furthermore, the responses of at least some of the appointees suggested 
that they considered it their prerogative to withhold information for reasons that go far beyond 
concerns about market stability. As Obama Appointee 1 explained, “you have a job to do, in 
terms of advancing a particular viewpoint.” This suggests that they may be withholding for 
purely political purposes, which raises serious questions in a democracy designed to allow 
citizens to pass informed judgment on their leaders. 
  Thus, at least some appointees appeared to be willing to withhold information for 
purposes not ostensibly justified by market stability or other legitimate aims – evincing the fact 
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that they may withhold information for partisan purposes, a classic component of the permanent 
campaign described by McClellan. To be sure, McClellan was clear that deception has always 
existed in politics; what is new is the larger volume of such deception today. The question of 
whether appointees are withholding more information than in the past is, however, outside of the 
scope of this study.      
 
VI. Lying to the Press 
  McClellan also describing lying as another tool of deception in the permanent campaign. 
I therefore asked the government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for 
someone in their position to shade the truth, what the circumstances would be, and whether this 
happened often or rarely in their work.  
  Nearly every appointee indicated that it was unacceptable to lie to reporters. Obama 
Appointee 1 indicated that “it’s always fair to present your case in the most forceful way 
possible, [but], as a spokesperson, there’s a definitive line you don’t cross, in that you don’t lie, 
you never lie. You do present your case in a tailored way, of course, but you should never 
straight out lie or mislead, partly for your own personal protection, because the reporters you 
deal with are going to be there for a long time afterward, and if they don’t trust you, you 
significantly hamper your way to do your job … and for public interests.” He also described 
lying as “an unethical thing to do.”  
  The exception was Obama Appointee 4, who indicated that it was acceptable to “shade 
the truth,” but I judged his definition of shading to be more like spinning than lying, because 
when I asked when such shading would be appropriate, he gave the answer discussed in section 
9, explaining a circumstance in which he knew information would eventually get out but he was 
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still gathering facts and determining strategy. (Obviously he could not lie if he knew the truth 
would eventually get out, because he would otherwise soon be exposed in the lie, nor could he 
lie about facts he did not yet know because he was still gathering them). However, appointees 
were otherwise clear that lying was unacceptable. In the words of Obama Appointee 3, “never 
shade the truth, because you’ll get found out.” Obama Appointee 5 explained, “the closest I’ve 
gotten and I assume most of us have gotten, is if a reporter asks you a question you do know the 
answer but you don’t feel at liberty to disclose it, to say, ‘I’m going to have to get back to you on 
that one’ and then maybe never get back to them, but not to say ‘we’ve never had a conversation 
on that,’ that would be something I’d never do, but I might say ‘I can’t have this conversation 
with you.’”   
  Bush Appointee 1 explained that it is “absolutely, absolutely wrong to ever lie.” Bush 
Appointee 5 added that not only is it “never appropriate to lie to a reporter,” but it was also never 
appropriate to “overtly mislead them.”  
 Like the appointees, civil servants stressed that it was never appropriate to lie to 
reporters. In the words of Civil Servant 1, “I’ve never been asked to say something I know is 
false, and I wouldn’t.” Or, as Civil Servant 5 put it, “I think there’s a difference between being 
truthful and not being truthful, and I don’t think it’s okay to not be truthful, and I don’t want to 
be on the record not being truthful, and I don’t think I ever was. Never.” Finally, Civil Servant 6 
concurred that “the first rule is, don’t lie, and I think everybody in public affairs learns that. You 
can never lie, you can not confirm, you can do other things, but you just can’t lie.” 
  Thus, the government officials were adamant that they did not lie to reporters. However, 
the responses of the majority of reporters tell a different story. 
270 
 
 
Reporters on Lying 
  To independently corroborate the responses of government officials on whether they ever 
lied to reporters, I used the responses of reporters to my question of whether they became aware 
of practices that public affairs appointees engaged in which they felt were inappropriate. If 
reporters did not respond by indicating that the officials had lied to them, I asked them directly 
whether they thought that the officials had done so. 
  Interestingly, reporters had widely divergent views of whether public affairs officials lie 
to them. Three reporters believed public affairs officials did not lie, one reported that it happened 
very rarely, and three believed they lied fairly frequently. 
  Reporters 1 and 6 did not believe that a government public affairs official had ever lied to 
them. For Reporter 1, “sometimes they would be adamant in presenting their position and 
somewhat unwilling to even concede there might be alternative viewpoints, but no one ever lied 
to me, that’s for sure, or if they did, I certainly didn’t know it.” Similarly, Reporter 6 indicated 
that he “can’t think of an instance in which anything anyone told me was outside the bounds of 
interpretation you’d take if you were in that person’s shoes, and the person on the other side had 
his fingers crossed, saying, ‘I hope he doesn’t realize what’s really going on.’” Reporter 5 
indicated that government spokespeople engaged “more in just withholding information” and 
therefore they “may not … outright lie, but by not telling me particular things they do know, the 
story I write is less factual, because I haven’t gotten the information.” 
  Reporter 7 indicated that, on average, once every two years a government public affairs 
official had engaged in a practice he would describe as untruthful, including a few cases where 
officials had “actively denied something they definitely knew was happening” or had 
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misrepresented the terms under which they were providing him with information he believed to 
be exclusive. 
  By contrast, Reporters 2, 3, and 4 believed that public affairs officers lied rather 
regularly, although Reporter 3’s definition of “lying” was very similar to Reporter 5’s definition 
of withholding. Reporter 3 indicated that often he would know from other sources that the 
Treasury was about to do something or a decision had already been made, but appointees would 
say that it was not final or complete because their definition of something being complete was 
when the press release was issued: 
 
  Sometimes it was not big stuff, so I’m giving you a mild one to make the point. The  
  Secretary will travel to Chicago and I ask and they say nothing is final or complete, but  
  it’s bullshit, because it has been [finalized]. Two hours later, they put out the release  
  announcing it. The decision was made [when he asked]. Is that lying? It’s up to you, it’s  
  pretty damn close, but it’s completely disingenuous, it’s not honest, let’s put it that way.  
  Usually most of the time people who are speaking to press are careful not to say a  
  technical lie, for fear it will come back. One, they could get caught and, two, it really can  
  hurt their credibility, but you don’t want to word something in such a precise way you’re  
  clearly lying, so [appointees] talk around it. 
   
  Reporters 2 and 4 were even clearer that the behavior of public affairs officers met the 
literal definition of lying. “I don’t understand how you can survive in that role without shading 
the truth in some way, because if you were to simply stick to pure fact, everything you say would 
sound like it came out of a CBO [Congressional Budget Office] report,” Reporter 2 said. When I 
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asked if he found such shading to be disingenuous, he answered affirmatively. “There’s no way 
someone can come up with a budget and claim they truly believe it will lead to a balanced budget 
in five years,” he argued. “In that case, they are lying. And it happens in both [Democratic and 
Republican] administrations.” He reported that he had had “many” such experiences.  
  Like Reporter 3, Reporter 2 also indicated that appointees, but not civil servants, would 
occasionally misdirect him and indicate that something was not going to happen shortly before it 
did actually happen. At times, this would be the case because the appointees did not know what 
was happening, and, at other times, it was deliberate. Sometimes, according to Reporter 2, 
appointees would do this so that they could release the information he had in a different 
publication. By contrast, he said civil servants would typically release information to all 
reporters at the same time.  
  Finally, while Reporter 4 indicated that he did not know how often civil servants working 
in public affairs had lied to him, it was “certainly not an uncommon experience” to be lied to by 
a political appointee, and it was “endemic” during the financial crisis: 
   
  It was not infrequent during the financial crisis that a public affairs official would assert  
  or deny something, and it would turn out to be the opposite. I’m willing to accept [that] 
  sometimes they were ignorant and, in good faith, telling what they knew or concealing a  
  fact they didn’t know, but … Not infrequently, they were willfully attempting to mislead  
  and steer away from stories and alter coverage not just by arguing for an interpretation  
  but by representing that there were facts I needed to consider even when those details  
  were not true.  
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  Reporter 4 indicated that his news organization came to distrust the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve so deeply that, while his media outlet would still report what officials said on 
the record, they would no longer believe officials who told them off the record that they were 
wrong. “Whereas, at the beginning of the crisis, we would have given significant pause to 
moving forward if Treasury or the Fed said ‘you’re headed in the wrong direction,’ we simply 
wouldn’t accept it from Treasury or the Fed, because we had been lied to too often,” he said. 
Reporter 4, who reported for a media outlet popularly viewed as liberal, indicated that “some of 
the worst lies” were told under the Bush administration at the start of the financial crisis, and 
while there was an initial “honeymoon” period under the Obama administration, “in time, we 
reached the same conclusion. There was a fundamental problem of trust.” (The government, of 
course, faced the same problem of lack of media trust during the Vietnam war, when military 
briefings came to be referred to by reporters as the “five o’clock follies.”) (Connable, 7). 
  Reporter 4 indicated that the problem had diminished simply because the crisis has 
receded and there is less “context of crisis or new policies moving forward.” He indicated that 
such outright lying seemed to be less prevalent among civil servants, because “they are willing to 
say a lot less; the degree of dialogue is very different. They tend not to be players in the great 
game in the same way. Not that it never happens, but it’s less frequent, because of both their 
means and [their] motive.” 
  It therefore appears that about half the reporters who cover the Treasury seem satisfied 
with the ethics of the government spokespeople with whom they work. Reporter 6, for example, 
described a “real sensitivity to the ethics rules” among both appointees and civil servants, “to the 
point where people wouldn’t even let you buy them a coffee.” He emphasized that there were no 
attempts at “trading access, [such as suggestions that] ‘we could get you this access to this 
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person, but you have to guarantee the story will look this way.’” But especially for Reporter 4, 
and to an important extent for Reporter 3 and a significant extent for Reporter 2, the information 
they received from government spokespeople was often not to be trusted, and they were much 
more likely to blame appointees than civil servants for lying.  
  This suggests that, contrary to the claims of the government officials, appointees may in 
fact sometimes engage in the mistruths that McClellan described as being part of the permanent 
campaign in government.  
 
VII. Lying to Make the President Look Good 
  As a further test of the presence of a permanent campaign, I asked the government 
officials whether they believed that it would be possible for someone else holding their position 
to tell untruths to make the president look good, and whether they or their colleagues had ever 
attempted to do so. 
  Bush Appointee 5 claimed not to know, and one Obama appointee and one Bush 
appointee believed that this would not be possible. Otherwise, all of the appointees believed that 
it would, in fact, be possible for a Treasury spokesperson to do so. In the words of Bush 
Appointee 4, “yeah, I guess it’s absolutely possible for people to lie to the press without getting 
found out, because some people are really good at lying and unethical.” However, many 
appointees acknowledged that the repercussions could be severe because, as Obama Appointee 1 
explained, “you run the risk of getting caught if the truth comes out later.”  Bush Appointee 2 
explained that “as a spokesperson, your job is built on trust, trust of the people that work with 
you and [of the] reporters you interact with, and once you cross that barrier and give out false 
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information, that trust is ruined, and you’re no longer capable of effectively doing your job.” 
  Obama Appointee 2 used the example of when State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki 
told reporters in July 2013 that Secretary of State John Kerry was not on his boat in Nantucket as 
a crisis unfolded in Egypt, and photographs later emerged of Kerry on his boat. Obama 
Appointee 3 indicated that a Treasury spokesperson could lie “very easily” but indicated it would 
be “harder about the President,” while Obama Appointee 5 predicted that a spokesperson could 
lose their job for doing so. Bush Appointee 3 likewise argued, “it’s D.C., this kind of crap 
happens all the time, but I think that person should be held accountable.” 
  Obama Appointee 4 indicated that it would not be possible, because “I don’t think you’d 
be able to get through the level of clearance you’d be required to get through to put out 
something, because Treasury is a … building that prides itself on putting out good facts.” Obama 
Appointee 4 indicated that reporters had told him that Treasury does not put out the kind of 
“spin” they get from the White House. Later in the conversation, he explained, for example, that 
a Treasury spokesperson had refused to go along with a White House attempt to claim that the 
country had recouped all of the money it lent to General Motors under President Obama but not 
under President Bush – a claim that was “ridiculous” and “stupid.”  
  While all of the Obama appointees indicated that their Treasury colleagues had never 
made such an attempt to lie for the President, several of the appointees volunteered that they 
suspected others in the administration of doing so. Like Bush Appointee 3, who said these things 
happened frequently in Washington, Obama Appointee 4 indicated that “there were certain 
things said by the White House that were not technically true, on numerous occasions, regarding 
one of the President’s signature initiatives.” Bush Appointee 4 said “there are people who think 
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lying is part of the job – some people in other parts of the administration.” Bush Appointee 1 told 
me to “call [the Department of] State, they would have done anything to make Bush look good.” 
  Most of the seven civil servants believed that it would be possible to lie for the president, 
though all indicated that they had never done so and were not aware of instances in which 
colleagues had done so. Civil Servant 1 believed that it was possible and that “politicals… do it 
all the time.” Civil Servant 4 concurred that “anything’s possible,” while Civil Servant 5 
concurred, “as long as they never got caught.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6, using the example of 
Lara Logan’s interview on CBS’s “60 Minutes” with a security contractor who falsely claimed to 
have been present during the attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, explained that 
“anytime anyone has access to a reporter, they can tell whatever they want and if they can back it 
up enough, then it’ll get written about … it’s just a matter of relationships, you can get away 
with it.” Civil Servant 7 initially said it would not be possible, but was later able to envision a 
scenario in which his boss met the president and he shared what the president said. Although 
Civil Servant 7 had previously admitted to leaking during our interview, he indicated that in such 
a circumstance, “my attitude is, that’s a personal conversation [between his boss and the 
president] and I have no business” sharing it. 
  Two of the civil servants indicated that it would not be possible to lie for the president. 
Civil Servant 2 explained that “we hardly ever deal with anything related to the president as far 
as the press. We definitely support what the president is trying to do from an economic 
standpoint, but if someone is looking for comment such as that, they go to [the appointees at] 
main Treasury.” Civil Servant 3 explained, “we’re not in the business of trying to make people 
look good; we’re just trying to do our jobs.” 
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  These responses call into question the claims of government officials that they had never 
lied to the press – claims which were disputed by most reporters. Here, the majority of both 
appointees and civil servants indicated that it would be possible to lie for the president. While 
they all claimed to have never done so, interestingly, appointees in both administrations 
indicated that they had knowledge that their colleagues had done so. Thus, while the particular 
appointees who I interviewed may have never personally lied to the press, it is evident that 
appointees under both administrations did so – although unclear whether these appointees were 
in government agencies and/or the White House.  
 
VIII. Crafting Narratives 
  Next, in an effort to determine how the government officials attempted to shape the 
information they provided to reporters to their advantage, I asked them what percentage of the 
messages they sought to promulgate they would describe as ideas (like ways of viewing 
particular things) and narratives, as well as how they developed and sculpted narratives to make 
their points. This measure was designed to determine whether they ever distorted information in 
the process. 
 Most appointees indicated that narratives and ideas were very important. Obama 
Appointee 1 explained that “virtually everything presented you try to shape with some aspect of 
narrative. There are very few points where it’s a pure data point divorced from any context or 
narrative.” Obama Appointee 2 would say to reporters, “here’s our idea and here are the facts to 
back it up,” and Obama Appointee 5 likewise explained that he would share “both a story and a 
fact.” Obama Appointee 3 explained, “you’ve got to put everything in context … putting it in a 
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way people understand … matters more than anything else.” The Obama appointees’ estimates 
of how much of the information they shared consisted of ideas and narratives (as opposed to 
straight facts such as numbers) included under fifty percent (which I counted as 49 percent) and 
“virtually everything” (which I counted as 99 percent), for an average of 53.1 percent. 
  With the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who declared that he could not remember 
before I had an opportunity finish asking the question aloud, the responses of the Bush 
appointees were broadly similar. They estimated that, on average, 48.75 percent of their 
messages consisted of ideas and narratives. Bush Appointee 1 explained that he “split my time 
between almost acting as a data processor for reporters calling with generic questions they need 
answers to, versus getting out there and doing more suasion through ‘here’s what we believe and 
think, here’s our goal in all of this.’” 
  Appointees varied in the tactics they used to develop and sculpt narratives to make their 
points. Obama Appointee 1 explained that the way to sculpt narratives is to “make 
announcements which are colored with your message, infused with your message, make an 
announcement you did [X], which is a natural news hook, but infuse it with quotes and other 
surrounding information which makes a case for why the actions you took were correct, so each 
news hook is an opportunity to infuse your [messages].” Obama Appointee 4 explained, “we 
looked for one-off stories to show how [an outcome they opposed] was bad, tried to find points 
in the data we could present to folks.” Obama Appointee 5 explained that “a small group would 
have a conversation about what we thought a good story would be and how to tell the story and 
then develop tactics, like write a press release, write a fact sheet or blog post, find a real person 
validator, put someone else in the administration on the phone, [think about] who are the best 
spokespeople for this, and, of course, do we want to do background, on the record, whatever, and 
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it would vary from issue to issue, but there were a whole slew of tactics. We could write an op-
ed … what would reporters be open to or find most useful on the issues?” 
  Bush Appointee 4 explained that, to sculpt narratives, he “thought of a reasonable person 
in my head and [would] tell a story … and include hard, presentable facts [and] good analysis.” 
Bush Appointee 1 likewise explained that “usually some person would come up with a good 
narrative or example, let’s say … that helps to explain the issue [we were] working on … It’s 
usually very helpful to reporters to have a common sense example. It started out as a team effort; 
I would take notes.” Bush Appointee 2 explained that sculpting narratives required “obviously 
always keeping the administration’s position overall in line and trying to put it in the context of 
what will support economic growth and job creation.” 
  The percent of messages promulgated by civil servants that were ideas or narratives 
ranged from zero to “almost all” (which I counted as ninety-nine percent in my calculation), for 
an average of nearly forty-three percent. However, Civil Servant 1, who replied “almost all,” 
clarified that “it’s almost all narratives, meaning ‘here’s the story without interpretation.’” This 
may have therefore overrepresented the amount of actual narrative in the average, since I 
considered narratives to generally include interpretation and believe the other civil servants did, 
as well. 
  To sculpt his narratives, Civil Servant 1 explained that he would approach his principals, 
“asking them, ‘what would you like the newspaper to say about you, if you could write the 
story?’” For Civil Servant 2, it was about looking “for end beneficiaries, real life stories,” a 
strategy also echoed by Civil Servant 5. Civil Servant 3 would “write the best press releases we 
can. Factual, to the point, here’s what we do, here’s the benefit to the public, [here’s] why we 
want the public to do what we want them to do.” Similarly, Civil Servant 6 would “build 
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narratives around the trends and patterns” in data. Civil Servant 4 would add context based upon 
his bureau’s previous work. Civil Servant 7 would put his bureau’s work in the context of the 
“traditions and values of the country.” 
  The descriptions of both groups regarding their work generally did not evince permanent 
campaign tactics. For example, with the exception of Bush Appointee 2, none of the government 
officials indicated that they sculpted narratives by considering what would work to the 
president’s advantage or what the American people wanted to hear. Many made clear, by 
contrast, that their messages were ultimately grounded in facts. Of course, their descriptions do 
not definitively prove that they did not engage in permanent campaign tactics which they chose 
not to share in these descriptions of their work, but they were generally not evident in my 
discussions of this question with the government officials. The fact that nearly as much 
information released by civil servants consisted of ideas and narratives in comparison with their 
appointee counterparts also suggests a perhaps unappreciated degree of sophistication among the 
careerists. 
 
VIX. How the Government Officials Handled Damaging Information 
   In a final attempt to measure permanent campaign tactics, I asked the government 
officials how their offices determined how to handle information that was potentially damaging 
or embarrassing. Nearly every official indicated that they began preparing immediately for the 
release of the information. An exception to this was Bush Appointee 5, who first indicated “we 
had meetings” and then changed his story and stated with a straight face that, during his time as a 
spokesperson for the Treasury during the height of the nation’s financial crisis, he had never had 
to handle negative information.   
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  The other Treasury spokespeople generally began preparing for the information to come 
out. They believed that even classified information might leak; one Bush appointee recounted 
how a Treasury official spent three years preparing for information to leak on a top-secret 
Treasury initiative tracking the finances of potential terrorists by using data from the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). In Juan Zarate’s account of this 
incident in Treasury’s War, he explained that when the highly-sensitive and classified operation 
finally leaked to the press, the Treasury’s top public affairs appointee, Tony Fratto, “was 
surprised it had taken so long.” (2013, 269).  
  Appointees differed in their views of whether the release of sensitive or damaging 
information was inevitable. Obama Appointee 2 explained, “I don’t think we have power in 
those positions to stop negative stories from coming” out. However, Obama Appointee 1 
explained that, if it was judged likely a story would go public, it often made sense to release it 
preemptively. To do this, a spokesperson would “just release it yourself … with the, spin is a 
loaded word, but its … best face or argument attached, so the first way someone counters it is 
accompanied by your message.” At other times, “if you think you can continue to avoid a story, 
you might take that chance and hope it doesn’t detonate.” Obama Appointee 4 concurred that “if 
there was something terrible, we wouldn’t necessarily release it ourselves, but prepare, assuming 
it will come out.” However, Obama Appointee 1 explained that “often you get out in front, 
because if it detonates unexpectedly in ways you don’t expect or understand, that’s a much 
higher risk, particularly in an election year.” 
  Interestingly, when asked how they would handle damaging information, three of the 
seven civil servants indicated that would confer with Treasury appointees, while a fourth civil 
servant indicated that he would confer “up the chain of command” within his own bureau. Civil 
282 
 
Servant 3 explained, “we will always seek guidance from the political public affairs staff and see 
how they want to handle it, and follow what they say to do. I would never say something they 
didn’t want us to say.” Civil Servant 2 indicated that he would approach Treasury public affairs 
appointees with a recommended course of action. 
  The other three civil servants indicated that they would release the information. “In my 
experience,” Civil Servant 5 explained, “the way the administration always starts is with a plant. 
Give it exclusively to one reporter to get the story out in a way they think will be more favorable, 
or at least more fair.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6 explained, “usually the best tactic is to get 
everything out as soon as you can. It’s worse to have the story bleed out than to at least get some 
credit for being transparent and honest and as open as possible.” Civil Servant 7 also indicated 
that “we’re full disclosure, if we have problems … we tell the truth,” although, when pressed, he 
explained that “we don’t go out and say, ‘guess what happened?’ but if they ask the question, 
absolutely.” 
   Two of my interview subjects who were familiar with the 2013 scandal in which the IRS 
was accused of conducting politically motivated investigations into organizations which applied 
for tax-exempt status recounted the incident in a way that suggests that the strategy of 
preemptive release has become such an article of faith among spokespeople that they sometimes 
do so even when it may not serve the interests of their organizations. In this instance, with an 
Inspector General preparing to release a report requested by Congress into the matter, Lois 
Lerner, Director of the IRS Exempt Organizations division, decided to proactively announce the 
allegations against her agency publicly.  
  One appointee made clear that Lerner did so against the advice of Treasury public affairs 
appointees, who had advised the IRS repeatedly that it would be better to wait for the Inspector 
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General’s report, which exonerated the agency. While the final discussions prior to Lerner’s 
announcement happened among more senior administration officials who did not work in public 
affairs, it is interesting that the Treasury public affairs appointees were aware that Lerner would 
speak publicly and tried to deter this action numerous times, but ultimately did not prevent her 
from doing so. One appointee told me that this was the case because Treasury “still wanted them 
to be their own agency” and therefore “would just strongly discourage or strongly encourage.” 
On the one hand, this suggests that appointees ultimately exert less control than we might expect 
over the actions of career staff; on the other hand, the situation was so damaging to the 
president’s reputation that it seems reasonable to suggest that appointees might have learned a 
lesson and be even more assertive with their bureaus in the future.  
  Additionally, the incident illustrates how the interests of appointees and civil servants 
will not always align. One appointee was clear that, during the IRS scandal, Treasury appointees 
tried to direct blame towards the IRS as opposed to the administration, though he argued this was 
warranted because “I mean, they just really, really fucked up.” This was not the only example of 
such conflicts. An appointee also described how, during the 2013 government shutdown, a 
Treasury bureau wanted to avoid highlighting the fact that citizens could not access its services, 
while appointees “loved those stories because we were like, ‘see, this is awful,’ so there were a 
few occasions like that and times when agencies were used as a scapegoat … a little bit ‘cause it 
was politically advantageous.” However, this appointee emphasized that “generally, like, you try 
to protect your bureaus, even if they don’t think you’re trying to help them.” 
 I judged another example of this practice of pre-emptive release of negative information, 
this time shared by a Bush appointee, to be one of the most ethically questionable tactics of 
which I learned in this project. A Bush appointee described how, as discussed above, the New 
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York Times learned that the administration was tracking financial transactions through SWIFT as 
part of its anti-terror efforts, without obtaining Congressional approval or individual warrants or 
subpoenas. The appointee indicated that Treasury public affairs appointees and attorneys worked 
for months with the Times to convince the paper that the practice was legal and that they should 
not run the story because it would jeopardize their counter-terrorism efforts. The appointee 
familiar with this incident believed the Times was publishing it “just to be assholes, frankly.” 
When the Bush administration learned that the paper had decided to move ahead with the story, 
they gave the story to the Wall Street Journal in an effort to achieve more favorable coverage. 
The appointee indicated that the decision to give the story to the Journal was personally 
approved by President Bush, making it clear that it was not undertaken lightly.  
  I nevertheless considered the practice to be ethically questionable, since the Times had 
clearly invested significant staff time and expense in order to obtain the story. The story 
published by the Times indicated that they had interviewed “nearly twenty current and former 
government officials and industry executives.” (Lichtblau and Risen 2006). A subsequent letter 
by Times Managing Editor Bill Keller evinced the extent of the work the paper had invested in 
the piece, explaining that “our decision to publish the story of the Administration’s penetration 
of the international banking system followed weeks of discussion between Administration 
officials and The Times, not only the reporters who wrote the story but senior editors, including 
me. We listened patiently and attentively. We discussed the matter extensively within the paper. 
We spoke to others – national security experts not serving in the Administration – for their 
counsel.” Furthermore, Zarate, who served as deputy national security adviser during the 
incident, wrote that he believed that the Times “thought they had found another … program 
worthy of … perhaps another Pulitzer prize.” (2013, 272). Reporters build their careers and 
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media organizations earn their reputations and revenue in part through such enterprise 
journalism. In this sense, it appears unjust for appointees to take the work of one company and 
give it for free to another company which it prefers on a partisan basis – although in this case the 
Bush administration likely felt justified in undertaking such strong-arm tactics by their belief that 
the Times’ decision to publish the story was politically motivated and endangered the nation.  As 
previously discussed, more than one reporter indicated that government public affairs officials 
will do this. However, while I consider this tactic to generally be wrong, it does not fall under 
my definition of the permanent campaign. 
  In general, however, while many of the government officials indicated that they often 
released damaging information because they believed it was in the best interests of their offices 
to do so on their own terms, it was also clear that appointees sometimes withheld this 
information and hoped the media would not uncover it. Of course, since nearly all of the civil 
servants indicated they would either defer to Treasury public affairs appointees or release the 
information (with the exception of a single civil servant who would elevate the issue within his 
bureau, which has political leadership), it appeared that this practice of withholding damaging 
information was practiced mainly by appointees. To be sure, it is unsurprising that any individual 
or organization might not wish to proactively promote information that sullies their reputation. 
Indeed, what is perhaps most remarkable is the major proclivity of Treasury spokespeople to 
preemptively release such information. Nevertheless, the responses also offered some evidence 
of withholding by appointees – a central component of McClellan’s permanent campaign.       
 
Possible Causal Factors 
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As expected, there was little difference in the degree to which the appointees and civil servants 
engaged in the tactics of the permanent campaign (although appointees were significantly more 
likely to withhold information from the press). This section will next consider whether, as 
hypothesized, the reason that appointees did not engage in more permanent campaign tactics was 
because their large workloads precluded them from doing so. I then explore whether or not the 
government officials were motivated by the goal of the permanent campaign, which is to build 
support for the president. Finally, I will consider whether those officials who studied journalism 
in school were less willing to withhold or manipulate information requested by the press. 
 
I. Workloads 
  I next sought to determine whether the reason why appointees did not practice most 
permanent campaign tactics was because they lacked the time to do so. This data in this section, 
and the following section on how the officials allocated their time, was also considered as a 
possible causal factor for the relative efficacy of appointees and civil servants in chapter 4. I first 
asked the government officials whether their workloads were reasonable. Although I asked this 
as a serious question, many of the appointees responded by laughing, because the suggestion that 
their workload might be manageable was such an outlandish proposition for them.  
  As Obama Appointee 2 explained, “from the day you signed on, to the day you left, you 
were never not on the clock. Not to complain about it, because I enjoyed it, but it’s not 
reasonable, it’s not normal.” Obama Appointee 3 concurred, “I enjoyed it, but it was insane. 
Absolutely insane.” Sharing gossip about a senior administration communications official who 
he heard had just been quietly hospitalized, not for the first time, he argued, “it’s scary in this 
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administration. Scary.” He explained that he, too, was “totally frayed by the end … It’s hard to 
drink from a fire hose and learn at the same time. That I found the most difficult part.” Obama 
Appointee 5 explained that there were “times where it felt like I couldn’t breathe because I 
couldn’t figure out what to do next.” He explained that he would “work weekends, until the 
minute you close your eyes at night until you pick up your Blackberry at 6 a.m. and start” and 
that because such overtime was never compensated, the work was “half volunteer, but it does 
great things for our careers and its exciting work.” Obama Appointee 4 explained that his 
portfolio “was so broad that … there were all kinds of things that you could focus on, that 
oftentimes it was overwhelming.” 
 Bush Appointee 1 explained, “in government you worked your butt off all the time” and 
he was “crazy busy, but also look at what you are doing.” One Bush appointee also reported that 
he found his present, demanding position with a major Wall Street firm to be “normal” in 
comparison. Bush Appointee 2 compared his “normal workload” of twelve to thirteen hour days 
before the financial crisis favorably with his work during the crisis, because beforehand “it was 
nothing where I was going too out of my mind.” Bush Appointee 3 explained that “I loved the 
job … there’s very high expectations and you don’t really have an option, because you’re there 
to work your tail off.” Later, when I asked him whether he or his colleagues had ever attempted 
to tell untruths to make the president look good, he explained that he did not “have much time to 
think about [doing] that” in his job. 
  While the civil servants likewise generally described their jobs as demanding, it was 
evident that they were not working around the clock or finding their jobs to be “insane” or 
causing “scary” personal problems. Civil Servant 1 explained that he generally stopped checking 
his Blackberry at 7:00 pm on weeknights; Civil Servant 3 explained that he “probably put in nine 
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or ten hours a day, but I know there are public affairs people who work twelve hours a day; I’m 
just not willing to do that anymore.” Civil Servant 4 described his workload as “reasonable; it’s 
manageable;” Civil Servant 6 explained that his workload was reasonable because his policy 
portfolio was “pretty narrow” and therefore “I rarely work weekends or need to respond then … 
and I’m usually home by 6:30 or seven and rarely respond in the evening,” with no early 
mornings, either. Civil Servant 7 explained that “it’s a lot less intense of an environment here” 
than in his previous public affairs positions. 
 It seemed clear from these responses that civil servants were generally hardworking, but 
the workloads of appointees were of a very different order. Of course, appointees generally 
indicated that they loved and were happy to be doing their jobs; one appointee in particular who 
later went on to another post considered very enviable in his field described his time at Treasury 
as “one of the happiest times of my life.” Nevertheless, the responses of appointees made it clear 
that their workloads were, at least at times, unmanageable. As discussed in chapter 5, Obama 
Appointee 3 also indicated he did not have time to think, while Obama Appointee 5 described 
executing strategies requested by his superiors against his better judgment because, “in this job, 
you’re so exhausted and there’s so much to do, that you just want to move on.” (While 
proclaiming to work long hours is often a point of pride and even an assertion of one’s 
importance in Washington, D.C., the appointees often indicated that they found their workloads 
to be too large to reasonably manage – a claim which I would not expect to be driven by pride.) 
  To further investigate my hypothesis that the massive workloads of appointees precluded 
them from engaging in a permanent campaign, I next asked the government officials to estimate 
how they spent their time. 
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II. Time Spent Pitching, Responding, and Crafting Strategy 
  For insight into how they spent their time and another measure of the capacity of the 
individuals to engage in the proactive tactics of the permanent campaign, I asked the government 
officials how much of their time they spent pitching stories to reporters, how much time they 
spent responding to inquiries from reporters, and how much time they spent crafting and 
implementing strategies to attain desired coverage. (I indicated to my interview subjects that I 
did not necessarily expect their percentages to add up to one hundred, since I realized that they 
might also do other things with their time). 
 The average Obama appointee estimated that he spent just seventeen percent of his time 
pitching stories. While Bush Appointee 5 could not recall how much time he spent on any of 
these activities, the other Bush appointees estimated that they spent on average twenty-four 
percent of their time pitching stories to press, a number skewed upwards by one appointee whose 
policy portfolio was new and therefore indicated that he needed to spend more time pitching. 
Obama appointees on average reported spending fifty-three percent of their time responding to 
reporters’ inquiries and thirty-one percent of their time crafting strategies to achieve desired 
coverage. Bush appointees on average estimated that they spent 37.5 percent of their time 
responding to reporters and twenty-five percent of their time crafting and implementing strategy. 
Civil servants spent on average nine percent of their time pitching stories, twenty-eight percent 
of their time responding to media inquiries, and thirty percent of their time crafting and 
implementing strategy. These numbers are skewed downwards by a civil servant who had 
numerous other responsibilities and therefore spent only about eighteen percent of his time on 
media relations. (See chapter 4, table 1). 
  As previously discussed, Obama Appointee 4 explained that his portfolio “was so broad 
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that … there were all kinds of things that you could focus on, that oftentimes it was 
overwhelming, plus we rarely even got to do any of the proactive stuff on this because so much 
of what I dealt with was incoming questions from reporters.” Obama Appointee 5 concurred that 
“this is probably a shortfall of the department – there was very little time spent thinking about 
proactive stories.” He explained that “we don’t have resources to be creative. We don’t have 
time to talk about things different from what’s happening during the day. There’s a job to do, it’s 
a terribly difficult one; you just have to focus on doing it and not screwing up. There’s no time to 
do anything else and no resources.” Obama Appointee 1 also indicated that “we didn’t do enough 
pitching,” while Obama Appointee 2 explained, “a lot of it was so reactive … there’s just so 
much incoming” and Obama Appointee 3 explained, “I played a lot of defense.”    
  Bush Appointee 1 likewise explained that “you want to say [that] being proactive is 
ninety percent of the job, but it isn’t. You’re trying to keep your head above water in that job. 
You just have very little time in the day left to say, ‘let’s get proactive, who should we call?’ At 
the end of the day, it’s what you have the least time for.” 
 Civil Servant 1 explained that he did almost no pitching because every time he suggested 
it, the idea was shot down by his civil service superiors; “it may be a civil service mentality, they 
don’t feel like we want to push anything, we’re happy to respond but don’t see that as our job to 
push an issue.” He did indicate, however, that Treasury appointees made major announcements 
on behalf of his bureau and that they sometimes utilized outside contractors for promotional 
purposes, who pitched stories. The actual strategy he described using when his agency did pitch 
stories, however, was particularly sophisticated. He explained that he used a platform which 
employs Boolean logic to target reporters across the nation who have previously reported on 
similar topics and therefore might be most interested in writing about his programs. 
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  In sum, appointees claim to have spent, very roughly, 45.25 percent of their time 
responding to reporters. This still seemingly left the majority of their time to act proactively. 
They spent 20.5 percent of their time pitching stories and twenty-eight percent of their time 
pursuing proactive strategies, seemingly leaving time for them to engage in permanent campaign 
tactics. By contrast, despite their more manageable workloads, civil servants spent less time 
responding to media inquiries (twenty-eight percent of their time) and significantly less time 
pitching (just nine percent of their time), however they spent slightly more of their time crafting 
and implementing strategy (thirty percent of their time). Of course, these estimates are rough; 
nevertheless, despite the at times “overwhelming” amount of work appointees faced, it appears 
that opportunities nevertheless remained to implement the permanent campaign. Therefore, my 
hypothesis that the massive workloads of appointees precluded them from engaging in a 
permanent campaign was not proven. 
 
III. End Goals of their Work 
  To assess their motivations and to what degree they were focused on the goal of the 
permanent campaign, which is to build public support for the president, I first asked the 
appointees and civil servants to describe the ultimate goals of their work and what they were 
trying to achieve each day. Both the Obama and Bush appointees were clear that key goals were 
to inform the people about their work and to promote the work of the administration for which 
they served, while civil servants generally reported that they informed the people and promoted 
the bureaus for which they served. 
 Obama Appointee 1 explained that his goal was “making sure the public was informed 
about the work of the agency but also advancing the administration and president I believed in.” 
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For Obama Appointee 2, “the ultimate goals were definitely to preserve a favorable opinion on 
what we were doing – to communicate but to do it in a favorable way.” Obama Appointee 4 said 
“the ultimate goal was twofold, especially given the time period … First, to defend the 
administration’s response to the Great Recession and, second, to show how the administration’s 
economic policies were best for our economy and our nation.” Obama Appointee 5 explained 
that he pursued twin goals of “trying to explain in plain English” what the Treasury was doing 
and “to dispel all the myths, rumors and misinformation out there on a lot of the initiatives.” 
  However, later in our conversation, Obama Appointee 5 explained that “there is no 
sophistication, no targeting, no message testing, but in the end, your goal is to not fuck up. There 
were times we could see the splash ad in the re-elect [campaign] and that was something we 
were very conscious of avoiding: could this have a negative impact in the next campaign? 
Everyone just wants to avoid that and Republicans want to find it. Civil servants have never 
thought that way, but no appointee didn’t think a number of times, ‘is this going to be used 
against the president?’” 
  The responses of the Bush appointees were very similar. Bush Appointee 1 explained that 
his goals were to “educate, inform, and support the administration.” Bush Appointee 4 explained 
that “I thought about just faithfully representing the views of the administration. That was really 
important. The second part, really … is education. I always thought we had an obligation to try 
to educate, [but] if I’m being honest, one came first, [and] education second, but it was really 
important.” 
  Civil servants, by contrast, described their goals as being to inform the people and, often, 
to present their bureaus favorably. Civil Servant 1 explained that his job was to explain “here’s 
what we do, here’s why we do it.” While he explained that “the big thing, ideally [what] I want 
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people to understand [is] what we do,” he added that he also had a “wish list: I would really like 
people to understand the commitment in my organization to good government, to trying to do the 
best they can all the time, finding better ways to do things. In the civil service, there are so many 
people committed to doing things better, regardless of political leanings.” Later in our 
conversation, he explained that “I don’t think, for me, it’s ever appropriate to try to help or hurt 
an administration.”  
  Civil Servant 2 explained that his ultimate goal was to help people understand the work 
his bureau was doing, but “underneath that would be the message” about why his work was the 
right thing to do. Civil Servant 4 explained his end goals as “very bland: to educate and inform 
about the agency’s mission and activities.” Civil Servant 6 indicated “we’re trying to make sure 
that my agency is represented fairly, perceived fairly, and the work it does on behalf of the 
American people is recognized in a positive way.”  
  In this sense, like the political appointees, the civil servants were not only attempting to 
inform the American people about their work, but also to convince them why their work made 
sense and to build support for the government. The only difference, then, was that civil servants 
were trying to burnish the images of their bureaus, while appointees focused on the president and 
the administration’s partisan goals. Nevertheless, because the president is responsible for the 
functioning of the entire government, the efforts of civil servants to promote the good work of 
their bureaus clearly stood to ultimately redound to the chief executive’s benefit. Ultimately, 
however, it appeared from these responses that appointees, but not civil servants, shared the goal 
of the permanent campaign: building public support for the president, despite the fact that they 
did not largely avail themselves of permanent campaign tactics. 
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IV. Building Support for the President 
  To understand the motivations of both groups more deeply, and how they related to the 
goal of the permanent campaign, I followed up on the above question by asking outright, “in 
doing your job, to what degree is your end goal to build public support for the president?” 
  Obama Appointee 1 described it as “fifty-fifty of advancing the president versus keeping 
the public informed about the agency’s operations.” Obama Appointee 2 said building support 
for the president was “definitely at the heart of the end goal. At the end of the day he is the big 
boss, so of course that’s part of my role. The steps would be to do my job and make sure I’m 
getting as much positive coverage as possible, dealing with the negative stories, trying to 
mitigate the potential for those to have a bad impact.” Obama Appointee 4 explained that “a lot 
of the work we did was to try to show how dumb the [Republican presidential candidate Mitt] 
Romney” economic proposals were.  
  Bush Appointee 2 explained, “absolutely, if you are part of an administration and 
especially a major cabinet agency, you’re always responsible for forwarding the president’s 
agenda, and so my role would be to not only explain the administration’s position, but also to get 
down to the level where reporters, whether they agreed with a position or not, understood where 
we were coming from.” For Bush Appointee 4, “I thought the best way to earn support for the 
president was to earn support for his policies, so I thought about the policies, I was a true 
believer on the policies, and if we could really just sell them on the policies, some of that would 
accrue to the president.” Bush Appointee 3 explained that “I think, yeah, everything we did, in a 
small part of everything was, ‘is this going to reflect poorly on the president’s administration or 
not?’” The exception was Bush Appointee 5, who indicated that he could not remember. 
 Obama Appointee 5 was the only appointee to respond that he did not “feel like any of 
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the goal was to build public support for the president, because I think that’s up to Organizing for 
America and the political arms of the organization. I think the job was more to make sure the 
public knew what the president was working on and the secretary, why they made this decision 
based on how it would impact lives, and to help them understand, especially given how complex 
the issues were that we talk about. If this doesn’t happen, the interest rate on your car could go 
up.” Here, however, the difference appeared to be semantic, since, as Bush Appointee 4 
explained, it is reasonable to assume that building support for the president’s policies should 
ultimately result in increased support for the president. 
  By contrast, almost all of the civil servants indicated that building support for the 
president was not their goal. In the words of Civil Servant 4, “that’s not a factor;” in the words of 
Civil Servant 5, “Lordy, thank God” that is not part of the job description. Civil Servant 7 
explained, “you know, I’ve never even thought of it that way. What we do is so apolitical,” while 
Civil Servant 3 explained that the work of his bureau is “essential to just the good functioning of 
government” and “we have to do [the bureau’s work] whether there’s a Democratic or 
Republican administration.” Civil Servant 1 indicated, “whether under Obama or Bush, I never 
felt like my job was to build support for the president or even to build support for the 
government as much as, ‘here’s the organization I work for and here’s the work we do. You may 
have heard rumors, but here’s how we do it.’ If people saw the inner workings, I believe what 
they’d see is a lot of reasonable people trying hard to do a good job.” 
  Nevertheless, several civil servants evinced an awareness of political realities and two 
explained explicitly that they try to support administration priorities. Civil Servant 2 explained 
that he is responsible for “developing flexible talking points that are true and real but can be 
utilized with whatever political perspective we’re dealing with.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6 
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explained: 
 
  I understand how it works, where the bureaus feed into Treasury, which feeds into the  
  White House … We’re certainly trying to keep up to date and stay aware of the  
  administration’s policies and … support their priorities where we can. Treasury has this  
  weekly report … and it’s a ‘what have you done for us lately’ report, and one of the  
  things in there is presidential and administration priorities, and we don’t often have  
  anything to include on that, only because it’s often the Affordable Care Act or something  
  we don’t have anything to do with, but we remain cognizant of the administration  
  policies and try to support them when we can. We’re happy to. It’s good for the agency  
  when we can produce something for the administration. 
 
Likewise, Civil Servant 5 explained that he did defend Obama’s policies: “I explained 
them, I knew that was the job I was being asked to do,” though he indicated that his role was 
unique and most civil servants were not asked to defend administration policies. Nevertheless, he 
argued, “there are smart civil servants at every agency who know that’s an expectation of them if 
they’re dealing with the outside world and wouldn’t be speaking publicly unless they were doing 
that, and if for any reason they went off message, it’s been my experience they will no longer be 
allowed to speak publicly.”  
  Thus, somewhat surprisingly, several of the purportedly apolitical civil servants 
explained that they were aware of and attempted to contribute to the administration’s political 
goals – a further indication of their loyalty to the chief executive. It likewise seemed clear from 
these responses that appointees were motivated by the goals of the permanent campaign, despite 
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the fact that they did not largely engage in the tactics of a permanent campaign.  
 
V. Study of Journalism 
   I had hypothesized that those government officials who studied journalism would be less 
willing to withhold or distort information because of the values they acquired during the course 
of their journalism training. Five of the seventeen government officials studied journalism as a 
major or minor at the undergraduate or graduate level. However, I did not find the practices of 
these officials, as a group, to differ significantly from those of their appointee or careerist 
counterparts who did not study journalism, and therefore concluded that this hypothesis could 
not be supported. 
 
Differences Between Obama and Bush Administration Tactics 
 As discussed in chapter 4, reporters overwhelmingly indicated that Obama appointees 
were significantly less forthcoming with information than the Bush appointees. I therefore 
investigated whether there were differences in the practice of a permanent campaign between the 
two administrations by asking many of my interview subjects what they thought accounted for 
this difference. 
  Reporters offered a variety of explanations for why this might be the case. Reporter 1, a 
veteran Treasury reporter, had an interesting hypothesis that reporters actually have an easier 
relationship with Republican administrations than with Democratic administrations, because 
Republicans perceive a liberal media bias: 
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 With a Republican administration, there’s a sort of understood adversarial relationship; 
 sometimes with the Democratic administrations, we [would] get the feeling that they  
  want us to give their side and they don’t want to argue with us, they just want to tell us.  
  It’s easier to clarify a position by arguing it; a reporter is just naturally adversarial. We  
  sometimes felt Democratic administrations didn’t understand the value in an adversarial  
  position as did the Republican administrations, and therefore it took longer and was  
  sometimes more contentious to sort out and get a full understanding of any issue. 
   
 Reporter 7 concurred that “in some ways, Republicans on a superficial level play the 
press game a bit better … Which is odd, given the fake belief that the media has a liberal bias. 
Maybe it’s compensation for that, or something.” 
 Reporter 4, who worked for a media outlet popularly perceived as liberal, agreed with the 
hypothesis that the adversity Republicans assumed they would face from a more liberal press 
actually resulted in better relationships with members of the media: 
 
  Republican administrations tend to view the media as more adversarial from the outset  
  and to treat it – to have a more formal relationship with it … Democrats tend to regard  
  the media as friendly, or think it ought to be friendly, and to respond with disappointment  
  and anger when it behaves otherwise. They like the idea and hate the reality of the media  
  with more intensity than Republican administrations. Republican appointees tend to have  
  a transactional relationship with the media … They believe you are not on their side and  
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  aren’t therefore as angry when you are not on their side. The emotional content of the    
  relationship is much lower with Republican administrations. There is less expectation,  
  less disappointment, less emotional volatility in the relationship. They understand each  
  other in a way more accurately. … Republicans don’t expect to have that relationship as a  
  potential ally, so to the extent we’re less adversarial than they expect, that works to our  
  advantage, whereas with a Democratic administration we were inevitably a  
  disappointment, because there’s that expectation of shared sympathies, goals, and  
  worldview, but the realization that the media has different goals tends to come as a  
  perpetual shock. 
  
Of course, another possibility not mentioned by the reporters is that, if it is indeed true 
that the media has a liberal bias, the reporters themselves were predisposed to like the Obama 
administration, and therefore were more surprised and angered when the Obama appointees 
withheld information than they would have been with a conservative administration which they 
might expect from the outset to be secretive. This might cause the reporters’ criticisms of the 
Obama administration to be exaggerated. 
  Interestingly, Reporter 2, who worked for a media organization popularly perceived as 
conservative, was especially critical of the Bush appointees. He believed that higher-level Bush 
appointees (who did not work in public affairs) “were more frequently interested in spinning and 
shading the truth than the Obama officials” and their spokespeople would convey these points on 
behalf of their principals and also provide more opportunities for their principals to make their 
cases directly to reporters. Reporter 2 suggested that Republican operatives may have worked 
harder to influence the press because they were “trained with the idea of media bias early on” 
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and felt that they needed to try especially hard to overcome it. For Reporter 2, this was not a 
good thing. He speculated about whether the Bush administration was “so good at spinning, even 
on financial and economic issues, that they prevented bad coverage even when the economy was 
turning and looking bad,” which caused the media to fail to report earlier warning signs of the 
impending 2008 financial crisis. When asked about Bush Appointee 1’s characterization of the 
last two years of President Bush’s second term as a period when the administration faced major 
hostility from the press, Reporter 2 suggested that the administration might have brought it on 
themselves, and it might have reflected backlash from the administration’s earlier excessive spin. 
Reporter 2 indicated that he had not perceived differences in the level of sophistication 
with which Democrats and Republicans approached the press in covering politics outside of the 
presidency and therefore suggested that the differences between the two administrations might 
just reflect an “administration-wide cultural approach to not risking information getting out, not 
volunteering information” in the Obama administration. Reporter 7 likewise described the 
Obama administration as having “a very tightly controlled messaging machine, where there are 
not as many people as …. in the Bush administration … empowered to provide actual 
information.”  
  This argument was also recently made in an influential Politico article which alleged that 
“conservatives assume a cozy relationship between this White House and the reporters who 
cover it. Wrong. Many reporters find Obama himself strangely fearful of talking with them and 
often aloof and cocky when he does. They find his staff needlessly stingy with information and 
thin-skinned about any tough coverage. He gets more-favorable-than-not coverage because many 
staffers are fearful of talking to reporters, even anonymously, and some reporters inevitably 
worry access or the chance of a presidential interview will decrease if they get in the face of this 
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White House.” (Vandehei and Allen 2013).  
 As discussed in chapter 2, the Obama administration has also been accused by the press 
of being particularly secretive. In 2013, the administration set a record in citing national security 
concerns to withhold information from the public 8,496 times (Nicks 2014). The use of this tool, 
along with the administration’s pursuit of investigations of the identities of leakers, also led New 
York Times editor Jill Abramson to call the Obama administration “the most secretive White 
House that I have ever been involved in covering” and former Washington Post editor Leonard 
Downie Jr. to describe the administration as the “most secretive and restrictive” administration 
since Nixon. (Mirkinson 2014; Dodson 2014). 
  However, the evidence considered in chapter 2 – including the admissions of President 
Bush’s own press secretary – make it difficult to argue that the withholding of information is 
confined to the Obama White House. Indeed, Reporter 5 – a veteran of the Treasury press corps 
–  concurred with Reporters 2 and 7, arguing that “the biggest problem now is that the Treasury 
PR strategy is not run by the Treasury, it’s run by the White House and that just adds another 
layer and slows down responses to issues oftentimes,” however he indicated that this was not 
unique to the Obama administration; “it’s [been happening in] administrations for a long time.” 
  What may, in fact, be new in the Obama administration is a strategy described by Politico 
in which “the president has shut down interviews with many of the White House reporters who 
know the most and ask the toughest questions. Instead, he spends way more time talking directly 
to voters via friendly shows and media personalities. Why bother with The New York Times beat 
reporter when Obama can go on ‘The View’?” Jim Vandehei and Mike Allen argued that new 
media and technology has given the Obama administration more options for bypassing the 
traditional media, while decreased media budgets have given the mainstream pressed decreased 
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bargaining power vis-à-vis the administration (ibid.) However, this does not appear to be a 
plausible explanation in the case of the Treasury Department. While the Treasury does utilize a 
robust blog to promulgate its views, the financial beat reporters and press still remain the 
Treasury’s main vehicle for sharing its news; The View and late-night comedy shows might be 
useful in helping the president reach the American people, but they are simply unlikely to cover 
the minutiae of economic and financial policy. 
  Reporter 5 had an alternate hypothesis, however, suggesting that the different 
relationships the administrations enjoyed with the press resulted heavily from the levels of 
experience of their spokespeople, as opposed to differences in partisan approaches to the press. 
He indicated that there were particularly strong spokespeople who had served in both 
administrations who had previously served as journalists, and therefore understood what 
reporters needed in order to do their jobs. With the exception of during the financial crisis, in 
which he found Bush spokespeople to be at the top of their game because “they had to be” given 
the gravity of the situation, he did not see overall differences in the sophistication of the Obama 
and Bush appointees. He found the idea that the Bush administration’s sophisticated spin could 
have precluded reporters from recognizing the impending 2008 financial crisis as laughable, 
arguing that “it was not an event that anybody was seeing … none of us working today had 
covered the 1929 crash, so we hadn’t experienced the tidal wave that was about to hit us.” 
  One Bush appointee was adamant that, as Reporters 2 and 7 suspected, Republican 
political operatives work harder to influence the press because they perceive themselves to have 
a disadvantage. The appointee argued that being a Republican is “like being a woman. You have 
to work twice as hard being a Republican, because there’s already a prevailing narrative … so 
we try to overcompensate.” This appointee believed that the impact of such Republican efforts 
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was ultimately limited, however, because “they’re still gonna prefer Dems at the end of the day.” 
However, the appointee indicated that Bush appointees were extremely social with the press, 
indicating that “we had a lot of fun with them. We had our own DMZ [de-militarized zone] … 
where we could hang out. That was us helping them help us.” 
  Another Bush appointee agreed with the assertion that Republican press aides work 
harder to influence the press, arguing that “whether it’s actual or perceived bias, we always try to 
work harder because we thought that we had to explain [our] policy positions.” He also 
acknowledged that President Bush’s “popularity was not that high and didn’t provide enough 
political capital to get things done. When an administration’s unpopular, you have to end up 
working harder to get things done.” 
  Civil Servant 5, who served under both the Bush and Obama administrations, clarified 
that part of the differential might be explained by his belief that the Bush administration had 
sharper policy positions to communicate in the first place. He argued that “part of it [is] that this 
administration hasn’t been as clear on what they want to achieve under cornerstone legislation 
like [the] Dodd-Frank [Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.] It has taken a long 
time to roll out regulations and move on housing finance reform, so [the administration] doesn’t 
know what [they] want to say.” He argued that this caused administration officials to attempt to 
avoid the press altogether, explaining that a Wall Street Journal editor who had been trying to 
reach the White House called him at one point and said “you’re the only person who will pick up 
the phone and talk to me.” 
  Of course, one possible problem with the argument that the Bush appointees were 
fighting an uphill battle in the press is the fact that their economic views were actually broadly 
popular. Gallup polls from 2001, when President Bush took office, through 2013, show that 
304 
 
Americans have always been much more likely to describe their views on economic issues as 
conservative than as moderate or liberal. In 2013, forty-one percent of Americans described their 
economic views as conservative – a record low for this time period which was still significantly 
above the thirty-seven percent of Americans who described their economic views as moderate 
and the nineteen percent of Americans who described their economic views as liberal (Dugan 
2013). This likely made it easier for the Bush appointees to sell their views, though of course this 
advantage would have been diminished if the reporters who were their interlocutors themselves 
had more liberal views – a question which is outside the scope of this project. 
  Bush Appointee 4, however, disagreed with the contention that Republicans work harder 
to overcome a liberal media bias, describing the idea as “bullshit.” He argued that the differences 
in access and reporter satisfaction between the two administrations were likely attributable to 
“differences in talent at the top,” indicating that he understood that Stephanie Cutter, who 
initially oversaw Treasury public affairs before moving to the White House and later serving as 
Deputy Campaign Manager on Obama’s 2012 re-election campaign, initially alienated reporters 
(a complaint also made by Reporter 4) whereas the previous top Treasury public affairs officials 
under the Bush administration possessed serious economic credentials. This of course echoed 
Reporter 5’s explanation for the differential.  
  However, Civil Servant 5, who, as noted, worked with Treasury spokespeople in both 
administrations, perceived an overall experience gap between the Bush and Obama White 
Houses. He noted that he was a Democrat and was therefore dismayed to observe that Obama 
“got the Millennial crowd all jazzed up [during his election campaign] and then … hired them!” 
By contrast, he reported that Bush White House appointees tended to have experience in 
previous administrations. Civil Servant 5 found this differential to be the case at the level of 
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Treasury spokespeople as well, reporting in an observation resonant of Heclo that “the Obama 
people were cycling in very quickly, and I was surprised how people were assigned beats 
randomly, and didn’t come in with experience on the issue, and left so soon that even after they 
learned, they would be gone. I never felt that way dealing with Bush spokespeople.” 
  In sum, there are a variety of possible explanations for the complaints of reporters that the 
Bush Treasury was more open than the Obama Treasury. For starters, as discussed in chapter 4, 
these complaints need to be approached with some degree of skepticism. As Obama Appointee 5 
explained, “reporters will always say you’re not doing a good enough job so you will do more 
for them. There’s a certain level of almost manipulation that has to happen in these transactional 
relationships and we need to protect and advocate for our principals. They’re never going to 
think it’s all done great. … If they weren’t saying you’re doing a bad job, then reporters would 
be doing a bad job.” 
  A different appointee, for example, described an “ongoing battle” in which reporters 
wanted to be given advance warning of upcoming Treasury designations freezing the assets of 
individuals with links to terrorist activities. Of course, such information was classified prior to 
release; the appointee explained to me that he could have been subject to jail time if he had 
acquiesced to the requests of the press. Furthermore, if an individual were to receive advance 
warning of a designation, he or she could pull their assets before banks were notified of the 
designation – indicating the sheer unreasonableness of reporters in this instance, and the degree 
to which the media will advocate for greater access even when the government has highly 
legitimate reasons for withholding information.    
  However, the alleged differential between the two administrations was so widely 
described that it nevertheless is likely to have some degree of merit. It may be true that some 
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Republican press operatives perceive themselves to have a disadvantage that compels them to 
work harder to explain themselves. Nevertheless, to the degree that the greater access they 
provide actually simply represents greater attempts to spin the press and shade the truth, as 
Reporter 2, who worked for an outlet popularly perceived to be conservative, alleged, it is 
unclear that this difference redounds to the benefit of the American people. 
  Another possibility is that the Bush Treasury spokespeople were simply better than the 
Obama spokespeople. For example, it is true that the top Treasury public affairs officials during 
the Bush administration, Michele Davis and Tony Fratto, both had academic backgrounds in 
economics, unlike their counterparts in the Obama administration. Additionally, the Bush 
appointees interviewed for this project had slightly longer tenures and previous experience than 
their Obama administration counterparts, although this finding is also reflective of the fact that 
two of the Bush appointees later served in higher-level Treasury public affairs posts. On the 
other hand, the Bush administration had been in office for seven years before the 2008 financial 
crisis, allowing time for their Treasury spokespeople to learn the ropes of their jobs under more 
pacific circumstances, while the Obama spokespeople inherited a global economic crisis with no 
modern precedent and its aftereffects – circumstances which can only have made it more difficult 
for them to master their jobs.  
  The fragility of the U.S. and global economy during the period in which the Obama 
appointees is another possible explanation for any differential that may have existed in the level 
of access afforded to the press under both administrations. As Obama Appointee 5 explained, “in 
government, there’s no reason to be cavalier.” The Treasury is generally considered to be one of 
the more conservative press shops in Washington; amidst a still shaky economic recovery, and 
with knowledge that a single statement (even if accurate) could hurt that recovery by tanking 
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markets and damaging confidence (as they had all seen occur during Geithner’s 2009 speech, 
discussed in chapter 3) it seems unsurprising that the Obama appointees would exercise caution 
in their work. (Though, as discussed, the Obama administration has used national security 
concerns to withhold a record amount of information – suggesting that the practice of 
withholding is not unique to the Treasury Department – the fragility of the economy could 
account for why the Obama appointees were overall less forthcoming in their interactions with 
reporters. The level of access afforded reporters by Obama appointees in other agencies falls 
outside the scope of this study.) 
 Of course, the answer to whether this served the interests of the American people is 
mixed. Releasing information with caution in order to avoid roiling markets is good for the 
people; withholding information for partisan purposes or failing to highlight threats to economic 
stability is bad. To be sure, there is a strong precedent in American history for presidents of the 
United States to restrict the rights of citizens in times of emergency. This has especially been the 
case during times of war; President Lincoln set the precedent for this by beginning the Civil War 
without Congressional authorization, expanding the Army and Navy, suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus, and declaring martial law in parts of the country. In his 1864 letter to Albert G. 
Hodges, Lincoln argued that “measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by 
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the 
nation.” It is arguably the case that the preservation of the nation in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis required the Treasury to take measures to stabilize our financial system. 
 There is also certainly precedent for the expansion of presidential power during economic 
crises. In response to World War I, for example, President Wilson expanded his control over the 
economy by fixing prices and regulating industries. However, this study suggests that the 
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Treasury may have expanded its power in response to the 2008 financial crisis in part by being 
less transparent with the press. While many scholars have charged the government with over-
classifying information, particularly during times of emergency, the withholding of non-
classified information for the protection of the country has not previously been identified or 
discussed in the literature (Herman 2004). My findings suggest that, during times of crisis, 
government agencies may respond in part by being less open with the press – a proposition that 
should be tested with additional case studies. Of course, there will always be the potential for 
abuse in such circumstances, raising important questions about government accountability during 
times of crisis. As David Pozen has written, “state secrecy can deny citizens the ability to 
exercise their rights and liberties, to be free from the unjust and coercive exercise of power, and 
to understand the world around them. It threatens the project of collective self-determination.”  
(2010, 286). 
  Ultimately, the question of whether there are broader partisan differences in press tactics 
would also require additional evidence outside of the scope of this project, including data from 
other Democratic and Republican administrations. Nevertheless, it is a question worthy of future 
research, to which the findings of this project could contribute. 
 
Conclusions and Analysis 
  This project investigated the question of whether appointees or civil servants better serve 
the interests of the American people in Treasury public affairs positions, by considering whether 
either group was conducting a permanent partisan campaign. The evidence is unmistakable that 
civil servants better serve the interests of the American people because, while they appreciate 
that it is sometimes legitimate to withhold information, they are significantly more inclined to 
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provide information to the press. By contrast, some appointees expressed a belief in their 
prerogative to withhold any information that did not make the president look good. Perhaps most 
shocking and disheartening about these findings was that reporters themselves generally 
appeared to accept that appointees were within their rights to do so.  
  While the “right to withhold” asserted by appointees was perhaps the most disturbing 
finding of this study, in keeping with my hypothesis, it nevertheless does not appear that 
government officials in the Treasury are largely conducting a permanent campaign. In chapter 3, 
however, I hypothesized that the large volume of responsibilities of appointees would be found 
to preclude them from engaging in the more sophisticated techniques of the permanent campaign 
– providing a rather extraordinary mechanism of democratic protection. While I discovered that 
the workloads of the appointees I studied did, in fact, inhibit their ability to engage in proactive 
tactics, they nevertheless did find a significant amount of time to pitch stories and to craft and 
implement strategies to attain their desired levels of coverage. The tactics they utilized in 
undertaking this work, however, did not include elements of the permanent campaign.  
  Furthermore, it did not appear from their responses that the reason that appointees did not 
appeal to the emotions of the American people in their messages or use public opinion polling 
was because they lacked the time to do so. They simply did not appear to believe that such 
tactics would be helpful or appropriate, because they advocated policies crafted by policy experts 
even when, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, they were unpopular. 
Appealing to emotions appeared to happen in the context of attempting to explain policies to the 
average person – and not in an effort to stimulate the unthinking, irrational support for the 
president described by Blumenthal. They declined to make emotional appeals even when it 
arguably could have been effective for them to do so, in order to respond to allegations, for 
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example, that the administration was bailing out banks but not ordinary citizens in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis. 
  I further hypothesized that those government officials who studied journalism would be 
unwilling to withhold or distort information because of the values imbued during the course of 
their education. Five of the seventeen government officials studied journalism as a major or 
minor at the undergraduate or graduate level. (In order to protect their identities, I will not break 
down whether they were appointees or civil servants). However, I did not find the views of these 
officials, as a group, to differ significantly from those of their appointee or careerist counterparts. 
Thus, this hypothesis was not supported, although the sample was certainly small.   
  Finally, I had hypothesized that the government officials would report that attempts to 
convey mistruths would be counterproductive. Indeed, the officials all reported that they 
eschewed lying, and often reported that it was likely that such untruths would be uncovered. 
While the appointees were willing to withhold information, they were unwilling to convey 
outright mistruths.  
  My results indicated that appointees, but not civil servants, were clearly motivated by the 
goals of the permanent campaign: to build support for the president. They considered doing so to 
be a legitimate end of their work. Both groups also had the opportunity to engage in permanent 
campaign tactics, since they spent a significant percentage of their time crafting and 
implementing strategies in order to achieve their desired media coverage. However, the 
appointees nevertheless did not largely engage in the tactics of the permanent campaign, with the 
exception of withholding information. 
  Neither appointees nor civil servants appeared to be devoting excessive resources to 
burning the images of top officials, or to be engaging in other unexpected or diabolical public 
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relations tactics. While the appointees, in particular, may have carried out their work in a 
sophisticated manner, the specific techniques they reported using have long been common 
among public relations professionals. Likewise, when they crafted narratives, the appointees 
generally (though not always) described building their cases based upon facts.  
  In a particularly surprising finding, two of the key tools alleged by Blumenthal and Heclo 
to be utilized by appointees for partisan advantage – public opinion polls and appeals to the 
emotions of the citizenry – were widely eschewed by appointees, but utilized by civil servants in 
an effort to communicate generally non-partisan information to the American people 
efficaciously. By contrast, the appointees had never utilized public opinion polls and did not 
appear to believe that they would be helpful to their work. Although the appointees were aware 
of public opinion through reading reports of polls in the media, various appointees explained that 
such activity was the provenance of the White House, that their programs were designed with the 
aims of good policy, and that, in any event, the issues they worked on were too complex to take 
the opinions of the American people as a whole into account. When appointees did attempt to 
play to the emotions of the American people, they reported that they did so in an effort to explain 
complex policies in terms an ordinary person could understand. While support for a president’s 
policies may ultimately result in support for the president, the appointees’ descriptions of the 
cases in which they appealed to emotions differed in kind from the descriptions by Blumenthal 
of political operatives attempting to bypass the reason of the American people in order to gain 
partisan advantage. 
  They key area in which it is possible that a permanent campaign is being conducted is in 
the withholding of information requested by reporters. Appointees frequently reported that they 
liberally withheld information requested by the media, for purposes which did not appear to fit 
312 
 
into categories of legitimate reasons, such as protecting the market or national security. Some 
appointees suggested that they withheld any information which did not reflect favorably on the 
president. Remarkably, reporters seemed to accept this state of affairs as merely frustrating – not 
as illegitimate. This suggested that appointees could potentially be withholding an enormous 
volume of information from the American people – a prospect which cries out for further 
research. Ultimately, however, the question of whether the Bush and Obama appointees withheld 
more information than previous Treasury spokespeople falls outside of the gamut of this study.  
  While the evidence regarding the withholding of information was stark, this study also 
uncovered more limited evidence that appointees may also be lying. While the subjects of my 
interviews reported that they had never personally done so, both Obama and Bush appointees 
indicated that other appointees within their administrations had conveyed untruths. Furthermore, 
a majority of reporters believed that Treasury public affairs officials were guilty of lying to them. 
  Finally, I considered whether there are partisan differences in the use of permanent 
campaign tactics, because the reporters had overwhelmingly indicated that the Obama appointees 
provided less information and more restricted access than the Bush appointees. Although I 
suspect that the differential may reflect the fact that the Obama appointees operated in the 
context of a significantly more fragile economic environment than the Bush appointees had for 
the majority of their tenure, it is possible that there were also differences in the skill sets of the 
Bush and Obama appointees. Another possibility, which is also ripe for future research, is that 
some Republican press operatives work harder to achieve positive media coverage and make 
greater attempts to explain their positions to reporters than Democratic press operatives. Both 
groups may perceive the media to have a liberal media bias, which may cause Republican 
operatives to exert greater efforts to overcome this handicap and cause Democratic operatives to 
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underestimate the degree to which they need to provide information and access to reporters, and 
even spar with members of the press. While such a question could only be studied in the context 
of several administrations, it was nevertheless clear from my own interviews that the Bush 
appointees placed greater emphasis on building relationships with and explaining themselves to 
the reporters with whom they worked than the Obama appointees. The reporters whom I 
interviewed also vehemently proclaimed this to be the case. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications 
 This study set out to answer two questions: Do political appointees or civil servants serve 
as more effective advocates for the president of the United States? And how do these officials 
serve the interests of the American people? 
  This chapter will first summarize my results. I will then assess the accuracy and validity 
of my results. Next, I will consider how representative the results likely are of government 
officials in other positions and agencies, and offer suggestions for future research. I will then 
discuss the contributions this research makes to the literature. Finally, I will assess the 
implications of the results for presidential staffing decisions. 
Summary of Results: Efficacy 
  The findings suggest that civil servants are more effective in advancing an 
administration’s arguments in the press than their appointee counterparts. My results indicate 
that, as is to be expected, civil servants have an effectiveness advantage in their significantly 
greater knowledge of their policy portfolios. It is of course vital for a public affairs officer to 
understand the policy they are communicating in order to effectively advance and rebut 
arguments. Also especially critically, civil servants enjoy greater credibility with reporters, who 
indicate that they approach the claims of civil servants with less skepticism than those of 
appointees.  
  On the other hand, appointees appear to be more effective in reversing the course of 
potentially negative press coverage, because both they themselves and reporters indicate that 
they more aggressively attempt to counter claims with which they disagree, while reporters 
indicate that they are open to such arguments and that this behavior does not generally poison 
their relationships or future coverage. Additionally, appointees appear to be somewhat faster at 
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responding to reporters; have somewhat greater access to key principals; and have somewhat of 
an advantage in shaping media coverage simply by virtue of the fact that they make more 
strenuous efforts to do so. (Of course, appointees may have worked harder overall to overcome 
their lack of prior knowledge, but this could not account for their greater efforts to actively shape 
media coverage).  
  However, the effectiveness advantage these factors give them is diminished by the fact 
that the information they provide is often unhelpful; they often withhold information to which 
they have access; and reporters view their claims skeptically. The latter finding is a particularly 
devastating handicap. While reporters must recognize that all of their sources have biases and 
information in the interests they provide, reporters were adamant that they view appointees to be 
particularly biased, and therefore lacking in credibility. This suggests that civil servants enjoy a 
major efficacy advantage in their ability to convey information with credibility in the media. 
  To be sure, reporters also perceived civil servants to be generally unsophisticated; they 
indicated that civil servants made few efforts to pitch stories and were not skilled in making 
persuasive arguments. However, other evidence uncovered in this study suggests that reporters 
may have underestimated the level of sophistication of civil servants, perhaps confounding it 
with the careerists’ lack of overt political goals. For example, civil servants described engaging 
in two tactics which require a particularly high degree of savvy – utilizing public opinion polls 
and appealing to the emotions of the American people – with greater frequency than appointees. 
Of course, appointees may have eschewed such tactics because they believed that they would be 
seen as inappropriate attempts to achieve partisan gain, and therefore this measure does not 
suggest that civil servants are more sophisticated than appointees. It rather suggests that they 
approach their work with a level of savvy which may be underestimated. 
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  The evidence thus indicates that the sophistication of civil servants may be 
underappreciated, while careerists enjoy a level of knowledge and trust with the press that their 
appointee counterparts severely lack – suggesting that civil servants may be more effective than 
the president’s own appointees in advancing administration goals in the press.   
 
Summary of Results: Loyalty 
  The results indicate a roughly similar number of acts of disloyalty conducted by 
appointees and by civil servants. 
  Unlike the appointees, when civil servants disagreed with the administration they served, 
a small number (one of the seven civil servants interviewed) indicated a willingness to share 
points of policy disagreement with the press. Perhaps more remarkable, however, is the large 
number of civil servants who insisted that it was not their place to do so – even when they 
witnessed what they believed to be large-scale waste of taxpayer dollars, believed the 
administration was making unsupportable claims for partisan advantage, or saw warning signs of 
an impending global financial meltdown! Furthermore, as previously discussed, my sample 
likely over-represents individuals who are inclined to leak, since more cautious public affairs 
officials likely would have declined my request for interview. 
  However, it is clear that appointees leaked, as well. While the appointees who I 
interviewed claimed never to have leaked, I had reason to question the claims of one Bush 
appointee and one Obama appointee. Coincidentally, two sources independently volunteered to 
me, without provocation, in discussions in which I had not mentioned the individuals in question, 
that they suspected these two appointees of leaking, as well. In addition, the government officials 
were not themselves aware of a single instance in which a civil servant had leaked information to 
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the press. However, they were aware of numerous instances in which appointees had been 
identified as the sources of leaks. 
   These claims are seemingly contradicted by the accounts of reporters. Four reporters who 
received leaks indicated that civil servants “leak” more, while two indicated that appointees and 
civil servants leak with roughly the same frequency. However, upon closer examination, the 
majority of instances of purported leaks by civil servants appeared to be somewhat innocuous. 
First, such instances were very rare. Second, in such instances, civil servants were almost 
always, in the course of conversations that were already occurring, simply more willing to 
acknowledge the fact that reasonable individuals might have a point of view other than that of 
the administration (a state of affairs which cannot have been shocking to reporters). Of course, 
the greater ideological and political agreement among the president and appointees appears to 
have caused appointees to argue the administration’s position more narrowly and forcefully 
However, the evidence of the “appointee discount” discussed in chapter 4 suggests that this 
behavior on the part of civil servants might have earned them credibility in the eyes of the press 
which ultimately allowed them to serve as stronger spokespeople – even though their superiors 
would have been unlikely to approve such a strategy and the president would be likely to view 
their acts as ones of insubordination. 
  This project ultimately identified no evidence of major insubordination by appointees nor 
by civil servants. I saw the actions of leaks by both groups unearthed in this project as certainly, 
at least at times, unhelpful to the president, but not posing significant threats to the 
administrations they served. Based upon the knowledge of government officials, appointees leak 
more, but based upon the feedback of reporters, civil servants leak more. Based upon the claims 
of government officials regarding their own behavior, civil servants leak more, however I had 
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reason to question the veracity of two claims by appointees that they never leaked. While the 
responses of reporters should be more reliable since they unquestionably know the true identities 
of leakers, and therefore it is possible that civil servants leak more, this cannot be concluded 
from the relatively small difference in the responses of reporters (one of whom reported that 
neither group leaked, four of whom reported that civil servants leaked more, and two of whom 
reported that they leaked with the same frequency. Indeed, reporter 4, who was among the group 
who believed that civil servants leaked more, was clear that he was not entirely sure; if he had 
concluded that appointees leaked with the same frequency, the results would have been evenly 
split. Though, to be sure, it is also revealing that none of the reporters believed that appointees 
leaked more.) I therefore concluded that both groups leaked with roughly the same degree of 
frequency, though it does remain possible that civil servants leak more.  
  Obviously this estimate is approximate based upon the results; it would be nearly 
impossible to precisely quantify the occurrence of such events given the interests leakers by 
nature will have in shielding their identities and the interests of reporters in protecting their 
sources. However, these findings do provide significantly more specific insight than the largely 
anecdotal descriptions of leaking otherwise available in the academic literature, and it appears 
from these findings that any differences that may exist in the frequency of leaking between the 
two groups are relatively marginal. As hypothesized, civil servants appear to be no less loyal to 
the presidents they serve than their appointee counterparts. 
  Of course, the causal factors examined suggested that, in areas other than leaking, 
appointees were particularly loyal to the president; additionally, the study of the permanent 
campaign found that appointees are much more protective of information that could be 
potentially damaging to the president. This may help explain why presidents hire appointees in 
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the first place. However, the evidence examined in the previous chapter suggests that this 
zealousness may actually be detrimental to appointees in public affairs positions, by weakening 
their credibility with the press. 
 
Summary of Results: The Permanent Campaign 
  In keeping with my hypothesis that the massive workloads of appointees leave them 
lacking the time to engage in a permanent campaign, the appointees were clear that the large 
volume of incoming requests they received from reporters prevented them from engaging in 
more proactive tactics. Nevertheless, appointees still spent the majority of their time engaging in 
proactive tactics. Interestingly, appointees still spent much more time pitching stories to reporters 
than civil servants and only two percent less of their time than civil servants crafting proactive 
strategies (a number of hours that may still have been greater than that of civil servants, since 
appointees work longer hours).  
  The appointees were also clearly motivated by the end goal of the permanent campaign, 
which is to build public support for the president. However, when both government officials and 
the reporters with whom they frequently interacted described the tactics that the officials 
employed, none were particularly sophisticated or diabolical, and none of the descriptions 
suggested that they were utilizing the tools of the permanent campaign. Unexpectedly, civil 
servants were much more likely than appointees to engage in two classic tactics of the permanent 
campaign as described by Blumenthal and Heclo: appealing to the emotions, as opposed to the 
reason, of the American people, and utilizing public opinion polls. However, neither group 
utilized these tools in order to build support for the president, thus disqualifying them as 
examples of the permanent campaign. The descriptions of both groups regarding how they craft 
320 
 
narratives likewise did not provide significant evidence of a permanent campaign. 
  However, this project did uncover potentially very disturbing evidence of the withholding 
of information. Some appointees did not appear to believe that the public had the right to any 
information which would not reflect favorably on the president. This evidence is troubling; 
perhaps most surprising about it is the fact that reporters do not find the state of affairs to be all 
that surprising or alarming.  
  Of course, McClellan was clear that deception (measured in this study by withholding 
and lying) has always been present in Washington; what was new, for him, was that the level of 
deception had reached unprecedented levels. It is outside the scope of this study to determine 
whether the Bush and Obama appointees withheld more information than their Treasury 
predecessors under previous administrations. This project therefore registers the views of the 
appointees as a potentially very significant threat to democracy, but cannot conclude that it is 
evidence of a permanent campaign.  
  This project also uncovered limited evidence of lying by appointees; this practice was 
denied by every government official but alleged by a majority of reporters. Appointees in both 
administrations believed that their counterparts were guilty of lying, though it is not clear that 
this necessarily occurred outside of the White Houses of both administrations. Given the 
evidence examined in chapter 2 of lying by previous administrations, it appears unlikely that the 
“shading” uncovered in this project exceeds that of previous administrations, although this 
cannot be determined definitively under the scope of this project. It is nevertheless clear that 
appointees withhold and distort information, and that they do so to a much greater degree than 
civil servants – suggesting that civil servants better serve the interests of the American people in 
Treasury public affairs roles.   
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  Finally, this project considered the allegations of reporters that the Obama appointees 
withheld information to a greater degree than the Bush appointees. It appears likely that some of 
these charges by reporters are self-serving; some may point to differences in the skill sets of the 
two groups. The explanation I find most probable is that the Obama appointees approach their 
work with a particular caution because they inherited a deeply unstable economy which is still in 
a fragile state of recovery. Nevertheless, this project also unearthed evidence suggesting that 
Republican press operatives may make greater efforts to influence media coverage because they 
perceive a liberal media bias and that Democratic operatives may underestimate the degree to 
which they need to spar with the press – a fascinating proposition worthy of future research.   
 
Accuracy and Validity of the Results 
  I will next address the accuracy and validity of my results, by considering the reliability 
of the responses of my interview subjects and the representativeness of my sample of Treasury 
appointees, civil servants, and reporters. The following section will consider how accurately the 
officials who were studied might represent appointees and civil servants in other federal 
positions. 
 
Reliability of the Responses of Interview Subjects 
  The results of my interviews left me confident in the general accuracy and validity of my 
results. As discussed in chapter 3, I felt a comfortable rapport with twenty-three of my twenty-
four interview subjects. With the exception of Bush Appointee 5, my interview subjects all 
seemed to take my project seriously and to genuinely want to provide thoughtful and accurate 
responses. They appeared to think deeply about my questions, and provided nuanced, detailed, 
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and insightful answers.  
  In part, their openness was clearly fostered by the fact that I pledged to keep their 
identities confidential. I considered many of the responses of the government officials (from the 
admission by one civil servant that he leaked information to the press to the candid responses of 
appointees regarding the sometimes strong-arm tactics in which they engaged or lack of 
influence they felt they enjoyed) to not necessarily reflect glowingly on the individuals 
describing them. I considered this to evince the willingness of my interview subjects to, at least 
often, be honest about their performance.  
  As indicated in chapter 3, because I worked with so many of the Obama appointees 
(which consisted of working in a shared office and attending daily meetings in which my fellow 
spokespeople summarized their work), the Obama appointees likely realized that it would have 
been particularly hard for them to make false assertions, because I was already broadly familiar 
with their work. Of course, this safeguard was somewhat diminished for the Bush appointees. 
However, the Bush appointees can only have been aware that I had an understanding of the 
general workings of the Treasury department, and was also, of course, acquainted with numerous 
civil servants who served under both administrations who I could have contacted with questions 
if I doubted their claims (with the exception of Bush Appointee 5, however, I had no such 
doubts). Of course, these circumstances would certainly not have made it impossible for either 
group to make false claims – it would have only made it harder. Nevertheless, my personal 
circumstances likely improved the accuracy of my results, and gave me a significant advantage 
in conducting this research. 
  The Bush appointees may also have had greater reason to be cautious in our interviews, 
since they were all aware of my identity as a previous Democratic appointee and would not have 
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wanted to share information that could be used in a partisan attack. However, I felt that such 
concerns on the part of the Bush appointees were likely partly assuaged by the fact that I was 
introduced to most of the Bush appointees through President Bush’s former speechwriter, who is 
a personal friend.   
  To be sure, as discussed in chapter 2, individuals can generally be expected to attempt to 
present themselves favorably in social situations (of course, the exception, in my experience, was 
the remarkably gauche behavior of Bush Appointee 5). I consider many of the Obama appointees 
who I interviewed to be personal friends, and all of the appointees and reporters whom I 
interviewed were likely keenly aware that we moved in the same social and professional circles. 
I conducted my interviews during the November-December holiday season, and one Bush 
appointee whom I interviewed greeted me by saying that my project was the talk of all of the 
holiday receptions he was attending. This therefore might have given the appointees whom I 
interviewed, in particular, reason not to share information which they felt would reflect 
abominably upon themselves, because they had reason to anticipate that they would encounter 
me in future professional and/or social situations. 
  I would also be remiss not to note that, in my interviews, so many of the appointees 
expressed a comfort with withholding information from reporters, raising the possibility that they 
also withheld information from me. An official who engaged in particularly egregious behavior 
would certainly have no incentive to share such information with me. While I attempted to 
corroborate the responses of the government officials by also querying the officials about the 
behavior of their colleagues, as well as by interviewing reporters, it nevertheless remains 
possible that the officials engaged in practices which I was unable to identify. However, I judge 
this possibility to have been unlikely to have significantly impacted my results. For example, if 
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an appointee had lied to me about public opinion polling, it is almost certain that other Treasury 
appointees would have been aware that polling had been conducted by their office. I consider it 
wildly unlikely that all of the appointees would have lied to me about such behavior, especially 
since they did not know the identities of my other research subjects, nor the questions I would 
ask in advance, making it practically impossible for them to have coordinated their responses. It 
is, of course, still possible that there might be a general unspoken understanding to the effect that 
certain conduct would never be acknowledged.  
 I consider the queries to which my interview subjects would have had most reason to give 
me dishonest answers in order to protect themselves to be the questions of whether they ever lied 
to a reporter or leaked information. Of course, if they had lied to a reporter and not been exposed 
and chose not to share the information with me in our interview, I would have no way of 
detecting it. However, I consider it likely that if an official had lied to a reporter, this fact would 
eventually have been exposed, if not in the course of this project than by one of the many other 
interested parties that would have an incentive to do so, such as reporters or members of the 
opposition party (a view shared by so many of my interview subjects). Furthermore, even if the 
officials lied to me about whether they had personally leaked, I should nevertheless have been 
able to accurately measure the overall degree to which appointees and civil servants leaked in the 
responses I obtained from reporters.  
  The questions of whether officials withheld information, how they handled damaging 
information, and whether they were motivated by partisan goals were also particularly sensitive. 
However, the appointees were transparent that they in fact regularly withheld information 
(including damaging information) and were in fact driven by partisan aims, leaving me reason to 
conclude that they were honest in their responses. All of the other questions I asked were by 
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comparison innocuous; the fact that my interview subjects appeared to be honest about these 
more sensitive questions left me with a high degree of confidence that they would have been 
truthful in their other responses. 
 While the reporters whom I interviewed discussed the behavior of other individuals, and 
therefore were not likely to have been concerned to protect their own reputations, it is possible 
that they would have been inclined to dampen their criticism of appointees in order to avoid 
offending me, since I previously served as an appointee. For example, in the course of our 
conversations, reporters sometimes used phrases such as “you guys” to refer to appointees, and 
one reporter told me he hoped I would not be offended by his comments. However, I did not 
believe significant sugarcoating actually occurred, because reporters were generally so critical of 
appointees, and of the Obama appointees in particular, in our interviews. 
  Of course, the exception to my confidence in the overall veracity of the responses of my 
interview subjects was Bush Appointee 5, whom I did not feel answered my questions in good 
faith. However, I accounted for this judgment when drawing my overall conclusions. In general, 
however, there is reason to feel confident in the accuracy of my results. 
Representativeness of the Sample 
  Because I interviewed a large percentage of the officials who work or worked in public 
affairs for the Treasury under the Bush and Obama administrations, as well as a large percentage 
of the reporters for the most elite media outlets who regularly interact with Treasury public 
affairs officials, I have a very high degree of confidence that my results are representative of 
Treasury public affairs staff.  
  For example, as previously indicated, there are currently seven appointees serving as 
Treasury spokespeople (though of course, as previously discussed, there is a significant degree of 
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turnover in such positions). I interviewed five such appointees from the Obama administration 
and five appointees from the Bush administration, all of whom were also asked to address the 
behavior of their public affairs colleagues. Likewise, the Treasury website lists ten bureaus. I 
interviewed civil servants who worked in seven different offices, all of whom were likewise 
asked to address the behavior of their public affairs colleagues.  
  Furthermore, there are only a handful of elite national newspapers and wire services in 
the United States. I interviewed seven reporters, representing seven different media 
organizations, who covered the Treasury for such outlets. This of course excluded broadcast 
reporters and bloggers, with whom Treasury public affairs officials also work, but should 
nevertheless provide a reliable sample of the impressions of the press. This was confirmed by the 
fact that the descriptions by reporters of the two most important findings regarding the relative 
efficacy of appointees – the “appointee discount” and the lack of access they felt they enjoyed 
under the Obama administration – were strikingly similar. (Of course, reporters differed in their 
responses on other measures, such as which group leaks more frequently, but I consider it 
credible that officials had different patterns of leaking to different media organizations. The fact 
that the media outlets popularly perceived as most liberal and most conservative reported the 
most frequent and dramatic occurrences of leaking is eminently logical). 
  As previously discussed, I approached all but one of the civil servants without prior 
acquaintance with or introductions to them, and many civil servants declined my request for 
interview. I therefore considered my sample of civil servants to represent those who were 
perhaps most open about their work. This likely skewed my results to over-represent the 
presence of leaking within the civil service. It may also have impacted my findings on the 
withholding of information, by over-representing the civil servants least likely to withhold. 
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  Finally, Reporter 3 reported that he had more limited interactions with civil servants than 
the other reporters, likely making his impressions of civil servants as a group somewhat less 
precise. Additionally, Reporter 6 interacted less frequently with the Treasury officials than the 
other reporters, but I nevertheless considered his perspective to be important because of the 
publication for which he worked. 
Representativeness of the Results and Suggestions for Future Research 
  I have established that my results appear to well represent the practices of Treasury 
public affairs officials. How likely is it that the results are representative of appointees and civil 
servants who work in other government positions and other government agencies?  
  Of course, it is only possible to speculate on this matter. For example, future research 
should examine whether the “appointee discount” identified in this study applies to appointees in 
other positions, as well. It is logical to project that this problem might particularly bedevil 
appointees in externally-facing positions, where a key aim is to build outside support – such as 
cabinet heads and other senior officials, as well as appointees in offices of legislative affairs, 
public affairs, and public liaison. The beliefs of these appointees’ interlocutors regarding their 
partisan motivations might actually enhance the ability of such appointees to advance the 
president’s goals with like-minded politicians and organizations, while especially hampering 
their negotiations with entities which do not support the president. On the other hand, if other 
actors who share the partisan goals of the administration nevertheless view appointees as 
motivated by the goal of advancing the chief executive at the expense of all other values, this 
could hamper their ability to work with all other actors, regardless of political affinity. In this 
study, for example, reporters were universally found to apply the “appointee discount” under 
both the Obama and Bush administrations, regardless of the perceptions of their media outlets as 
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liberal or conservative. However, this may simply reflect the fact that reporters for mainstream 
newspapers and news wires do not approach their sources with liberal or conservative biases. 
  The findings of this study regarding the loyalty of civil servants generally confirmed the 
results of numerous other researchers that civil service insubordination is isolated and rare, but 
nevertheless real. This suggests that the results of this study regarding civil servants are likely 
applicable in other agencies and positions, as well. If anything, we should expect the results on 
the loyalty of civil servants to overstate the amount of careerist disloyalty in the government-at-
large, because the time period studied included the Great Recession of 2008, and interview 
subjects were clear that this upheaval provoked a larger-than-normal amount of leaking by both 
civil servants and appointees (although, as discussed in chapter 1, other researchers have also 
measured the loyalty of civil servants in circumstances that would have been expected to 
provoke especially high levels of civil service insubordination). However, as discussed in chapter 
3, the Treasury bureaus are, under more pacific circumstances, not typically the site of the kind 
of the partisan disagreement that has occurred in the EPA and social service agencies, where 
Democratic and Republican administrations tend to pursue dramatically different, and often 
controversial, goals. 
  Previous studies of the loyalty of civil servants have focused on whether civil servants 
faithfully implement the administration’s policies. My research addresses this question by 
ascertaining whether civil servants and political appointees in public affairs positions faithfully 
communicate the administration’s positions even when they disagree with them. However, it also 
utilizes an additional measure of loyalty (leaking) because previous anecdotal evidence 
suggested that this might be an area in which appointees are less loyal to the president than civil 
servants.     
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  Unfortunately, few researchers have ever attempted to measure the loyalty of appointees, 
leaving us without a baseline with which to compare the results of this study. The information 
we have about leaking by appointees is largely anecdotal. Clearly, further research is called for 
in this area. However, unlike the results of this study on the relative efficacy of public affairs 
officers, the results on loyalty are certainly applicable to the entire Treasury (not just officials 
who work in public affairs), since my interview questions probed government officials on the 
practice of leaking anywhere within their organization, and queried reporters on the practice of 
leaking by any appointees or civil servants in federal economic agencies. This makes it more 
likely that the results would be reflective of other government agencies, as well. While 
appointees will likely always have incentives to leak damaging information in order to weaken 
rival staffers and/or grant favors to members of the press upon which they can later capitalize, 
the Great Recession likely gave the appointees studied in this project greater-than-normal 
incentives to leak in order to float trial balloons or advance their policy proposals internally 
within the administration. This project likely therefore overrepresented the typical amount of 
leaking we should expect by appointees (however, it also overrepresented the typical amount of 
leaking we should expect by civil servants for the same reason, which should therefore not have 
affected the ultimate conclusion that both groups do a roughly similar amount of leaking). 
  The findings of this study that a permanent campaign is not largely being conducted in 
the Treasury are likely, but not certainly, representative of other government agencies, as well. 
This is because, as discussed in chapter 3, if a permanent campaign were to be conducted in any 
government agency, the Treasury appears to be the most likely place to find it being waged, 
given the importance of the economy to the president’s political fortunes and public approval 
ratings. This was especially the case during the time period studied, as the legacies of Presidents 
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Bush and Obama both depended heavily on their responses to the 2008 financial crisis. The 
Treasury was also responsible for advocating signature initiatives of both presidents. President 
Bush’s tax reform, attempted Social Security reform, and landmark efforts to track the finances 
of terrorists after the attacks of September 11, 2001, all fell under the purview of the Treasury. 
Likewise, the Treasury is also responsible for President Obama’s signature reform of the 
financial industry in an effort to prevent a future financial crisis, under the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. While Treasury therefore provides a particularly 
tough case of the presence of a permanent campaign, this finding should nevertheless be 
corroborated by studies of other agencies. Because President Obama’s legacy is also perceived to 
be tied up in the success of his signature initiative, the Affordable Care Act, and because the Act 
has been the site of protracted and especially rancorous partisan disagreement and allegations of 
White House deception, the Department of Health and Human Services would also provide a 
particularly difficult test of the broader applicability of this finding.  
  There is reason, however, to both expect and hope that the practice of withholding 
information by appointees discovered in this project might be particularly severe at the Treasury. 
As explained in the previous chapter, the market-moving nature of much of the information 
possessed by the Treasury is truly anomalous among government agencies. Likewise, as 
explained in chapter 3, the economy is particularly critical to a president’s public approval 
ratings and re-election prospects, which likely makes appointees particularly cautious about the 
release of economic information. The caution that can only have been engendered amidst the 
2008 financial collapse and a still shaky and uneven recovery likely made Treasury public affairs 
officers particularly cautious regarding the release of information in the time period 
encompassed by this study.  Nevertheless, the cavalier manner in which some appointees 
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responded that they only released information which was advantageous was striking and clearly 
calls for future research. This future research should probe more deeply into exactly how much 
information public affairs officers withhold, and under what circumstances. It should also study a 
wider body of government agencies. 
  Of course, because I studied public affairs officers, this study cannot account for the 
possibility that other officials in the Treasury are conducting a permanent campaign. For 
example, appointees in policy positions might be tailoring their programs to public opinion as 
reported in the media. They might also be timing their decisions around the electoral cycle, for 
example, by announcing popular policies and decisions in the lead-up to elections and saving 
unpopular decisions for after re-election campaigns. 
  Finally, my research unexpectedly uncovered another fascinating hypothesis, worthy of 
future research. Several of the Bush appointees and reporters whom I interviewed indicated that 
Republican political operatives work harder than Democrats to attempt to influence press 
coverage, because they perceive themselves to start out with a disadvantage because of a liberal 
media bias. Additionally, the results indicated that reporters were overall more satisfied with the 
level of access they enjoyed under the Bush administration than under the Obama administration. 
As previously discussed, this correlation does not necessarily prove causation; there are 
numerous other potential explanations, including differences in the skill sets of spokespeople and 
the vastly different economic circumstances during the majority of the time under which both 
administrations served. Nevertheless, this finding calls for future research into whether 
Republican operatives approach the press differently and whether, as some of my interview 
subjects suggested, this, ironically, helps them achieve better media relationships and better press 
coverage. 
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Key Contributions to the Literature  
 My results make several important contributions to the literature. First, the findings on 
the “appointee discount” add a new factor to be considered in future studies of political 
appointees. As discussed in chapter 1, previous studies have contended that, to the degree that 
appointees are ineffective, the explanation lies in their less-detailed policy knowledge and 
shorter tenures. The findings of this study confirmed the relevance of these factors. However, I 
also identified a new phenomenon that may further diminish the efficacy of appointees: the 
“appointee discount.”  
  Reporters were clear that they viewed political appointees as less credible actors simply 
by virtue of their positions. They assumed that appointees were motivated by the near single-
minded goal of advancing the president’s partisan interests, while civil servants were motivated 
by other goals, such as serving their country. As a result, they heavily discounted the claims of 
appointees. When an appointee made an assertion, reporters worked especially hard to consider 
possible alternative points of view. Two reporters indicated that the tenor of their skepticism 
towards appointees changed over time, suggesting that appointees have some influence over the 
degree of handicap this discount causes them. However, it was also clear that reporters 
approached all appointees, simply by virtue of their positions, with heightened suspicion. This 
can only have served to significantly inhibit the ability of appointees to act as effective advocates 
for the president. 
  Because the raison d’etre of public affairs officials is to communicate the 
administration’s messages, the “appointee discount” can only cripple the ability of appointees in 
such positions to do their jobs effectively. This points to a need for researchers examining the 
efficacy of government officials to pay closer attention to ideational factors, such as how the 
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motivations of appointees are perceived by others, and how this impacts their efficacy. For 
example, as discussed in chapter 1, the major piece of recent evidence regarding the relative 
effectiveness of appointees and civil servants was conducted by Lewis, and measured how the 
programs each group runs were internally evaluated (2008). One possibility for the lower scores 
of programs run by appointees, which was not considered by Lewis, is that the existence of such 
an “appointee discount” could have made it harder for appointees to build the support from 
external actors necessary to the success of many government programs. Additionally, Lewis’ 
work cannot account for the fact that appointees in positions that do not strictly involve policy 
management – such as cabinet heads and other senior officials, and appointees in offices of 
legislative affairs, public affairs, and public liaison – may be especially hampered in their 
efficacy by the ways in which their motivations are perceived by external actors whose 
cooperation is often essential to their work.   
  Second, this study casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that political appointees are 
more loyal advocates for the president than career civil servants. An enormous problem with past 
studies of the loyalty of civil servants is that scholars have generally not also simultaneously 
measured the loyalty of appointees, in order to consider acts of careerist insubordination in 
perspective. This study corroborated the findings of many previous scholars that a small number 
of civil servants will engage in acts of disloyalty. However, the significance of this result, and its 
implications for presidential staffing, can only be understood when the behavior of civil servants 
is studied in comparison with that of their appointee counterparts. Previous scholars have simply 
assumed that appointees will be loyal to the presidents they serve. This study finds that such 
assumptions are mistaken. In fact, in the case of Treasury officials, both groups of officials 
appear to engage in a roughly similar number of acts of leaking information which does not serve 
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the president’s interests to the press. 
  As a result, this study calls into question the contention advanced by Lewis (2008), which 
has by now essentially attained the status of conventional wisdom, that presidents face a 
“loyalty-competence trade-off” in deciding whether to place civil servants or appointees in 
particular positions. No such trade-off can exist if civil servants are no less loyal to the president 
and more effective than their appointee counterparts – a possibility not afforded significant 
consideration by scholars who have not sufficiently tested the first part of this proposition.  
  This study also evinces the major limitations of past research which has attempted to 
ascertain whether civil servants are loyal by studying external indicators of agency actions. The 
results obtained in this study – including admissions by appointees and civil servants of behavior 
which arguably reflected rather poorly on themselves and their colleagues, such as leaking and 
withholding any information requested by the press which does not reflect well on the president 
– are by design shielded from public view and could only be learned through the establishment 
of trust and detailed conversations. Meanwhile, as argued by Cook in chapter 1, myriad factors 
influence the eventual output of government agencies beyond the simple loyalty of their 
careerists. To understand whether officials are loyal to the president requires isolating their 
specific actions in situations in which they disagree with the president – and thus cannot be 
accomplished without interacting with the subjects under study. 
  The methodology employed in this study of using outside actors – in this case, reporters – 
to corroborate and enhance the reports of government officials, is likewise unusual in the 
literature. However, the feedback of the government officials’ interlocutors in the press was 
critical to identifying the “appointee discount” and the other opportunities the officials missed to 
advance the administration’s positions in the press. This study could not have begun to 
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accurately measure the claims of the government officials about their behavior without 
understanding the impact of their actions on their end recipients (in this case, reporters). 
  This project also contributed to the literature by studying specific positions in order to 
determine whether appointees or civil servants best serve the interests of the president and the 
American people in them. As discussed in the Introduction, there is a remarkable lacuna of 
evidence-based research to guide presidents in their staffing decisions. If future research were to 
replicate this approach, political scientists could begin to develop a body of work that would 
provide guideposts to administrations on the types of positions in which appointees serve best 
and the types of roles in which civil servants serve best.  
  In particular, my work began to build a much-needed literature on appointees in Schedule 
C positions. As discussed in the Introduction, there is such a dearth of knowledge regarding the 
individuals who serve in such positions that they have been dubbed by two of the pre-eminent 
scholars of political appointees as the “invisible presidential appointments.” (Lewis and 
Waterman 2013). However, it is precisely these lower-level appointments which are most 
interchangeable with civil service positions. By studying appointees in other Schedule C 
positions in comparison with civil servants, scholars can begin to achieve a clearer picture of 
what staffing arrangements work best across the government.   
    Third, and equally significantly, this study began to measure, for the first time, whether a 
permanent campaign is being conducted in government agencies. The findings suggest that the 
Treasury’s public affairs officers are not, in fact, conducting a permanent campaign (although, as 
previously discussed, it remains possible that other Treasury officials are doing so by making 
policy decisions based upon what they know to be popular). Unexpectedly, the sophisticated 
tools of political campaigns that critics have charged appointees with improperly employing in 
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government were actually utilized not by appointees, but rather by civil servants, in the pursuit of 
decidedly non-partisan aims. The one tactic of the permanent campaign that was clearly 
employed to a significant degree by appointees – but not civil servants – was the withholding of 
the information from the press. Some appointees appeared to believe that they had the right to 
withhold any information that was potentially damaging to the president. While it is unclear 
whether such withholding has increased over time, now that it has been identified as the key 
permanent campaign tactic being employed by appointees, further research is in order, to 
understand how the practice of withholding is conducted more specifically, and across other 
government agencies. Finally, while this project uncovered some evidence that some appointees 
would tell untruths to make the president look good, such behavior appeared to have been much 
more limited, and it was not at all clear that it was conducted outside of the White House. 
 Finally, this study began to develop deeper knowledge of the practices of government 
agency public affairs officers, who had not been studied in detail since the pre-digital era. While 
the Treasury public affairs officers were not found to engage in particularly sophisticated or 
Machiavellian techniques, some were evinced to believe that they do not have an obligation to 
share information with the American people unless it serves their interests. This finding was 
shocking, and indeed begs for further research. The possibility identified in this project that 
Republican operatives work harder to achieve positive media coverage, while Democratic 
operatives underestimate the degree to which they need to engage in sometimes antagonistic 
exchanges with the press also presents a tantalizing proposition for future researchers. If true, 
such a finding could help to explain the widely discussed puzzle of why President Obama was a 
superior communicator as a candidate but, in office, his administration has failed to 
communicate effectively with the American people. It would also be a particularly interesting 
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finding to practitioners, because it would begin to identify a source of possibly significant 
partisan advantage. 
Recommendations for the President 
  My results suggest that efforts by modern presidents to improve their efficacy by hiring 
more political appointees have been counterproductive. The findings suggest that the president 
would be wise to reduce his reliance on appointees in the roles of Treasury spokespeople, given 
the fact that civil servants overall serve as more effective and no less loyal administration 
advocates in such positions. Of course, some of the policy portfolios for which Treasury 
spokespeople are responsible include policies which are the site of major partisan disagreement 
(such as tax and economic policy). In such positions, it would not be appropriate to utilize a civil 
servant. However, as discussed in chapter 5, many of the Treasury portfolios, including TARP, 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and International Affairs, encompass policies which 
change little over the course of different administrations.  
  Utilizing civil servants in such roles would allow these spokespeople to develop the 
detailed expertise in their subject areas, which would help them to better explain policies to 
reporters. This would likely at least partially address the major complaint of reporters that they 
feel that they are in the dark on administration thinking and the technical operations of Treasury 
programs. The ability of civil servants to make more detailed and nuanced arguments on behalf 
of such policies would likewise engender greater support for them. Civil servants would also 
enjoy better credibility with reporters, paradoxically allowing them to better advance the 
president’s arguments in the press. To be sure, civil servants in such positions would continue to 
report to Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Public Affairs – who would continue to provide 
political oversight and input into their work, even though the appearance of it would be reduced.  
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  Of course, civil servants tend not to work the same particularly long hours as appointees, 
suggesting that using civil servants in such positions might slightly raise personnel costs. On the 
other hand, civil servants may be able to work more quickly than their appointee counterparts if 
they develop the detailed policy knowledge that allows them to respond more rapidly to 
reporters, as Bush Appointee 4 described in chapter 4. Additionally, such public affairs officers 
would likely not be too tired to think or argue back – providing an additional effectiveness boost. 
  The results also suggest that the administration should also look at public affairs posts in 
other government agencies, to likewise replace Schedule C appointees with civil servants in 
positions responsible for advocating policies that are not the nexus of major partisan 
disagreement.  
  Presidents would likely also win plaudits from good government groups for initiating 
such changes – including the legions of groups and scholars who have called for reducing 
appointees over the past several decades.  Such changes would almost certainly be seen as a win 
for the American people, perhaps beginning to restore the record low levels of faith in our 
government which would likely further boost support for the president. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study found evidence suggesting that modern presidents have been misguided in 
their decisions to hire increased political appointees. Paradoxically, much-maligned civil 
servants were found to better promote the economic agendas of Presidents Bush and Obama in 
the press than their own political appointees. On the other hand, Treasury political appointees 
were not discovered to largely be engaged in the “permanent campaign,” which their White 
House counterparts have been charged with conducting. Appointees were, however, found to 
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withhold significantly more information from the press than their civil service counterparts, 
suggesting that the interests of the American people are also less well-served by appointee 
spokespeople. The evidence of the “appointee discount” and the roughly similar levels of loyalty 
exhibited by appointees and civil servants should cause presidential administrations to re-think 
the conventional wisdom that political appointees best advance the president’s agenda. The 
results of this study suggest that both the American people and presidents of the United States 
would be better served by such an outcome. 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
A. Interview Questions for Political Appointees and Civil Servants 
My first set of questions is designed to help me understand the differences between political 
appointees and civil servants who work in government public affairs positions. 
 
1. How long have you been in your current position? 
2. I’m interested in your background, but please keep in mind that these questions are only 
designed to help me draw comparisons between my interview subjects, and I will not include any 
information that could be used to identify you in my publication. How many years of experience 
did you have before you started your current job? What did you do in the past? 
3. Where did you go to school and what did you study?  
4. What is your subject matter portfolio in your current job?  
5. Is your overall workload reasonable?  
6. How did you learn the subject matter of your portfolio, and was it easy or hard? At what point 
did you begin to feel comfortable with your subject matter portfolio? 
7. How well would you say you know the policy substance of the portfolio you cover now: very 
well, pretty well, or it is easy to feel a little behind the curve here?  
8. I know that you arrange media interviews for your principal(s). If you were to do the 
interviews yourself, how well do you think you’d do?   
341 
 
9. Many of the reporters who cover economic issues have been doing so for a long time. Do you 
think that gives them an advantage over you? How do you handle it? 
10. Is it important for you to coordinate with other government spokespeople? How much time 
do you spend doing so? 
11. How well do you get along with the reporters you work with? Do things ever become heated? 
If so, how often? How do you handle such situations? 
12. When a reporter sends you a question, how long does it typically take you to respond? 
13. How satisfied are you with the access you have to the principals for whom you work? How 
does your level of access affect your work?  
14.  Who do you think is more effective in conveying the administration’s messages in the press: 
civil servants or political appointees? Why? 
15. How much influence do you think you have in shaping the topics covered by the reporters 
who you try to influence?  
16. How much influence do you think you have in shaping the tone and content of stories you try 
to influence? 
I would imagine that sometimes people who work in your position would be asked to advocate a 
position with which they didn’t personally agree. My next set of questions is designed to help me 
understand whether that happened to you and if so how you coped with it. Please keep in mind 
that I will not publish any details you might share that could be used to identify you.  
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1. What do you think someone in your position should do if asked to advocate a position with 
which he or she personally disagrees? 
2. Does/did this ever happen to you? If so, how often and how did you react? Would you be 
comfortable giving me an example? 
3. One of the things I’m interested in is leaks. I think of leaks as information given without 
attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the administration – as opposed to 
plants, which further the interests of the administration. In your experience, do leaks happen 
often? Who does the leaking that does happen? Do you think appointees or civil servants leak 
more frequently? Why? 
4. Have you even been tempted to leak information to the press? Can you tell me a little about 
the circumstances? 
5. I’d like to talk a bit about the political views of the people who work in your public affairs 
office. Do you think they have an impact on the work they do? How about for you personally?  
6. [Asked to political appointees only:] Would you consider doing this job under an 
administration of a different political party? Why or why not? 
My final set of questions is designed to help me understand the strategies you use in 
communicating with the American people about the economy. 
1. How would you describe the ultimate goals of your work? What are you trying to achieve each 
day? 
2. In doing your job, to what degree is your end goal to build public support for the president? 
What steps do you take to achieve it? 
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3. I’m interested in the ways you try to influence media coverage. Can you tell me about the 
more sophisticated techniques you use to shape what reporters cover? 
4. Do you ever try to appeal to the emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in 
the messages you craft?  
5. Do you ever use public opinion polls in your work? If yes, how do you use them and how 
often do you use them? If no, why not? 
6. What percent of your time would you estimate you spend doing each of these three things: 
responding to questions from reporters, pitching them stories, and crafting and implementing 
strategies to attain desired coverage? 
7. Do you believe it’s ever appropriate for someone in your position to withhold information 
requested by the press or to shade the truth?  What would the circumstances be? Does this 
happen often or rarely in your work? 
8. Let’s say someone else had your position and he or she wanted to tell untruths to make the 
president look good. Would it be possible for him or her to do so? Have you or your colleagues 
ever attempted to do so, and if so, were the attempts successful?  
9. Every administration tries to avoid negative press coverage. How does your office determine 
how to handle information that is potentially damaging or embarrassing?  
10. I’m interested in the mix of messages you work to convey in the press. What percentage of 
the messages you seek to promulgate would you describe as ideas (like ways of viewing 
particular things) and narratives? 
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11. How do you develop and sculpt narratives to make your points? 
12. How much time do you spend focusing on the profiles and images of the officials for whom 
you work? Is it a good use of your time? 
B. Interview Questions for Reporters 
My first set of questions is designed to help me understand whether civil servants or political 
appointees are more effective advocates for the administrations they serve. 
1. How long have you been reporting on the Treasury? 
2. I’m interested in the public affairs officials at economic agencies with whom you work. What 
would you say the strengths and weaknesses are of the political appointees? What are the 
strengths and weaknesses of the civil servants? 
3. How convincing to you are the arguments the political appointees make to you? How 
convincing are the arguments of the civil servants? How do they compare? 
4. To what degree do the political appointees influence the topics on which you ultimately 
report? To what degree do the civil servants influence the topics on which you ultimately report? 
How do they compare? 
5. To what degree do the political appointees influence the tone and content of what you 
ultimately report? To what degree do the civil servants influence the tone and content of what 
you ultimately report? How do they compare? 
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6. How well do you think the political appointees know the subject matter they’re responsible 
for? How well do the civil servants know the subject matter they’re responsible for? How do 
they compare? 
7. Do political appointees or civil servants respond to you more quickly? Which group is better 
at getting you the information you need?  
8. Do you generally think you know more about the issues that federal economic agencies work 
on than the political appointees and/or the civil servants in public affairs? Is this an issue for 
you? How? 
9. Do you find yourself more skeptical regarding the information put out by public affairs 
officers who are political appointees or civil servants? Why? 
My next set of questions is designed to help me understand whether political appointees or civil 
servants are more loyal advocates for the administrations they serve. 
1. One of the things I’m interested in in this research is leaks. I think of leaks as information 
given without attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the administration – 
as opposed to plants, which further the interests of the administration. In your personal 
experience, how often do the political appointees in federal economic agencies leak information 
to you? How often do the civil servants leak? Is there a difference in the nature of the things they 
leak? 
2. What do you think the motivations of the leakers typically are? Does this differ for civil 
servants and appointees? 
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3. Has any political appointee ever indicated to you that he or she personally disagreed with the 
position he or she was required to officially advocate? How many times has this happened? Over 
how many years? How about civil servants?  
My final set of questions is designed to help me understand the techniques that public affairs 
officers use in attempting to shape media coverage. 
1. What percentage of the information you receive from political appointees would you say has 
an interpretive element, as opposed to being more directly factual? What is the corresponding 
percentage for civil servants? 
2. Do you get the sense that appointees often alter their messages in response to public opinion or 
to try to shape public opinion, and do you get the sense that civil servants do so? 
3. Have you ever become aware of practices public affairs appointees engaged in which you felt 
were inappropriate? How about civil servants? If so, which group did so more often and can you 
give some examples? 
4. What do you think are some of the savvier things federal economic agencies do to shape the 
coverage they receive in the press?  
5. What do you think it would serve the interests of the Treasury for their public affairs officers 
to do differently? 
6. What do appointees do when they’re upset with your coverage, and what do civil servants do? 
How, if at all, do their responses affect your coverage? 
 
 
347 
 
Appendix B: Bush Appointee 5 
 
  As indicated in Chapter 3, I enjoyed a warm and productive rapport with every research 
subject except Bush Appointee 5. While I felt that my other twenty-three interview subjects took 
my project seriously, attempted to consider and offer detailed, helpful answers to my questions, 
and treated me with respect, the disposition of this interview subject surprised me considerably.  
  Bush Appointee 5 insisted repeatedly that the questions I asked him were “bad,” and 
often refused either to answer them or to provide a reason for not answering them. He indicated 
that he could not understand many of my questions, including these: 
  ∙“Many of the reporters who cover economic issues have been doing so for a long time. 
Do you think that gives them an advantage over you?”   
  ∙“How do you develop and sculpt narratives to make your points?” 
  ∙“How much time did you spend focusing on the profiles and images of the officials for 
whom you worked? Was it a good use of your time?” 
  Often, he tried to pejoratively explain to me why my questions could not be answered in 
black or white terms; I replied that I would welcome a nuanced response explaining the 
circumstances under which his answer might vary; however, he would typically instead turn back 
to making his original point about why my question was dumb.  
  For many questions, such as how much influence he had over the topics covered by 
reporters or the tone and content of media coverage, he indicated that he could not remember, 
because his service in the Bush administration was so very long ago, but he did so rapidly 
without seeming to exert any effort to think. When I attempted to ask what percentage of the 
messages he sought to convey were ideas and narratives, he indicated that he could not 
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remember long before I had an opportunity to finish stating the question out loud. 
  It was also abundantly clear that Bush Appointee 5 simply did not trust me enough to 
answer my questions. For example, when I asked how he got along with reporters, he indicated 
that he did not want to answer and would not provide a reason for not answering. When I asked 
him whether his political views impacted his work, he replied “I don’t feel comfortable, I just 
decline to comment.”  
  At other times, I felt that his rapidly-fired responses were blatantly disingenuous. For 
example, when I asked him how his office determined how to handle information that was 
potentially damaging or embarrassing, he indicated that he had never been involved in such a 
situation, despite the fact that he worked for the Treasury during the height of an unprecedented 
financial crisis that threatened the entire global economy. 
  Furthermore, he snapped his responses in a tone that can only be described as downright 
hostile. I attempted to re-set by lowering the volume of my voice below the level of normal 
conversation with which I had previously spoken to Bush Appointee 5, and twice asked whether 
it would be helpful for me to stop and explain my project in greater detail and answer any 
questions he might have about it, in an effort to put him at greater ease regarding my intentions. 
However, he declined my offer. 
  I found it perplexing why, if he truly could not remember the details of his work at 
Treasury and he did not find me to be trustworthy, Bush Appointee 5 had agreed to grant me an 
interview in the first place. My best supposition is that he granted the interview under good 
intentions, but then had a terrible day. We had originally been scheduled to meet at 10:00 am, but 
he indicated that morning that he needed to re-schedule without providing an explanation. We 
ended up meeting at 5:30 pm that evening in a conference room in his office, and he was clear 
349 
 
that “I’m just trying to get out of here.” However, because he clearly conveyed that he thought so 
little of my questions, I did not think that it would have been productive for me to suggest that I 
return at a different time. Since I had already started the interview, I needed to account for his 
responses in my results, so I judged it best to make the most of the situation that I could, while 
realizing that his responses would be significantly less helpful than those of my other interview 
subjects. 
  In part, I imagine that his distrust of me stemmed from the fact that, unlike almost all of 
the other appointees, I had no previous connection to Bush Appointee 5. As previously 
explained, I had been connected with one Bush appointee through a mutual friend and former 
colleague, and this Bush appointee in turn connected me to other Bush appointees. However, I 
identified Bush Appointee 5 by researching the names of the Bush Treasury appointees online 
and reaching out to him.  
  Of course, this fact alone cannot account for his suspicion of me, since the other Bush 
appointee who I approached blindly was among the most polite and loquacious of my interview 
subjects. Additionally, I approached six of the seven civil servants whom I interviewed without 
introduction from a mutual friend or colleague, and the civil servants were unfailingly helpful 
and forthcoming.  
  However, I found the fact that the Bush appointee who connected me to most of the other 
Bush appointees did not suggest that I speak with Bush Appointee 5 to be potentially revealing. 
Perhaps he is considered by the others to reflect poorly on the administration. This supposition is 
further supported by the fact that one of the Bush appointees whom I interviewed indicated to me 
that she suspected Bush Appointee 5 (and no other Bush Treasury appointee) of leaking 
information to the press.    
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  Ultimately, I concluded that Bush Appointee 5 can only be assumed to have been having 
a terrible day because I did not think it possible that he could have achieved his impressive 
professional and educational credentials if he treated everyone with whom he came into contact 
with the insolence he exhibited in our interview. At the same time, I did consider his behavior to 
be relevant to my study of the qualifications of the government officials because it indicated that, 
at least at times, he exhibited behavior in his interactions with other professionals which I 
consider to be highly inappropriate. While he must have interpreted my interview questions as 
potentially threatening, such situations would of course have been a regular occurrence in his 
interactions with reporters at the Treasury. I therefore found his inability to comport himself 
appropriately in the situation to be truly remarkable – and to reflect terribly on the administration 
for which he served. 
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